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Institutional Responses to #MeToo Claims:
#VaticanToo, #KavanaughToo, and the
Stumbling Block of Scandal
Mary Anne Case†
INTRODUCTION
The #MeToo movement has led institutions of all sorts to take more
seriously than heretofore claims that powerful men, in time frames
ranging from decades ago to very recently, have engaged in sexual im-
position ranging from rape to crude suggestiveness. What the move-
ment has not resolved is what is to be done going forward with the men
against whom such claims are credibly asserted. The hope that they
would voluntarily and permanently step aside was, of course, overopti-
mistic. Even those men whose advanced age would suggest the possibil-
ity of a graceful step into retirement, such as TV personality Charlie
Rose, have already attempted a comeback.1 Yet, the possibility that no
avenue for redemption seems open may have led many of the accused
to make the rational calculation that anything short of categorical de-
nial would be career ending.
The calculation for the institutions involved is also difficult, as an
analogy might help illustrate. After World War II, the victorious Allies
ultimately refrained from imposing widespread de-Nazification on Ger-
many, and Germany rapidly became one of the world’s most stable con-
stitutional democracies. After invading Iraq, the United States
† Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for the
brainstorming assistance of Susan Bandes, Cathleen Kaveny, Barbara Dorris, Ramón Gutiérrez,
Josh Gutoff, Dick Helmolz, Mary Hunt, John Paul Kimes, Dan Maguire, Sara McDougall, Alan
Morrison, Virginia Saldanha, Mark Silk, Heather Stinson, Kieran Tapsell, Hedi Viterbo, Lesley
Wexler, Bill Wilhelm, Rupert Younger, and participants in the Legal Forum’s #MeToo Symposium
and the Oxford Reputation Symposium, and for the support of the Arnold and Frieda Shure Re-
search Fund.
1 Laura Bradley, Someone Is Reportedly Plotting Charlie Rose’s TV Comeback—But Who?,
VANITYFAIR (April 26, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/04/charlie-rose-tv-series
-me-too-scandal-matt-lauer-louis-ck-tina-brown [https://perma.cc/93CU-GXYW] (describing prop-
osal for a show in which Rose would interview other men caught up in #MeToo scandals and men-
tioning comeback efforts of other such men).
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promptly dissolved both the Ba’ath Party and the Iraqi Army, resulting
in continuing horrendous violence and instability.2 Among those inter-
ested in applying the tools of transitional justice in the #MeToo context,
some have suggested that the approach of truth and reconciliation, pio-
neered in Latin America but most famously applied in post-apartheid
South Africa, could be a fruitful one because it offers a path to the rein-
tegration of offenders; others have looked to the example of lustration3
in recommending a “career death penalty”4 for particularly egregious,
high-profile offenders.
This paper will center on another kind of institutional response,
actually though disastrously used by the Catholic Church in its re-
sponse over time to allegations of clerical sexual abuse, a response the
Church saw as dictated by the canon law doctrine of scandal.5 As the
Catholic Church saw it, even worse than the sexual sins committed by
its clergy would be public acknowledgement of them in such a way as to
present a stumbling block (“σκάνδαλον” or “skandalon” in Greek) to the
faith of believers. Thus, secrecy to the point of cover-up could be seen,
not as a problem, but as an imperative, a contribution to the greater
good. The hierarchy’s response to sexual abuse by clergy was for dec-
ades focused first and foremost on reputation management.
Though the specifics of the Catholic response are rooted in its canon
law and theological commitments, as this paper will show, the general
approach of above all avoiding scandal so as to preserve institutional
reputation has many diverse parallels in the #MeToo era. The paper
will briefly consider two of them. The first, closely analogous, concerns
the mobilization of halachic (Jewish law) equivalents of the doctrine of
scandal to respond to sex abuse allegations in the Haredi, or ultra-or-
thodox, Jewish community. The second, less directly analogous but also
potentially instructive, concerns the interplay of institutional reputa-
tional concerns in the procedures and the rhetoric used to deal with
2 For an overview and comparison of the processes in post-war Germany and Iraq, see gener-
ally Aysegul Keskin Zeren, From De-Nazification of Germany to De-Baathification of Iraq, 132
POL. SCI. Q. 259 (2017).
3 For a discussion of these and other transitional and restorative justice strategies as applied
in the #MeToo context, see generally Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbennolt, & Colleen Murphy,
#MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 19 U. ILL. L. REV. 47 (2019).
4 See Lesley Wexler, #MeToo: Not Decapitation, but Possibly Lustration, VERDICT (April 27,
2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/04/27/metoo-not-decapitation-possibly-lustration [https://pe
rma.cc/M5E9-3QZM].
5 Although, as this paper will show, specifics of Catholic doctrine and structure shaped much
of the response, it might be worth noting that each of the recent popes most directly confronted by
the problem had experience in his country of origin with institutional responses to those involved
in systemic institutional evil–Francis lived through the Argentine junta and its aftermath, Bene-
dict through Nazi Germany and de-Nazification, John Paul II through both the Nazi and the Soviet
Communist regimes in his native Poland.
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sexual assault allegations against Supreme Court nominee Brett Ka-
vanaugh.
Many have argued that the doctrine of scandal, inasmuch as it pri-
oritizes a concern for institutional reputation, is per se misguided and
should be abandoned in favor of a more victim-centered approach.6 This
paper will take a different tack: conceding that there is validity to the
idea behind the doctrine of scandal, to wit that the effect of allegations
of wrongdoing by those in power on the people’s faith in institutions
needs to be an important consideration in responding to those allega-
tions, it will argue that the doctrine itself needs to be reformed because
it is the conventional operation of the doctrine, as it motivates and jus-
tifies cover up of wrongdoing, that has become a stumbling block to faith
in the institutions affected.
This revisionist point of view, that avoidance of scandal requires
not secrecy, but openness and disclosure, has gradually seeped into the
rhetoric of the Catholic Church. After decades of being told it was their
duty to keep silent, sex abuse survivors finally heard Pope Francis say
to his bishops in 2015 that “the crimes and sins of sexual abuse of mi-
nors cannot be kept secret any longer” and heard him acknowledge that
the Church “owe[s] each of [the survivors of abuse] and their families
gratitude for their immense courage in making Christ’s light to shine
upon the evil of sexual abuse of children.”7 Nearly three years later, in
a June 5, 2018 letter to the Chilean people, Francis spoke for the first
time and repeatedly of “a culture of abuse and cover up” and acknowl-
edged with “shame . . . that we did not know how to listen and react in
time.”8 He declared it “urgent to create spaces where the culture of
abuse and cover up is not the dominant scheme, where a critical and
questioning attitude is not confused with betrayal”9 and to “promote
communities capable of fighting against abusive situations, communi-
ties where exchanges, debate and confrontation are welcome.”10
As the paper will discuss, the evolution of Pope Francis’s rhetoric
and his position in the intervening years, like that of the Catholic
6 See, e.g., Cathleen Kaveny,What Benedict’s Letter on Sex Abuse Gets Wrong, COMMONWEAL
(May 20, 2019), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/putting-justice-first [https://perma.cc/R6K
T-G9AD].
7 See Joshua McElwee, For Only Second Time, Francis Meets Abuse Survivors, Says ‘God
Weeps,’NAT’L. CATH. REP. (Sep. 27, 2015), https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/only-second-tim
e-francis-meets-abuse-survivors-says-god-weeps [https://perma.cc/XS8D-623H]. These off-the-cuff
remarks to bishops came immediately after Francis’s second meeting ever, more than two years
into his papacy, with abuse survivors.
8 Letter from Pope Francis to the Pilgrim People of God in Chile, ¶ 3 (Jun. 5, 2018) (Catholic
News Agency trans.), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/full-text-of-pope-francis-letter-
to-the-church-in-chile-35580 [https://perma.cc/ZGD4-H443].
9 Id. at ¶ 4.
10 Id. at ¶ 5.
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Church more generally, is not a straightforward progress narrative, but
rather each step forward is in turn provoked by and then regrettably
followed by a step back. Among the latest attempts at a step forward
was an extraordinary meeting of the heads of bishops’ conferences
called in late February 2019 at the Vatican on “The Protection of Minors
in the Church.” Francis’s explanation of the reason for this summit al-
ready exemplified the shift in the discourse of scandal. “As you know,”
he said,
the issue of the sexual abuse of minors by members of the clergy
has for some time given rise to a serious scandal in the Church
and in public opinion, both for the tragic suffering of the victims
and due to the unjustifiable lack of attention given to them and
to covering for the guilty by people with responsibility in the
Church.11
The three days of the summit were dedicated respectively to three
overarching themes, responsibility, accountability, and transparency,
which in themselves are indicative of a desire to shift the terms of the
discourse. What concrete changes in laws, policies, or attitudes will fol-
low remain to be seen.12 But it is noteworthy that among the best re-
ceived speakers at the summit were the three women: Nigerian Sister
Veronika Openibo, who asked, “Is it possible for us to move from fear of
scandal to truth?” and answered that “openness to the world” and
“transparency should be the hallmark of mission as followers of Jesus
Christ;”13Mexican journalist Valentina Alazraki, who warned that, “the
more you cover up, the more you play ostrich, fail to inform the mass
media and thus, the faithful and public opinion, the greater the scandal
will be;”14 and Italian canon lawyer Linda Ghisoni, who called for the
active participation of lay people in diocesan supervisory commissions
and for changes in the “current legislation on pontifical secrecy. . . .”15
11 Pope Francis, Angelus in Saint Peter’s Square (Feb. 24, 2019), http://w2.vatican.va/con-
tent/francesco/en/angelus/2019/documents/papa-francesco_angelus_20190224.html [https://perma
.cc/2A43-C4MW].
12 A few, and the absence to date of others, are discussed below.
13 Sr. Veronica Openibo, Society of the Holy Child Jesus, Openness to the World as a Conse-
quence of the Ecclesial Mission, Presentation at “The Protection of Minors in the Church” Meeting
(Feb. 23, 2019), http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_suoropenibo-protezioneminori_201902
23_en.html [https://perma.cc/CFW9-L32Z].
14 Journalist Valentina Alazraki Urges Bishops to Reject Secrecy, ZENIT (Feb. 23, 2019), https:/
/zenit.org/articles/jouanalist-valentina-alazraki-urges-bishops-to-reject-secrecy/ [https://perma.cc/
7R6Z-PQXB].
15 Gerard O’Connell, Vatican Official Urges Revision on Pontifical Secret and Role of Laity in
Abuse Crisis, AMERICAMAGAZINE (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2019/02
/22/vatican-official-urges-revision-pontifical-secret-and-role-laity-abuse-crisis [https://perma.cc/F
FS6-PYJM]. In addition to Alazraki, powerful cardinals Reinhard Marx of Germany and Blase
Cupich of Chicago also called for revision of pontifical secrecy mandates. See, e.g., John L. Allen,
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I. “SCANDAL” AS A TERM OF ART
“In Biblical language, scandal signifies a trap, that which causes a
fall, therefore something which causes one to falter, which endangers
faith.”16 Thomas Aquinas, who crystallized the doctrine already devel-
oped by Peter the Chanter and his followers around 1200, defined scan-
dal as “something less rightly done or said, that occasions another’s
spiritual downfall.”17 The early theorists of scandal had already been
careful to subordinate the need to avoid scandal to concern for the three-
fold “truth of life, doctrine, [and] justice,”18 taking their cue from Greg-
ory the Great, who had declared:
As much as we can without sin, we ought to avoid scandal to our
neighbors. But if scandal is taken from truth, it is better that
scandal be allowed to arise than that truth be relinquished.19
In recent years, the doctrine’s use has not been limited to questions
of covering up clergy sex abuse, it has more generally been used to
ground something approximating an all-purpose don’t-ask-don’t-tell ap-
proach to violations of Church norms on sexual conduct. Thus, for ex-
ample, both in vitro fertilization and same-sex marriage have led to fir-
ings of Catholic school teachers at the point that conduct previously
tolerated by Catholic institutional employers became widely known and
was therefore seen as giving rise to scandal.20 As explained in one of the
earliest archdiocesan reports on clergy sex abuse, the 1990 Winter re-
port from St. John’s Newfoundland,
The traditional cultural and ecclesiastical concern for avoiding
the spread of scandal is based on the view that if people see their
leaders and those they admire doing evil things the tendency
Jr., No Secret that ‘Pontifical Secrecy’ is Taking a Beating at Pope’s Summit, CRUX (Feb. 24, 2019),
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2019/01_02/2019_02_24_John_ Crux_No_rsquo.htm [h
ttps://perma.cc/47TV-8SVU].
16 Georges Cottier, Counter-Witness and Scandal (1996), https://www.vatican.va/jubilee_2000
/magazine/documents/ju_mag_june-sept-1996_cottier_en.html [http://perma.cc/6XH4-ZFL2].
17 3 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, § 2.2 Q. 12, A. 43 (Benziger Bros. ed., 1947); see
also 3 THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2.2 A. 5,2284-87 (“Scandal is an attitude or
behavior which leads another to do evil . . . the person who gives scandal . . . damages virtue and
integrity; he may even draw his brother into spiritual death”).
18 See Lyndsey Bryan, Periculum animarum: Bishops, Gender, and Scandal, 19 FLORILEGIUM
49 n.1 (2002) (citing texts).
19 Id. (quoting Gregory’s Homiliarum in Ezechielem, lib. I, Horn. VII, PL 76, col. 842).
20 See, e.g., MailOnline Reporter and Associated Press, Roman Catholic Schoolteacher Who
Says She Was Fired by Diocese for Trying to Get Pregnant through In Vitro Fertilization Will Take
Case to Court, DAILYMAIL (Sep. 5, 2014), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2745396/Suit-
vitro-fertilization-trial.html [https://perma.cc/8UTZ-6S5J].
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will be “to stumble” either by direct imitation of those evil ac-
tions or by being shocked into turning away from the good that
may be associated even with those who do evil.21
Two scriptural references to scandal are particularly important in
the context of clergy sex abuse. The first, Romans 14:13, enjoins, “Let
us not therefore judge one another any more. But judge this rather, that
you put not a stumbling block or a scandal in your brother’s way.”22 The
second, which appears with slight variants in the gospels of Matthew
and Mark, reads in Matthew:
Whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin,
it would be better for him to have a great millstone fastened
around his neck and to be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe
to the world because of scandals! For it is necessary that scan-
dals come, but woe to the man by whom the scandal comes!23
Many commentators on the clergy sex abuse scandals have inter-
preted this passage literally, seeing “little ones” as the young children
on whom clergy have imposed themselves sexually.24 But, in his recent
controversial intervention into the sex abuse debate, emeritus Pope
Benedict XVI insists that “[t]he modern use of the sentence is not in
itself wrong, but it must not obscure the original meaning.”25 According
to Benedict XVI, “‘the little ones’ in the language of Jesus means the
common believers who can be confounded in their faith” and Jesus in
this passage “protects the deposit of the faith with an emphatic threat
21 1 GORDON WINTER ET AL., REPORT OF THE ARCHDIOCESAN COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO
THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN BY MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY, Vol. 1, 112 (1990), http://bishop-
accountability.org/reports/1990_06_Winter_St_Johns/1990_Winter_Volume_1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/WHH4-9ZZ4].
22 Romans 14:3 (Douay-Rheims).
23 Matthew 18:6–7, as quoted by Pope Francis, Address at the End of the Eucharistic Concel-
ebration at “The Protection of Minors in the Church” Meeting (Feb. 24, 2019), http://w2.vati-
can.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2019/february/documents/papa-francesco_20190224_incont-
ro-protezioneminori-chiusura.html [https://perma.cc/XJ2K-K9CG].
24 See, e.g., Pope Francis, Address at the End of the Eucharistic Concelebration at “The Pro-
tection of Minors in the Church” Meeting (Feb. 24, 2019), http://w2.vatican.va/content/fran-
cesco/en/speeches/2019/february/documents/papa-francesco_20190224_incontro-protezioneminori
-chiusura.html [https://perma.cc/XJ2K-K9CG].
25 Pope Benedict XVI, The Church and the Scandal of Sexual Abuse (Apr. 10, 2019) (un-
published essay), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/full-text-of-benedict-xvi-the-church-
and-the-scandal-of-sexual-abuse-59639 [https://perma.cc/P2UK-VTUN]. Among the many oddities
of this essay is that, although rapidly translated and widely disseminated, it was originally sched-
uled for publication only in Klerusblatt, an obscure journal directed at the Bavarian clergy.
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of punishment to those who do it harm.”26 Benedict sees it as “an alarm-
ing situation” that in “the general awareness of the law, the Faith no
longer appears to have the rank of a good requiring protection.”27
Catholic theologian and law professor Cathleen Kaveny is scandal-
ized by the fact that Benedict here “presents the major victim as the
Faith itself—not the children whose integrity was violated.”28 I share
Kaveny’s distaste for Benedict’s general tendency to focus on lofty the-
ological abstractions at the expense of vulnerable human beings. In
other work, I have observed that his theological anthropology resembles
what Carol Gilligan has called “doing math problems with humans.”29
But, in this particular context, I think there is much to be said for Ben-
edict’s approach. Consider the one concrete abuse victim Benedict does
discuss in his essay, a former altar server whose abuser regularly used
the words of consecration, “This is my body which will be given up for
you,” in the course of pedophilic abuse. To Benedict, it “is obvious that
this woman can no longer hear the very words of consecration without
experiencing again all the horrific distress of her abuse.”30 To Kavney,
this indicates that Benedict has mistakenly recharacterized the all too
human horror of child rape as an abstract sacrilege. But, if one is a be-
liever who values belief, loss of faith and of the ability to derive comfort
from the trappings of faith can indeed be the most profound of harms.
Kaveny is also, in my view, wrong about the conclusions she as-
sumes follow ineluctably from Benedict’s tendency to see the “worst con-
sequence of the crisis [a]s the widespread loss of faith in the church’s
credibility.”31 It does not necessarily follow that it is therefore “better to
handle specific instances quietly, so as not to scandalize the faithful” or
that “victims should be encouraged to remain quiet, perhaps with a le-
gally binding confidentiality agreement” and with no monetary dam-
ages so as to safeguard the Church.32 While the actions Kaveny criti-
cizes are indeed the ones the Catholic Church historically has taken to
avoid scandal from sex abuse, this only reveals that church officials
have been mistaken in the means they used to combat this scandal.
Their approach to avoiding scandal may have been in practice worse
26 Francis has expressed similar sentiments. See Pope Francis, Homily at the Closing Mass of
the Eighth World Meeting of Families (Sep. 27, 2015), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/
homilies/2015/documents/papa-francesco_20150927_usa-omelia-famiglie.html [https://perma.cc/R
63H-TEXV] (“For Jesus, the truly ‘intolerable’ scandal is everything that breaks down and destroys
our trust in the working of the Spirit!”).
27 Benedict XVI, supra note 25.
28 Kaveny, supra note 6.
29 See Mary Anne Case, The Role of the Popes in the Invention of Complementarity and the
Vatican’s Anathematization of Gender, 6 RELIGION ANDGENDER 155–172 (2016).
30 Benedict XVI, supra note 25.
31 Kaveny, supra note 6.
32 Id.
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than ineffectual, indeed counterproductive, but this does not mean their
end is not a valuable one, which should still be pursued if more effective,
less damaging means can be identified.
While I realize that the line may often be hard to draw and may be
controversial even in principle, I would contend that there is an im-
portant difference between attempts at reputation management by in-
stitutions acting only in narrow self-interest and those for which a
greater good is at stake. Only the latter are concerned in the technical
sense with avoiding scandal. Consider a corporate analogy. Cigarette
manufacturers who seek to hush up links between smoking and cancer
may be protecting nothing more noble or valuable than their sales fig-
ures and their corporate profits, but vaccine manufacturers who seek to
avoid publicity about rare adverse side effects may in fact be concerned
about a greater good—a decline in the use of vaccines has negative ex-
ternalities that a decline in cigarette consumption does not.33 If one be-
lieves, as orthodox Catholics do, that “outside the Church there is no
salvation,”34 an abuse-provoked decline in Church membership means
that more people are damned. Even absent this sort of theological com-
mitment, individual victims and their families have convincingly spo-
ken about the loss of their ability to trust in the persons in whom they
had previously reposed the greatest trust of all, and of the severe psy-
chological damage they suffered as a result. Publicizing this scandal
without a good way of making amends for it or preventing it from re-
curring in future can spread these adverse consequences.
By contrast to Kaveny, and with Benedict XVI, I am therefore will-
ing to consider the possibility that “the major victim [i]s the Faith it-
self,” but I would insist that secrecy to the point of cover up, far from
protecting the faith or having a hope of doing so, is what has injured it.
This can consistently be seen in the findings of decades worth of reports
from multiple jurisdictions that have examined the Catholic Church’s
response to clergy sexual abuse.
33 Other public institutions from the U.S. Military to the police have long had comparable
reputation management concerns and comparable difficulties addressing them. See generally Su-
san Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 1275 (1999)
(analyzing the tendency to anecdotalize and to resist seeing systemic patterns in police miscon-
duct).
34 1 THECATECHISM OF THECATHOLICCHURCH, § 2.3 A. 9, ¶ 3, 845, http://www.vatican.va/ar-
chive/ENG0015/__P29.HTM [https://perma.cc/P8YR-5Y9C].
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II. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S FAILED EXERCISEOF REPUTATION
MANAGEMENT
If there is a single conclusion common to reports from all corners of
the globe examining sex abuse in the Catholic Church, whether pro-
duced last month or more than thirty years ago, whether by the Church
itself, independent commissions, or law enforcement agencies, it is that
a major obstacle to putting an effective stop to the abuse was the Cath-
olic Church’s obsession with protecting its own reputation and avoiding
scandal. Consider the numbing sameness of the following representa-
tive findings, taken in chronological order.35
As early as 1990, the Winter Commission, examining sex abuse in
the Archdiocese of St. John’s Newfoundland, observed that “the need to
avoid scandal has played a part in the thinking of senior Archdiocesan
administrators. . . . While such a policy may not be always and every-
where inappropriate it can lead to serious abuse.”36 Archbishop Alphon-
sus Liguori Penney, who had commissioned the Winter Report and who
was blamed in it for tolerating and covering up abuse, resigned on the
day the report became public, becoming one of the first bishops in the
world to accept responsibility, even though Vatican representatives
sent to investigate did not think his resignation was warranted.37
Twenty years later, commission member and pediatrician Sr. Nuala
Kenny, insisted, “[W]e understood that there were deeper systemic is-
sues that allowed it to happen . . . . If there’s one thing I want to do, [it]
is to help our bishops to understand that head down, avoiding scandal
has resulted in the greatest scandal in the modern church.”38
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating wanted to send a similar mes-
sage, when, in 2003, as head of a lay National Review Board appointed
by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (“USCCB”), he de-
clared at a press conference, “To act like La Cosa Nostra and hide and
suppress, I think, is very unhealthy, . . . Eventually it will all come
out.”39 Although an uproar over his remarks led to his resignation from
35 That the examples included here are, as a matter of convenience, taken from reports pub-
lished in English concerning English speaking countries, is no indication that the problem is in
any way limited to such countries.
36 WINTER ET AL., supra note 21, at 112.
37 See Abuse-Enabling Bishops Who Resigned or Were Removed, BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.OR-
G, http://www.bishop-accountability.org/bishops/removed/ [https://perma.cc/A22G-642G].
38 Canadian Broadcast System, Betrayal: Abuse in the Catholic Church in Nova Scotia
(2010)—The Fifth Estate, YOUTUBE, min. 31:00–32:45 (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=_jmpu3TopHc [https://perma.cc/6AQL-VQRH] (originally aired on CBC, Oct. 1, 2010).
39 Larry B. Stammer, Mahony Resisted Abuse Inquiry, Panelist Says, L.A. TIMES (June 12,
2003), http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-me-keatingnu12jun12,1,6706831.story [https:
//perma.cc/H7UW-3F7J].
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the USCCB Review Board,40 its ultimate conclusions in 2004 were in
line with his:
Faced with serious and potentially inflammatory abuses,
Church leaders placed too great an emphasis on the avoidance
of scandal in order to protect the reputation of the Church, which
ultimately bred far greater scandal and reputational injury. . . .
At heart, this was a failure of Church leadership, which lacked
the vision to recognize that, unless nipped in the bud, the prob-
lems would only grow until they no longer could be contained,
and that then the problems would have an even greater propen-
sity to undermine the faith of the laity.
The impulse to avoid scandal at all costs manifested itself in sev-
eral ways. First, Church leaders kept information from parish-
ioners and other dioceses that should have been provided to
them. Some also pressured victims not to inform the authorities
or the public of abuse. . . . Bishops and other Church leaders of-
ten did not tell their brethren the full story when a priest took
up residence in a new dioceses. . . . This lack of candor—with pa-
rishioners, with civil authorities, with fellow bishops—avoided
scandal in the short term while sowing seeds for greater up-
heaval in the long term.41
It took another decade for a principal target of Keating’s criticism,
Los Angeles Cardinal Roger Mahony, to be barred by his successor from
further public ministry in Los Angeles on account of his failures to pro-
tect young people from sexually abusive priests.42 Among Mahony’s
40 In his resignation letter, Keating again deplored the Church’s “code of silence” and insisted,
“I make no apology. To resist grand jury subpoenas, to suppress the names of offending clerics, to
deny, to obfuscate, to explain away; that is the model of a criminal organization, not my church.”
See Head of Abuse Panel Blasts Church’s ‘Code of Silence’, BELIEFNET (2003), https://www.beliefnet
.com/news/2001/05/head-of-abuse-panel-blasts-churchs-code-of-silence.aspx [https://perma.cc/M5
LW-HZJV] (setting forth the full text of Keating’s resignation letter).
41 ROBERT S. BENNETT ET AL., A REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE
UNITED STATES PREPARED BY THE NATIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
AND YOUNG PEOPLE 108 (Feb. 27, 2004). Bennett, Keating’s replacement as head of the Review
Board, drew an analogy only slightly less devastating to the bishops than Keating’s to the Mafia.
Bennett declared the bishops must “start acting like pastors and shepherds of their flock, and stop
acting like risk assessment officers of insurance companies.” He went on to explain, “In the church
there has been a culture of secrecy, and it has gotten them in a lot of trouble. . . . [T]hey must be
open, they must be transparent and they must be accountable.” See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops
Uneasy on Whom to Protect, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/13/us/
bishops-uneasy-on-whom-to-protect.html [https://perma.cc/S6L6-HE4F] (quoting Bennett’s reac-
tion to bishops, including Roger Mahony of Los Angeles, who resisted providing information to the
Review Board).
42 Jerry Filteau, Cardinal Mahony Barred from Public Ministry in Los Angeles, NAT’L. CATH.
REP. (Feb. 1, 2013), http://ncronline.org/news/accountability/la-cardinal-mahony-barred-public-
ministry [https://perma.cc/LBP2-RLR3].
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failed efforts at cover up was the assertion, ultimately rejected by the
courts and having no discernible basis in either canon or secular law,
that all of his communications about abuse allegations with affected
priests were covered by what he called a “formation privilege,” and
thereby shielded from disclosure even in a criminal case.43 Unfortu-
nately, to this day Keating has yet to be vindicated in the overoptimistic
conclusion with which he began his 2003 resignation letter: “Never
again will any bishop be able to hide or avoid the scandal of sex abuse
in his diocese.”44
Five years after the USCCB report, the 2009 Murphy Report into
sex abuse in the Dublin archdiocese reached a by now familiar conclu-
sion:
The Dublin Archdiocese’s pre-occupations in dealing with cases
of child sexual abuse, at least until the mid 1990s, were the
maintenance of secrecy, the avoidance of scandal, the protection
of the reputation of the Church, and the preservation of its as-
sets. All other considerations, including the welfare of children
and justice for victims, were subordinated to these priorities.45
Responding to the Murphy report and the companion Ryan report,
which examined abuse in Irish Catholic schools, Benedict XVI, in his
2010 Pastoral Letter to the Catholics of Ireland, agreed that among the
factors “that gave rise to the present crisis” were “a misplaced concern
for the reputation of the Church and the avoidance of scandal . . . which
have had such tragic consequences in the lives of victims and their fam-
ilies, and have obscured the light of the Gospel to a degree that not even
centuries of persecution succeeded in doing.”46
Nearly a decade after the Irish reports, an Australian government
report repeated: “The response of various Catholic Church authorities
to complaints and concerns about its priests and religious was remark-
ably and disturbingly similar. . . . [T]he avoidance of public scandal, the
maintenance of the reputation of the Catholic Church and loyalty to
43 See William Lobdell & Jean Guccione, A Novel Tack by Cardinal, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 14,
2004), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-mar-14-me-priest14-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/5ZRY-S6PK] (describing this claim); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court, 131 Cal. App. 4th 417 (2005) (rejecting this claim).
44 See BELIEFNET, supra note 40.
45 Yvonne Murphy et. al, Commission of Investigation Report into the Catholic Archdiocese of
Dublin, § 1.15, 4 (2009), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/reports/2009_11_26_Murphy_Re-
port/01_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/46X4-3WBL] [hereinafterMurphy Report].
46 Pastoral Letter from Pope Benedict XVI to the Catholics of Ireland (Mar. 19, 2010), http://w2
.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/letters/2010/documents/hf_ben- xvi_let_20100319_church-irel
and.html [https://perma.cc/HA54-Z5FY].
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priests and religious largely determined the responses of Catholic
Church authorities.”47
In 2018, the Grand Jury report on sex abuse and its cover-up in a
number of Pennsylvania dioceses began by observing, “While each
church district had its idiosyncrasies, the pattern was pretty much the
same. The main thing was not to help children, but to avoid ‘scandal.’”
Finally, most recently, an investigation into the Archdiocese of Bir-
mingham, England concluded in June 2019, “The sexual abuse perpe-
trated . . . could have been stopped much earlier if the Archdiocese had
not been driven by a determination to protect the reputation of the
Church.”48
Ironically, even those members of the hierarchy alive to its prob-
lems with reputation management seem powerless to improve it. Con-
sider Archbishop Wilton Gregory, who quoted Machiavelli to a reporter
to explain the Church’s problems as follows:
If a prince, if a leader is going to give away a thousand ducats,
he should do it one ducat at a time because people forget, but if
he has to slay a thousand soldiers, he should do it in one night
because people forget. The constant revelation, the continual
disclosure of bad, criminal behavior keeps this issue alive. And
it’s as though it’s a never-ending drama.49
Gregory has himself been a major player in this never-ending
drama for decades. He was president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops in 2002 when it prepared its first Charter for the Protection of
Children and Young People (the “Dallas Charter”) in response to the
scandal caused by the Boston Globe’s Spotlight team’s exposé of priest
sexual abuse and episcopal cover-up.50 During his presidential term, he
was held in contempt of an Illinois court for failing to release the files
of a suspended predator priest in his diocese.51 Most recently, in the
47 16 AUSTRALIAN ROYAL COMMISSION INTO INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE, FINALREPORT: RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, Bk. 2, § 13.5.9, 278 (2017), https://www.childabus
eroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/final_report_-_volume_16_religious_institutions_book
_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/N829-GLSY].
48 ALEXIS JAY ET AL., THEROMAN CATHOLICCHURCHCASE STUDY: ARCHDIOCESE OFBIRMING-
HAM INVESTIGATION REPORT ii (2019), https://www.iicsa.org.uk/document/roman-catholic-church-
archdiocese-birmingham-case-study-investigation-report [https://perma.cc/Q7TG-37ER].
49 See The Shame of the Church, RETROREP. (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.retroreport.org/tran
script/the-shame-of-the-church/ [https://perma.cc/E6C2-M8BH] (transcript).
50 The movie Spotlight is an account of the Globe’s work. See generally SPOTLIGHT (Open Road
Films 2015).
51 See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops’ Leader Resists Releasing Priest’s Records in His Own Dio-
cese, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/02/us/bishops-leader-resists-re-
leasing-priest-s-records-in-his-own-diocese.html [https://perma.cc/78RF-2BJV].
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spring of 2019, he was appointed Archbishop of Washington D.C.,52 re-
placing two immediate predecessors caught up in the abuse scandals
after themselves earlier cultivating reputations as leading opponents of
abuse: Donald Wuerl, who resigned in 2018 after being described in the
Pennsylvania grand jury report as covering up abuse while bishop of
Pittsburgh;53 and Theodore McCarrick, who was laicized in 2019 after
a canonical trial for sex abuse of seminarians.54
III. SOME EXAMPLES OF LEGAL AND POLICY APPROACHESUSED BY
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ATTEMPTS TO AVOID SCANDAL BY
MANAGING REPUTATION
The imperative of avoiding scandal was ingrained in the Church
hierarchy at every level from the pastors in the parishes to the cardinals
in the Curia. While a systematic exploration of the canon law, secular
law, and policy commitments they used to justify and to attempt to im-
plement scandal avoidance through reputation management is well be-
yond the scope of this paper, a small handful of examples may give a
sense of the relevant complexities.55
At one extreme of legal intricacy, consider the interlocking series of
canon law mandates now encompassed by the term of art “pontifical
secrecy,” which for nearly a century have imposed a requirement of
strict confidentiality, enforced through threat of excommunication, on
all allegations and proceedings relating to child sexual abuse by
clergy.56 These mandates begin with the 1922 Crimen Sollicitationis,
52 Joshua J. McElwee & Heidi Schlumpf, Pope Names Gregory, Designer of US Bishops’ Abuse
Procedures, as Washington Archbishop, NAT’L. CATH. REP. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.ncronline.or
g/news/people/pope-names-gregory-designer-us-bishops-abuse-procedures-washington-archbisho-
p [https://perma.cc/GWB5-3Y46].
53 See John L. Allen Jr., Abuse Scandal Isn’t the Only Chapter in Donald Wuerl’s Story, CRUX
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://cruxnow.com/new-analysis/2018/10/12/abuse-scandal-isnt-the-only-chapter
-in-donald-wuerls-story/ [https://perma.cc/86ST-NU8N] (describing Wuerl as a proponent of zero
tolerance for abuse who had opposed Vatican leniency with abusive priests since the 1980s).
54 See Part IV.A infra for further discussion of McCarrick.
55 For some additional details, see generally, Gerald E. Kochanskya & Frank Herrmann,
Shame and Scandal: Clinical and Canon Law Perspectives on the Crisis in the Priesthood, 27 INT.
J. OFL. AND PSYCHIATRY 299 (2004); KIERAN J. TAPSELL, POTIPHAR’SWIFE: THEVATICAN’S SECRET
AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (2017) (focusing mostly on the pontifical secret, but including much
additional historical and legal analysis of the Church’s approach to sex abuse over time).
56 A leading expert on the pontifical secret as it applies to clerical sexual abuse is Australian
lawyer Kieran J. Tapsell. Among his publications on the subject are, in addition to the book Poti-
phar’s Wife, cited supra note 55, a detailed submission to the AUSTRALIAN ROYAL COMMISSION
INTO INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, CANON LAW AS A SYSTEMATIC FACTOR
INCHILD SEXUALABUSE IN THECATHOLICCHURCH (2015). The extremely abbreviated summary of
the complexities in text, supra, relies chiefly on his most recent publication: Kieran J. Tapsell,
Civil and Canon Law on Reporting Child Sexual Abuse to the Civil Authorities, 31 J. OF THE
ACADEMIC STUDY OF RELIGIONNo. 3 (2018).
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itself a secret law to be “kept carefully in the secret archive of the Curia
for internal use, not to be published or augmented with commen-
taries,”57 which bound to permanent silence victims, witnesses, the
bishop, and all others involved in canonical inquiries and trials concern-
ing soliciting sex in the confessional, homosexual sex, and the sexual
abuse of minors. In a 1974 Instruction, Secreta Continere,58 Pope Paul
VI expanded the secrecy requirement by imposing it on the very allega-
tion itself, and not just the information obtained through canonical pro-
ceedings. Although the 1983 revision of the canon law threw the status
of Crimen Sollicitationis into some doubt, the continuing requirement
of secrecy was confirmed by Article 25 of Pope John Paul II’s 2001 motu
proprio Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela59 which again imposes the
pontifical secret on all allegations and proceedings relating to child sex-
ual abuse by clerics. A dispensation to allow reporting to the police
where the local secular law requires it was granted to the United States
in 2002 and to the rest of the world in 2010, but where reporting is not
required (that is, in most of the world), it is still prohibited. The justifi-
cations for this level of secrecy with respect to these crimes was, of
course, the prevention of scandal. But, while it might have once been
seen as scandalous to turn a priest over to the secular authorities,60 it
is now clearly causing scandal when it is observed that officials of the
Catholic Church do not do so.61
57 Instruction from the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office to All Patriarchs,
Archbishops, Bishops and Other Local Ordinaries, On the Manner of Proceeding in Causes Involv-
ing the Crime of Solicitation (Mar. 16, 1962), http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_crimen-
sollicitationis-1962_en.html [https://perma.cc/BH2X-KUQ8].
58 Instruction from Pope Paul VI, Secreta Continere (Feb. 4, 1974), http://www.vatican.va/ro-
man_curia/secretariat_state/card-villot/documents/rc_seg-st_19740204_secreta-continere_lt.html
[https://perma.cc/Y6SU-H4UP] (inter alia changing the name of what had previously been called
the secret of the Holy Office to the pontifical secret).
59 Apostolic Letter from Pope John Paul II to The Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Sac-
ramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela (Apr. 30, 2001) (Punderson & Scicluna Translation), https://w2.vat
ican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/motu_proprio/documents/hf_jp-ii_motu-proprio_20020110_sacram
entorum-sanctitatis-tutela.html [https://perma.cc/L6LB-PH7Q] (Isssued Motu Proprio). The title
of this motu proprio makes the church’s priorities perfectly clear: the primary concern is “Safe-
guarding the Holy Sacraments,” not the children; stricter penalties were imposed for advocating
the ordination of women than for abusing children. For the Vatican’s own explanation for the
changes over time, see The Norms of the Motu Proprio “Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela,”
CONGREGATION FOR THEDOCTRINEOF THEFAITH (2001), http://www.vatican.va/resources/resoures
_introd-storica_en.html [https://perma.cc/6993-4L9B].
60 For example, in 2001, the prefect of the Vatican’s Congregation for Clergy wrote a letter,
approved by John Paul II and sent to all the bishops of the world, congratulating a French bishop
for failing to inform the secular authorities about a pedophile priest in his diocese, for which cover
up the bishop had been found criminally guilty and sentenced to a suspended jail sentence by a
French court. See, e.g., Kieran Tapsell, Church Laws May Justify Calls for French Cardinal’s Res-
ignation, BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.ORG (May 4, 2014), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2
016/05_06/2016_05_04_Kieran_Reporter_Church_resignation.htm [https://perma.cc/68JT-72JY].
61 Another fascinating aspect of the evolution of canon law on clerical sexual abuse is the way
it de facto reinstates the medieval legal doctrine of benefit of clergy (i.e. the notion that clerics
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At the other extreme from these strict legal requirements, consider
that, as journalist Celia Wexler put it at a gathering of Catholic women
to discuss the abuse crisis, “The American Catholic Church has a ‘bro-
culture’ stronger than every fraternity.”62 At the U.S. Bishops’ 2018
General Assembly, Cardinal Roger Mahony, sanctioned in 2013 for his
role in covering up abuse, sought to reinforce this culture, urging his
fellow bishops, as they sought an “‘effective’ response to the crisis” “not
[to] allow outside groups of any kind, in this country or anywhere else,
to interfere with, or attempt to break the bonds of our collegial union.”63
Another name for this particular bro-culture is clericalism, a favorite
target of Pope Francis, but one whose clutches he has not fully escaped.
When it comes to its substantive treatment of offenders, the Cath-
olic Church has cycled through the trilogy of sin, crime, and disease in
its approach to sex abuse, but in each case in a manner that led to leni-
ency—forgiving sin, attempting to cure the disease of pedophilia despite
being told as early as the 1980s by its own psychiatric experts that the
disease was incurable,64 and demanding “moral certainty,” the canon
law equivalent of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, before imposing pe-
nal sanctions. What it failed to do was to treat clerics the way secular
law treats employees, allowing them to be removed from positions in
which they can endanger young people or bring scandal on the institu-
tion even if there is merely a preponderance of evidence against them.
IV. POPE FRANCIS AS EXEMPLIFICATIONOF THE PROBLEMS ON THE
PATH TO A SOLUTION TO THE SCANDALOF CLERICAL SEX ABUSE
Because there has been a widespread tendency on the part of both
Catholics and non-Catholics to view Pope Francis as a sort of caped cru-
should not be tried by the secular courts, but only by the Church, whose punishments were often
less harsh). As Kieran Tapsell points out, however, medieval clerics found guilty of sex crimes by
the Church were defrocked and turned over to the secular authorities for punishment, including
execution. But by the late nineteenth century, “the canon law and practice of handing over the
cleric for punishment in accordance with the civil law even for the most serious offences was offi-
cially abandoned everywhere,” and this, combined with secrecy whose effect was to prevent secular
authorities from ever learning of clerical sex crimes and a more lenient approach to dealing with
such crimes within the canon law system, effectively protected clergy from any meaningful pun-
ishment. See Tapsell, supra note 56, at 70.
62 See Claire Giangravè, As Bishops’ Summit Opens, Catholic Women Say: ‘Let’s Be A Nui-
sance!’, CRUX (Oct. 2, 2018), https://cruxnow.com/synod-of-bishops-on-youth/2018/10/02/as-bishops
-summit-opens-catholic-women-say-lets-be-a-nuisance/ [https://perma.cc/73ZH-MSMW].
63 Cardinal Guilty of Covering Up Sex Abuse Addresses US Bishops Conference, LIFE SITE
NEWS (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/cardinal-found-guilty-of-covering-up-se
x-abuse-addresses-us-bishops-confere [https://perma.cc/5WHA-FNGG].
64 See, e.g., A.W. RICHARD SIPE, THOMAS P. DOYLE, & PATRICK J. WALL, SEX, PRIESTS AND
SECRET CODES: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S 2000 YEAR PAPER TRAIL OF SEXUAL ABUSE (Kindle ed.
2006) (discussing the Mouton-Doyle-Peterson report presented to the USSCB in 1985).
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sader, swooping in to reform the attitudes and practices of Church offi-
cials,65 it may be instructive to examine the way his own actions and
statements exemplify rather than definitively break with the two steps
forward, one step back approach that has left the Catholic Church
mired in sex abuse scandals for decades. Even with respect only to
events in the papacy of Francis, it would be beyond the scope of this
paper systematically to set forth all the steps the Catholic Church has
taken on the lurching path toward finally dealing with the scandal of
sex abuse. Below are just a few bullet points of concern, on which Fran-
cis has not yet unequivocally made progress.
A. Acknowledging That “Repairing Scandal” May Now Require
Harsher Penalties and Close to Zero Tolerance
Canon 1341 of the Code of Canon Law requires Church officials to
“take care to initiate a judicial or administrative process to impose or
declare penalties only after . . . ascertain[ing] that fraternal correction
or rebuke or other means of pastoral solicitude cannot sufficiently re-
pair the scandal, restore justice, [or] reform the offender.”66 For decades
this provision has been used as a justification by bishops for the forgiv-
ing approach and repeated second chances they gave sex abuser priests.
But, in addition to arguing that avoiding scandal now requires trans-
parency, not secrecy, one might also argue that it now requires swift,
certain, and harsh imposition of penalties through canonical process,
because “fraternal correction” and “other means of pastoral solicitude”
have scandalously been revealed systematically to have failed to
achieve any one of the three stated objectives.
“Zero tolerance” has been the catch phrase most closely associated
with the move toward imposition of penalties and away from fraternal
correction. The USCCB sought to adopt what it called a zero-tolerance
policy in its 2002 Dallas Charter. Pope John Paul II appeared categori-
cally to endorse such an approach when he declared in a message to the
65 Even those who do not support him seem to impose such expectations on him. Thus, for
example, the Church was roiled over the past year by a series of open letters published by Arch-
bishop Viganò, former Papal Nuncio to the United States and a theological conservative who lost
his position in part because of his decision to invite Rowan County clerk and same-sex marriage
resister Kim Davis to a reception for the Pope in Washington. See, Jason Horowitz, The Man Who
Took on Pope Francis: The Story Behind the Viganò Letter, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/world/europe/archbishop-carlo-maria-vigano-pope-francis.html [https://p
rma.cc/W9TD-S7ZL]. In his widely-publicized letters, Viganò accused Francis, inter alia, of know-
ing about and tolerating the decades long pattern of sexual imposition by now defrocked Cardinal
Theodore McCarrick on seminarians whom he forced to share his bed and otherwise molested. For
the first of these letters, see Testimony of Carlo Maria Viganò, Archbishop of Ulpiana (Aug. 22,
2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4786599/Testimony-by-Archbishiop-Carlo-Ma
ria-Vigan%C3%B2.pdf [https://perma.cc/562F-4EQQ].
66 CODE OF CANON LAW (1983), http://www.vatican.va/archive/cod-iuris-canonici/eng/docume
nts/cic_lib6-cann1311-1363_en.html#TITLE_V [https://perma.cc/STS7-U8H8].
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U.S. Bishops, “People need to know that there is no place in the priest-
hood and religious life for those who would harm the young.”67 Taken
at face value, this would suggest the “career death penalty” of dismissal
from the clerical state after even one act by a cleric of sexual imposition
on a minor.68 But the USCCB’s attempt at zero tolerance was watered
down from the start. The text as finally approved in 2006 read:
When even a single act of sexual abuse of a minor by a priest or
deacon is admitted or is established after an appropriate process
in accordance with canon law, the offending priest or deacon will
be removed permanently from ecclesiastical ministry, not ex-
cluding dismissal from the clerical state, if the case so war-
rants.69
Notably, the provision covers only priests and deacons, not all “cler-
ics,” as originally proposed, and therefore notably not bishops, even
though in 1998 Austrian Cardinal Hans Hermann Groer already had to
relinquish his archiepiscopal duties as a result of credible allegations
that he had molested boys.70 Bishops centrally involved in the drafting
had a clear conflict of interest. One, Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, was
laicized in early 2019 for his decades of sexual imposition on seminari-
ans and others;71 as early as 2005, allegations about his conduct were
sufficiently credible as to have forced the Diocese of Metuchen to enter
into financial settlements with priests he had abused.72 Requiring that
the abuse be “of a minor” (a limitation now removed) again limited the
67 Pope John Paul II, Address to the Cardinals of the United States (Apr. 23, 2002), http://ww
ww.vatican.va/resources/resources_american-cardinals-2002_en.html [https://perma.cc/NE5H-9
K].
68 Of course, to the extent that a canonical penal trial rather than the administrative laiciza-
tion of a guilty cleric at his request is necessary, the canon law statute of limitations might make
this difficult, given that under canon law it could be as short as five years, albeit Benedict XVI’s
2010 revisions to Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela extended it to twenty years from a victim’s
eighteenth birthday. See Benedict, supra note 59. It does often take traumatized victims decades
to file a report.
69 See UNITED STATESCONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 23-24 (rev. Jun. 2018), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-ac-
tion/child-and-youth-protection/upload/Charter-for-the-Protection-of-Children-and-Young-People-
2018-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/89QB-BWXR].
70 See, e.g., Dennis Coday, A Cardinal Is Accused: The Groer Case, NCRONLINE (Apr. 4, 2014),
https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/cardinal-accused-groer-case [https://perma.cc/TGM6-
MDLC] (detailing the charges and the hierarchy’s response to them).
71 Chico Harlan, Ex-Cardinal McCarrick Defrocked by Vatican for Sexual Abuse, WASH. POST
(Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ex-cardinal-mccarrick-defrocked-
by-vatican-for-sexual-abuse/2019/02/16/0aa365d4-2e2c-11e9-8ad3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html?utm
_term=.a7c1e7fbd736 [https://perma.cc/6VJG-R6L5].
72 JD Flynn, McCarrick, the Bishops, and Unanswered Questions, CATH. NEWS AGENCY (Jul.
23, 2018), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/mccarrick-the-bishops-and-unanswered-que
stions-87927 [https://perma.cc/YZ53-XQAH] (reporting on this and a similar 2007 settlement by
the Archdiocese of Newark).
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regulatory purview to the benefit of clerics like McCarrick, whose abuse
largely targeted young adults, not minors. Additionally, the high level
of process required73 meant that few of those credibly accused could be
promptly removed.74
Pope Francis himself declared in 2017 that “the Church irrevocably
and at all levels intends to apply the zero-tolerance principle against
the sexual abuse of minors.”75 He did close a major loophole by issuing
amotu proprio, or decree, specifying that bishops could be removed from
office if they were “negligent . . . in relation to cases of sexual abuse
inflicted on minors.”76 But in dealing with individual cases he has
shown far more leniency,77 leading Marie Collins, one of only two survi-
vors of clergy sexual abuse appointed in 2014 to the Pontifical Commis-
sion for the Protection of Minors established by Pope Francis, to say in
her 2017 resignation letter that Francis “does not appreciate how his
actions of clemency undermine everything else he does in this
area. . . .”78
73 In addition to the Manual for Canonical Processes for the Resolution of Complaints of Cler-
ical Sexual Abuse of Minors prepared in 2003 by then Monsignor Charles J. Scicluna on behalf of
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the USCCB prepared Diocesan Review Board Re-
source Booklets. See, Manual for Canonical Processes for the Resolution of Complaints of Clerical
Sexual Abuse of Minors (2003), https://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resource-files/chu
rchdocs/ManualForCanonicalProcesses.pdf [https://perma.cc/CXA6-Q7GL]. For the 2012 version
of the resource book, see U.S.CONFERENCEOFCATH. BISHOPS, DIOCESANREVIEWBOARDRESOURC-
E BOOKLET (2003), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youth-protection/ upload/201
2-Diocesan-Review-Board-Resource.pdf [https://perma.cc/44GE-SS4M].
74 See, e.g., Zero Tolerance, Allegations, and Reinstatements Policy and Practice Since the 2002
Dallas Charter and Norms, BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.ORG (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.bishop-ac-
countability.org/White_Paper/2010_10_12_Zero_Tolerance_and_Reinstatements.htm [https://per
ma.cc/K5EV-HYQ4 ] (detailing problems with the process).
75 Address from Pope Francis to the Members of the Pontifical Commission for the Protection
of Minors (Sept. 21, 2017), http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_american-cardinals-2002_
en.html [https://perma.cc/PB7Z-H37A].
76 Apostolic Letter IssuedMotu Proprio from Pope Francis, As a LovingMother (June 4, 2016),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/motu_proprio/documents/papa-francesco-motu-pro-
prio_20160604_come-una-madre-amorevole.html [https://perma.cc/UHX4-VJBE].
77 See, e.g., Nicole Winfield, Pope Quietly Trims Sanctions for Sex Abusers Seeking Mercy,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/64e1fc2312764a24bf1b2d6ec3bf4caf
[https://perma.cc/W7YE-WHC2] (giving examples and explanations). In fact, at no time before or
during the papacy of Francis has anything like zero tolerance been achieved, even with respect to
credible claims of abuse sent to and adjudicated by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith(“CDF”). See, e.g., Kieran Tapsell, Zero Tolerance? The Facts Don’t Support the Pope’s Claims
on Child Abuse, THEGUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018
/jan/31/zero-tolerance-the-facts-dont-support-the-popes-claims-on-child-abuse [https://perma.cc/Y
G93-JJHJ] (analyzing statistics worldwide between 2004 and 2014 and, with respect to Australian
referrals to the CDF in 2017, to show that, based on the percentage of priests who were dismissed
rather than given lesser penalties, the tolerance rate exceeded 75%).
78 Marie Collins, Exclusive: Survivor Explains Decision to Leave Vatican’s Abuse Commission,
NAT’L CATH. REP. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.ncronline.org/news/people/exclusive-survivor-explai
ns-decision-leave-vaticans-abuse-commission [https://perma.cc/39AU-MM8C].
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Of course, to expect zero tolerance from the Catholic Church, and
especially from Pope Francis,79 is to ignore some basic theological com-
mitments.80 More than a crime or a psychological pathology, child sex
abuse is for the Catholic Church a sin, and the Church and particularly
Pope Francis are in the business of forgiving sin. One of Francis’s favor-
ite metaphors for this forgiving approach is of the church as a field hos-
pital for sinners.81 There is no reason to think there isn’t a bed in the
field hospital for sex abuser priests, just as Francis has made clear there
is for the divorced and remarried, gays and lesbians, and women who
have procured abortions. Moreover, the twenty-one reflection points
distributed by Francis at the commencement of the summit veered far
from zero tolerance, in the direction of rights for the accused, stressing,
inter alia, “the right to defen[s]e,” the necessity because of the “pre-
sumption of innocence . . . to prevent the lists of the accused being pub-
lished . . . until after the preliminary investigation and the definitive
condemnation,” and the requirement to “[o]bserve the traditional prin-
ciple of proportionality of punishment with respect to the crime com-
mitted.”82 Francis ended his recent sex abuse summit speaking no more
79 Unfortunately, in addition to his general commitment to mercy, Francis has given evidence
of particularly lenient treatment of accused persons with whom he has a personal relationship.
The most recent instance of this tendency leading to scandal is the case of Argentine Bishop Gus-
tavo Zanchetta, now facing both a criminal trial in his home country and a trial before the CDF in
the Vatican on charges of abusing seminarians. When pornographic images of young men were
first discovered on Zanchetta’s phone in 2015, Francis initially accepted Zanchetta’s explanation
that his phone had been hacked, then sent him for counseling, and, even after causing him to
resign from his bishopric in 2017, created a position for him in Rome, claiming to be unaware of
abuse allegations until 2018. See Inés San Martín, Argentine Bishop at Heart of Phone Porn Scan-
dal Charged with Abusing Seminarians, CRUX (June 10, 2019), https://cruxnow.com/church-in-the-
americas/2019/06/10/argentine-bishop-at-heart-of-phone-porn-scandal-charged-with-abusing-sem
inarians/ [https://perma.cc/58TS-DCZA].
80 Additionally, there are practical reasons not to expect zero tolerance, given the growing
worldwide shortage of priests and the comparatively high percentage of them against whom cred-
ible allegations of either abuse or cover-up have beenmade. Moreover, one advantage of the system
as it has historically been practiced is that offenders often had little hesitation about confessing,
secure in the hope that they would be forgiven. A zero tolerance policy, whatever its other merits,
incentivizes persistent denial.
81 See, e.g., Antonio Spadaro, S.J., A Big Heart Open to God: An Interview with Pope Francis,
AMERICA (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2013/09/30/big-heart-open-god-
interview-pope-francis [https://perma.cc/APG5-EH8X ] (“I see the church as a field hospital after
battle. It is useless to ask a seriously injured person if he has high cholesterol and about the level
of his blood sugars! You have to heal his wounds.”).
82 Reflection Points for “The Protection of Minors in The Church” Meeting (Feb. 21, 2019),
http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_puntidiriflessione-protezioneminori_20190221_en.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/7AYD-LL7G]. The second sentence of Reflection Item 15, whose first sentence
speaks of proportionality, introduces even further ambiguity. It reads in its entirety “To decide
that priests and bishops guilty of sexual abuse of minors leave the public ministry.” Does this
suggest that removal from “public ministry” is a proportional response to every proven act of sexual
abuse? And, even if it does, does removal from “public ministry” (emphasis added) mean that the
guilty man, rather than be defrocked, will simply be sent, as McCarrick initially was, into a private
retreat?
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of “zero tolerance” but of “the mystery of evil” and of the need “to find a
correct equilibrium of all values in play and to provide uniform direc-
tives for the Church, avoiding the two extremes of a ‘justicialism’ pro-
voked by guilt for past errors and media pressure, and a defensiveness
that fails to confront the causes and effects of these grave crimes.”83 It
is not clear which is worse, to promise “zero tolerance” and fail to de-
liver, as the Catholic Church has done up to now, or, having once prom-
ised “zero tolerance,” to retreat from that promise, as Francis now
seems to be doing. What is clear is that both give rise to scandal.
B. Treating Accusers at Least as Well as the Accused
In no small part because of the reputational harm they can do to
both the accused individual and the institution, the Church has long
treated false accusations more harshly than proven abuse or cover up,
in both the Code of Canon Law and in everyday practice.84 This attitude
has complicated the ability of Pope Francis to deal with the abuse crisis.
When Chileans, including victims of abuse, other parishioners, and
even bishops, protested the promotion to a bishopric of Juan Barros Ma-
drid, seen as complicit in the crimes of a notorious abuser, Fernando
Karadima, Francis initially insisted the accusers were “dumb” and “led
by the nose by the leftists who orchestrated all this”85 and “there is not
one single piece of evidence. It is all slander. Is that clear?”86 Surprised
by a firestorm of response,87 Francis finally met with survivors, as he
had initially declined to do, and commissioned a report from Archbishop
Charles Scicluna of Malta, formerly the Vatican’s top prosecutor for sex
83 Francis, supra note 24 (emphasis in original).
84 See SIPE ET AL., supra note 64, at 595 (comparing the canon law penalties for these offenses).
85 Catholic League, Pope Says “Leftists” Exploit Abuse Issue, BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.ORG
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2015/09_10/2015_10_08_CatholicLeague
_PopeSays.htm [https://perma.cc/YXS4-T244]. See also, e.g., Francis Becomes First Pope to Con-
demn Church’s ‘Culture Of Abuse And Cover-Up’, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 31, 2018), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2018/may/31/pope-francis-catholic-church-culture-abuse-chile [https://per
ma.cc/F5MA-MQJS]; Jason Horowitz, Pope Apologizes to Abuse Victims but Again Doubts Them,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/world/europe/pope-francis-sex-ab
use.html [https://perma.cc/PYB8-KFJN].
86 See, e.g., Siobhán O’Grady, Chilean Church Apologizes after Issuing Guidelines Saying
Priests Shouldn’t Touch Kids’ Genitals, WASH. POST (October 4, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/2018/10/04/chilean-church-apologizes-after-issuing-guidelines-saying-priests-
shouldnt-touch-kids-genitals/?utm_term=.94a02e45db85gg [https://perma.cc/EBQ5-Z5NM].
87 Even Cardinal Seán O’Malley of Boston, President of the Pontifical Commission for the
Protection of Minors, rebuked Francis for his apparent callousness. See Statement of Cardinal
Seán O’Mally, President of the Commission for the Protection of Minors (Jan. 20, 2018),
https://www.bostoncatholic.org/utility/news-and-press/content.aspx?id=34264 [https://perma.cc/5
3X8-GBPE] (“Pope Francis’ statements . . . in . . . Chile were a source of great pain for survivors of
sexual abuse by clergy . . . . Words that convey the message ‘if you cannot prove your claims then
you will not be believed’ abandon those who have suffered reprehensible criminal violations of
their human dignity and relegate survivors to discredited exile.”).
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abuse crimes, that led to a mass offer of resignation on the part of the
Chilean bishops. In a June 5, 2018 letter to the Chilean people, quoted
above, Francis spoke for the first time and repeatedly of a “culture of
abuse and cover up”88 which he urged be ended. Nevertheless, he has
continued to be less than fully receptive to the demands of victims. Just
one day before the beginning of the summit on sex abuse, he insisted,
“one cannot live an entire life accusing, accusing, accusing the Church.
Whose is the office of the accuser! The devil! And those who spend their
life accusing, accusing, accusing, are—I will not say children, because
the devil does not have any—but friends, cousins, relatives of the
devil.”89
After the summit, when asked why he had not accepted the resig-
nation of French Cardinal Barbarin, who had offered it after having
been convicted by a French court of the crime of covering up child abuse
and whose local diocesan council had voted almost unanimously in favor
of his retirement, Francis noted that Barbarin was appealing his crim-
inal conviction and therefore remained entitled to the presumption of
innocence; he did not explain why the standards of the secular criminal
law should apply to the administrative question of Barbarin’s resigna-
tion, other than to say it was “important because it goes against the
superficial condemnation of the media.”90
C. Ending Mandated Secrecy
Francis has been repeatedly asked by national and international
bodies to abolish the pontifical secret with respect to sexual abuse and
to mandate reporting by Church officials to state authorities, but has
thus far refused to do so in any categorical way. In 2014, early in his
papacy, the United Nations committee investigating the failure of the
Holy See to live up to its commitments under the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child identified as particularly problematic the fact
that “[d]ue to a code of silence imposed on all members of the clergy
under penalty of excommunication, cases of child sexual abuse have
hardly ever been reported to the law enforcement authorities in the
countries where the crimes were committed.”91 The U.N. Committee
88 Letter from Pope Francis to the Pilgrim People of God in Chile, ¶ 3 (Cath. News Agency
trans. June 5, 2018), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/full-text-of-pope-francis-letter-to-
the-church-in-chile-35580 [https://perma.cc/V8SF-EW9F].
89 Pope Francis, Greeting to the Archdiocese of Benevento (Feb. 20, 2019), http://w2.vati-
can.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2019/february/documents/papa-francesco_20190220_diocesi
-benevento.html [https://perma.cc/M5FR-3KSN].
90 Pope Francis, Remarks during the Press Conference on the Return Flight from Rabat to
Rome (Mar. 31, 2019), http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2019/march/documents/
papa-francesco_20190331_marocco-voloritorno.html [https://perma.cc/7LHW-WEG8].
91 UNITED NATIONS, COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
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Against Torture similarly recommended “that the Holy See take effec-
tive measures to ensure that allegations received by its officials con-
cerning violations of the Convention are communicated to the proper
civil authorities to facilitate their investigation and prosecution of al-
leged perpetrators.”92 The Vatican had responded that its treaty obliga-
tions only extended to the territory of Vatican City and to the conduct
of its ambassadors, that it did “not have the capacity or legal obligation
to impose the abovementioned principles upon the local Catholic
churches and institutions present on the territory of other States and
whose activities abide with national laws” and that to attempt to impose
them “could constitute a violation of the principle of non-interference in
the internal affairs of States.”93 As a general matter, the Catholic
Church’s resort to legalisms has not served its reputational interests
well, whether before the U.N. or in national courts; this has in itself
been a source of scandal. More specifically, as commentators observed,
this particular legalistic response was more than slightly disingenuous
given that a) the Pope as a virtual absolute monarch could single-hand-
edly and at will alter the legal obligations under canon law of the clergy
throughout the world, and b) no other state prohibits, and all would
likely welcome, greater reporting of child sexual abuse by clergy.94 The
Vatican did grant a dispensation to allow reporting to the police “where
the civil law requires to the United States in 2002 and to the rest of the
world in 2010, but where there are no such civil laws, the pontifical
secret” continued to apply.95
At the February 2019 Vatican summit, not only canon lawyer Linda
Ghisoni,96 but Cardinal Reinhard Marx, a member of the C9 Council of
Cardinals who are Francis’s closest advisors, called for the abolition of
ON THE SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE HOLY SEE 10 (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.ref-
world.org/docid/52f8a1544.html [https://perma.cc/6ZRH-NBHN].
92 UNITED NATIONS, COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE




93 Comments of the Holy See on the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights
of the Child, ¶ 5 (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/2014/docu-
ments/rc-seg-st-20140205_concluding-observations-rights-child_en.html [https://perma.cc/7T2J-
JJAW].
94 See, e.g., Kieran Tapsell, The Strange Disconnect Between Pope Francis’ Words and Actions
About Sex Abuse, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.ncronline.org/news/accountabil-
ity/strange-disconnect-between-pope-francis-words-and-actions-about-sex-abuse [https://perma.cc
7HLA-Z8VA].
95 Id.; see also Guide to Understanding Basic CDF Procedures Concerning Sexual Abuse Alle-
gations, http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_guide-CDF-procedures_en.html [https://perm
a.cc/C7XA-GZG9] (“Civil law concerning reporting of crimes to the appropriate authorities should
always be followed.”).
96 See O’Connell, supra note 15.
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the pontifical secret as applied “to the prosecution of criminal offences
concerning the abuse of minors.”97 Archbishop Scicluna, one of the or-
ganizers of the summit, suggested in a press conference that legislation
might be prepared to accomplish this,98 but it has not yet clearly
emerged.99
D. Carrying through on Commitments
Increasingly, the response of the Vatican under Pope Francis to the
sex abuse crisis has come to resemble that of a typical business corpo-
ration in the throes of crisis management. It issues the equivalent of a
press release when particularly bad news hits the headlines, promises
action after a committee studies the matter, and then fails to follow
through even on explicitly promised reforms. The 2017 resignation let-
ter of abuse survivor Marie Collins from the Pontifical Commission for
the Protection of Minors illustrates this problem, describing as “stum-
bling blocks” what might properly be called scandals, chief of which is
the “reluctance of some members of the Vatican Curia to implement the
recommendations of the Commission despite their approval by the
pope.”100 Among the papally approved but unimplemented recommen-
dations Collins lists are major structural ones, such as “a tribunal in
which negligent bishops could be held accountable,” announced in 2015,
but then “found by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith . . . to
have unspecified ‘legal’ difficulties” and vetoed.101 Collins also recounts
that despite explicit papal instructions “to ensure all correspondence
from victims/survivors receives a response,” some Vatican departments
were categorically refusing to comply, a more minor but still meaningful
97 Reinhard Cardinal Marx, Second Presentation at “The Protection of Minors in the Church”
Meeting (Feb. 23, 2019), http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_card-marx-protezioneminori
_20190223_en.html [https://perma.cc/TU4G-LPB9].
98 Gerard O’Connell, The Vatican Summit on the Protection of Minors Is Over. What’s Next?,
AMERICA (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2019/03/01/vatican-su
mmit-protection-minors-over-whats-next [https://perma.cc/6HVM-EZR8] (quoting Scicluna as ac-
knowledging “a growing feeling that these cases should not be subjected to the pontifical secret,”
and suggesting that after discussions among the relevant congregations in Rome “the vademecum
can be finalized”).
99 See Kieran Tapsell, Has the Pontifical Secret Been Secretly Buried?, PEARLS AND
IRRITATIONS (June 12, 2019), https://johnmenadue.com/kieran-tapsell-has-the-pontifical-secret-be
en-secretly-buried/ [https://perma.cc/AD6S-LVUA] (analyzing recent developments).
100 Collins, supra note 78.
101 Id. When Collins subsequently asked Francis why he had allowed the CDF to block the
tribunal, he “told [her] that bishops could not all be held to the same standard. Allowances had to
be made for their cultural difference.” She responded that “Canon law is universal—Catholic Doc-
trine is universal – safeguarding should be universal.” See Press Release, We Are Church Ireland,
Marie Collins puts it up to Pope Francis (Jan. 14, 2019), http://wearechurchireland.ie/marie-col-
lins-puts-it-up-to-pope-francis/ [https://perma.cc/AW4F-22X6].
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failure.102 When the 2019 summit was announced, Collins pointed out
that a similar meeting with a similar purpose organized by many of the
same Church leaders has been held at the Vatican in 2012, and that
meeting, titled Towards Healing and Renewal, had yet to yield concrete
results.103
Rather than marking an end to these failures to follow through, the
2019 Vatican summit simply intensified the scandalous impression that
words would not be followed by meaningful and effective action. Even
before it began, it was seen as needlessly impeding meaningful pro-
gress, when, in November, the Vatican asked the USCCB to delay a vote
on proposed standards of episcopal conduct and on the formation of a
special commission for review of complaints against bishops for viola-
tions of the standards until after the summit.104 This delay would have
been bad enough if, at the summit, comparable proposals on these is-
sues had been presented and made applicable to the worldwide Church.
But no concrete proposals of any kind on any issue were put on the table
for resolution at the summit, which seemed more of a consciousness
raising session than a venue for decision-making, its goal a “change of
mentality”105 more than a change of policy. Instead, of acting, or even
being given specific directions for acting, the bishops were sent home to
discuss amongst themselves and to await a promised vademecumwhose
contents and delivery date remained unspecified. In the months since
the summit, Francis has issued two relevant pieces of legislation, one
establishing reporting requirements within the clerical hierarchy for
those with notice of child sex abuse or its cover up,106 the other govern-
ing child sex abuse and related crimes in the territory of Vatican City.107
Francis has always been clear that “[l]oss of credibility . . . cannot be
regained by issuing stern decrees or by simply creating new committees
102 Collins, supra note 78.
103 SeeWe Are Church Ireland, supra note 101.
104 See, e.g., Christopher White, Vatican Asks US Bishops for Delay in Responding to Sex Abuse
Crisis, CRUX (Nov. 12, 2018), https://cruxnow.com/church-in-the-usa/2018/11/12/24atican-asks-us-
bishops-for-delay-in-responding-to-sex-abuse-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/MSQ8-FLH9] (describing
the USCCB’s head Cardinal DiNardo decrying “victimizing survivors all over again by demanding
they heal on our timeline”).
105 See Pope Francis, Address at the end of the Eucharistic Concelebration at “The Protection
Of Minors In The Church” Meeting (Feb. 24, 2019), http://w2.vatican.va/content/24atican24o/en/sp
eeches/2019/24atican24/documents/papa-francesco_20190224_incontro-protezioneminori-chiusur
a.html [https://perma.cc/8CSL-XSG2] (“a change of mentality is needed to combat a defensive and
reactive approach to protecting the institution and to pursue, wholeheartedly and decisively, the
good of the community by giving priority to the victims of abuse”).
106 Apostolic Letter from Pope Francis, Vos Estis Lux Mundi (May 7, 2019), http://w2.vati-
can.va/content/24atican24o/en/motu_proprio/documents/papa-francesco-motu-proprio-20190507_
-estis-lux-mundi.html [https://perma.cc/KHS3-B4NY] (Issued Motu Proprio).
107 LAW NO. CCXCVII, ON THE PROTECTION OFMINORS AND VULNERABLE PERSONS (Mar. 26,
2019), http://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_protezioneminori-legge297_20190326_en.html
[https://perma.cc/RQY4-FXMB].
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or improving flow charts, as if we were in charge of a department of
human resources.”108 But, at least when it comes to the scandal of cler-
ical sexual abuse, Francis has been no more effective at implementing
a “change in [the hierarchy’s] mind-set (metanoia)” 109 than he has been
at effecting systemic organizational change.
E. Engaging in Meaningful Atonement
In an August 2018 Letter to the People of God provoked by the re-
lease of the extremely graphic and detailed Pennsylvania grand jury
report on clergy sex abuse, Pope Francis acknowledged that “no effort
to beg pardon and to seek to repair the harm done will ever be suffi-
cient.”110 He is right about that, but survivors and other critics are also
right that there have been to date no meaningful efforts at atonement
by responsible persons in the hierarchy of the Church. Later in the same
letter, Francis acknowledged that “prayer and penance will help” to
achieve “a conversion of heart” but then “invite[d] the entire holy faith-
ful People of God to a penitential exercise of prayer and fasting.”111 This
aroused justifiable indignation among faithful Catholics, who correctly
insisted it was not the people, who had been excluded from all relevant
decision making, but the hierarchy of the Catholic Church who needed
to do penance for the scandal of sex abuse.112 Since the beginning of the
sex abuse crisis, a standard punishment for guilty clerics was to be sen-
tenced to prayer and repentance in seclusion. Before the process against
him escalated to his laicization, for example, McCarrick was “ordered
last year to a friary in a remote Kansas town to live in seclusion, prayer
and penance.”113While sufficient seclusion might isolate such penitents
108 Letter from Pope Francis to the Bishops of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
(Jan. 1, 2019), http://w2.vatican.va/content/25atican25o/en/letters/2019/documents/papa-francesc
o_20190101_lettera-vescovi-usa.html [https://perma.cc/K5CS-QT2K].
109 Id.He hasn’t even settled on a set of slogans. His latest effort, five months after the summit
was to call for an “apostolate of prevention” in a video message to Mexican clerics at a workshop
on sexual abuse. What exactly this might be was left unclear. See, e.g., Claire Lesegretain, Pope








112 See, e.g., Joanna Moorhead, How Dare the Pope Ask Ordinary Catholics to Atone for Child
Abuse?, THEGUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/21
/pope-catholic-church-child-abuse-letter-atone [https://perma.cc/AA97-X8TX].
113 Michelle Boorstein, Julie Zauzmer, & Chico Harlan, The Vatican Moves Quickly Toward
Punishing Ex-Cardinal McCarrick For Sexual Abuse, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.was
hingtonpost.com/religion/2019/01/09/25atican-moves-quickly-toward-punishing-ex-cardinal-mcca
rrick-sexual-abuse/?utm_term=.1c4de112c9be [https://perma.cc/PAL6-CWGP].
26 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
from access to further abuse victims, critics view them as still being in
too comfortable surroundings supported by the Church.114Occasionally,
bishops have engaged in symbolic public acts of penance, such as pros-
trating themselves before the altar or washing the feet of abuse victims
as part of the traditional Holy Thursday service commemorating Je-
sus’s washing of his apostles’ feet at the Last Supper.115 This latter act
may have given victims some comfort and sense of acknowledgment,
but, when compared with historical examples of public penance,116 it is
far too easy. King Henry II of England, for example, walked barefoot to
Canterbury, where, stripped to the waist, he allowed himself to be
scourged by the monks to atone for the public scandal of the murder of
Thomas Becket.117 Public penance by authority figures historically also
involved some concessions of money and power. Henry II, for example,
as part of his public penance, contributed to a Crusade and to the
Church and committed to abolish all customs prejudicial to the
Church.118 Instead of mobilizing expensive lawyers to fight abuse claims
in court and to lobby against extensions of the statute of limitations for
tort cases involving clergy sex abuse, the Catholic Church might have
opened its coffers, if not for prompt and generous payments directly to
the victims, then at least to fund, for example, victim-oriented services.
To avoid the financial cost of atonement falling on the faithful people,
the hierarchy might have begun, not by cutting programs or seeking
contributions, but by selling off assets like their rectories and episcopal
residences119 and their precious jewels, living like penitents in sackcloth
on the ash heap.
114 Support by the Church in a controlled environment has practical advantages as well as
symbolic costs, however, because it makes it less likely that predators will seek secular employ-
ment in which they can abuse again.
115 See, e.g., James Martin, S.J., Cardinal and Archbishop Wash the Feet of Abuse Victims,
HUFFPOST (May 21, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/cardinal-and-archbishop-w_b_826083
[https://perma.cc/N8E9-E4EK] (distinguishing between public confession, involuntary punish-
ment, such as imprisonment in a penitentiary, and the sort of penance he sees as necessary in the
wake of the sex abuse crisis, in which “it is the layperson who must grant absolution to those clergy
who are seeking forgiveness.”).
116 Eve Tushnet, The Value of Public Penance in the Age of Clerical Abuse, Mass Incarceration
and #Metoo, AMERICA (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2019/02/22/value-p
ublic-penance-age-clerical-abuse-mass-incarceration-and-metoo [https://perma.cc/88XF-5N7K]
(summarizing scholarly work on the medieval history of public penance, which could involve “an-
ything from whipping to reciting psalms, from pilgrimage to fasting to public humiliations, like
standing outside the church doors in sackcloth and ashes”).
117 SeeMike Ibeji, Becket, the Church and Henry II, BBC (updated Feb. 11, 2017), http://www.b
bc.co.uk/history/british/middle_ages/becket_01.shtml [https://perma.cc/ZQ36-HR8U].
118 Id.
119 Under financial pressure from abuse settlements, this has occasionally occurred, most no-
tably in the Archdiocese of Boston following the Spotlight revelations. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Bos-
ton Archbishop Will Sell Residence for Abuse Payout, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2003), https://www.ny-
times.com/2003/12/04/us/boston-archbishop-will-sell-residence-for-abuse-payout.html [https://per
ma.cc/SA83-8UE6].
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Even now, however, offers of compensation from the Church have
obviously mixed motives. Consider, for example, New York Cardinal
Timothy Dolan’s hiring of Kenneth Feinberg, made famous through his
handling of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, to apply a
similar methodology to an Archdiocesan Independent Reconciliation
and Compensation Program, which reviews the claims of abuse victims
and offers compensation without resort to formal court process and not-
withstanding the statute of limitations.120 Although touted as a model
other dioceses might follow, it was clearly developed in the shadow of
the New York legislature’s plan to pass a Child Victims Act with an
extended statute of limitations and a one year lookback during which
victims of any age or time of offense could bring their claims to court, a
provision Dolan claimed would be “toxic to the Church.”121
F. Acknowledging That the Abuse of Minors Is Only a Small Frac-
tion of Clerical Sexual Abuse, Albeit the Only One the Catholic
Church Has Thusfar Made Any Serious Effort to Address
One of the many respects in which the summit on the “The Protec-
tion of Minors in the Church” can be seen as too little, too late was its
narrow focus on the sexual abuse of minors122 in a year in which there
was more scandalous publicity than ever before concerning diverse
other forms of sexual abuse by members of the clergy. For example, alt-
hough Theodore McCarrick had been credibly accused of abuse of mi-
nors, the bulk of his sexual imposition was on seminarians who were
legal adults but subject to his power; his treatment of them played a
major role in the canonical proceedings leading to his laicization. And,
immediately before the summit, Tom Doyle, an Irish activist on behalf
of the children of priests, of which he himself is one, announced to the
New York Times that this would be “the next scandal,” revealing that
an archbishop had showed him internal Vatican guidelines for how to
120 See, e.g., Paul Elie, What Do the Church’s Victims Deserve?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 15, 2019),
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/04/15/what-do-the-churchs-victims-deserve [https://perma.cc
/RK6B-CDUK] (describing Feinberg’s New York program in the context of the history of claims
against the Catholic Church).
121 Karen DeWitt, Cardinal Dolan Says Key Provision in Child Victims Act Would Be ‘Toxic’
for the Church, WNYC (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.wnyc.org/story/cardinal-dolan-says-key-pro-
vision-child-victims-act-would-be-toxic-church/ [https://perma.cc/44M9-93E6].
122 The emphasis on minors also led to problems in another direction, perhaps exacerbated by
Francis’s insistence that it was in families, not in the Church where most abuse occurs. See Fran-
cis, supra note 24. Some African and Asian prelates wondered why only sexual abuse was being
discussed, when, in their countries child soldiers and child enslavement were also prevalent. See
Jamie Manson, Why the Sex Abuse Summit Accomplished Nothing, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Mar. 6,
2019), https://www.ncronline.org/news/accountability/grace-margins/why-sex-abuse-summit-acco
mplished-nothing?fbclid=IwAR0rmJWTLEvQ-jcSGc2wYX7ROL3_L99MABhwRGi17qIpzdWyB6
FzXjl8Kg [https://perma.cc/9B3T-GKNU] (quoting Archbishop Mark Coleridge).
28 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
deal with priests who father children.123 Summit organizer Scicluna
met with Doyle the next day, and appeared to endorse Doyle’s position,
previously endorsed by the Irish bishops, that “the interest of the child
should be paramount,” rather than enforced secrecy to protect the
Church’s reputation, or even enforced laicization, which might leave the
father without the financial means to provide for his child.124
The sexual exploitation of nuns by clergy was also prominently in
the news, with both breaking news stories and investigative journalism
bringing it to Pope Francis’s direct attention immediately before the
summit on minors. Among the breaking news stories were the resigna-
tion of a CDF official for alleged sexual imposition on a German nun in
the confessional125 and protests in India following accusations by a nun
in Kerala that a bishop had repeatedly raped her.126 The supplement
Woman Church World in the Vatican’s own newspaper, L’Osservatore
Romano, included in February 2019, the month of the summit, an arti-
cle by editor Lucetta Scaraffia on the sexual abuse of nuns by clergy,127
following up on an article in the same magazine the previous year on
the slave like conditions under which nuns in Rome and elsewhere were
forced to perform menial labor for priests.128 “If eyes continue to be
closed to this scandal—rendered even more serious by the fact that the
abuse of women entails procreation and is thus at the root of the scandal
of imposed abortions and of the children not recognized by priests,”
Scaraffia wrote, “the condition of oppression of women in the Church
will never change.”129 The hashtag #NunsToo had begun trending in
2018, when Nicole Winfield of the Associated Press reported that
123 Jason Horowitz & Elisabetta Povoledo, Vatican’s Secret Rules for Catholic Priests Who Have
Children, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/world/europe/priests-
children-vatican-rules-celibacy.html [https://perma.cc/BGR6-F269].
124 Priest’s Son Demands Vatican Attention for Clergy’s Children, CRUX (Feb. 21, 2019), https://
cruxnow.com/church-in-uk-and-ireland/2019/02/21/priests-son-demands-vatican-attention-for-cle
rgys-children/ [https://perma.cc/RCF5-LAHS].
125 See Conservative Priest Resigns from CDF Under Liberal Media Pressure Ahead of Vatican
Sex Abuse Summit, LIFESITE (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/vatican-official-
resigns-after-ex-consecrated-woman-accuses-him-of-advances [https://perma.cc/WAR9-CX29].
126 See, e.g., Agence France-presse, India: Police Charge Catholic Bishop with Raping Nun,
THEGUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/10/india-police-charg
e-catholic-bishop-with-raping-nun [https://perma.cc/DXK6-R8Z6] (describing months of protests
by nuns that preceded the eventual police arrest of the bishop).
127 Lucetta Scaraffia, Without Any Touching, L’OSSERVATORE ROMANO: WOMEN CHURCH
WORLD (Feb. 1, 2019), http://www.osservatoreromano.va/en/news/without-any-touching [https://pe
rma.cc/5CG7-PMCQ] (citing inter alia path-breaking reports from the 1990s by Sr. Maura
O’Donohue and Sr. Marie McDonald concerning the impregnation and forced abortions imposed
by priests on nuns in Africa).
128 Marie-Lucile Kubacki, The (Almost) Free Work of Sisters, L’OSSERVATOREROMANO:WOMEN
CHURCH WORLD (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.osservatoreromano.va/en/news/almost-free-work-sis-
ters [https://perma.cc/C6H3-YUKM].
129 Scaraffia, supra note 127.
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“[a]fter decades of silence, nuns talk about abuse by priests.”130 Win-
field’s article cited both specific very recent examples and a report cov-
ering the sexual abuse of nuns in nearly two-dozen countries that had
been prepared for the Vatican by Sr. Maura O’ Donaghue in 1994 but
had only first been publicly acknowledged in 2001.131 When Winfield
took the occasion of Scaraffia’s article to ask Pope Francis himself at a
press conference whether the abuse summit would also address “the
sexual abuse of consecrated women in the Church,” Pope Francis
acknowledged that this was a longstanding, not yet solved problem
about which “something more [should] be done.” Describing an instance
where John Paul II, presented by the future Benedict XVI with docu-
mentary evidence of such sexual abuse, had refused to take action,
Francis insisted, “We should not be scandalized by this—it’s part of a
process.” He credited Benedict XVI with later bringing the documents
out of the archive, and dissolving a particular order of nuns “because a
certain slavery of women had crept in, slavery to the point of sexual
slavery on the part of clergy.”132 After this admission made headlines,
the Pope’s spokesman promptly walked it back saying, “When the Holy
Father . . . spoke of ‘sexual slavery’ he meant ‘manipulation.”133 Shortly
thereafter, Scaraffia and the bulk of her team tendered their resigna-
tions, claiming they felt surrounded by an atmosphere of distrust and
progressive delegitimisation.134
In recent legislation, the Vatican has expanded its angle of vision
to encompass clerical sexual abuse not only of minors but of “vulnera-
ble” persons, but its definition of vulnerability appears to be a narrow
130 See Nicole Winfield & Rodney Muhumuza, After Decades of Silence, Nuns Talk about Abuse
by Priests, ASSOCIATEDPRESS (Jul. 27, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/5ef7c4d0177840939929293
14fd87621 [https://perma.cc/CBA6-T9P3.] Among the recent cases Winfield mentioned were alle-
gations of sexual imposition by confessors (the original target of Crimen Sollicitationis), and ex-
amples from convents in Chile and Uganda.
131 Id.; see also, e.g., Patsy McGarry, The Irish Woman Who Exposed Abuse of Nuns by Priests
25 Years Ago, IRISHTIMES (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/religion-
and-beliefs/the-irish-woman-who-exposed-abuse-of-nuns-by-priests-25-years-ago-1.3788555 [http
s://perma.cc/JQK9-P3EM].
132 Pope Francis, Remarks during the Press Conference on the Return Flight from Rabat to
Rome (Feb. 5, 2019), http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2019/february/documents/
papa-francesco_20190205_emiratiarabi-voloritorno.html [https://perma.cc/8GJF-TLQG] (transcri-
pt corrected as described in following footnote); Jason Horowitz & Elizabeth Dias, Pope Acknowl-
edges Nuns Were Sexually Abused by Priests and Bishops, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.n
ytimes.com/2019/02/05/world/europe/pope-nuns-sexual-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/DY9D-2UP8]
(quoting Pope’s remarks as originally delivered).
133 See Jason Horowitz, Sexual Abuse of Nuns: Longstanding Church Scandal Emerges from
Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/06/world/europe/pope-fran-
cis-sexual-abuse-nuns.html [https://perma.cc/ZG3W-CME3] (quoting papal spokesperson Ales-
sandro Gisotti).
134 The reasons for the group resignation were complicated, including claims that changes in
the editorial structure of the paper had put the women under greater control by men.
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one135whereas, when it comes to sexual imposition by clergy, adult sem-
inarians, nuns, even congregants are all vulnerable; the children of
priests, whatever the circumstances of their conception, are per se vul-
nerable; and the Catholic Church itself is most vulnerable to the scan-
dal of all such sexual imposition. To date no legislation, no concrete
plans, not even any overarching rhetoric, has emerged to address the
sum total of these scandals.
V. CODA: SCANDAL AS STUMBLING BLOCK INOTHER INSTITUTIONS
In my view, the central problem of scandal at the core of this paper
is not limited either to the Catholic Church or to the problem of sex
abuse. The need, in the technical sense, to avoid scandal arises any time
it is important for the sake of the public good that people have faith in
an institution and in the particular persons in charge of running that
institution. It should not be surprising that other religions now faced
with their own long hidden sex abuse problems have doctrines akin to
the Catholic doctrine of scandal to which institutional actors can appeal
in calibrating their response. I will briefly discuss one set of such doc-
trines, those deriving from halakha or Jewish law, as they are applied
to concerns about sex abuse of minors among the Haredim, or ultra-
orthodox Jews.
Religions are, however, not the only institutions that require faith.
So, at least in the United States, do the institutions of government. One
recent #MeToo scandal, the process by which Brett Kavanaugh was con-
firmed to a seat on the Supreme Court, has shaken the faith of many in
each of the three main branches of the federal government. This paper
will conclude by drawing some very brief analogies between the Ka-
vanaugh hearings and the Catholic Church’s failed approach to the
scandal of sex abuse.
A. Child Sex Abuse among the Haredim, or Ultra-Orthodox Jews
Consider the case of Rabbi Nuchem Rosenberg, described as “the
lone whistleblower among the Satmar, a powerful Hasidic sect.” After
he personally observed the anal rape of a boy in a Jerusalem Mikvah,
or ritual bath, in 2005, “he started blogging about sex abuse in his com-
munity and opened a New York City hotline to field sex abuse com-
plaints,” concluding from the evidence he gathered that about half of all
135 See, e.g., Pope Francis, supra note 106, A. I, § 2 (b) (“‘vulnerable person’ means: any person
in a state of infirmity, physical or mental deficiency, or deprivation of personal liberty which, in
fact, even occasionally, limits their ability to understand or to want or otherwise resist the of-
fence”).
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young Hasidic males are victims of sex abuse by adults in their commu-
nity. His reward has been ostracism, as, for example, advertisements
taken out by the self-described “great rabbis and rabbinical judges of
the city of New York” have denounced him as “a stumbling block for the
House of Israel.” As in the Catholic Church, victims’ advocates among
the Haredim claim that in their community, the “greatest sin is not the
abuse, but talking about the abuse.” The Haredi leadership, like that of
the Catholic Church, can invoke religious doctrine and religious law in
support of secrecy. The halakhic (Jewish law) equivalent of the doctrine
of scandal is the prohibition of “lashon hara “ or “evil speech,” a prohi-
bition on the spreading of derogatory albeit true information about an-
other. And, as in the Catholic Church, some religious leaders have been
arguing for decades that, not only does the prohibition on such speech
not apply when the purpose of speaking is to prevent further harm, but
also “a conspiracy to conceal information about abuse will ultimately be
made public, creating an even greater hillul Hashem” or desecration.
B. The Kavanaugh Hearings as a Scandal136
Like the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (“CDF”), the
Senate Judiciary Committee, when it comes to advising and consenting
to judicial nomination, sees its chief task as investigation of doctrinal
matters, from original intent to stare decisis, even though it may not
have as clear a sense as the CDF as to what constitutes orthodoxy or
heresy.137 Like the CDF, it has also long needed to involve itself in at
least some examination of the alleged sins and crimes of candidates for
office, something it has generally done in executive session, to protect
136 At least two op-eds, one from a priest, the other from a law professor active in clergy sex
abuse cases, apply lessons learned in the clergy sex abuse scandal to the charges against Ka-
vanaugh. See Thomas Reese, Father Brett Kavanaugh Would Be Suspended and Investigated,
RELIGIONNEWS SERV. (Sep. 21, 2018), https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/signs-times/father-
brett-kavanaugh-would-be-suspended-and-investigated [https://perma.cc/4WWJ-2CM5] (suggest-
ing that the procedures used by the N.Y. Archdiocese to investigate claims against McCarrick
would be a good model for addressing claims against Kavanaugh); Marci A. Hamilton, The Re-
sponse to the Kavanaugh Allegations Exposes the Lessons We Failed to Learn from the Catholic
Clergy’s Abuse, TIME (Oct. 4, 2018), https://time.com/5415241/brett-kavanaugh-catholic-church-
abuse/ [https://perma.cc/CNE9-B58P] (noting that, unlike in the Kavanaugh case, with respect to
clergy sex abuse, no one any longer agonizes over “the possibility of falsely maligning ‘good men,’”
in part because so many allegations initially deemed “not credible” have been proven true). At the
other extreme was the criticism that the Pennsylvania grand jury report had failed to accord ac-
cused priests the presumption of innocence and ability to defend themselves the nomination pro-
cess had granted Kavanaugh. See Peter Steinfels, The PA Grand-Jury Report: Not What It Seems,
COMMONWEAL (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/pa-grand-jury-report-not-
what-it-seems [https://perma.cc/MM7S-3Z5P].
137 Compare the first part of the Clarence Thomas hearings, which focused on his endorsement
of natural law, with the second part, which focused on charges of sexual harassment. See, e.g.
Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Thomas on Natural Law, CSPAN (Sept. 13, 1991), https://ww
w.c-span.org/video/?c4474100/justice-thomas-natural-law [https://perma.cc/93TG-CREC].
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the privacy of the nominee and avoid scandal. Well before any allega-
tions of sexual assault were put on the agenda in connection with Brett
Kavanaugh’s nomination, the committee was already investigating eve-
rything from whether he had lied in previous testimony before Congress
to whether he had a gambling addiction to where he had obtained the
funds to pay off his considerable debts.138
Every major institutional and individual actor in the Kavanaugh
hearing process seemed to have had a concern with scandal that the
Catholic Church would recognize as familiar. In part, this may be re-
lated to the very high number of Catholics involved, from White House
Counsel Don McGahn, an old friend of Kavanaugh’s who shepherded
his nomination through the Senate with an unprecedented level of se-
crecy when it came to potentially damaging documentary evidence; to
Justice Kennedy, who may have resigned with an explicit understand-
ing that his former clerk would be nominated to replace him139 (a sort
of nepotism of the spirit rather than the flesh familiar in the Catholic
hierarchy); to Kavanaugh himself and his classmates at Georgetown
Prep. I could draw a lot of fairly superficial parallels,140 but there are, I
would argue, also deeper analogies. Kavanaugh’s classmate and wit-
ness Mark Judge includes in his memoir of their days at Georgetown
Prep a quote from the Baltimore Catechism he said Republican strate-
gist Pat Buchanan particularly valued: “The Eighth Commandment for-
bids lies, rash judgment, detraction, calumny, and telling of secrets we
are bound to keep. When does a person commit the sin of detraction? A
person commits the sin of detraction when, without a good reason, he
makes known the hidden faults of another.”141 This quotation sets forth
exactly the sort of justification that might lead a Catholic through, for
example, the technique of mental reservation, to be less than fully forth-
coming when asked about another’s sexual misconduct, as Judge and
generations of clerics were.142 It, together with the Catholic bro culture
138 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Kavanaugh Responds to Gambling Questions, Explains Re-
buffed Handshake, ABA J. (Sept. 13, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/kavanaugh_
says_he_occasionally_gambled_while_a_student_but_did_not_accrue_g [https://perma.cc/Q3JD-Y
PQ5].
139 Christopher Cadelago, Nancy Cook, & Andrew Restuccia, How A Private Meeting with Ken-
nedy Helped Trump Get to ‘Yes’ on Kavanaugh, POLITICO (July 9, 2018), https://www.politico.com/
story/2018/07/09/brett-kavanaugh-trump-private-meeting-706137 [https://perma.cc/75RC-7X5M].
140 For example, the use of alcohol as a disinhibitor and memory solvent was endemic among
pedophile priests, whose retreat houses routinely treated alcoholism together with sexual pathol-
ogies. Priests regularly took their victims in groups to beach houses allegedly to combine recreation
with spiritual retreat; Mark Judge, Kavanaugh’s drinking buddy, describes the infamous Beach
Week as “a perverse Liturgy of the Hours,” the beginning of “something sacred.” See MARK
GAUVREAU JUDGE, GOD ANDMAN AT GEORGETOWN PREP: HOW I BECAME A CATHOLIC DESPITE 20
YEARS OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLING 70, 75 (2005).
141 Id. at 16.
142 See, e.g., SIPE ET AL., supra note 64, at 3847 (describing this tactic of using misleading words
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in which it was applied, grounds Kavanaugh’s central assurance that
“What happens at Georgetown Prep, stays at Georgetown Prep. That’s
been a good thing for all of us.”143 Like bed-hopping seminarians, the
boys of Georgetown Prep, well into adulthood, could feel free to misbe-
have secure in the knowledge that a culture of omertà would preserve
both personal and institutional reputations from scandal.144
The analogies are even stronger when one focuses on the behavior
of and arguments made concerning the Judiciary Committee. As with
investigations into sex abuse, there were both sincere and somewhat
disingenuous expressions of concern about the victim, claims that it was
in her best interests that allegations not be made public, either by not
being pursued at all or being pursued only in executive session. With
respect to both the accuser’s choice to testify and the committee’s choice
to hear her, there were claims that this would ruin the glorious future
of a good man of hitherto blameless life for whom probity was an essen-
tial part of his job description. For the accusers this meant not only that
the risk of not being believed was high, but also that they would be
blamed for needlessly tarnishing reputations even if they were believed.
There was the same feeling that to vindicate the accuser would be to
take something infinitely precious from the accused, so that even if we
do believe her, we should refrain from punishing him. The question was
asked in both cases, do you really want to ruin this man’s life? The ju-
diciary, like the priesthood, was seen as an ontologically transformative
status as to which, on the one hand personal rectitude was important,
but on the other, depriving of it those who had worked hard to attain it
was a loss more devastating than that of an ordinary job.145Not just the
but avoiding an outright lie as permissible in Catholic moral theology when telling the full truth
would violate an obligation to keep a secret or otherwise cause a greater harm).
143 See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, What Happens at Georgetown Prep Stays at Georgetown Prep:




144 Forensic psychologist Lisa Rocchio characterized this as “the institutional response of pro-
tection” for the “youngmen [who] have their lives ahead of them” and “[l]ike in the Catholic Church
. . . for the institution itself” with the result of “sacrificing the victim to their priorities and goals.”
See Susan Zalkin, Kavanaugh Shows the Disgusting Underbelly of America’s Elite Schools, VICE
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4383bd/kavanaugh-shows-the-disgusting-un-
derbelly-of-americas-elite-schools [https://perma.cc/HT8W-8ZQN] (describing, inter alia, George-
town Prep’s cover up of abusive priests on its faculty and a more widespread “deny till you die
culture”).
145 On the other hand, those with knowledge of abusing priests who could “lovingly administer
. . . mass on Sunday after having raped . . . the night before” could bring to their evaluation of
Kavanaugh the conviction “that people are in fact capable of being more than one type of person.”
See Heather Stinson, Inadvertent Lessons from Judge Kavanaugh’s Confirmation Hearing, WAKE
FOREST J. OF L. & POL’Y (2018), https://wfulawpolicyjournal.com/2018/09/27/inadvertent-lessons-
from-judge-kavanaughs-confirmation-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/F37F-FDH3] (drawing on her ex-
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individual candidate, but the pipeline was seen to be at risk. As Senator
Lindsey Graham put it, “This is going to destroy the ability of good peo-
ple to come forward.”146 There was the same argument that, to preserve
the accused’s reputation and ability to continue in his noble profession,
allegations should be kept secret until proven. And there was the same
difficulty with that policy, that others with similar allegations were
much more likely to come forward only once they knew they were not
alone. For both Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh, as with so
many predator priests, the notion that the initial allegations were
uniquely aberrational accusations in an otherwise blameless life, was
increasingly undercut the more time went by from the publication of
the initial accusation. But, as with investigations into predator priests,
the results of the FBI investigation of Kavanaugh were put into a secret
archive, with senators only allowed to view it a few at a time over very
limited time periods and forbidden from copying or disclosing the con-
tents.147 For both accused clergy and accused judicial candidates, there
was an institutional apparatus behind the accused, but not the accuser.
In both cases although the central question was whether the candidate
was suitable for a job, not whether he was deserving of a penal sanction,
the standard imposed was “moral certainty,” or guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.
Perhaps most devastatingly for institutional reputations in both
the Catholic clerical and U.S. judicial sex abuse investigations, there
was the sense of déjà vu all over again. Just as each decade from the
1980s to the present has produced a new iteration of the clerical sex
abuse scandals, without the sense that anything had been learned, sub-
stantively or procedurally, from the last major iteration, so the Senate,
the Executive Branch, the Supreme Court, and the nation each found
itself facing in the Kavanaugh hearings exactly the same procedural
lapses and moral challenges it had faced in the 1991 Clarence Thomas-
Anita Hill hearings, without the sense that lessons had been learned or
much progress made.
periences hearing claims against priests for the Independent Reconciliation Compensation Pro-
gram (IRCP) in evaluating Kavanaugh).
146 Lindsey Graham, Statement during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the nomi-
nation of Brett M. Kavanaugh to be an Associate Justice of The Supreme Court (Wash. Post Tran-
script Sept. 27, 2018).
147 See Greg Sargent, Opinion: Elizabeth Warren’s New, Tantalizing Claim About Kavanaugh
Shows What Utter Madness This Is, S. F. GATE (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/ar-
ticle/Sen-Elizabeth-Warren-s-new-tantalizing-claim-13284601.php [https://perma.cc/FF6W-PHA
X] (noting that although Senator Warren was correct to say “Senators have been muzzled. . . .
Republicans have locked the documents behind closed doors,” the 2009 memorandum of under-
standing between the Judiciary Committee and the White House counsel concerning the confiden-
tiality of FBI background checks into nominees could be renegotiated).
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There is a numbing sameness to the stories, both substantively and
procedurally. There is also a grinding disillusionment that comes with
the awareness that multiple times over decades an institution has
promised it now has recognized the problem and will deal appropriately
with it, only to leave compromised actors and flawed procedures in place
essentially unchanged. This, in the end, rather than individual bad acts
by institutional actors, is what causes scandal that destroys necessary
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ABSTRACT
Two revelations are central to the meaning of the #MeToo movement. First, sexual
harassment and assault are ubiquitous. And second, traditional legal procedures
have failed to redress these problems. In the absence of effective formal legal pro-
cedures, a set of ad hoc processes have emerged for managing claims of sexual har-
assment and assault against persons in high-level positions in business, media,
and government. This Article sketches out the features of this informal process, in
which journalists expose misconduct and employers, voters, audiences, consumers,
or professional organizations are called upon to remove the accused from a position
of power. Although this process exists largely in the shadow of the law, it has at-
tracted criticisms in a legal register. President Trump tapped into a vein of popular
backlash against the #MeToo movement in arguing that it is “a very scary time for
young men in America” because “somebody could accuse you of something and
you’re automatically guilty.” Yet this is not an apt characterization of #MeToo’s
paradigm cases. In these cases, investigative journalists have carefully vetted alle-
gations; the accused have had opportunities to comment and respond; further in-
vestigation occurred when necessary; and the employment consequences, if there
were any at all, were proportional to the severity of the misconduct. This Article
offers a partial defense of the #MeToo movement against the argument that it of-
fends procedural justice. Rather than flouting due process values, #MeToo’s infor-
mal procedures have a number of advantages in addressing sexual misconduct
while providing fair process when the accused person is a prominent figure.
INTRODUCTION
The #MeToo movement has exposed that sexual harassment and
assault remain commonplace and that traditional legal procedures have
failed for survivors.1 The civil and criminal law impose high costs on
† Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I am grateful to Joni Hersch, Neha
Jain, Bethany Davis Noll, David Noll, Richard McAdams, Lesley Wexler, and the faculty at the
University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law for their advice on this project. Thanks to
Emily Lamm for helpful comments and superb research assistance.
1 Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html [https://perma.c
c/J7QL-BZD2].
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those who come forward while offering little in the way of benefits.2
Confidential settlements and mandatory arbitration isolate survivors
and cloak legal claims in secrecy, impairing the law’s ability to promote
social change.3 In the absence of effective formal legal procedures, an
ad hoc process4 has emerged for managing claims of sexual harassment
and assault against persons in high-level positions in business, media,
and government.5 In this ad hoc process, journalists expose misconduct
and employers, voters, audiences, consumers, or professional organiza-
tions are called upon to remove the accused from a position of power.
Since the fall of 2017, a number of survivors have used this informal
process to report abuse, and, as a result, over two hundred accused in-
dividuals have lost high-profile jobs, roles, or positions.6
The backlash came swiftly, invoking concerns of false allegations,7
due process,8 and overreach.9 In September 2018, the Supreme Court
confirmation hearings for Justice Brett Kavanaugh inspired the use of
the social media hashtag #HimToo to complain about the mistreatment
of accused men.10 President Trump tapped into this vein of popular
2 See infra notes 31–58, 219–228 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.
4 Cf. Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 774
(2017) (“Ad hoc procedure overcomes problems that cannot be solved using the existing procedural
structures, and may be necessary to ensure that the civil justice system is able to provide the
ordinary desiderata of civil litigation in cases that defy customary judicial management.”).
5 SeeMelissaMurray,Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual
Regulation, 113 NW. L. REV. 825, 833 (2019) (“#MeToo and its efforts respond directly to the view
that the state has failed to impose appropriate consequences on those who commit sexual harass-
ment and sexual assault.”). Cf. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Unofficial Reporting in the #MeToo Era,
2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 273, 276 (2019) (discussing how “#MeToo has catalyzed the creation of new
channels for reporting sexual misconduct without directly invoking the legal system or law-adja-
cent institutional structures”).
6 Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Re-
placements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10
/23/us/metoo-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/VTM3-KDJ].
7 See Measuring the #MeToo Backlash, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.econo-
mist.com/united-states/2018/10/20/measuring-the-metoo-backlash [https://perma.cc/65LW-CAF7]
(reporting that “18% of Americans now think that false accusations of sexual assault are a bigger
problem than attacks that go unreported or unpunished, compared with 13% in November last
year” based on YouGov polls of 1500 Americans).
8 See Emily Stewart, Trump Wants “Due Process” for Abuse Allegations. I Asked 8 Legal Ex-
perts What That Means, VOX (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/11/16
999466/what-is-due-process-trump (“[A]s more and more figures face consequences —financial, po-
litical, professional, and legal—for their bad behavior, one term that comes up over and over again
is ‘due process.’”).
9 See Masha Gessen, Sex, Consent, and the Dangers of ‘Misplaced Scale,’ NEW YORKER (Nov.
27, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/sex-consent-dangers-of-misplaced-sca
le [https://perma.cc/MN3F-PWMM]; Jia Tolentino, The Rising Pressure of the #MeToo Backlash,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-rising-pressu-
re-of-the-metoo-backlash [https://perma.cc/CVW7-8329].
10 Emma Grey Ellis, How #HimToo Became the Anti #MeToo of the Kavanaugh Hearings,
WIRED (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/brett-kavanaugh-hearings-himtoo-metoo-chr
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backlash in arguing that it is “a very scary time for young men in Amer-
ica” because “somebody could accuse you of something and you’re auto-
matically guilty.”11 With this comment, he connected the allegations
against older, powerful men with those against younger ones, perhaps
on college campuses. At rallies, the President trivialized the #MeToo
movement, joking that “the rules of MeToo” amount to a code of political
correctness.12 Hyperbolic commentators have called the movement a
“witch hunt,” “McCarthyism,” and “Soviet Union-style erasure” of ac-
cused men.13 More temperate observers have expressed the concerns
that “trial by media” is “often a hindrance to truth-finding”14 and that
decisions have been made in a “rush to judgment.”15
In large part, the response to this backlash has been to argue that
it is off the mark as a matter of law because the court of public opinion
is not constrained by procedural rules.16 This Article takes a different
tack. It identifies a set of emerging procedural norms for making and
istine-blasey-ford/ [https://perma.cc/E8GQ-Z5G2].
11 Dara Lind, Trump: “It’s a Very Scary Time for Young Men in America,” VOX (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/10/2/17928800/trump-women-doing-great-kavanaugh [http://perma.cc/
EUX8-NGN5].
12 Betsy Klein, Allie Malloy, & Kate Sullivan, Trump Mocks the #MeToo Movement at a Rally,
Again, CNN (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/10/politics/trump-rally-mocks-me-too/
index.html [https://perma.cc/9T9E-863E].
13 See, e.g., David M. Perry, No, #MeToo Is Not a Witch Hunt, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://psmag.com/social-justice/no-metoo-is-not-a-witch-hunt [https://perma.cc/4M7H-LFG5].
14 Shira A. Scheindlin & Joel Cohen, After #MeToo, We Can’t Ditch Due Process, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/08/metoo-due-process-televi
ctions [https://perma.cc/QV5P-F5VG].
15 Elizabeth Bartholet, #MeToo Excesses, HARV. CRIMSON, (Jan. 16, 2018) https://www.thecri-
mson.com/article/2018/1/16/bartholet-metoo-excesses/ [https://perma.cc/Q453-HHU5].
16 See, e.g., Ana Marie Cox, Al Franken Isn’t Being Denied Due Process. None of These Famous
Men Are, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/20
17/12/07/al-franken-isnt-being-denied-due-process-none-of-these-famous-men-are/?utm_term=.49
f4dfa95a51 [https://perma.cc/9B5B-LNYY] (“But the courts aren’t where our national conversation
is taking place, so let’s not dither about the dangers of proclaiming guilt or innocence.”); Alison
Gash & Ryan Harding, #MeToo? Legal Discourse and Everyday Responses to Sexual Violence, 7
LAWS 21 (2018) (“Critics who contend ‘due process is better than mob rule’ miss the point. The aim,
and point, is not (or is not always) criminal prosecution.” (citation omitted)).
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evaluating public reports17 of sexual assault, harassment, and miscon-
duct18 against high-profile leaders in business, media, and govern-
ment.19 It defends these norms against the charge that they violate
principles of procedural justice in their treatment of the accused.20 In
#MeToo’s paradigm cases—reporting on Harvey Weinstein, Bill
O’Reilly, Eric Schneiderman, Louis C.K., and others by The New York
Times and The New Yorker—journalists have carefully vetted allega-
tions; the accused have had opportunities to comment and respond;
skeptical commentators have scrutinized accusations; decision makers
have required corroborative evidence and conducted follow-up investi-
gations when necessary; and the employment consequences, if any,
were proportional to the severity and likelihood of the misconduct.21
This Article does not argue that every decision in the #MeToo era has
been procedurally sound.22 Rather, it argues that in most instances in
which high-profile leaders have lost positions, the allegations have been
17 This Article is interested in the public nature of reports as a characteristic feature of the
#MeToo era. It is not focused on the procedures for handling complaints against students under
Title IX or against employees under Title VII. The due process implications of these processes,
which are often confidential, have been analyzed elsewhere.
18 This Article uses “sexual misconduct” as a provisional term to describe the broader set of
harms illuminated by #MeToo. One controversial feature of #MeToo is that it has contested the
legal and social boundaries separating various forms of harm, including, but not limited to: rape,
sexual assault, unwanted and coercive sex, child sex abuse, nonsexual but gender-based harass-
ment, harassment inside and outside the workplace, intimate partner violence, homophobic and
transphobic harassment, claims against women, claims by men and nonbinary survivors, and
claims about the erasure of people of color and other groups. This Article is not the place to resolve
these controversies, although it addresses the question of whether the consequences are propor-
tional to the severity of the misconduct in Part IV.E. Where appropriate, this Article refers specif-
ically to certain of these forms of harm.
19 I am concerned with high-profile abusers who occupy positions that afford them great fame,
power, or wealth and whose misconduct therefore counts as newsworthy. See, e.g., Poynter Staff,
Which Sexual Harassment and Assault Stories Should You Cover? Here Are Some Guidelines, POY-
NTER (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.poynter.org/ethics-trust/2017/which-sexual-harassment-and-as
sault-stories-should-you-cover-here-are-some-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/XR4Y-TN3L]. Accusa-
tions against rank-and-file workers raise different concerns. See Rachel Arnow-Richman,Of Power
and Process: Handling Harassers in an At-Will World, 128 YALE L.J.F. 85, 95–99 (2018). While
the boundaries of the category of high-profile employees can be disputed, core cases are easy to
identify.
20 This Article does not advance any particular theory of what procedural justice requires.
Rather, it responds to specific procedural objections to the #MeToo movement by examining the
set of cases of individuals who lost prominent positions in the year after the Weinstein story and
evaluating the procedures those individuals were afforded based on principles from due process
precedents. This Article does not argue that extralegal processes are ideal for survivors or are a
satisfactory alternative to legal reform.
21 These Pulitzer Prize winning stories are collected at THE PULITZER PRIZES, THE 2018
PULITZER PRIZEWINNER IN PUBLIC SERVICE (2018), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/new-york-ti
mes-reporting-led-jodi-kantor-and-megan-twohey-and-new-yorker-reporting-ronan [https://perma
.cc/3VWQ-SZYL].
22 I do not defend employment decisions based on anonymous public reports or sparse allega-
tions against high-level leaders; rather, I argue that any such cases are exceptional deviations
from emerging procedural norms. See infra Part III.
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vetted and scrutinized by media, and decision makers have required
some form of corroborative evidence or conducted their own investiga-
tions before taking action. This set of extralegal norms provides promi-
nent figures accused of sexual misconduct with fair procedural safe-
guards.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the advantages
of #MeToo’s extralegal procedures over traditional legal procedures,
such as those provided by the criminal justice system and workplace
sexual harassment law. Part II argues that, even though private actors
are not bound by procedural rules outside of legal proceedings, #Me-
Too’s advocates should be concerned with procedural justice for the ac-
cused because it is important to the legitimacy of the movement’s goals.
Part III argues that a set of procedural norms for evaluating extralegal
claims of sexual harassment and assault against persons in positions of
power is emerging. Part IV defends these emerging norms against var-
ious procedural objections: that they are not enforceable; that survivors
who failed to pursue formal legal remedies should be barred from purs-
ing extralegal ones; that #MeToo fails to give the accused a fair hearing;
and that it imposes disproportionate consequences. Close examination
reveals that that the rules of #MeToo, as applied, do not violate basic
procedural principles in terms of the rights of the accused.
I. ADVANTAGES OF #METOO’S EXTRALEGAL PROCEDURES
The originators of the #MeToo movement conceived of their project
as a “therapeutic, restorative, and educational” effort aimed at struc-
tural change and solidarity for survivors.23 Although the movement’s
leaders did not envision its aims as identifying individual perpetrators,
#MeToo gained national prominence as a result of the Harvey Wein-
stein story.24 It is now associated with an extralegal process for remov-
ing high-level perpetrators from positions of power.25 In this extralegal
process, journalists first publicly expose sexual misconduct and then
private actors, such as employers, voters, audiences, consumers, or pro-
fessional organizations, determine whether the accusations warrant re-
moval of the accused. This process enforces an evolving social norm:
that sexual misconduct disqualifies a person from holding a position of
23 See, e.g., Lesley Wexler, #MeToo and Law Talk, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 343, 343 (discussing
“Alyssa Milano’s informative, hand raising oriented
#MeToo hashtag and its intersection with Tarana Burke’s victim-centered, empathy-generating
and restorative-justice focused Me Too”).
24 Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/K45D-2XH3].
25 See Carlsen et al., supra note 6.
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power.26 The process itself is a set of evolving, decentralized, and infor-
mal norms, with specific features that are described in detail in Part
III. It is not a rights-claiming system in which survivors make demands
for justice,27 because the pressure generated by news coverage is the
key feature of the system,28 and the only available remedy is removal of
the perpetrator. The process is private in the sense that it is not en-
forced by state actors, but unlike many other forms of private admin-
istration, it is public in the sense that it is driven by and occurs in the
spotlight of media coverage.
This process has a number of significant limitations, and fails to
achieve many of the #MeToo movement’s goals. Nonetheless, removing
perpetrators from power is an essential component of the reckoning oc-
casioned by the #MeToo movement.29 In this regard, #MeToo’s extrale-
gal procedures have a number of important advantages over traditional
legal ones in terms of transparency, collective action, and institutional
change.30
Legal processes have been largely ineffective in removing high-pro-
file perpetrators. The criminal law is a blunt and unwieldy tool. Sexual
offenses are defined narrowly31 and are difficult to prove.32 Some re-
search suggests only 5 to 20% of rapes are reported to law enforcement,
only 7 to 27% of rapes that are reported to law enforcement are prose-
cuted, and only 3 to 26% of those that are prosecuted result in convic-
tion.33 One reason is that the criminal justice system imposes a “credi-
bility discount” on victims.34 On surveys, law enforcement officers
26 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MI-
CH. L. REV. 338, 350 (1997) (discussing definitions of norms by contrast to legal rules).
27 Compare Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 863 (2008) (explaining how employment discrimination law,
including sexual harassment law, is a flawed rights-claiming system).
28 Compare William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW& SOC’Y REV. 631, 635–36
(1980) (describing a process of “naming, blaming, and claiming” in which an aggrieved individual
seeks justice).
29 See, e.g., Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbennolt, & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, Time’s Up,
and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. Ill. L. REV. 45, 68–81 (discussing principles of restorative justice,
which require backward-looking efforts to ensure offender accountability as well as forward-look-
ing efforts to ensure meaningful change).
30 My argument is not that these extralegal processes should supplant legal ones or substitute
for legal reform. It is that they serve purposes current legal processes do not.
31 For a survey of state laws and discussion of reform efforts, seeMODELPENALCODE: SEXUAL
ASSAULT AND RELATEDOFFENSES (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
32 See, e.g., Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecu-
tion of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 971 (2008) (discussing research showing “jury re-
luctance to convict men accused of raping women who have violated traditional sexual mores”).
33 Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual Assault Cases:
Future Directions for Research and Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINSTWOMEN 145, 156 (2012).
34 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166
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report that they believe rape claims are far more likely to be false than
reports of other crimes, despite the lack of empirical support for this
assumption.35 The penalties for sexual offenses—such as harsh prison
sentences and lifelong sex offender registration requirements—are so
draconian that some survivors may not wish to involve the criminal jus-
tice system at all.36
As for workplace sexual harassment law, it is ridden with loopholes
and limitations.37 For example, independent contractors, like many of
the Hollywood actors who sought opportunities with Weinstein, are not
protected by federal law.38 Additionally, federal courts have ratcheted
up the standard for how bad harassment must be to violate the law.39
Some courts have held that even repeated instances of unwanted sexual
touching do not count as harassment.40
Sexual harassment law is particularly ineffective at stopping high-
level harassers. In its 2016 study of harassment in the workplace, an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) task force found
that workplaces that anoint some employees as “superstar[s]” tend to
be “breeding ground[s]” for harassment.41 When some employees “are
privileged with higher income, better accommodations, and different ex-
pectations,” they may begin to think “they are above the rules.”42 Vic-
tims may believe they have nothing to gain but everything to lose from
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, 58 B.C. L. REV.
205, 209 (2017) (“Unlike people who have been robbed, beaten, or defrauded, rape victims must
bypass a series of gatekeepers that, beginning with the police, impede the criminal justice system
from vindicating victims’ allegations.”).
35 Amy Dellinger Page, Gateway to Reform? Policy Implications of Police Officers’ Attitudes
Toward Rape, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 44, 55 (2008) (discussing a survey of 891 police officers, in
which 53% believed that 11 to 50% of rape reports by women were false, and 10% believed that
between 50 and 100% were false).
36 SeeMichelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform,
125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1953 (2016).
37 For summaries of some of Title VII’s shortcomings, see, e.g., Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S.
Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1603–10 (2018); Rebecca
Hanner White, Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1014 (2018). Tort law
is no answer; sexual harassment law was meant to address the many limitations of tort law. See
generallyMartha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #Me Too Moment?, 11 J. TORT L. 39 (2018).
38 Title VII applies only to employer/employee relationships. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
39 See, e.g., SANDRASPERINO&SUJATHOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOWAMERICA’SCOURTSUNDERMINE
DISCRIMINATION LAW 33–38 (2017) (discussing the requirement that harassment be “severe or
pervasive” to violate the law).
40 Id.
41 CHAIR.FELDBLUM&VICTORIAA.LIPNIC, U.S. EQUALEMP’TOPPORTUNITYCOMM’N, REPORT
OF THECO-CHAIRS OF THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OFHARASSMENT IN THEWORKPLACE
(2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.cfm [https://perma.cc/AH2R-93V
Q].
42 Id. Additionally, “power can make an individual feel uninhibited and thus more likely to
engage in inappropriate behaviors.” Id. (citing Dacher Keltner et al., Power, Approach, and Inhi-
bition, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 265 (2003)).
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reporting misconduct by chief executives, rainmakers, and moguls.43 In-
stitutions have incentives to shield their anointed ones from scandal.44
Those institutions may conclude that the benefits of retaining a super-
star are worth the costs of misconduct.45High-level employees are more
likely to have contracted for protection against termination, meaning
their institutions realize that actions against them will be drawn-out
and expensive.46
The legal rules for reporting sexual harassment allow institutions
to sweep it under the rug. In order to prevail in a sexual harassment
case, most employees must first attempt to make use of their employer’s
internal complaint process.47 Yet research has found only 30% of victims
do so.48 When victims do report, internal processes may result in confi-
dential settlements that allow serial harassers to continue.49 For exam-
ple, Fox News host Bill O’Reilly was accused of a series of incidents of
sexual harassment and other misconduct, but his accusers received pay-
outs, totaling $45 million, in exchange for their silence.50 Fox News
hired private investigators to seek out damaging information about one
victim, and then agreed to destroy the materials the investigators had
found as part of a settlement.51 In other cases, employees are required,
as a condition of the job, to sign away their rights to public litigation by
43 See, e.g., Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Ac-
cusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-wein
stein-harassment-allegations.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock [https://perma.cc/D79
H-48C8] (quoting a memo from a former assistant of Harvey Weinstein: “I am a 28 year old woman
trying to make a living and a career. Harvey Weinstein is a 64 year old, world famous man and
this is his company. The balance of power is me: 0, Harvey Weinstein: 10.”); MEGANKELLY, SETTLE
FORMORE 302 (2016) (Explaining that she did not report Roger Ailes because, “if I caused a stink,
my career would likely be over. Sure they might investigate, but I felt certain there was no way
they would get rid of him, and I would be left on the wrong side of the one man who had power at
Fox.”).
44 Arnow-Richman, supra note 19, at 87.
45 FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 41; see also, e.g., Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill
O’Reilly Settled New Harassment Claim, Then Fox Renewed his Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment.html?
module=inline [https://perma.cc/VU7R-VBT4].
46 Arnow-Richman, supra note 19, at 92–95.
47 This rule generally applies when the harasser is a supervisor. See Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
48 Lilia M. Cortina & Jennifer L. Berdahl, Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A Decade of
Research in Review, in 1 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 469, 469–96 (J.
Barling & C. L. Cooper eds., 2008).
49 See, e.g., Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements [https:
//perma.cc/RY7M-MNCV].
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agreeing that any claims be settled in confidential arbitral proceed-
ings.52
Moreover, it is administratively difficult and time consuming for
individual survivors to invoke legal remedies. Class action lawsuits
could minimize these burdens, helping plaintiffs to attract higher-qual-
ity lawyers and offering them more leverage against the economic
power of their employers.53 Yet there have been relatively few sexual
harassment class actions.54 Courts regard sexual harassment as “more
individualized than many types of employment discrimination claims”
because each plaintiff must prove the harassment was “unwelcome” as
a subjective matter.55 In recent years, the Supreme Court has made the
requirements of class certification more stringent.56 Additionally, many
employers require their workforces to sign away their rights to class
proceedings along with their rights to litigation.57 In a series of recent
decisions, the Supreme Court has made “class arbitration waivers
nearly bulletproof.”58
By contrast, #MeToo’s procedures are open, relatively simple, col-
lective, and effective in removing high-level perpetrators. It is one of
#MeToo’s distinctive features that accusations are public.59 #MeToo
52 See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, Arbitration Clauses Let American Apparel Hide Miscon-
duct, DEALB%K (July 15, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/arbitration-clauses-let-
american-apparel-hide-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/VQ2M-2LU4]. One study found mandatory
arbitration clauses cover 56% of non-union private-sector workers. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON.
POLICY INST., THEGROWINGUSE OFMANDATORY ARBITRATION 1 (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.epi
org/files/pdf/135056.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9AD-X3C7]. For a discussion of how forced arbitration
deters claims, see Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Toward Justice in
Employment Law: Where To, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 155, 201—05 (2019).
53 See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guide-
lines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 484 (1992).
54 Melissa Hart, Litigation Narratives: Why Jensen v. Ellerth Didn’t Change Sexual Harass-
ment Law, But Still Has a Story Worth Telling, 18 BERKELEYWOMEN’S L.J. 282, 288 (2003) (“There
appear to have been only ten reported cases between 1995 and 2002 in which courts considered
sexual harassment claims as part of a federal class action suit.”).
55 Id. at 293; Tristin K. Green, Was Sexual Harassment Law A Mistake? The Stories We Tell,
128 YALE L.J.F. 152, 166 (2018) (“Judges have constructed an individualized harassment law that
revolves around stories of ‘personal advances,’ even though in most cases harassment is not an
individualized problem.”).
56 See, e.g., Katherine E. Lamm, Work in Progress: Civil Rights Class Actions AfterWal-Mart
v. Dukes, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 153, 176–77 (2015) (discussing challenges for plaintiffs bring-
ing civil rights class actions after the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision inWal-Mart v. Dukes).
57 COLVIN, supra note 52, at 2 (reporting that 30.1% of employers that require mandatory
arbitration also require class waivers).
58 Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Provid-
ers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5 n.27), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3238460 [https://perma.cc/Z2DX-UXVR].
59 See, e.g., Stephanie Zacharek et al., Time Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers,
TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/ [https://perm
a.cc/P7NS-U728].
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claimants have been lauded as “silence breakers.”60 The public pressure
generated by #MeToo has overcome legal barriers to speaking out. #Me-
Too allows survivors to band together—creating networks of support,
lending credibility to one another’s claims, and exposing that problems
are systemic rather than isolated occurrences or the fault of individual
victims. Journalists have reported a snowball effect: a source who would
otherwise have stayed silent might go on the record if she could be told
she was the third, fourth, or fifth named source for an article.61 Some of
the numbers are staggering—after journalist Glenn Whipp wrote about
allegations by thirty-eight women against filmmaker James Toback, he
was contacted by two hundred additional accusers.62 Sources may resist
coming forward out of “self-blame, guilt, and complicity,” but when in-
formed about additional victims, they realize, “It can’t be 30 or 40
women’s fault.”63
The #MeToo movement has been stunningly effective in removing
perpetrators from positions of power. In the year prior to the Weinstein
news stories, fewer than thirty prominent people lost positions due to
public accusations of sexual misconduct.64 In the year after, over two
hundred did.65 By incapacitating offenders, #MeToo has prevented
them from further abusing their positions of power to harm others. The
threat of public exposure may also deter other leaders, and those who
aspire to leadership, from engaging in misconduct. It is important to
note, of course, that incapacitating and deterring high-level harassers
only assists a privileged pool of potential victims, and only in a limited
set of circumstances.66 Most perpetrators are not high-level leaders or
60 Id.
61 8 Reporters Reflect on the Challenges of Covering Sexual Harassment, NIEMAN REPS. (Nov.
13, 2017), https://niemanreports.org/articles/reporters-on-their-stories-about-male-abuses-of-pow
er/ [https://perma.cc/RE3U-DA3C] (quoting restaurant critic Brett Anderson on his reporting on
celebrity chef John Besh). For example, Leigh Corfman, who reported that Roy Moore had sexually
abused her when she was fourteen years old, was at first reluctant to come forward, but told The
Washington Post that “If they found additional people, I would tell my story.” Adam Edelman, Roy
Moore Accuser Leigh Corfman: I Didn’t Deserve to Be Preyed Upon, NBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/roy-moore-accuser-leigh-corfman-i-didn-t-deserve
-be-n822416 [https://perma.cc/U7QB-23KL].
62 Glenn Whipp, 200 More Women Share Their James Toback Stories after 38 Accuse Director
of Sexual Harassment, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/mov-
ies/la-et-mn-toback-follow-up-20171023-story.html [https://perma.cc/2N97-BQGG].
63 8 Reporters Reflect, supra note 61 (quoting editor Michelle Cottle).
64 Carlsen et al., supra note 6.
65 Id.
66 See Rebecca Traister, Your Reckoning. And Mine., THECUT (Nov. 2017), https://www.thecut
.com/2017/11/rebecca-traister-on-the-post-weinstein-reckoning.html? [https://perma.cc/NDZ7-P6
U9] (“There are also women who do want to go on the record, women who’ve summoned armies of
brave colleagues ready to finally out their repellent bosses. To many of them I must say that their
guy isn’t well known enough, that the stories are now so plentiful that offenders must meet a
certain bar of notoriety, or power, or villainy, before they’re considered newsworthy.”).
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celebrities.67 Survivors without fame and fortune are less likely to find
investigative journalists eager to tell their stories. The media has fo-
cused on white women, even though women of color experience higher
rates of sexual violence.68 Even when their stories are covered, “[b]lack
victims of sexual abuse are often disregarded.”69 Low-wage,70 blue col-
lar,71 and immigrant workers72 are particularly vulnerable to abuse, but
are less able to speak out and less likely to be heard when they do.73
Transgender and nonbinary survivors have received little coverage,74
despite the fact that they are at higher risk of sexual assault.75 Popular
attention has focused on a stock narrative involving an older man who
67 Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment Discrimination
Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 19 n.4 (2018) (collecting studies showing coworker har-
assment is more prevalent).
68 Tarana Burke, #MeToo Was Started for Black and Brown Women and Girls. They’re Still
Being Ignored, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/
2017/11/09/the-waitress-who-works-in-the-diner-needs-to-know-that-the-issue-of-sexual-harass-
ment-is-about-her-too/?utm_term=.358786061779 [https://perma.cc/M9DQ-TRPL]. See also Angel-
a Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo Movement, 128
YALE L.J.F. 105, 107 (2018) (“The recent resurgence of the #MeToo movement reflects the
longstanding marginalization and exclusion that women of color experience within the larger fem-
inist movement in U.S. society.”).
69 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, I Believe I Can Lie, BAFFLER (Jan. 17, 2019), https://thebaf-
fler.com/latest/i-believe-i-can-lie-crenshaw [https://perma.cc/XY5K-WX9V]; see also Jemele Hill,R.
Kelly and the Cost of Black Protectionism, ATLANTIC (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com
/entertainment/archive/2019/01/r-kelly-and-cost-black-protectionism/580150/ [https://perma.cc/Q4
JX-A2LU] (discussing the “prolonged indifference” to claims by black girls and women against
musician R. Kelly).
70 Lia Russell, Saying #MeToo Is Harder for Low-Wage Workers, AM. PROSPECT (May 3, 2018),
https://prospect.org/article/saying-metoo-harder-low-wage-workers [https://perma.cc/U8V9-NR7
X].
71 See, e.g., Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, Decades after the Company Tried to Tackle Sexual
Misconduct at Two Chicago Plants, Continued Abuse Raises Questions about the Possibility of
Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chi-
cago-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/UW8J-7UNW] (discussing racial and gender dy-
namics that contributed to sexual harassment of blue-collar workers at Ford’s Chicago plants).
72 See generally BERNICE YEUNG, IN A DAY’S WORK: THE FIGHT TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST AMERICA’SMOST VULNERABLEWORKERS (2018).
73 Stories have not focused on how dynamics like class can make certain women more vulner-
able to abuse. Josephine Livingstone, The Task Ahead for Feminism, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 17,
2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/145850/task-ahead-feminism [https://perma.cc/UV65-HEH
X] (“Important contextual information—that Roy Moore allegedly chose working-class women and
children to abuse, for example—has been lost.”).
74 See, e.g., Ebony Miranda, Did #MeToo Forget About Me?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/smarter-living/the-edit-me-too.html [https://perma.cc/YAE7-
TKGX].
75 SANDYE. JAMES ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 15 (Dec.
2016), http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS%20Full%20Report%20-%2
0FINAL%201.6.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8A2-WTTK] (reporting that 47% of transgender survey
respondents had been “sexually assaulted at some point in their lifetime,” and 10% “were sexually
assaulted in the past year”).
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demands sexual favors from a younger, less-powerful woman, or occa-
sionally a man.76 Sexist but non-sexual forms of workplace harassment
have often been overlooked, as have the connections between sexual
abuse and broader patterns of gender-based inequality, power dynam-
ics, and institutional dysfunction.77
Yet all these criticisms—the failure to address harassment by low-
level employees, the failure to attend to intersectional dynamics involv-
ing race, class, LGBTQ, and immigration status, and the failure to ad-
dress non-sexual forms of harassment—are commonly made of legal
processes. What is interesting about #MeToo is how, in many cases, it
has achieved what the law could not.78 #MeToo’s procedures are distinc-
tive in specifically asking whether sexual assault, harassment, or mis-
conduct should disqualify an individual from important office. This is
not the question asked by the criminal or civil justice systems, although
loss of employment is sometimes a collateral consequence of a convic-
tion or judgment.
Despite the limits of the strategy, the #MeToo movement’s ability
to remove abusive leaders is an accomplishment because of what it says
about gender and power. The movement has the potential to redefine
the conditions for holding power, celebrity, and wealth in our society.
TheWeinstein story came one year after a presidential election in which
the winning candidate had bragged on video that being famous meant
he could grope women without first asking for their consent.79 Prior to
76 For stories involving male perpetrators and male victims, see, e.g., Laura Bradley, “I Was
Terrified, and I Was Humiliated”: #MeToo’s Male Accusers, One Year Later, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 4,
2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/10/metoo-male-accusers-terry-crews-alex-wint
er-michael-gaston-interview [https://perma.cc/5QNH-HXC2]; Adam B. Vary, Actor Anthony Rapp:
Kevin Spacey Made A Sexual Advance Toward Me When I Was 14, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Oct. 30, 2017,
12:37 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/adambvary/anthony-rapp-kevin-spacey-made-s
exual-advance-when-i-was-14 [https://perma.cc/D5LW-FU5L]. When women abuse men, the story
is told as if it were “man bites dog.” Headlines insinuate that such cases somehow undermine the
movement, rather than demonstrating the problems with unconstrained power. See, e.g., Kim Sev-
erson, Asia Argento, a #MeToo Leader, Made a Deal With Her Own Accuser, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/19/us/asia-argento-assault-jimmy-bennett.html [https://
perma.cc/Y6MP-WTW6]; Zoe Greenberg, What Happens to #MeToo When a Feminist Is the Ac-
cused?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/nyregion/sexual-harassm
ent-nyu-female-professor.html [https://perma.cc/E6ZA-ZUJG].
77 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22,
24 (2018); Rebecca Traister, This Moment Isn’t (Just) About Sex. It’s Really About Work, THE CUT
(Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/12/rebecca-traister-this-moment-isnt-just-about-sex
.html [https://perma.cc/8TML-UYNG].
78 SeeMacKinnon, supra note 1.
79 David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Recorded Extremely Lewd Conversation About Women in
2005,WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-recorded-having
-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07/3b9ce776-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d2684
7eeed4_story.html?utm_term=.4c56ec64c6e1 [https://perma.cc/7P4J-ZAJK] (“You know I’m auto-
matically attracted to beautiful—I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t
even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything . . . Grab them by the
p---y.”).
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October 2017, reports of sexual assault, harassment, and misconduct by
powerful men were “an almost wholly open secret, sometimes even hav-
ing been reported in major outlets, and yet somehow ignored, allowed
to pass, unconsidered.”80What has changed is that some of these reports
are being taken seriously “and treated as disgraceful and outrageous
misconduct with which no self-respecting company or university can af-
ford to be associated.”81 In asking whether sexual assault, harassment,
and misconduct are disqualifying, voters, corporate boards, consumers,
and other decision makers have made clear that survivors matter, that
sexual assault and harassment are unacceptable, and that those who
fail to treat all people as equals, regardless of sex, are unfit to hold high
office.
It is true that removing harassers from high places will not resolve
all harassment.82 As Professor Vicki Schultz has written, “sooner or
later, other harassers will take their place—unless the underlying con-
ditions that foster harassment in the first place are addressed.”83 How-
ever, there are some positive signs here. Many of the institutions that
have undergone leadership transitions in the wake of #MeToo reports
have taken the opportunity to consider gender diversity. Out of 201
male leaders who lost their positions due to sexual harassment, almost
half were replaced by women.84 Nonetheless, removing perpetrators
does not provide restitution to victims. To truly address sexual assault,
harassment, and misconduct, comprehensive legal, public health, and
education strategies are required. But in the course of calls for compre-
hensive change, it is important not to diminish the #MeToo movement’s
accomplishments in ending high-level impunity.
II. WHY PROCEDURAL JUSTICEMATTERS
Because of their employment consequences for accused individuals,
#MeToo’s informal procedures are controversial.85 Calls for due process
80 Rebecca Traister, Why the Harvey Weinstein Sexual-Harassment Allegations Didn’t Come
Out Until Now, THECUT (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/10/why-the-weinstein-sexual
-harassment-allegations-came-out-now.html?utm_source=tw&utm_medium=s3&utm_campaign=
sharebutton-t [https://perma.cc/3YG7-M8WV].
81 Catharine A. MacKinnon, ‘This Moment Turned Out to Be Fleeting’ Nine Reflections on
#MeToo, One Year On, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/opinion/me-
too-weinstein-one-year.html [https://perma.cc/DQU4-LYF8].
82 For a discussion of the goals of the #MeToo and Times Up movements, see Murray, supra
note 5, at 867. For more comprehensive suggestions on reform, see Schultz, supra note 67.
83 Schultz, supra note 77, at 26. These underlying conditions include sex segregation and un-
structured authority. Id. at 48–53.
84 See Carlsen, supra note 6; Schultz, supra note 67, at 22–25 (discussing the links between
sex segregation and harassment).
85 See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
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have taken various forms, from exhortations not to rush to judgment,86
to arguments that those making employment decisions should adopt
procedural safeguards applicable to criminal, civil, or administrative
proceedings,87 to the insistence that only criminal courts can hear
claims.88Many of these arguments rest on mistaken assumptions about
the law and the troubling suggestion that high-profile men, most of
them white, deserve exceptional protections against false allegations.
But #MeToo advocates should still be concerned about the charge of a
rush to judgment.
One response to the due process backlash is that technically, pro-
cedural requirements do not apply to most employment decisions. Crim-
inal penalties like incarceration cannot be imposed outside of the crim-
inal justice system, and so the rules of criminal justice, such as the
requirement that proof be established beyond a reasonable doubt, do
not apply outside of that system. The Constitution’s Due Process Clause
seldom applies to employment decisions. The main reason is that it does
not generally bind non-state actors—such as private employers, voters,
consumers, and shareholders.89 The Due Process Clause only protects a
subset of public employees, such as those with a recognized property
interest in continued employment, for example, because of a collective
bargaining agreement, state statute, employer policy, or contract that
only allows discharge for cause.90 Job applicants do not have any such
86 See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 15.
87 See, e.g., Editorial Board, The Presumption of Guilt, WALLST. J. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://ww
w.wsj.com/articles/the-presumption-of-guilt-1537570627 [https://perma.cc/54A8-C4ZY] (arguing
that “the set of facts [Christine Blasey Ford] currently provides wouldn’t pass even the ‘prepon-
derance of evidence’–or 50.01% evidence of guilt–test that prevails today on college campuses”).
88 See, e.g., Mollie Hemmingway, The Kavanaugh Allegation Process Is a Miscarriage of Jus-
tice for Everyone, FEDERALIST (Sept. 19, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/2018/09/19/the-kavanaug
h-allegation-process-is-a-miscarriage-of-justice-for-everyone/ [https://perma.cc/E4JT-DN9Z] (“[T]-
he Senate is still an inappropriate place to litigate claims of sexual assault. Since Maryland ap-
parently doesn’t have a statute of limitations on felony sex assault, charges could still be filed there
if the case is strong enough to do so.”).
89 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982) (discussing the “state
action” requirement for certain constitutional claims, which requires that “the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State”). Even a scholar mak-
ing the unlikely argument (rejected by every court to consider it) that due process applies to Title
IX proceedings by private universities against students, see Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization and State
Action: Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate Due Process?, 96 TEXAS L. REV 15, 26 (2017),
recognizes that due process does not apply to private employers in their proceedings against em-
ployees, id. at 48.
90 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
37] THE RULES OF #METOO 51
entitlements.91 Individuals who choose to resign rather than face fur-
ther scrutiny waive any rights to due process.92 Due process also pro-
tects a public employee’s liberty interest in their professional reputa-
tion, but only if the government falsely claims that an employee
engaged in misconduct.93 This right does not apply if it was the media
that disclosed the information.94
It is a widely-accepted myth that U.S. workers have automatic job
protection.95 In many U.S. jurisdictions, private employers are permit-
ted to consider any entanglement by a worker with the criminal justice
system as a ground for firing—even one resulting in an acquittal.96 The
reason most employers created internal complaint processes to resolve
sexual harassment claims was to avoid lawsuits from victims, not to
protect the interests of accused employees.97 The Fair Credit Reporting
Act was amended in 2003 to allow employers to conduct investigations
91 Id. (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”).
92 See, e.g., Stone v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167, 173–75 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that “the mere fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives—e.g.,
resignation or facing disciplinary charges—does not of itself establish that a resignation was in-
duced by duress or coercion, hence was involuntary”).
93 See, e.g., Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977) (per curiam) (where the constitutional
deprivation consists of a false and stigmatizing report about a public employee, due process re-
quires the employee be given “an opportunity to clear his name” (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 573)).
This right applies even if the employee has no property interest in continued employment. Owen
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 630 n.10 (1979). But a liberty interest alone is not sufficient
for a claim; there must also be some sort of employment action, such as a termination. See Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976). The employee must also show the disclosure caused a stigma that
harmed their future prospects for employment. See, e.g., Cannon v. Vill. of Bald Head Island, N.
Carolina, 891 F.3d 489, 502–05 (4th Cir. 2018). Nonetheless, a name-clearing hearing does not
result in reinstatement. Codd, 429 U.S. at 628.
94 Wojcik v. Massachusetts State Lottery Comm’n, 300 F.3d 92, 103–04 (1st Cir. 2002).
95 Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110 (1997) (reporting on survey
results demonstrating that workers “consistently overestimate the degree of job protection af-
forded by law, believing that employees have far greater rights not to be fired without good cause
than they in fact have”).
96 Benjamin D. Geffen, The Collateral Consequences of Acquittal: Employment Discrimination
on the Basis of Arrests Without Convictions, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 88–89 (2017) (“There
is no comprehensive federal law safeguarding the employment rights of people without convictions,
although Title VII and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) extend protections in certain situ-
ations. A handful of state and local laws grant strong, enforceable rights, but most jurisdictions
offer none.”). While some states have “ban-the-box” laws that forbid employers from asking about
criminal records on job applications, those laws do not forbid employers from considering an ap-
plicant’s criminal history after making a provisional employment offer. Shelle Shimizu, Beyond
the Box: Safeguarding Employment for Arrested Employees, 128 YALE L.J.F. 226, 233–35 (2018)
(surveying employment protections based on criminal records).
97 Arnow-Richman, supra note 19, at 97.
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of employment-related misconduct or legal violations without any no-
tice to the accused.98 If an outside investigation results in some type of
adverse employment action, an employer is only required to provide the
accused with “a summary containing the nature and substance” of the
investigator’s report.99 The accused is not entitled to the names of any
sources.100 Union employees may have contractual rights to challenge
their employers’ decisions through grievance processes, but these ar-
rangements are diminishing in frequency.101 Employees with unusual
bargaining power, such as ousted CBS chief Les Moonves, may be able
to negotiate for the right to be terminated only under certain conditions,
and may therefore avail themselves of formal legal procedures to chal-
lenge an employer’s finding of misconduct.102 This group of sheltered
high-level employees cannot complain about lack of process.
The argument that those accused of sexual misconduct should re-
ceive special procedural protection, while those accused of other forms
of misconduct do not, is a troubling form of exceptionalism. It “harken[s]
back to a time when rape victims faced unique hurdles in criminal pros-
ecution”103 based on widespread beliefs “that women have a tendency to
lie about rape and sexual assault.”104 Exceptional procedural protec-
tions may also be rooted in a sexist view of gender roles that presup-
poses that accused men have special entitlements to their careers, pro-
fessional reputations, and future prospects because they are men, while
women whose careers are derailed by harassment have not lost any-
thing of value because they are women.105 Many commentators argue it
is hypocritical to insist on due process for the accused but not access to
justice for survivors.106 This exceptionalism also raises questions about
98 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(y)(1)(B). This exemption does not apply under certain conditions, includ-
ing if the employer discloses the results of an external investigation to the public. Id. § 1681a(y)(1)
(D).
99 Id. § 1681a(y)(2).
100 Id.
101 Arnow-Richman, supra note 19, at 97.
102 See, e.g., Elizabeth Tippet, CBS’ Moonves Scandal Shows Why Corporate America Needs
Tougher CEO Pay Contracts, CONVERSATION (Dec. 19, 2018), https://theconversation.com/cbs-moo
nves-scandal-shows-why-corporate-america-needs-tougher-ceo-pay-contracts-109050 [https://per
ma.cc/266J-3NJ7].
103 Anderson, supra note 36, at 2000 (discussing “rape or sexual assault exceptionalism”).
104 Id. A 1940 treatise on evidence described “errant young girls and women coming before the
courts in all sorts of cases” with “psychic complexes” that take the form of “contriving false charges
of sexual offenses by men.” 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEMOFEVIDENCE INTRIALS ATCOMMONLAW § 924a, at 459 (3d ed. 1940). The treatise warned:
“On the surface the narration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim, however, too
often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal
for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.” Id.
105 See KATEMANNE, DOWNGIRL: THE LOGIC OFMISOGYNY 218 (2018).
106 Lenora Lapidus & Sandra Park, The Real Meaning of Due Process in the #MeToo Era,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/due-process-metoo
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racism—why are #HimToo advocates not concerned with procedural de-
fects of the criminal justice system that disadvantage racial minori-
ties?107
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to confront procedural objections on
their own terms. To say that prominent people accused of sexual as-
sault, harassment, and misconduct should not be permitted exceptional
protections is not to say that normal principles of procedural fairness
should be suspended.108
If the #MeToo movement is to maintain its moral authority as a
mechanism for disqualifying those who have committed serious forms
of sexual misconduct from high-level positions of power, it must attend
to principles of procedural justice.109 Research from social psychology
demonstrates that whether an authority is considered legitimate de-
pends on whether people think its procedures are fair.110 With respect
to legitimacy, fair procedures are more important than favorable out-
comes.111 Procedure may be particularly important when the “correct”
outcome is not objectively clear.112 Much of the debate over the Ka-
vanaugh nomination was trained on procedural disputes, such as the
propriety of raising an allegation at a late stage, the thoroughness of
the FBI’s investigation, and the appropriate burdens and standards of
proof.113 People care about being treated fairly because it expresses
/553427/ [https://perma.cc/ECY2-A33N] (“[F]airness also requires that those reporting violence
and harassment be fully heard.”).
107 See, e.g., Ayesha Rascoe, Trump Pushes Due Process for Some, ‘Lock’ Them Up for Others,
NPR (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/05/654347194/trump-pushes-due-process-for-so
me-for-others-lock-them-up [https://perma.cc/F7L7-9HB2] (discussing President Trump’s commit-
ment to due process for his Supreme Court nominee but not the five black and Latino teenagers
who were wrongfully convicted in New York’s “Central Park Five” rape case).
108 Nor does the goal of ending sexual assault, harassment, and misconduct justify an “at will”
employment regime that allows arbitrary terminations and is unfair to low-level workers accused
of any type of misconduct. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 19, at 99–103.
109 Cf. Murray, supra note 5, at 874–75 (“[A]t some point, the criticisms of #MeToo—concerns
about due process and vigilantism—may make this kind of extralegal regulation unsustainable in
the long term.”); Wexler, supra note 23, at 14 (“If the #MeToo Movement is perceived as deeply
unfair, much of society is unlikely to willingly participate in its call for a social reckoning”).
110 Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 133 (1992) (discussing research showing “a key factor affecting
legitimacy across a variety of settings is the person’s evaluation of the fairness of the procedures
used by the authority in question”); see also JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICALANALYSIS (1975). This research pertains to whether particular author-
ities are considered legitimate. Tyler & Lind, supra at 117. It suggests the legitimacy of the #Me-
Too movement may be in question to the extent that the public regards it as an authority in moti-
vating decision makers such as boards, employers, voters, or consumers to remove accused leaders
without fair process.
111 Tyler & Lind, supra note 110, at 133.
112 Id. at 134.
113 See, e.g., Abigail Abrams, Here’s Sen. Susan Collins’ Full Speech about Voting to Confirm
Kavanaugh, TIME (Oct. 5, 2018), http://time.com/5417444/susan-collins-kavanaugh-vote-tran-
script/ [https://perma.cc/SN5G-VRWA].
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their equal status as group members.114 Thus, critics of the #MeToo
movement have seized on slogans like “believe all women” as evidence
of the movement’s aspirations to “mob rule.”115 Such slogans frame #Me-
Too as a battle of the sexes, inviting men to imagine themselves as
falsely accused, rather than as potential victims themselves, or as peo-
ple who share a stake in gender equality and the elimination of sexual
abuse.116 If #MeToo’s extralegal procedures do not appear to adhere to
basic procedural standards, those procedures will lose the persuasive
force on which they depend, and the reckoning occasioned by the move-
ment will prove to have been a fleeting one.
III. #METOO’S PROCEDURALNORMS
An examination of high-profile cases in the #MeToo era reveals that
rather than ignoring procedural justice, decisionmakers have relied on
a set of evolving procedural norms for resolving these claims. One norm
is that allegations are vetted by journalists according to the standards
of that profession. Once aired publicly, allegations are scrutinized by
skeptical commentators and other journalists. In the #MeToo era, alle-
gations are unlikely to result in formal employment consequences un-
less they are “corroborated” in a colloquial sense of that term, or con-
firmed by follow-up investigations.
A. Vetting and Scrutiny
Journalistic standards require that reporters verify facts, seek both
sides, and attribute information to its sources.117 The profession regards
114 Tyler & Lind, supra note 110, at 140 (“To the extent that a procedure is seen as indicating
a positive, full-status relationship, it is judged to be fair, and to the extent that a procedure appears
to imply that one’s relationship with the authority or institution is negative or that one occupies a
low-status position, the procedure is viewed as unfair.”).
115 See, e.g., Bari Weiss, The Limits of ‘Believe All Women,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opinion/metoo-sexual-harassment-believe-women.html [https://pe
rma.cc/598H-YSBK]. For a thoughtful response, see Sady Doyle, Despite What You May Have He-
ard, “Believe Women” Has Never Meant “Ignore Facts”, ELLE (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.elle.com
/culture/career-politics/a13977980/me-too-movement-false-accusations-believe-women/ [https://pe
rma.cc/S9Y7-SLCE].
116 Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 26
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 1309, 1311 (1992) (“Men’s fear of being victimized [by unfair enforcement
of rules against sexual abuse] is only indirectly and ambiguously related to whatever the reality
might turn out to be. The fear varies from man to man, but there is still an unmistakable group
interest in avoiding having to worry about enforcement excesses; it is in direct conflict with
women’s interest in not having to worry about being abused.”).
117 SOC’YPROF’L JOURNALISTS, CODEOFETHICS (2014), https://www.spj.org/pdf/spj-code-of-eth-
ics.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG2G-D2KM]. The Society for Professional Journalists is “the largest vol-
untary association of news reporters and editors in the United States” and its Code of Ethics is
widely cited. Jane E. Kirtley, Not Just Sloppy Journalism, but a Profound Ethical Failure: Media
Coverage of the Duke Lacrosse Case, in INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES: DUKE LACROSSE, UNIVERSITIES,
THENEWSMEDIA, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 145 (Howard M. Wasserman ed., 2011).
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its “core function” as “getting the facts right.”118 Journalists are advised
to employ “verification routines” to avoid errors before publication,119
and issue corrections of errors caught by readers after publication.120
High-profile magazines employ independent research editors to confirm
the factual details of their print stories.121 While many outlets do not
have regular fact-checking processes for online content, they focus scru-
tiny on investigative pieces and those that could give rise to liability.122
Ethical journalism also requires consideration of both sides, which
means reporters must “[d]iligently seek subjects of news coverage to al-
low them to respond to criticism or allegations of wrongdoing.”123 An-
other principle of ethical journalism is transparency: journalists should
explain their methods and sources to readers, so readers themselves
can assess the potential for errors and bias.124 This requires that stories
identify the sources for particular pieces of information,125 and explain
any decisions to allow sources to remain anonymous.126 Journalists in
the #MeToo era recognize that these rules cannot be suspended in re-
porting on sexual assault.
Before the #MeToo movement, there were two notorious instances
of misreporting on campus sexual assault: (1) the 2006 news coverage
of accusations of sexual assault by members of the Duke Lacrosse
team;127 and (2) a retracted 2014 article in Rolling Stone Magazine
about an alleged rape at a fraternity party at the University of Vir-
ginia.128 In the Duke case, a prosecutor who was up for re-election fed
falsehoods and sound bites to uncritical reporters.129 Ultimately, other
118 Kelly McBride & Tom Rosenstiel, Introduction, THENEW ETHICS OF JOURNALISM: PRINCIP-
LES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 5, 5 (Kelly McBride & Tom Rosenstiel, eds., 2013).
119 Lucas Graves & Michelle A. Amazeen, Fact-Checking as Idea and Practice in Journalism,
in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATION (2019).
120 See, e.g., Margaret Sullivan,Make No Mistake, but if You Do, Here’s How to Correct It, N.Y.
TIMES PUBLICEDITOR’SBLOG (Jan. 16, 2013, 5:45 PM), https://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/201
3/01/16/make-no-mistake-but-if-you-do-heres-how-to-correct-it/ [https://perma.cc/737M-EPRF].
121 Stephanie Fairyington, In the Era of Fake News, Where Have All the Fact-Checkers Gone?,
COLUM. JOURNALISMREV. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/business_of_news/fact-checking.ph-
p [https://perma.cc/2YDG-YCZ6]; Susan Sivek & Sharon Bloyd-Peshkin, Where Do Facts Matter?
The Digital Paradox in Magazines’ Fact Checking Practices, 12 JOURNALISM PRACTICE 400 (2018).
122 See Fairyington, supra note 121; Sivek & Bloyd-Peshkin, supra note 121.
123 SOC’Y PROF’L JOURNALISTS, supra note 117.
124 BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM: WHAT NEWSPEOPLE
SHOULDKNOW AND THE PUBLIC SHOULD EXPECT 114 (3rd ed. 2013).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 117.
127 Kirtley, supra note 117, at 146–52; Rachel Smolkin, Justice Delayed, AM. JOURNALISMREV.
(Aug./Sept. 2007).
128 Sheila Coronel, Steve Coll, & Derek Kravitz, Rolling Stone’s Investigation: ‘A Failure that
Was Avoidable,’ COLUM. REV. JOURNALISM (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.cjr.org/investigation/rolling
_stone_investigation.php [https://perma.cc/HA2L-S23V].
129 See, e.g., Kirtley, supra note 117, at 158–59 (“[M]any in the media, by accepting the ‘official
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journalists helped to uncover information that undermined the prose-
cutor’s case against the accused players and led to his disbarment.130 In
the University of Virginia case, the Rolling Stone reporter failed to ver-
ify basic facts told to her by the accuser, failed to speak with the friends
the accuser identified as being present on the night in question, failed
to give the accused fraternity enough details about the incident to ena-
ble a response, and failed to make clear that the article’s only source for
certain information was the accuser, despite the contrary advice of a
fact checker.131 At Rolling Stone’s request, The Columbia Journalism
Review issued a report on what went wrong, concluding that “[t]he mag-
azine set aside or rationalized as unnecessary essential practices of re-
porting” and that the magazine’s “failure . . . need not have happened,
even accounting for the magazine’s sensitivity to [the accuser]’s posi-
tion.”132
Investigative journalists have heeded the lessons of these incidents
in reporting on #MeToo.133 The New York Times reporters verified the
accuracy of their story about Harvey Weinstein “through interviews
with current and former employees and film industry workers, as well
as legal records, emails and internal documents from the businesses he
has run, Miramax and the Weinstein Company.”134 They interviewed
people that Weinstein’s victims had confided in about his abuse at the
time, such as friends and relatives.135 They gave Weinstein an oppor-
tunity to comment on the story and printed his statement as well as
quotations from his lawyer.136 They attributed the facts they reported
to specific sources, or explained why sources wished to remain anony-
mous.137 In the #MeToo era, some journalists have established their
own standards as to what sort of corroborative evidence is required for
version’ of the alleged crime without question, effectively became mouthpieces of the government
(or of other powerful institutions, such as Duke University), largely ignoring other voices. They
accepted the prosecution’s version of events, taking officials’ words at face value and reporting
them without challenge.”).
130 Id. at 144; see also id. at 154.
131 Coronel, Coll, & Kravitz, supra note 128.
132 Id.
133 See Poynter Staff, supra note 19 (discussing standards for sourcing and verification, includ-
ing the caution that “While it is often impossible to verify specific claims of sexual harassment or
assault, it is important to verify as much as possible about the story including: If the source says
she shared her story with friends or family, can you confirm that?, Can other facts around the
story be checked, including employment dates and times, travel events, emails or text messages?
Are there any documents or evidence that support the general story?”); Sivek & Bloyd-Peshkin,
supra note 121, at 15 (quoting magazine editors about their reactions to the Rolling Stone case).
134 Kantor & Twohey, supra note 43.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. One source, for example, “who asked not to be identified to protect her privacy, said a
nondisclosure agreement prevented her from commenting.” Id.
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a newsworthy story.138 For example, they ask accusers, “Who did you
tell after this happened?” so that they may confirm the story with the
people the accuser confided in.139
It is true that not every example of #MeToo reporting has been Pu-
litzer-prize winning journalism, but even stories that have received crit-
icism have met basic standards. In a controversial story posted on
Babe.net, an anonymous 23-year-old photographer, referred to as
“Grace,” accused 34-year-old comedian Aziz Ansari of pressuring her
into sexual activity while the two were on a date.140 The story was crit-
icized for its “execution”: it was told in a tone befitting a tabloid, it in-
cluded details best described as gossip, and it failed to address its sub-
ject with “range or depth.”141 But the story was not criticized for
reporting falsehoods, misattributing information, or failing to seek both
sides. It attributed the facts to Grace and confirmed her story with text
message records and the friends she had confided in.142 It posted a text
message in which Ansari told Grace, “Clearly, I misread things in the
moment and I’m truly sorry,” as well as a statement in which Ansari
admitted to sexual activity, but disputed whether there was any indi-
cation that it was other than consensual.143 Some journalists have crit-
icized the story for its haste, which could make it appear as though the
editors did not conduct “due diligence.”144 But Babe.net conducted sev-
138 Jessica Bennett, gender editor for The New York Times, has refused to publish reports of
sexual assault unless there are two other individuals to attest that the victim reported the assault
to them at the time. Alexandra Botti & T.J. Raphael,How Journalists Corroborate Sexual Harass-
ment and Assault Claims, PRI (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-12-18/how-jour-
nalists-corroborate-sexual-harassment-and-assault-claims [https://perma.cc/HKG5-JYYV].
139 Id.
140 Katie Way, I Went on a Date With Aziz Ansari. It Turned Into the Worst Night of my Life,
BABE (Jan. 13, 2018), https://babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari-28355 [https://perma.cc/GZ29-NVL
5]. Grace stated that Ansari aggressively pressured her into performing oral sex and engaging in
other sexual activity, despite her “non-verbal cues,” such as “pulling away,” and her “verbal cues,”
such as telling him “next time” and stating that she did not want to “feel forced.” Id.
141 Julianne Escobedo Shepherd, Babe, What Are You Doing?, JEZEBEL (Jan. 16, 2018), https://
jezebel.com/babe-what-are-you-doing-1822114753?rev=1516127284762 [https://perma.cc/WN5U-
DTY7].
142 Way, supra note 140.
143 Id.
144 Caroline Franke, The Controversy Around Babe.net’s Aziz Ansari Story, Explained, VOX
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/1/17/16897440/aziz-ansari-allegations-babe-me
-too [https://perma.cc/35XL-N6WB] (“Is it possible to do your due diligence on a story in [one week]
given the space and resources? Sure. Does it leave you and your subject vulnerable to probing
criticism about whether you did your due diligence? Absolutely.”).
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eral interviews, fact-checked the story, and sought the advice of a law-
yer.145 The story did not end Ansari’s career; rather, Ansari “mostly dis-
appeared from public life” for a few months before resuming his stand-
up comedy.146
In a few instances, allegations of sexual assault against particular
individuals have been aired without vetting by journalists. Some people
have posted specific accusations on social media sites such as Twitter.147
Others have authored blog posts and essays.148 There are also examples
of crowdsourced lists,149 such as the “Shitty Media Men List:” a google
document circulated in October 2017 that allowed anonymous users to
collect “rumors and allegations of sexual misconduct, much of it violent,
by men in magazines and publishing.”150 Journalists are particularly
wary of crowdsourced allegations.151 It is difficult to find examples of
instances in which employment actions were taken against high-profile
individuals based solely on anonymous allegations that were not vetted
by journalists.152 In a few cases, allegations on anonymous lists resulted
145 Kerry Flynn, What is Babe? Meet the Site that Published the Aziz Ansari Allegation,
MASHABLE (Jan. 15, 2018), https://mashable.com/2018/01/15/what-is-babe-aziz-ansari-sexual-mis-
conduct-allegation/#hroXzRFCVmqQ [https://perma.cc/9CP2-KU9Y].
146 Sopan Deb, Aziz Ansari, Sidelined by Accusation, Plays to a Big Crowd Back Home, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/arts/television/aziz-ansari-standup-ch
arleston.html [https://perma.cc/YPM9-WV5P].
147 See, e.g., Travis M. Andrews, CBS Is Dropping Jeremy Piven’s Show Amid Sexual Miscon-
duct Allegations Against the Actor, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2017/11/28/cbs-is-dropping-jeremy-piven-drama-amid-sexual-misconduct-
allegations-against-the-actor/?utm_term=.ae2384bb5c8e [https://perma.cc/YXE5-CTDZ] (discuss-
ing allegations against actor Jeremy Piven, including one posted on Twitter).
148 See, e.g., Chloe Dykstra, Rose-Colored Glasses: A Confession, MEDIUM (June 14, 2018),
https://medium.com/@skydart/rose-colored-glasses-6be0594970ca [https://perma.cc/2GMF-YGG2];
Leeann Tweeden, Senator Al Franken Kissed and Groped Me Without My Consent, and There’s
Nothing Funny About It, 790KABC (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.kabc.com/2017/11/16/leeann-
tweeden-on-senator-al-franken/ [https://perma.cc/Q2VH-BPA7].
149 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 5, at 869 (discussing anonymous “crowdsourced registries” and
their critics); Tuerkheimer, supra note 5, at 9–13 (discussing anonymous accusations).
150 Moira Donegan, I Started the Media Men List; My Name is Moira Donegan, THE CUT (Jan.
2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/01/moira-donegan-i-started-the-media-men-list.html [https:/
/perma.cc/D3F6-4UBV]. Donegan’s purpose was not to subject accused men to consequences; ra-
ther, it was to open up the traditional whisper networks that warn women of danger. Id.
151 One journalism professor has advised reporters to “[t]hink of an anonymous crowdsourced
list as Wikipedia wrapped in razor blades. By all means examine it—but do so carefully or there
may be a lot of blood on your hands.” James Warren, A Word of Caution: Documents Like that
Media Men List Are Like ‘Wikipedia Wrapped in Razor Blades,’ POYNTER (Jan. 12, 2018), https://w
ww.poynter.org/ethics-trust/2018/a-word-of-caution-documents-like-that-media-men-list-are-like-
wikipedia-wrapped-in-razor-blades/ [https://perma.cc/4QTK-PATJ] (quoting Jill Geisler, the Bill
Plante Chair in Leadership and Media Integrity at Loyola University Chicago). When reporting
on allegations of sexual misconduct that have become public through, for example, Twitter, experts
on journalistic ethics advise that reporters should question the sources of the allegation, look for
corroborating evidence, explain the context of the allegation and whether there is any supporting
evidence, and inform readers of all the relevant information so that they are able to assess the
facts for themselves. KOVACH&ROSENSTIEL, supra note 124, at 124–25.
152 But see Bari Weiss, What Do You Do When You Are Anonymously Accused of Rape, N.Y.
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in internal investigations that led to resignations.153 A number of the
claims that came to light during the #MeToo movement–including those
against HarveyWeinstein, Kevin Spacey, andMatt Lauer–had been the
subjects of “blind items” and gossip columns for years.154 But those al-
legations did not have employment consequences for these accused ce-
lebrities until after they had received attention from investigative jour-
nalists.155
Moreover, even after a story appears, journalists subject high-pro-
file allegations to critical scrutiny, and different media outlets report on
alternative perspectives and updated information.156 The Shitty Media
Men list’s allegations against one individual received critical coverage
in The New York Times.157 Commentators rushed to the defense of Aziz
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/opinion/stephen-elliott-moira-donega
n-media-men.html [https://perma.cc/A38F-TDQU] (discussing the defamation suit brought by
writer Stephen Elliot based on an anonymous assertion on the Shitty Media Men list that he had
been the subject of “rape accusations”). Elliott claims that the false rape allegation harmed his
professional reputation, causing him to be disinvited from events and reducing his opportunities
to publicize a new book. Stephen Elliott, How an Anonymous Accusation Derailed My Life,
QUILLETTE (Sept. 25, 2018), https://quillette.com/2018/09/25/how-an-anonymous-accusation-derail
ed-my-life/ [https://perma.cc/5LX9-2LHB]. Others question whether “What happened is that years
of behaving badly (not criminally) caught up to him.” Marisa Siegel, Firsthand, RUMPUS (Sept. 26,
2018), https://therumpus.net/2018/09/firsthand/ [https://perma.cc/53YV-SHS8] (accusing Elliott of
sexist behavior in the workplace).
153 See, e.g., Alexandra Alter & Sydney Ember, Paris Review Editor Resigns Amid Inquiry into
His Conduct with Women, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/books/
lorin-stein-resigns-the-paris-review.html [https://perma.cc/3SM9-GGK9]; A.J. Chavar, Exclusive:
National Geographic Investigated a Top Photo Editor for Sexual Misconduct. He Left Quietly, but
Women Are Speaking Out, VOX (Jan. 31, 2018, 12:33 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/1/29/169345
52/exclusive-national-geographic-sexual-misconduct [https://perma.cc/MRS2-LPDC].
154 Alyssa Bereznak, Blind Item Revealed: How a Scorned Form of Gossip Changed Hollywood,
RINGER (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.theringer.com/2018/12/13/18138512/blind-item-revealed-how
-a-scorned-form-of-gossip-changed-hollywood [https://perma.cc/C95D-FUAX]. “Blind items” are
“anonymous snippets of gossip that require readers to guess the parties involved.” Id. They are left
“intentionally vague” so that “only the publication’s savviest readers” know who they refer to. Id.
For one example, see, e.g., Ramin Setoodeh, Ashley Judd Reveals Sexual Harassment by Studio
Mogul, VARIETY (Oct. 6, 2015), https://variety.com/2015/film/news/ashley-judd-sexual-harassment
-studio-mogul-shower-1201610666/ [https://perma.cc/N3BK-93RQ].
155 See, e.g., supra note 21; Vary, supra note 76. The immediate cause of Matt Lauer’s termina-
tion was an internal complaint, but at the time he was fired, journalists had been investigating
allegations against him for months. Ramin Setoodeh & ElizabethWagmeister,Matt Lauer Accused
of Sexual Harassment by Multiple Women, VARIETY (Nov. 29, 2017), https://variety.com/2017/biz/n
ews/matt-lauer-accused-sexual-harassment-multiple-women-1202625959/ [https://perma.cc/QKB
8-WQNQ].
156 More than a year after allegations against former Senator Al Franken led to his resignation,
commentators continue to critically question the evidence against him. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The
Case Against Al Franken, NEWYORKER (July 22, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/201
9/07/29/the-case-of-al-franken [https://perma.cc/ZLZ3-N4YE]; Emily Yoffee, Democrats Need to
Learn From Their Al Franken Mistake, ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ide
as/archive/2019/03/democrats-shouldnt-have-pressured-al-franken-resign/585739/ [https://perma.
cc/TV9D-R4MT].
157 Weiss, supra note 115.
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Ansari, taking issue with Grace’s characterization of what had hap-
pened to her as “sexual assault”158 and arguing that Ansari’s conduct
had been unfairly equated to worse behavior.159 There was a swift and
critical response to allegations by Julie Swetnick that Supreme Court
nominee Brett Kavanaugh may have participated in a gang rape in the
1980s.160 The reaction to this allegation demonstrates the vetting norm:
commentators criticized Michael Avenatti, Swetnick’s lawyer, for sub-
mitting an affidavit containing Swetnick’s statement rather than allow-
ing journalists to first investigate the claim.161 Media reports ques-
tioned Swetnick’s account, character, and credibility.162 Rather than
having an adverse impact on Kavanaugh’s confirmation prospects,
many commentators believe that the weakness of Swetnick’s allegation
cast more credible allegations in a negative light.163
B. Investigation and Corroboration
Another informal norm is that allegations do not generally result
in specific employment consequences unless they are borne out through
formal investigation, corroborated, or both. Corroboration is not a for-
mal legal requirement. Historically, a claim of rape required “corrobo-
rative evidence,” such as physical injuries, because rape allegations
were treated with exceptional skepticism.164 But today, credible evi-
dence could be a single victim’s testimony, depending on the circum-
stances.165 The corroboration requirement has come to have a specific
meaning in #MeToo discussions: that in the very least, an accusation
158 Way, supra note 140.
159 For a summary of just some of the critical reaction, see Franke, supra note 144.
160 Aaron Blake, Did Michael Avenatti Help Doom the Case Against Brett Kavanaugh?, WASH.
POST (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/05/did-michael-avenatti-hel
p-doom-case-against-brett-kavanaugh/ [https://perma.cc/9P4X-5GZM]. See alsoMayer, supra note
156 (critically assessing the decision of a radio station website to post an essay by Leeann Tweeden
accusing Al Franken of sexual misconduct without first requesting comment from Franken or fact
checking Tweeden’s statements).
161 Id.; Jackie Kucinich et al., Democrats to Michael Avenatti: You’re Not Helping in the Ka-
vanaugh Fight, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/democrats-to-ave
natti-youre-not-helping-in-the-kavanaugh-fight [https://perma.cc/5H4S-6B34] (stating that Sena-
tor Chris Coons (D-DE), “suggested Avenatti should have followed in the footsteps of [Dr. Christine
Blasey] Ford, who ‘attempted to contact news outlets and the committee before Judge Kavanaugh
was confirmed as being the nominee’” and another “Democratic source” as saying, “If he had vetted
it through a media outlet and had journalists represent it in a well-reported way or have the com-
mittee introduce it, it would have been better”).
162 Blake, supra note 160.
163 Id.
164 Anderson, supra note 36, at 2000.
165 Tuerkheimer, supra note 34, at 2.
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must be supported by more evidence than a single victim’s state-
ments.166 Accusations by multiple victims qualify.167 The New York
Times made a list of “prominent people who lost their main jobs, signif-
icant leadership positions or major contracts, and whose ousters were
publicly covered in news reports” as a result of sexual misconduct alle-
gations in the year following the Weinstein story.168 By my count, out of
the 202 cases listed by the New York Times, only fifty involved a single
accuser, and in ten of those instances, the accused person admitted to
some form of wrongdoing.169 Out of the forty remaining cases, in all but
five, the media reported there was some type of investigation.170
166 Whether this is a fair rule for survivors is a different question. Cf. MacKinnon, supra note
1 (“[I]n cases of campus sexual abuse over decades; it typically took three to four women testifying
that they had been violated by the same man in the same way to even begin to make a dent in his
denial. That made a woman, for credibility purposes, one-fourth of a person.”).
167 This is not the legal meaning of corroboration. Legal rules sometimes limit “me too” evi-
dence. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk Gerson, Bill Cosby’s Crimes and the Impact of #MeToo on the Ameri-
can Legal System, NEW YORKER (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/bill-
cosbys-crimes-and-the-impact-of-metoo-on-the-american-legal-system [https://perma.cc/
2M4R-WFSZ]. It may be akin to the legal requirement of “numerosity” for a class action lawsuit.
See FED R. CIV. P. 23. I am grateful to Lesley Wexler for pointing out this analogy.
168 Carlsen et al., supra note 6. I do not claim that this is a comprehensive set of cases. This
list reflects the judgments of New York Times reporters about what qualifies as “prominent.” It
includes only men, although there are at least three women—Asia Argento, Andrea Ramsey, and
Avital Ronnell—who lost opportunities on account of reports of sexual misconduct. One consulting
firm claims to have compiled its own proprietary list of over 900 people, including twenty-nine
women, whose names have appeared in “at least seven news articles as accused of behavior that
includes sexual harassment, assault, abuse or rape and condoning and/or helping to hide such
behavior” since December 2015. See Jessica Brice & Jeff Green, Woman Compiling MeToo Names
Says They’re the ‘Tip of the Iceberg, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2018-10-17/woman-compiling-metoo-names-says-they-re-tip-of-the-iceberg [https://perm
a.cc/KW6Z-FAHN].
169 This count is based on news stories in addition to the New York Times article. A chart de-
scribing those sources is on file with the author.
170 One of the five exceptions involved allegations detailed in a sexual harassment lawsuit.
Jessica Sidman & Anna Spiegel, The Inside Story of Mike Isabella’s Fallen Empire, WASHINGTONI-
AN (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonian.com/2018/11/26/the-inside-story-of-mike-isabellas-
fallen-empire/ [https://perma.cc/3ZYH-VUHK]. Two involved allegations of criminal conduct. Anita
Busch, Tom Sizemore Dropped From Thriller ‘The Door’ After Sexual Misconduct Allegations,
DEADLINEHOLLYWOOD (Nov. 15, 2017), https://deadline.com/2017/11/tom-sizemore-sexual-miscon
duct-allegations-dropped-from-horror-film-the-door-1202208846/ [https://perma.cc/A6GU-YFG5];
Michael Schneider, T.J. Miller Replaced as Mucinex Spokesman, Coinciding With Sexual Assault
Allegations, INDIEWIRE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.indiewire.com/2018/02/tj-miller-mucinex-jason
-mantzoukas-super-bowl-ad-1201925909/ [https://perma.cc/QXT3-4SAT]. In one case, there was
evidence in the form of text messages that a lawmaker had communicated with a teenage girl in
ways legislative leaders regarded as inappropriate. Keith M. Phaneuf, Angel Arce to Resign From
General Assembly, CT MIRROR (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.courant.com/politics/hc-pol-arce-texts-
whats-next-20180327-story.html [https://perma.cc/W4WQ-6DY5]. And in one case, the accused
and his employer denied that the allegations of harassment were related to his decision to resign.
Rachel Monahan, Former Portland Mayor Sam Adams Has Abruptly Left his Job at a D.C. Think
Tank, WILLAMETTE WEEK (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.wweek.com/news/city/2017/12/06/former-
portland-mayor-sam-adams-has-abruptly-left-his-job-at-a-d-c-think-tank/ [https://perma.cc/6AJ2-
W96A].
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One evolving norm in the #MeToo era is that institutions generally
conduct investigations. Out of the 95 cases in which the accused indi-
vidual did not admit to wrongdoing or resign,171 there were reports of
investigations in all but 27.172 Sexual harassment investigations are a
commonplace function of human resources departments.173 Institutions
often hire outside counsel for high-profile or sensitive investigations.174
When a corporation conducts an internal investigation into sexual har-
assment by an existing employee, it is advised to apply the “preponder-
ance of the evidence standard,” which means deciding whether miscon-
duct was more likely than not to have occurred.175 This is because
sexual harassment is a civil matter, and the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard is commonly used in civil cases, rather than the higher
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal matters.176 As
in criminal cases, a survivor’s credible testimony alone may be suffi-
cient evidence.177 Nonetheless, “[m]any employers falsely believe that if
there are no independent witnesses, there can be no finding of harass-
ment,” while others “balk[] at making a finding that conduct occurred”
because of concerns about the impact on the accused person’s career.178
The details of most internal investigations are confidential. But a
number of these investigations have come out in favor of the accused.179
The Ford-Kavanaugh controversy—in which the FBI investigated Dr.
Christine Blasey Ford’s allegation that she had been sexually assaulted
by Kavanaugh when they were teenagers before the Senate voted to
confirm Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court—is a notable example, but
171 Those who resign rather than face an investigation cannot complain about lack of process.
See Stone v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167, 173–75 (4th Cir. 1988).
172 Many of the cases in which there was no employer investigation involved investigative jour-
nalism that uncovered corroborating evidence, such as the reporting on Harvey Weinstein. See
supra note 21.
173 See, e.g., AMY OPPENHEIMER & CRAIG PRATT, INVESTIGATING WORKPLACE HARASSMENT:
HOW TO BE FAIR, THOROUGH, AND LEGAL 50 (2002).
174 Id. at 62.
175 Id. at 108–09; see also Dori Meinert, How to Investigate Sexual Harassment Allegations,
SHRM (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/0218/pages/how-to-invest
igate-sexual-harassment-allegations.aspx [https://perma.cc/R9DP-SH4D].
176 OPPENHEIMER & PRATT, supra note at 109 (explaining that if an employer applies the “be-
yond a reasonable doubt” standard and finds no harassment occurred, but then a civil jury finds
that harassment did occur based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” there is a risk that the jury
will “question the employer’s good faith and may award significant damages to the complainant.”).
177 Id. at 110.
178 Id.
179 My focus is not the fairness of these investigations, because they are not unique features of
the #MeToo moment, and they are not extralegal in the same sense; rather, they have insinuated
themselves into the fabric of sexual harassment law. See, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING
LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 183–88 (2016).
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there are also others.180 For example, after actor Chloe Dykstra pub-
lished an essay accusing her ex-boyfriend, television host Chris Hard-
wick, of emotional abuse and sexual assault, Hardwick’s employer AMC
suspended him and conducted an internal investigation with the assis-
tance of an outside law firm.181 After the investigation, Hardwick was
reinstated.182 After eight women accused actor Morgan Freeman of har-
assment in forms such as “demeaning comments” and “unwanted touch-
ing,”183 the National Geographic network, which was producing a series
by Freeman, and SAG-AFTRA, which had awarded Freeman a SAG
Life Achievement Award, both conducted investigations and decided
not to take any adverse action against Freeman.184 After Pulitzer-prize
winning author Junot Díaz was accused of misconduct, including an in-
cident of forcible kissing, three institutions—the Pulitzer Prize board,
M.I.T., where he teaches, and the Boston Review, where he is a fiction
editor—each conducted investigations and decided to take no action
against him.185
In other contexts, how strong the evidence must be to justify an
employment decision and what type of evidence counts as corroborative
has been the subject of debate. During the Kavanaugh confirmation
hearings, some commentators argued that because of the importance of
a Supreme Court appointment, the Senate should disqualify the nomi-
nee if there were “credible” evidence of sexual misconduct—a lower
180 See, e.g., German Lopez, The FBI Investigation of Kavanaugh Was Doomed from the Start,
VOX (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/5/17940738/fbi-investigation-
kavanaugh-thorough-limits [https://perma.cc/V7P7-Z32Y].
181 Dykstra, supra note 148. With respect to sexual assault, Dykstra stated that “I let him
sexually assault me.” Id. While Dykstra did not identify Hardwick by name, she included enough
details to allow readers to identify him. Corinne Heller, Chris Hardwick Returning to AMC After
Sexual Assault Investigation, E! NEWS (Jul. 25, 2018, 2:28 PM), https://www.eonline.com/news/94
4736/chris-hardwick-s-talk-show-pulled-by-amc-amid-sexual-assault-claims [https://perma.cc/CR
V7-PZMF].
182 Heller, supra note 181 (reporting that AMC released the following statement: “We take
these matters very seriously and given the information available to us after a very careful review,
including interviews with numerous individuals, we believe returning Chris to work is the appro-
priate step”).
183 An Phung & Chloe Melas,Women Accuse Morgan Freeman of Inappropriate Behavior, Har-
assment, CNN (May 28, 2018, 11:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/24/entertainment/mor
gan-freeman-accusations/index.html [https://perma.cc/EM26-A27S].
184 David Robb,Morgan Freeman to Keep SAG Lifetime Achievement Award Following Harass-
ment Probe, FOX NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/morgan-freeman-
to-keep-sag-lifetime-achievement-award-following-harassment-probe [https://perma.cc/FXP6-GT
DC].
185 Julia Jacobs, Junot Díaz Welcomed Back by Pulitzer Prize After Review into Sexual Miscon-
duct Claims, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/nov/19/j
unot-diaz-welcomed-back-by-pulitzer-prize-after-review-into-sexual-misconduct-claims [https://pe
rma.cc/ASL6-CQ3Z].
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standard than the preponderance of the evidence.186 Senator Susan Col-
lins, however, one of the last senators to announce her vote in favor of
Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation, stated that a preponderance of the
evidence standard should apply.187 While Collins found Dr. Ford’s testi-
mony to be “sincere, painful, and compelling,” she concluded that Ford’s
allegations were insufficient due to the lack of “corroborating evi-
dence.”188 This was despite the fact that Ford had confided in her hus-
band and a counselor about her sexual assault in 2012.189
Thus, when public allegations of sexual assault, harassment, or
misconduct are raised against high-level leaders, a set of informal
norms has developed for evaluating whether those allegations warrant
dismissal. These norms require that public allegations be vetted accord-
ing to journalistic standards of verification, attribution, and seeking
both sides. The allegations should be specific enough to permit the ac-
cused person to respond meaningfully and to allow for further scrutiny
by the media and the public. Before action is taken, decision makers
require an admission of misconduct by the accused, corroborative evi-
dence, or a formal investigation. Terminations of high-level employees
based on single accusations alone are deviations from these norms. Crit-
ics of #MeToo have brought to light few, if any, such cases.190
IV. RESPONDING TO PROCEDURALOBJECTIONS
This Part defends #MeToo’s informal procedural system against
the charge that it is unfair to the accused on procedural grounds. Over-
looking the fact that legal procedures are not required in extralegal con-
texts, this Part addresses the fairness concerns that underlie the proce-
dural justice critique. Specifically, it responds to the objections that
186 See, e.g., Kate Shaw, How Strong Does the Evidence Against Kavanaugh Need to Be?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/kavanaugh-blasey-allegation
-disqualify.html [https://perma.cc/SG8P-5QBX].
187 David A. Graham, Susan Collins Says She Believes Survivors—Just Not Ford, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/susan-collinss-kavanaugh-sex
ual-assault/572347/ [https://perma.cc/3YP7-7E8U] (“This is not a criminal trial, and I do not be-
lieve that claims such as these need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, fairness
would dictate that the claims at least should meet a threshold of more likely than not as our stand-
ard.” (quoting Senator Collins)).
188 Abrams, supra note 113 (quoting Senator Collins). Later, Senator Collins stated that she
thought Dr. Ford was mistaken about the identity of her assailant. Caroline Kelly, Collins: ‘I Do
Not Believe That Brett KavanaughWas’ Ford’s Assailant, CNN (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.cnn.com
/2018/10/06/politics/collins-sotu-kavanaugh-cnntv/index.html [https://perma.cc/3G2W-KNDX].
189 Kavanaugh Hearing: Transcript, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-trascript/?utm_term=.b9d91041e335 [http
s://perma.cc/653E-77AT] (testimony of Christine Blasey Ford that “My husband recalls that I
named my attacker as Brett Kavanaugh.”).
190 See supra notes 152 & 170 (collecting news stories on cases that might arguably fit into this
category); infra notes 289–293 (discussing Andrea Ramsay).
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#MeToo’s procedural norms are unenforceable; that survivors have
waived their rights to complain informally by failing to use legal proce-
dures; that only formal legal tribunals are equipped to handle claims;
that #MeToo’s procedures fail to provide the accused with notice of the
claims against them, a fair opportunity to respond, or the right to con-
front their accusers; and that consequences have been disproportionate
to the severity of the misconduct. A close examination of cases in the
#MeToo era demonstrates these complaints lack basis in fact or are not
supported by principles of procedural fairness.
A. Unenforceability
One criticism of the rules of #MeToo, as I have described them, is
that they are not “rules” at all; they are a loose set of informal standards
without enforcement mechanisms. There is no guarantee that these
norms will be applied consistently or apolitically. Opponents make slip-
pery slope arguments about what might result from the lack of hard-
and-fast rules to screen out frivolous or abusive allegations.191 They ex-
press the concern that enforceable standards are required when the ac-
cused lacks power, money, or fame.192 However, defamation law and an
aggressive media have provided checks on abusive allegations, and
there are principled reasons for treating for high- and low-level employ-
ees differently.
While journalistic standards such as accuracy, seeking both sides,
and attribution are not legally enforceable on their own, investigative
journalists operate in the shadow of defamation law.193 Defamation law
casts a longer shadow over extralegal processes of the sort I am describ-
ing as characteristic of the #MeToo era, because journalists are unlikely
to be liable for reporting the statements of law enforcement officials, as
191 See, e.g., Hemmingway, supra note 88 (“You can’t establish a precedent where anyone can
make an unverifiable and murky claim against another person to kill his nomination and career.”);
Benjamin Wittes, I Know Brett Kavanaugh, But I Wouldn’t Confirm Him, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/why-i-wouldnt-confirm-brett-kavanaugh/5719
36/ [https://perma.cc/SK9Z-P3CP] (“Even assuming that Christine Blasey Ford’s allegations are
entirely accurate, rejecting him on the current record could incentivize not merely other sexual-
assault victims to come forward—which would be a salutary thing—but also other late-stage alle-
gations of a non-falsifiable nature by people who are not acting in good faith.”).
192 Emily Yoffee, Why the #MeToo Movement Should Be Ready for a Backlash, POLITICO (Dec.
10, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/12/10/yoffe-sexual-harassment-college-
franken-216057 [https://perma.cc/PT3X-3K5N].
193 Kirtley, supra note 117, at 144–45. Libel, for example, is a tort that allows a plaintiff to sue
a defendant who has made a false claim that damaged their reputation. In New York, to prove a
claim of libel, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a written defamatory factual statement concerning the
plaintiff; (2) publication to a third party; (3) fault; (4) falsity of the defamatory statement; and (5)
special damages or per se actionability.” Chau v. Lewis, 771 F.3d 118, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2014). Alle-
gations of sexual misconduct may qualify as per se actionable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 574 (1977).
66 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
they did in the Duke Lacrosse case.194 In the University of Virginia case,
by contrast, the Rolling Stone article was not based on any legal filings
or statements by law enforcement.195 The author of the Rolling Stone
story lost her job.196 Nicole Eramo, a university administrator accused
of mishandling sexual assault complaints in the article, won a $3 mil-
lion defamation verdict.197 Because Eramo was a public figure, she had
the heavy burden to convince the jury, by “clear and convincing evi-
dence,” that Rolling Stone reported the story with “actual malice.”198
This standard requires that the defendant made a defamatory state-
ment “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”199 In the Eramo case, the court noted that
“departure from journalistic standards is not a determinant of actual
malice, but such action might serve as supportive evidence.”200 The
jury’s verdict made clear it believed the recklessness standard was met.
Like journalists, individual bloggers and social media users can be
sued for libel for making accusations of sexual assault, harassment, and
misconduct.201 Some accusers have been persuaded to take down social
media posts based on the mere threat of legal action.202 While the bur-
den lies with the defamed person to demonstrate the accusation was
false, many accusers do not have the resources or wherewithal to defend
194 Kirtley, supra note 117, at 153 (explaining that “it is both easier and legally safer for jour-
nalists to rely on official sources. Conducting parallel and independent investigations exposes jour-
nalists to a greater risk of legal liability for inaccurate, incorrect, or defamatory statements, while
relying on official sources protects them in their ‘fair reports’ of government documents and ac-
tions”).
195 Coronel, Coll, & Kravitz, supra note 128.
196 T. Rees Shapiro & Emma Brown, Rolling Stone Settles With Former U-Va. Dean in Defa-
mation Case, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/rolling
-stone-settles-with-u-va-dean-in-defamation-case/2017/04/11/5a564532-1f02-11e7-be2a-3a1fb24d
4671_story.html [https://perma.cc/39FG-Z27X].
197 Id. The defendants filed a motion to vacate the judgment, but the case settled before it was
resolved. Id.
198 Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862, 869 (W.D. Va. 2016).
199 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). “Reckless disregard” means that
the defendants “entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [their] publication.” St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968). Victims who are not public figures may generally prevail on
the lesser showing that the defendant was negligent. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 LAW OF DEFAMATION
§ 3:30 (2d ed. 2018).
200 Eramo, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 871.
201 Tyler Kingkade, As More College Students Say “MeToo,” Accused Men Are Suing for Defa-
mation, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tylerkingkade/as-
more-college-students-say-me-too-accused-men-are-suing#.rlW1WVZPE [https://perma.cc/7W7U-
TJTW].
202 Susan Seager, #MeToo Stories Can Lead to Libel Suits, THEWRAP (Nov. 4, 2017), https://ww
w.thewrap.com/brett-ratner-melanie-kohlier-sexual-assault-rape-hollywood-harvey-weinstein/ [h
ttps://perma.cc/7SA6-6SQB] (discussing how an accuser was persuaded to remove a Facebook post
by the threat of a libel suit).
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against a lawsuit.203 Thus, the threat of defamation liability may
squelch even true allegations.
One concern with respect to the Ford-Kavanaugh hearings was
that taking Dr. Ford’s allegations seriously would incentivize future ac-
cusers to invent stories against their political enemies that are non-fal-
sifiable, and so cannot be disproven or deterred with defamation law.204
For example, Senator Collins stated that the fact that the “outlandish
allegation” of gang rape by Julie Swetnick “was put forth without any
credible supporting evidence and simply parroted public statements of
others” had underscored the importance of “the presumption of inno-
cence.”205 Yet aggressive and skeptical reporting serves as a check on
such accusations. By the time of Senator Collins’s statement the media
had already subjected Swetnick’s allegation to extensive scrutiny.206
That allegation was regarded as so improbable that it was not even in-
vestigated,207 and Swetnick and Avenatti were referred to the Justice
Department for criminal investigation for making false statements.208
Journalists also corrected other false reports, as with the allegations,
later recanted, that Kavanaugh had committed sexual assault on a boat
in Rhode Island.209 It is true that outright hoaxes have been at-
tempted.210 But they are not easy to pull off because of the media’s vig-
ilance in verifying facts and skepticism about partisan motives.211 Jour-
nalists have succeeded in uncovering bad faith allegations, as in one
203 Id.
204 See supra note 191.
205 Abrams, supra note 113 (quoting Senator Collins).
206 See, e.g., David Bauder, NBC Faces Scrutiny for Interview with Kavanaugh Accuser, AP
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/c5ecf76c62ec4c398e35020b5df01061 [https://perma
.cc/G84H-HRJB]; Michael E. Miller et al., Who is Julie Swetnick, the Third Kavanaugh Accuser?,
WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/who-is-julie-swetnick-the-third-
kavanaugh-accuser/2018/09/26/91e16ed8-c1bc-11e8-97a5-ab1e46bb3bc7_story.html [https://perm
a.cc/LFW9-848E].
207 See Lopez, supra note 180.
208 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Swetnick, Avenatti Referred for Criminal Investigation
(Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/swetnick-avenatti-referred-for
-criminal-investigation [https://perma.cc/H9U3-KTL2].
209 Nicholas Fandos & Michael D. Shear, Before Kavanaugh Hearing, New Accusations and
Doubts Emerge, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/ us/politics/kava
naugh-calendar.html [https://perma.cc/G3X4-84NB] (discussing an individual from Rhode Island
“who charged—and then recanted Wednesday night—that Judge Kavanaugh had raped a woman
on a boat in 1985 in Newport, R.I.”).
210 See, e.g., Natasha Bertrand, Mueller Wants the FBI to Look at a Scheme to Discredit Him,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/special-counsel-re-
fers-scheme-targeting-mueller-to-fbi/574411/ [https://perma.cc/QCJ2-JV39].
211 See, e.g., Jill Abramson, The GOP Thinks #MeToo Is a Chance to Exploit the ‘Biased’ Press,
INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 19, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/gop-thinks-metoo-is-a-ch
ance-to-exploit-the-biased-press.html.
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instance in which the nonprofit group Project Veritas attempted to em-
barrass The Washington Post by planting a false story of sexual abuse
about then-Senate candidate Roy Moore.212
Another concern is that the news media will not provide “due dili-
gence” when accusations are brought against workers who do not pos-
sess fame, power, or prestige.213 Rank-and-file workers may then find
themselves terminated based on mere reports of harassment or jokes
and banter that are sexualized but inoffensive. But this problem is al-
ready occurring, and it is one that long predates the #MeToo move-
ment.214 Many employers believe there are economic reasons to sup-
press all sexuality in the workplace, not just harmful forms of
harassment.215 While highly-paid executives often have contracts that
provide them with the assurance that they will not be terminated with-
out cause, most lower-level employees can be fired at will.216 The solu-
tion, for those concerned about due process, is to extend some form of
protection against arbitrary terminations to all employees.217 It would
be perverse to respond to this concern by carving out special protections
against allegations of a sexual nature, or to refrain from holding those
at high levels accountable when careful journalism exposes sexual mis-
conduct.
B. Waiver, Timeliness, and Jurisdiction
Another procedural argument is that victims who failed to pursue
relief through legal channels—like the civil and criminal law—should
not be able to raise claims informally. This argument may be about
waiver: that it is unfair for survivors who chose not to exercise their
rights to legal relief to raise claims outside legal processes, especially
after the lapse of time. Or it may be a jurisdictional point: that formal
legal fora should have exclusive jurisdiction over claims of sexual as-
sault and harassment, as informal processes are incompetent to handle
such issues. This genre of argument rests on a number of false premises.
212 Beth Reinhard et al.,Woman’s Effort to Infiltrate The Washington Post Dated Back Months,
WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/womans-effort-to-in-
filtrate-the-washington-post-dates-back-months/2017/11/29/ce95e01a-d51e-11e7-b62dd9345ced89
6d_story.html [https://perma.cc/T252-G5E6].
213 Yoffee, supra note 192 (expressing the worry that the #MeToo movement “will eventually
move past this moment of shocking allegations against famous men, and should soon focus on the
many nonfamous people in quotidian circumstances. But top news organizations are not likely to
provide as much due diligence about those cases”).
214 See generally Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003).
215 Id.
216 Arnow-Richman, supra note 19, at 89.
217 See, e.g., id. at 101–02.
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The “waiver” version of this argument rests on false premises re-
garding the availability of legal recourse. “Waiver” is a procedural doc-
trine that prevents a party from raising an issue when they had an op-
portunity to bring it up at some earlier point, but failed to do so. A key
premise here is that a person had a fair opportunity and the incentive
to raise an issue at an earlier point.218 But the law fails to prohibit much
conduct widely regarded as sexual abuse, and those prohibitions that
do exist are systematically underenforced.219 Survivors understand
this.220 In response to the question why she didn’t report, Actor Ashley
Judd asked, “Were we supposed to call some fantasy attorney general
of moviedom”?221
Those recent cases in which the law has achieved ostensible suc-
cesses only go to show the law’s abject failure. Twenty-years of com-
plaints against USA Gymnastics doctor Larry Nassar by young gym-
nasts were not taken seriously until the police found child pornography
on his hard drive.222 For decades before his conviction for sexual assault,
Bill Cosby’s accusers “were met, mostly, with skepticism, threats, and
attacks on their character.”223 Recording artist Taylor Swift, who re-
ported that she was groped by a radio host while posing for a photo-
graph, did not attempt to avail herself of any legal remedies until two
years later, when she found herself a defendant in a suit brought by the
radio host claiming that Swift had lied about the assault and caused
him to be fired from his job.224 He lost his case, and the jury granted
218 See, e.g., United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Whether there
is a waiver depends not, . . . on counting the number of missed opportunities (hearings, motions,
etc.) to raise an issue, but on whether the party had sufficient incentive to raise the issue in the
prior proceedings.”).
219 See supra notes 33–58 and accompanying text. Professor Duncan Kennedy has called this
the “tolerated residuum” of sexual abuse. Kennedy, supra note 116, at 1320. It serves not only the
interests of abusers, but also the individual interests of those men who imagine themselves more
likely to be falsely accused than sexually abused, and who wish to avoid the burden of worrying
about “excess or inaccurate enforcement” of the law. Id.
220 See, e.g., #WhyIDidntReport, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/hashtag/WhyIDidntReport [http
s://perma.cc/FCG7-JBGS].
221 Zacharek, supra note 59.
222 Kerry Howley, Everyone Believed Larry Nassar. The Predatory Trainer May Have Just
Taken Down USA Gymnastics. How Did He Deceive So Many For So Long?, THE CUT (Nov. 19, 20-
18), https://www.thecut.com/2018/11/how-did-larry-nassar-deceive-so-many-for-so-long.html [http
s://perma.cc/C4W6-3BQA] (“Over the course of at least 20 years of consistent abuse, women and
girls reported to every proximate authority.”).
223 Noreen Malone & Amanda Demme, ‘I’m No Longer Afraid’: 35 Women Tell Their Stories
About Being Assaulted by Bill Cosby, and the Culture that Wouldn’t Listen, THE CUT (July 26,
2015), https://www.thecut.com/2015/07/bill-cosbys-accusers-speak-out.html#barbara-bowman [htt
ps://perma.cc/PAY5-BHR2].
224 Eliana Dockterman, ‘I Was Angry.’ Taylor Swift on What Powered her Sexual Assault Tes-
timony, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017), http://time.com/5049659/taylor-swift-interview-person-of-the-year-
2017/ [https://perma.cc/3767-N3Y2].
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Swift the $1 she had requested in symbolic damages.225 Despite being
one of the best-selling recording artists of all time, Swift found herself
blamed for what had happened.226Her experience with the legal process
was “demoralizing.”227 Swift said, “Going to court to confront this type
of behavior is a lonely and draining experience, even when you win,
even when you have the financial ability to defend yourself.”228 The
#MeToo movement has demonstrated that survivors might now be
taken seriously. Survivors should not be faulted for waiting until the
time when they might be heard to come forward.
Another version of this argument is about timeliness—that victims
are using the court of public opinion to circumvent the statutes of limi-
tations that apply to civil and criminal cases, long after evidence has
gone stale, memories have faded, and social norms about appropriate
conduct have changed.229 But an unfortunate feature of sexual abuse is
that it causes delayed reporting by intimidating survivors through
threats of shaming and retaliation, and by convincing survivors that
they were to blame, that they overreacted, or that they misinterpreted
what happened.230Moreover, legal deadlines for bringing claims are too
short. Title VII sexual harassment claims must be brought within an
exceptionally short timeframe, generally less than a year.231 While re-
formers have succeeded in eliminating or expanding statutes of limita-
tions for rape in many states, in others the time limit may be as short
as six years.232These sharp deadlines should not be applied by decision
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. (“When I testified, I had already been in court all week and had to watch this man’s
attorney bully, badger and harass my team including my mother over inane details and ridiculous
minutiae, accusing them, and me, of lying.”).
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (explaining that statutes of
limitations provide defendants with “repose,” “encourage the prompt presentation of claims,” and
“protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth
may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses,
fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.”).
230 Cf. Jessica Henderson Daniel, Statement of APA President Regarding the Science behind
Why Women May Not Report Sexual Assault, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.ap
a.org/news/press/releases/2018/09/report-sexual-assault.aspx [https://perma.cc/N8NW-3FYK] (ex-
plaining that survivors may not report for any number of reasons, including “fear for their safety,
being in shock, fear of not being believed, feeling embarrassed or ashamed, or expecting to be
blamed.”).
231 Anne Lawton, Tipping the Scales of Justice in Sexual Harassment Law, 27 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 517, 519–22 (2001) (criticizing the short statute of limitations for sexual harassment claims,
and pointing out that, for example, under Ohio law there is a four-year statute of limitations for
breach of a sales contract).
232 See Jamie R. Abrams, The #MeToo Movement: An Invitation for Feminist Critique of Rape
Crisis Framing, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 749, 769–70 (2018).
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makers asking whether an accused person is fit to hold high office. De-
cision makers may appropriately consider the passage of time and re-
sulting lack of evidence as a factor in assessing the likelihood of the
misconduct.
Yet another variation on this argument is that the court of public
opinion is ill-suited for truth-finding, so real courts should have exclu-
sive jurisdiction. This argument overestimates the truth-finding capac-
ity of the criminal justice system, which is focused on plea bargaining,233
and the civil justice system, which is directed at settlement.234 It under-
estimates the independent media, which has long served as a check on
arbitrary and unfair legal proceedings, monitoring and exposing mis-
carriages of justice.235 While it is true that the public may rush to judg-
ment rather than examining whether media reports adhere to basic
journalist standards, public judgments tend to be ephemeral rather
than having any lasting career consequences for celebrities.236 Institu-
tions have acted with more care, often engaging their own investiga-
tors.237Moreover, the argument that any given dispute can only be tried
in one tribunal is inconsistent with the practice of U.S. courts. O.J.
Simpson’s acquittal in the criminal case against him for the murders of
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman did not bar the victim’s
families from relitigating the matter in a civil suit alleging wrongful
death or a custody proceeding to terminate his parental rights.238 In
233 See, e.g., George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALEL.J. 857, 859 (2000) (discuss-
ing how the criminal justice system is dominated by plea bargaining); Thea Johnson, Fictional
Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 857 (2019) (discussing “fictional pleas” in which offenders plead guilty to
crimes they did not commit to avoid trials that place them at risk of extreme consequences).
234 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 925 (2000).
235 As the Supreme Court has reflected:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard is documented
by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not simply pub-
lish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting
the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). The Duke Lacrosse incident provides one example
of how the press can serve as a check on irresponsible prosecutors. See, e.g., supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
236 See, e.g., Joanna Piacenza, How #MeToo Impacts Viewers’ Decisions on What to Watch,
MORNING CONSULT (May 28, 2018), https://morningconsult.com/2018/05/28/how-metoo-impacts-
viewers-decisions-what-watch/ [https://perma.cc/TJ8S-A7FK] (surveying 2202 U.S. adults about
whether allegations of misconduct against twenty performers would affect their viewership, and
finding that “allegations against only two — Kevin Spacey and Louis C.K. — spurred more people
to say their viewership habits would change as a result”).
237 See supra Section III.B.
238 STEPHENN. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, ANDCONTEXT 1024–25
(4th ed. 2012).
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each of these cases, there was something different at stake, and so a
different standard of proof was appropriate.239
What standard of proof ought to apply when a person holding or
seeking high office is publicly accused of sexual misconduct has appro-
priately been the subject of public debate.240 The standard should be
calibrated by balancing the risks of a “false negative (i.e., failing to im-
pose consequences when the allegation is in fact true)” against the risks
of a “false positive (i.e., imposing consequences when the accused is in
fact innocent).”241 In the context of the Ford-Kavanaugh hearings, for
example, the risk of a false negative was that a person who had com-
mitted sexual assault would be confirmed to a lifetime Supreme Court
appointment where he would “cast the deciding vote on matters of
women’s liberty and equality.”242 The risk of a false positive was that
Kavanaugh would have remained a judge on a lower court, and another
“highly qualified jurist” would have taken his place on the Supreme
Court.243 Thus, a “substantial” or “credible” evidence standard might be
more appropriate for nominations to high-profile positions, rather than
the higher preponderance of the evidence standard that is commonly
applied by investigators.244 The risk that accused individuals will con-
tinue to abuse their power is also a relevant consideration in this calcu-
lation.245
Career consequences and reputational harms for the accused are
relevant but too often overvalued. The decisions of any particular insti-
tutional decisionmaker, consumer, or audience member on the merits
of a #MeToo claim do not bind all others.246 For example, while it is true
that Justice Kavanaugh might have suffered some further degree of
reputational harm if he had not been confirmed, the Senate’s ultimate
vote did not “absolve Judge Kavanaugh in the court of public opin-
ion.”247 A finding of “credible” or “substantial” evidence is just that; it is
239 Id.
240 See supra notes 186–189 and accompanying text.
241 See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, Burdens of Proof for Sexual Misconduct Claims in Senate Confir-
mations and on College Campuses, MEDIUM (Sept. 23, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-
derived/burdens-of-proof-for-sexual-misconduct-claims-in-senate-confirmations-and-on-college-
campuses-ed6347713674 [https://perma.cc/3BYD-NTU9].
242 See Shaw, supra note 186.
243 See Hemel, supra note 241.
244 See id. (discussing the substantial evidence standard); Shaw, supra note 186 (arguing for a
“credible accusation” standard).
245 See Hemel, supra note 241.
246 Different employers may conduct their own investigations, see, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 185,
and may sometimes reach different conclusions, see, e.g., Erik Wemple, CNN Reinstates Ryan
Lizza, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2018/
01/25/cnn-reinstates-ryan-lizza/?utm_term=.afb7cd3dd9b4 [https://perma.cc/YU3G-2RMD].
247 See Hemel, supra note 241.
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not any sort of final determination.248 The lack of finality in the court of
public opinion may work to the advantage of the accused, who can re-
litigate his case as long as the media remains interested in the story.249
And in discussions of reputational harm to the accused, it is important
to recognize there is an inverse and corresponding risk of reputational
harm to accusers whose claims are determined to be without merit.250
C. Notice and Hearing
Another set of concerns relates to the basic due process principle
that “a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it.”251 Assuming due process ap-
plies, it requires “some kind of hearing.”252 But the Supreme Court has
held that the particular requirements for that hearing depend on the
circumstances.253 Under the circumstances, #MeToo’s informal proce-
dural norms provide high-profile individuals with all process that is
due.
Lack of notice does not seem to be the main due process complaint
in the #MeToo era. Unlike some Title IX proceedings and workplace in-
vestigations, the defining feature of #MeToo reporting is that allega-
tions are made publicly, with detailed news coverage. Before a story is
even published, journalistic standards require that a person accused of
serious misconduct be given an opportunity to respond, along with
enough information about the story to make that response meaning-
ful.254 Journalists include these responses in their stories and publish
new stories when accused persons or their lawyers wish to add to the
response.255
248 Id.
249 See supra note 156 (citing sources re-evaluating of the accusations against former Senator
Al Franken over a year after his resignation).
250 See Hemel, supra note 241 (discussing the consequences of the allegation for Christine
Blasey Ford, who went into hiding with her family to avoid harassment).
251 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
252 Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1975) (quoting
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974)).
253 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (setting forth an inquiry that considers three factors: “First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail”).
254 This was a failing of the reporting by Rolling Stone on rape at the University of Virginia.
Coronel, Coll, & Kravitz, supra note 128 (“If both the reporter and checker had understood that by
policy they should routinely share specific, derogatory details with the subjects of their reporting,
Rolling Stone might have veered in a different direction.”).
255 See supra Section III.A.
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The objection might be that there is no trial-like procedure with a
neutral adjudicator that would allow individuals accused of sexual mis-
conduct to clear their names. However, in many cases, employers hire
outside investigators to conduct formal investigations and announce the
results publicly.256 The more highly-paid the accused, the more likely it
is that they are protected by a contract that gives them the right to
contest the factual basis for any termination in court or arbitration.257
Even when the accused person does not have contractual protec-
tions, principles of due process do not require a formal trial. Cases in
which a public employee is entitled to a “name clearing hearing” to re-
but a public charge of misconduct made by a government employer are
instructive here.258 No particular procedures are prescribed for every
such hearing.259 Rather, courts engage in a functional inquiry, balanc-
ing the costs and benefits of additional procedure in each case.260 Due
process does not necessarily require an adjudicator who is independent
of the employer.261 Some courts have held that no oral hearing is re-
quired in cases in which the employee had a “high degree of access to
the news media.”262 This is because, as a public figure, the dismissed
employee is unlikely to “need a formal hearing as a forum in which to
repeat his side of the story.”263 The cost of requiring a trial-like proce-
dure in this context is that government employers would never disclose
256 See supra notes 173–185 and accompanying text.
257 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 19, at 92.
258 For more discussion of “name clearing hearings,” see supra notes 93–94 and accompanying
text.
259 See, e.g., Wojcik v. Massachusetts State Lottery Comm’n, 300 F.3d 92, 103 (1st Cir. 2002)
(“The purpose of the hearing is only to allow the employee to clear his name of the false charges;
compliance with formal procedures is not necessarily required.”); Moody v. Cty. of Santa Clara,
No. 5:15-CV-04378-EJD, 2018 WL 2267662, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2018) (“Due process imposes
no hard and fast requirements on what constitutes an adequate ‘name-clearing’ hearing, including,
for example, whether it must be public, evidentiary in nature, or held prior to deprivation of the
liberty or property interest.”).
260 See, e.g., Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 469–71 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying the balancing
test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)).
261 See, e.g., Harrell v. Cty of Gastonia, 392 Fed. App’x 197, 205 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[G]overnmen-
tal officials conducting such hearings will often be employed by the same governmental entity that
made the decision being challenged, and those officials are still presumed to be fair and impartial
in conducting proceedings.”).
262 See, e.g., Baden v. Koch, 799 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff “could
presumably have called a press conference and provided any further defense of his record or ex-
planation of his removal from office that he desired to give”); see also Moody, 2018 WL 2267662, at
*4.
263 Baden, 799 F.2d at 832; see also Esposito v. Metro-N. Commuter R. Co., 856 F. Supp. 799,
807–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[A]s plaintiff concedes, because media interest in his story was so intense,
he had, and took advantage of, ready and pervasive access to the public to refute the allegations
against him. Indeed, as the plethora of newspaper articles contained in the record demonstrates,
plaintiff was not shy about publishing his version of events, and the media was more than willing
to report it”).
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high-level misconduct;264 a result that would allow serial harassers to
move to their next high-level job without accountability.
Another variation on this complaint is that the decision makers un-
der the rules of #MeToo—such as boards of directors, corporate officers,
voters, political party leaders, consumers, or audiences—are prone to
conflicts of interest and motivated reasoning.265 The argument may be
that decision makers are under undue pressure from the #MeToo move-
ment to act decisively,266 or that politicians and businesspeople will
weaponize accusations to embarrass and distract their opponents.267
This may be an argument for shifting factfinding responsibilities to out-
side investigators. But it is not a reason for decision makers to alto-
gether abdicate responsibility for evaluating allegations of sexual mis-
conduct against their leaders. Just as with other serious allegations, it
is incumbent on those with decision-making authority to evaluate facts
critically, exercise independent judgment, and attempt to remain fair-
minded and neutral.
D. Confrontation
Another complaint might be that there is no opportunity to confront
the accuser, to cross-examine them, or to otherwise scrutinize their ac-
count. But, for the most part, decision makers have not acted on dis-
puted allegations against high-level perpetrators unless accusers have
been willing to come forward and respond to scrutiny.
The complaint about the right to confrontation may overstate what
the law requires. In criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment affords a
right of confrontation;268 and in civil cases, rules of evidence prohibit
certain forms of hearsay.269 But what rights apply outside these con-
texts is controversial. In name-clearing hearings for public employees,
264 Cf. Baden, 799 F.2d at 833 (“If we were to hold that a government executive’s public state-
ment of reasons for a discretionary personnel decision automatically triggered a requirement for
a formal trial-type hearing, executives would be tempted to refrain from explaining their personnel
actions in public, a result contrary to the strong policy of maintaining an informed electorate.”).
265 It is not clear which direction biases will point in. For example, some survey evidence sug-
gests that sexual misconduct allegations have little effect on film and television audiences, with
some audience members reporting they are more likely to watch a performer after accusations
emerge. Piacenza, supra note 236.
266 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 19, at 86 (“With harassment in the spotlight, many [em-
ployers] are likely to conclude that a swift and severe response to any allegation of misconduct is
the only way to avoid a public relations nightmare.”). With respect to high level employees, insti-
tutions may have countervailing incentives to protect incumbent leadership. Id. at 87.
267 Cf. Hemmingway, supra note 88 (describing the Ford-Kavanaugh hearings as “[a] Senate
star chamber full of grandstanding senators on both sides”).
268 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
269 See FED. R. EVID. 801–07.
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some courts have approved procedures that did not allow any cross-ex-
amination.270 Some courts have even approved procedures in which the
accusers were not named.271 With respect to campus sexual assault
hearings under Title IX, the Sixth Circuit has held that “some form of
cross-examination” is required when the resolution of a claim turns on
credibility.272 The court reasoned that cross-examination “takes aim at
credibility like no other procedural device . . . to test [a witness’s]
memory, intelligence, or potential ulterior motives.”273 Yet empirical re-
search suggests reasons to doubt the utility of cross-examination as a
truth-seeking device.274 Cross-examination also has the potential to
subject victims to trauma and deter reporting.275 Thus, a number of
courts have held that questioning by a neutral college administrator
suffices to ensure fair process in the Title IX context.276
In the #MeToo context, reporters are wary of coming forward with
stories in which accusers refuse to be named publicly.277 Journalistic
270 See, e.g., Miller v. Metrocare Servs., 809 F.3d 827, 834 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e decline Miller’s
invitation to make confrontation of witnesses a mandatory requirement for an adequate name-
clearing hearing.”); Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 206 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a name-
clearing hearing did not violate due process even though the plaintiff was not permitted to cross-
examine city council members who had voted for his termination or to require that they answer
questions he had submitted).
271 See, e.g., Feterle v. Chowdhury, 148 F. App’x 524, 532 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that due
process was satisfied even though an employee accused of discriminatory misconduct was not pro-
vided the names of witnesses who had contributed to a report that was part of the basis for termi-
nating him).
272 Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a university is faced with competing
narratives about potential misconduct, the administration must facilitate some form of cross-ex-
amination in order to satisfy due process.”).
273 Id. at 582.
274 H. Hunter Bruton, Cross-Examination, College Sexual-Assault Adjudications, and the Op-
portunity for Tuning Up the “Greatest Legal Engine Ever Invented”, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
145 (2017) (collecting and assessing empirical research). Cross-examination may suggest that the
key to the truth is a witness’s demeanor, but “scientific evidence proves that most, if not all, readily
observable behavioral cues assumed to indicate deceit do not actually do so.” Id. at 155–56. Under
the stress of cross-examination, “many cope by simply changing their story regardless of their
original answers’ veracity,” particularly victims of sexual abuse. Id. at 165. While cross-examina-
tion allows lawyers to point out inconsistencies, even truthful witnesses are sometimes unable to
recall precise details, and so the technique “highlights the errors of well-intentioned and deceptive
witnesses alike.” Id. at 158.
275 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Keep Cross-Examination Out of College Sexual-Assault Cases,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Keep-Cross-Exami-
nation-Out-of/245448?cid=wcontentlist_hp_5 [https://perma.cc/5DM2-ZHXH].
276 See, e.g., Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223, 252 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that
prohibiting the student-plaintiff from personally cross-examining the witnesses did not violate due
process because the student “was able to cross examine the witnesses by posing questions through
the [panel’s] Chair”).
277 SPJ ETHICS COMM., POSITION PAPERS, ANONYMOUS SOURCES, https://www.spj.org/ethics-
papers-anonymity.asp [https://perma.cc/AV6S-KVBD] (last visited Jan. 15, 2019) (discussing the
principles that sources should be identified “whenever feasible” and journalists should “[a]lways
question sources’ motives before promising anonymity”). The use of an anonymous source should
require a supervisor’s approval, and many news organizations have policies on the question. Id.;
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standards only allow the use of anonymous sources for allegations of
sexual assault or harassment if the story is credible, considering factors
such as whether there are “multiple, independent anonymous sources
making similar claims.”278 In a few stories, multiple anonymous accus-
ers have described a pattern of misconduct, but were unwilling to be
named due to fear of reprisals. 279 But even if sources go unnamed in a
story, journalistic standards require that the accused person receive
enough details about the misconduct so as to have a meaningful oppor-
tunity to respond.280 For example, in response to anonymous allegations
of “inappropriate touching,” restauranteur Mario Batali stated, “Alt-
hough the identities of most of the individuals mentioned in these sto-
ries have not been revealed to me, much of the behavior described does,
in fact, match up with ways I have acted.”281
Employers are wary of acting on anonymous allegations. During
the confirmation hearings for Justice Kavanaugh, for example, the Sen-
ate did not act on leaked information about Dr. Ford’s allegations until
she came forward.282 In other cases, anonymous allegations prompted
employers to conduct investigations.283 In only two of the 202 cases
see also ANONYMOUS SOURCING, NPR ETHICS HANDBOOK (accessed Jan. 15, 2019), http://eth-
ics.npr.org/tag/anonymity/ [https://perma.cc/2B4Z-TSU9].
278 Poynter Staff, supra note 19.
279 See, e.g., Oliver Darcy, Five Women Accuse Journalist and ‘Game Change’ Co-Author Mark
Halperin of Sexual Harassment, CNN (Oct. 27, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/25/media/ma
rk-halperin-sexual-harassment-allegations/index.html [https://perma.cc/8L3B-EV3S]; Irene Plagi-
anos & Kitty Greenwald, Mario Batali Steps Away From Restaurant Empire Following Sexual
Misconduct Allegations, EATER (Dec. 11, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://ny.eater.com/2017/12/11/1675954
0/mario-batali-sexual-misconduct-allegations [https://perma.cc/3X4B-C2PM]; Jenn Ableson & Sa-
cha Pfeiffer,Modeling’s Glamour Hides Web of Abuse, BOSTONGLOBE (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.
bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/02/16/beauty-and-ugly-truth/c7r0WVsF5cib1pLWXJe9dP/story.html
[https://perma.cc/WTH7-PT98] (reporting that three anonymous models accused “Karl Templer, a
top stylist, of yanking their breasts, touching their crotches, or aggressively pulling down their
underwear without asking them during shoots,” which Templer denied).
280 See Coronel, Coll, & Kravitz, supra note 128; Poynter Staff, supra note 19 (“Although you
may not be naming a source in a story, in most cases it is appropriate to reveal accusers’ names to
the accused.”).
281 Plagianos & Greenwald, supra note 279 (quoting a statement from Mario Batali); see also
Darcy, supra note 279 (quoting a statement in which Halperin apologized for pursuing relation-
ships with junior colleagues).
282 Eli Watkins, Timeline: How the Kavanaugh Accusations Have Unfolded, CNN (Sept. 17,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/17/politics/kavanaugh-ford-timeline/index.html [https://perm
a.cc/4NST-TDLH].
283 See, e.g., Frank Pallotta, John Lasseter Joins Skydance Media After Leaving Disney Follow-
ing Misconduct Allegations, CNN Business (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/09/media/
john-lasseter-skydance/index.html [https://perma.cc/5UBT-G53G] (discussing an investigation
conducted after unnamed sources alleged sexual harassment); Maureen Ryan, ‘Supergirl,’ ‘Arrow’
Producer Suspended Amid Sexual Harassment Allegations by Warner Bros., VARIETY (Nov. 10,
2017), https://variety.com/2017/tv/news/warner-bros-sexual-harassment-andrew-kreisberg-12026
12522/ [https://perma.cc/DKX4-XYPR] (discussing how inquiries by Variety about anonymous al-
legations of harassment prompted an investigation by the Warner Brothers’ human resources de-
partment).
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listed by the New York Times did decision makers appear to act based
only news stories with a single anonymous accuser.284
When victims do come forward, their accounts do not evade scru-
tiny. The prospect of this public scrutiny is a factor that deters report-
ing.285 For example, the media was skeptical of Julie Swetnick’s accu-
sations against Kavanaugh from the outset, reporting on her financial
troubles and history of litigation.286 The media has covered the specifics
of defamation and wrongful termination cases brought against various
accusers.287 While there is no cross-examination in the court of public
opinion, there are on-camera interviews. In interviews, journalists can
ask questions that might expose inconsistencies in an accuser’s story
and audiences can assess the accuser’s credibility for themselves. NBC
Nightly News aired an interview of Swetnick by Kate Snow, in which
Snow pointed out discrepancies between Swetnick’s answers and an af-
fidavit she had signed under penalty of perjury.288
One exception to the norm that victims come forward involves a
woman accused of sexual harassment, Andrea Ramsay, who dropped
out of her race to become the democratic nominee for a congressional
seat in Kansas in December 2017.289 The Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee (DCCC) had withdrawn its support for Ramsay,
seemingly on account of tersely worded allegations that she had sex-
ually harassed a male subordinate in 2005.290 The allegation was made
in a Title VII complaint, which means the defendant was the company,
not Ramsay herself. Ramsay denied the allegations and stated that she
would have opposed the settlement the company ultimately reached
284 See Busch, supra note 170; Schneider, supra note 170. In another case, an employer acted
on the report of a source who was known to it and the accused but whose story was not disclosed
to the public. See, e.g., Liam Stack, Ryan Lizza Fired by The New Yorker over Sexual Misconduct
Allegation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/business/ryan-lizza-
sexual-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/T4XT-82W5]. There may be cases in which employers
acted on anonymous reports that were not included in the New York Times’ list. See supra note
152.
285 See, e.g., Steel, supra note 38 (discussing how Bill O’Reilly hired a private investigator to
find damaging information about one accuser).
286 Miller et al., supra note 206.
287 See, e.g., Maria Halkias, Scandal Surrounding Alleged Extramarital Affair of Former U.S.
Hispanic Chamber Leaders from Dallas Moves into Court, DALLASNEWS (July 17, 2018), https://
www.dallasnews.com/business/business/2018/07/17/charges-surrounding-extramarital-affair-for-
mer-us-hispanic-chamber-leaders-dallas-moves-court [https://perma.cc/X2RU-MUU2]; Weiss, su-
pra note 152.
288 Bauder, supra note 206.
289 Lindsay Wise & Bryan Lowry, Kansas Dem Andrea Ramsey, Accused of Sexual Harassment,
Will Drop Out of U.S. House Race, KAN. CITY STAR (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/ne
ws/politics-government/article189931704.html.
290 Id. Court documents include very few details about the incident. An EEOC charge attached
to the complaint states: “In lateMarch 2005, [Ramsay] made sexual advances toward [the plaintiff]
on a business trip,” and that after the plaintiff told Ramsay he was not interested in her, she
terminated him. Complaint, Funkhouser v. LabOne, Inc., No. 05-cv-02458 (D. Kan. Oct. 25, 2005).
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with her accuser.291 Ramsay’s accuser refused to give his side of the
story to the press, perhaps because his settlement included a confiden-
tiality agreement.292 Thus, there was no opportunity for the media to
probe the details of the matter. This example is atypical, and the con-
troversy around it demonstrates evolving norms that require accusers
to stand by their allegations.293
E. Proportionality
Another criticism is that the consequences for the accused are not
proportional to the severity and likelihood of the accusations. Commen-
tators fear false equivalences and extreme penalties. For example, talk
show host Gayle King has said, “I think when a woman makes an accu-
sation, the man instantly gets the death penalty. There has to be some
sort of due process here. All of these inappropriate behaviors are not all
the same.”294 The principle that responses should be proportionate is an
important one.295 But #MeToo’s critics have overestimated the conse-
quences high-profile men have faced, and underestimated the harms of
sexual assault, harassment, and misconduct to its victims.
With respect to high-profile cases, it is not true that consequences
have been either automatic or terminal. The public cannot keep track
of accusations against celebrities, and it tends to forgive and forget.296
After being fired by Fox News, Bill O’Reilly was hired to host a new
show on Newsmax TV.297 As a result of allegations of sexual misconduct
291 Andrea Ramsey Letter: ‘I Never Engaged in Any of the Alleged Behavior,’ KAN. CITY STAR
(Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article189934114.html.
292 Wise & Lowry, supra note 289 (Ramsay is quoted as saying “All I can say is the matter has
been resolved.”).
293 Two democratic representatives have publicly questioned the DCCC’s decision to withdraw
its support for Ramsay. Maggie Severns & Marianne Levine, Both Parties Face Dissent over Han-
dling of #MeToo, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/29/con
gress-sexual-harassment-metoo-372855 [https://perma.cc/F7Y2-KA6K].
294 Audie Cornish, Gayle King Thinks #MeToo Needs Due Process, N.Y. TIMESMAG. (June 12,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/magazine/gayle-king-thinks-metoo-needs-due-process
.html [https://perma.cc/HUW9-BH7G]; see also Traister, supra note 66 (“MSNBC’s Mike Barnicle,
himself once having been returned to power after a plagiarism scandal, has mourned publicly for
the injury done to his friend and former colleague Mark Halperin, who got canned after being
accused of pushing his penis against younger female subordinates: ‘He deserves to have what he
did deplored,’ Barnicle declared. ‘But does he deserve to die? Howmany times can you kill a guy?’”).
295 Not only do disproportionate penalties offend basic fairness, but treating all instances of
sexual misconduct with “zero-tolerance” can make rules against misconduct less effective.
FELDBLUM& LIPNIC, supra note 41 (explaining that “zero tolerance” rules “may contribute to em-
ployee under-reporting of harassment, particularly where they do not want a colleague or co-
worker to lose their job over relatively minor harassing behavior–they simply want the harassment
to stop”).
296 Piacenza, supra note 265 (discussing polling data and quoting public relations executives).
297 Don’t Miss Bill O’Reilly’s ‘No Spin News’ on Newsmax TV, NEWSMAX (Nov. 20, 2018), https:
//www.newsmax.com/newsmax-tv/bill-oreilly-no-spin-news-newsmaxtv/2018/03/28/id/851260/ [htt
tps://perma.cc/6XR6-SG6T].
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that were not disclosed to the public, reporter Ryan Lizza lost his job at
The New Yorker but was retained by CNN.298 After an investigation into
misconduct, New York Times reporter Glenn Thrush was removed from
his prestigious post at the White House but permitted to return to the
newsroom.299 After resigning from the Senate, Al Franken continues to
be involved in public life.300 Some celebrities have worked allegations
into their performances. In the midst of publicity regarding allegations
of his sexual misconduct, musician R. Kelly released a nineteen-minute
song titled “I Admit.”301 After a documentary aired in which R. Kelly’s
accusers were interviewed, “daily streams of his songs in the United
States more than doubled, according to Nielsen, from 1.9 million the
day before the series began to 4.3 million on its last day.”302 Comedian
Louis C.K., who admitted that he abused his position of power to get
female comedians into situations where he could masturbate in front of
them, is back to performing standup less than one year later, joking
that, as a result of the news story, “I lost $35 million in an hour.”303 Aziz
Ansari is also still performing, but rather than using his platform to
make light of the Babe.net story, he has said that “if other men learned
from the allegation against him, ‘that’s a good thing.’”304
298 SeeWemple, supra note 246.




300 See, e.g., Al Franken, https://soundcloud.com/user-490403240 [https://perma.cc/AER9-JP4
Y] (podcast hosted by Franken with guests including Norm Ornstein, E.J. Dionne, Michael Lewis,
and Dana Carvey); Dahlia Lithwick, How Would Al Franken Question Attorney General Nominee
William Barr?, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/how-al-franken-
would-question-william-barr.html [https://perma.cc/W7HH-BA2K] (interviewing Franken); Al Fr-
anken, Kavanaugh Supreme Court Hearings Showcase Republican Partisanship, Hypocrisy: Al
Franken, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/09/07/brett-
kavanaugh-supreme-court-hearings-showcase-republican-hypocrisy-column/1215578002/ [https://
perma.cc/5P3Y-VQ9Q]. But see Mayer, supra note 156 (observing that the level of public interest
in Franken is a shadow in comparison to his past celebrity as “the most recognizable figure in the
Senate”).
301 Crenshaw, supra note 69 (“A crass effort to marshal his considerable talent to sing his way
to clemency, ‘I Admit’ is a coyly titled work of audience-trolling in the vein of O.J. Simpson’s mem-
oir of his ex-wife’s murder case, If I Did It.”).
302 Elizabeth A. Harris & Ben Sisario,Why It Could be Hard to Mute R. Kelly, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/13/arts/music/mute-r-kelly.html [https://perma.cc/6P
9W-8FAH].
303 Louis CK: I’ve Been ‘to Hell and Back’ and Lost $35 Million, LAUGHSPIN (Oct. 12, 2018),
https://laughspin.com/louis-ck-west-side-comedy-club-sexual-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/ZY8E-
58AB]. C.K. is one of the world’s highest paid comedians, reportedly earning $52 million in the
twelve months prior to June 2017. Madeline Berg, Louis C.K.’s Losses: How Much the Sexual Mis-
conduct Scandal May Cost the Comedian, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/m
addieberg/2017/11/10/louis-c-k-s-losses-how-much-the-sexual-misconduct-scandal-may-cost-the-c
omedian/#2051da615801 [https://perma.cc/H8FL-A9EA].
304 Anna North, Aziz Ansari’s New Standup Set, and its Complicated, Necessary Role in #Me-
Too, VOX (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/20/18263783/aziz-ansari-tour-2019-sexual-
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This is not to diminish the lost opportunities and career conse-
quences these men have faced. Nor is it to condone mobbing behaviors
such as online insults, threats, trolling, or doxing, whether that mob-
bing is aimed at the accuser or the accused.305 Rather, it is to argue
accusations alone have not forced prominent men into professional ex-
ile.
The “disproportionality” argument may misunderstand the sever-
ity of sexual assault, harassment, and misconduct. It may be based on
an all-or-nothing view—long reflected in criminal law—that the prob-
lem is an exceptional phenomenon perpetrated by a small number of
predators.306 But the problem is not limited to rape, and the harms are
not sexual violation alone — the harms are also in how sexual assault,
harassment, and misconduct contribute to systemic gender-based ine-
quality.307 For example, the harm of harassment of the sort Louis C.K.
perpetrated is in diminishing women’s equal employment opportuni-
ties. After complaining about C.K., comedians Dana Min Goodman and
Julia Wolov found their opportunities in Hollywood limited because
they had to maneuver to avoid his manager.308 As one female stand-up
comic put it: “We are all avoiding someone who could help us make
money. Female comics do a lot of calculating, finding alternate routes
to a career.”309 Another potential comic, Abby Schachner, decided to
pursue a different career, in part because of C.K.’s harassment.310
Harms to women’s careers may be discounted because of victim-blam-
ing, particularly when the survivors are people of color.311 Another
harm may be in treating women like objects, the butt of the joke, or
making light of sexual assault, as when Al Franken posed for a picture
placing his hands over the breasts of a sleeping woman as if to sexually
misconduct-allegations [https://perma.cc/2FCV-KVWJ] (describing the themes of a recent comedy
performance by Ansari as “personal growth and political progress”). See also Doreen St. Félix, The
Productive Ambivalence of Aziz Ansari in his Comeback Netflix Special, NEW YORKER (July 13,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-productive-ambivalence-of-aziz-
ansari-in-his-comeback-netflix-special [https://perma.cc/N3PH-257F].
305 “Doxing” is the spread of personal information about an individual in an effort to facilitate
harassment. See Leigh Honeywell, Staying Safe When You Say #MeToo, ACLU (Feb. 12, 2018), htt
ps://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/staying-safe-when-you-say-metoo [htt
ps://perma.cc/P4W3-8S7V]. Unfortunately, online mobbing is a risk for accusers. Id.
306 See Anderson, supra note 36, at 1953.
307 See Schultz, supra note 67.
308 Melena Ryzik et al., Louis C.K. Is Accused by 5 Women of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/arts/television/louis-ck-sexual-misconduct.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/PM3E-H5QZ].
309 Laurie Kilmartin, Being a Female Comic in Louis C.K.’s World, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/10/opinion/sunday/louis-ck-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/
FPE4-RR4A].
310 Ryzik et al., supra note 308.
311 See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 105, at 225–38.
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assault her.312 United States Senators should be held to higher stand-
ards when it comes to treating all people with dignity and respect.313
Another version of the “death penalty” argument is that there is no
path to redemption. Yet there are few examples of attempts at mean-
ingful amends.314 Principles of restorative justice require that an apol-
ogy include acknowledgment of the victim’s experience, responsibility-
taking, repair of the harm, and steps to avoid repeating the miscon-
duct.315 Rather than attempting amends, many high-profile men who
have lost their positions due to credible and severe accusations have
sought unproven medical treatments, sometimes in expensive, resort-
style residential facilities.316 In other cases, they have apologized and
received second chances.317
312 See Dartunorro Clark, Al Franken Accused of Forcibly Kissing, Groping Leeann Tweeden,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/sen-al-franken-accused-
forcibly-kissing-groping-woman-n821381 [https://perma.cc/GL9H-BM8U]. One commentator has
said about this photo: “I found it an inoffensive burlesque of a burlesque—they were, after all, on
a USO tour, which is a raunchy vaudeville throwback.” Yoffe, supra note 156. Cf. Mayer, supra
note 156 (quoting an individual who was present when the photo was taken as explaining that the
picture was a reference to a skit in which Franken’s character attempted to grope Tweeden’s char-
acter on the pretense of performing a breast examination). Modern day burlesque might be a sex-
ually liberatory form of feminist camp, but only if all the performers are in on the joke. At best,
the picture shows Franken treating Tweeden like a prop, not a performer. About the picture,
Franken himself said:
It’s obvious how Leeann would feel violated by that picture. And, what’s more, I can
see how millions of other women would feel violated by it—women who have had sim-
ilar experiences in their own lives, women who fear having those experiences, women
who look up to me, women who have counted on me.
Associated Press, Statement by Sen. Al Franken on Sexual Harassment Allegation, AP (Nov. 16,
2017), https://www.apnews.com/3adcb145c40341c384208dcc036d2429 [https://perma.cc/L6QB-K4
EP].
313 Kirsten Gillibrand, Senator Franken Should Step Aside, FACEBOOK (Dec. 6, 2017), https://w
ww.facebook.com/KirstenGillibrand/posts/senator-franken-should-step-asidei-have-been-shocked-
and-disappointed-to-learn-o/10155471770513411/ [https://perma.cc/W48V-B6HW] (“We should de-
mand the highest standards, not the lowest, from our leaders, and we should fundamentally value
and respect women.”).
314 Wexler, Robbennolt, & Murphy, supra note 29, at 31 (discussing NFL player Ray Rice’s
meaningful efforts at redemption after being caught on video assaulting his then-girlfriend).
315 Id. at 22–33.
316 Benedict Carey, Therapy for Sexual Misconduct? It’s Mostly Unproven, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/27/health/sexual-harassment-addiction-treatment.html
[https://perma.cc/4A52-BYUM]; Amy Chozick,Where’s Harvey?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/style/harvey-weinstein-in-arizona.html [https://perma.cc/8BBJ-EZ
PR].
317 See, e.g., Sean O’Neal, The Tortured Mind of Dan Harmon, GQ (May 30, 2018), https://www.
gq.com/story/dan-harmon-rick-and-morty-profile [https://perma.cc/489Q-8QKL] (describing the
successful career of Dan Harmon, who apologized for harassment in January 2018); Stacy Perman,
John Lasseter is Attempting Hollywood’s Biggest #MeToo Comeback. How’s that Going?, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-lasseter-skydance-test
case-20190124-story.html [https://perma.cc/2C43-F75K] (discussing controversy over the hiring of
John Lasseter to run the animation division of Skydance Media after he had apologized for “mis-
steps” at his previous job).
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A more general problem with the disproportionality argument is
that it frames the goals of #MeToo’s procedures as “retribution” rather
than “replacement.”318 Unlike rank-and-file workers, those at the up-
per-echelons represent their enterprise and chart its course. Such indi-
viduals have lost their positions for making racist319 and anti-Semitic320
remarks, for telling lies,321 and for marital infidelity.322 As the public
faces of businesses, communities, or organizations, these individuals
represent their entities’ brands, values, or priorities. Their individual
misconduct, and how it is managed, sends a message about the larger
whole. Moreover, these are the people who make the decisions about
what news stories are worth covering, what movies are worth making,
what startups are worth funding, and what laws are worth passing, up-
holding, and enforcing. It should be beyond cavil that those who hold
such power should be held to higher standards of accountability. If they
are not held accountable for their own wrongdoing, they are unlikely to
have the will or the moral authority to hold others accountable.
CONCLUSION
Under the rules of #MeToo, anyone could one day be in the position
of evaluating public accusations of sexual misconduct against political
figures, entertainers, or executives. Although we may not be state ac-
tors, we should take due process seriously. We should consider the
source of information and critically evaluate media based on whether it
conforms to journalistic standards such as seeking both sides, attribu-
tion, and verification. We should not act based on allegations that have
not been vetted or are not sufficiently specific to enable the accused to
respond meaningfully. We should insist on independent investigations
318 See Traister, supra note 66.
319 See, e.g., Judy Faber, CBS Fires Don Imus over Racial Slur, CBS NEWS (July 16, 2007),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-fires-don-imus-over-racial-slur/ [https://perma.cc/9462-V2P
D]; John Koblin, After Racist Tweet, Roseanne Barr’s Show Is Canceled by ABC, N.Y. TIMES (May
29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/business/media/roseanne-barr-offensive-tweets.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/CUP9-3CYP].
320 See, e.g., John Patterson, Is All Forgiven? The Strange, Troubling Resurgence of Mel Gibson,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2017/nov/23/mel-gibson-hollywood-
road-rehabilitation [https://perma.cc/S79M-LUBS].
321 See, e.g., John Koblin & Emily Steel, Brian Williams Gets New Role at Lower Salary, N.Y.
TIMES (June 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/business/media/brian-williams-nbc-
lester-holt.html [https://perma.cc/64BT-MAT8] (lies about a helicopter incident in Iraq); James B.
Stewart, In the Undoing of a CEO, a Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com
/2012/05/19/business/the-undoing-of-scott-thompson-at-yahoo-common-sense.html [https://perma.
cc/L8EA-XZZ4] (fabricating a college degree to embellish a resume).
322 See, e.g., Chris Tognotti, Whatever Happened to John Edwards? The North Carolina Sena-
tor’s Fall from Grace Was Quick & Absolute, BUSTLE (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.bustle.com/article
s/121572-whatever-happened-to-john-edwards-the-north-carolina-senators-fall-from-grace-was-q
uick-absolute [https://perma.cc/G62N-KNBK].
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where appropriate. We should apply different considerations to those
seeking high office, fame, and fortune and those just seeking to make a
living. We should recognize that not all sexual misconduct is equally
harmful. But we should not carve out exceptional protections for those
accused of sexual forms of misconduct. The #MeToo movement has ac-
complished something unprecedented in removing abusive leaders from
positions of power. The movement should continue to reflect critically
on procedural justice if it hopes to achieve a future in which sexual har-
assment and assault disqualify a person from holding immense power.
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Beyond the Bad Apple—Transforming the
American Workplace for Women after #MeToo
Claudia Flores†
INTRODUCTION
This recent era of the #MeToo Movement has caused many to ques-
tion whether U.S. sexual harassment laws and policies are responsive
to workplace realities. Complaint-based employer policies, contractu-
ally-mandated arbitration agreements, time-limited administrative ex-
haustion requirements, and narrow judicial interpretations of actiona-
ble conduct have created a myriad of barriers to workers seeking
enforcement. For women (and some men) targeted by harassing behav-
ior it has often been too costly—financially, professionally, and person-
ally—to navigate a system that depends almost exclusively on individ-
ual complainants to prompt social reform.
U.S. law has largely relied on the “bad apple” theory of harass-
ment.1 The harasser is a wayward employee and the employer an inno-
cent third party to interpersonal relations and relation(ships) that have
gone awry. Though courts have found Title VII to provide a legal rem-
edy for sexual harassment, they have struggled to define this form of
gender discrimination, instead developing complex tests that rely on
prevailing opinions of gendered interactions, sometimes reproducing
the very sexism Title VII sought to correct.
Meanwhile, numerous studies have found that sexual harassment
is best understood not as isolated occurrences between individuals but
as patterns of behavior that are prominent in certain workplaces and
correlated with workplace features within an employer’s control. More-
over, research indicates that sexual harassment is both impacted by the
work environment and alters that environment by reducing employee
† Claudia Flores is an associate clinical professor of law and director of the International
Human Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School. Previously, Professor Flores was a
staff attorney at the ACLU Women’s Rights Project and partner at Hughes Socol Pierce Resnik
and Dym where she litigated sexual harassment and other workplace gender discrimination cases.
1 See Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 817 (2004).
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satisfaction, productivity and efficacy, and, unsurprisingly, discourag-
ing women from entering and staying, as well as hampering their rise
to positions of influence.
Congress sought to transform the American workplace with Title
VII, but the implementation of the statute has failed to do so. In this
Article, I will explore how we might move past the “bad apple” theory
of sexual harassment to better change the workplace for women. I will
argue that our current legal framework cannot provide the necessary
shift in workplace practices. Instead, we need a transformation of both
our understanding of sexual harassment and our approach to eradicat-
ing it. We need to focus less on sex and more on harassment and less on
liability and more on prevention to move towards gender equality in
employment.
In Part One, I will begin by summarizing U.S. law on sexual har-
assment and the legal standard that has emerged. I will discuss how
our aversion to regulating workplace behavior, narrow judicial inter-
pretations, and reliance on existing social norms has led to an impover-
ished enforcement system. In Part Two, I will explore Title VII’s trans-
formative purpose in the context of what research and scholarly work
have concluded about the nature, purpose, and impact of harassment.
In Part Three, I will review international standards and comparative
jurisdictions that have taken an alternative approach to sexual harass-
ment that positions it as one form of workplace abuse, among others. I
will discuss how this alternative approach, which is grounded in the
dual concepts of human dignity and equality, has allowed for greater
emphasis on prevention of the conditions that enable sexual harass-
ment. In Part Four, I will explore the possibility and advantages of en-
gaging with this approach in the U.S. context, and our need to develop
a standard of workplace behavior against which to measure the inequal-
ity harassment engenders. Finally, in Part Five, I will discuss the im-
portance and possibility of developing a positive vision of the workplace,
grounded in women’s dignity and equality, in order to build an Ameri-
can workplace that fulfills the original vision of Title VII.
I. U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits em-
ployment discrimination in hiring, firing, and compensation, and terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.2 Congress intended Title VII to transform
the American workplace by “improv[ing] the economic and social condi-
tions of minorities and women by providing equality of opportunity in
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964).
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the work place,” recognizing that “[t]hese conditions were part of a
larger pattern of restriction, exclusion, discrimination, segregation, and
inferior treatment of minorities and women in many areas of life.”3 Con-
gress also understood that the liability mechanism created in Title VII
could only be a component of a broader effort to move towards equality
in the workplace, and “strongly encouraged employers, labor organiza-
tions, and other persons subject to title VII . . . to act on a voluntary
basis to modify employment practices and systems which constituted
barriers to equal employment opportunity, without awaiting litigation
or formal government action.”4
In the mid-80s, courts began to recognize workplace sexual harass-
ment as a form of gender discrimination under Title VII.5 As courts de-
veloped jurisprudence around harassment claims, they acknowledged
Title VII’s reformative aim: “[t]he purpose of Title VII is not to import
into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to
liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination,
and thereby to implement the goals of human dignity and economic
equality in employment.”6 Yet, courts often struggled to implement
these goals in a manner that captured the social transformation Title
VII envisioned,7 instead often relying on the very societal prejudices Ti-
tle VII sought to eradicate.8 Consequently, over time, Title VII’s goal of
redefining the workplace against cultural norms of inequality was lost.
3 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (1979).
4 Id.
5 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986); Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and
Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1267 (1994) (“The victim of sexual harassment is a vulnera-
ble player within the courts. Sexual harassment protections in America are almost completely the
product of the judiciary; as a statute, Title VII gives virtually no guidance about this type of sex
discrimination.”).
6 Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998);Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64; Los Angeles
Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)) (“The language of Title VII is not limited to
‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’
evinces a congressional intent’ ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women’ in employment’”); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)) (“By acknowledging and not trivializing the
effects of sexual harassment on reasonable women, courts can work towards ensuring that neither
men nor women will have to “run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living.”“)
7 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881 (quoting Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir.
1990)) (“Congress did not enact Title VII to codify prevailing sexist prejudices. To the contrary,
“Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense of degradation
which serve to close or discourage employment opportunities for women.”)
8 See e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1017, 1018 (8th Cir. 1988): (“Title VII does
not mandate an employment environment worthy of a Victorian salon. Nor do we expect that our
holding today will displace all ribaldry on the roadway. One may well expect that in the heat and
dust of the construction site language of the barracks will always predominate over that of the
ballroom. What occurred in this case, however, went well beyond the bounds of what any person
should have to tolerate.”); See Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 338, 342 (“Today, while gender relations in
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Courts have more or less divided sexual harassment claims into
two categories—quid pro quo harassment and harassment that creates
a “hostile work environment.”9 Quid pro quo means “something for
something” and involves claims where submission to or rejection of un-
welcome sexual conduct results in a tangible employment action that
adversely impacts the complainant. The classic example is when a su-
pervisor offers a promotion in exchange for sex. Courts have found these
sorts of claims to be straightforward—achieving consensus on the fact
that women (and men) should not be required to provide sexual favors
or attention in exchange for workplace benefits or concessions.10
Hostile work environment claims have proven to be the more diffi-
cult category. These claims involve harassment that result in no clear
adverse employment action other than the impact of the harassment on
the employee and her or his work experience. In order to make out a
claim for a hostile work environment, a complainant must prove that
the conduct was severe or pervasive.11 The “employment action” in a
hostile work environment case must come in the form of some alteration
of the workplace. The employee must demonstrate that (1) the employee
was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (2) the harassment was based
on sex, (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to
alter the terms or conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment (judged by both an objective and subjective stand-
ard), and (4) that the employer knew or should have known of the har-
assment.12 This analysis requires a mixed inquiry of law and fact by
judges and juries.13
the workplace are rapidly evolving, and views of what is appropriate behavior are diverse and
shifting, a jury made up of a cross-section of our heterogeneous communities provides the appro-
priate institution for deciding whether borderline situations should be characterized as sexual
harassment and retaliation.”). For an explanation for why juries are not well situated to make
sexual harassment determinations and often reflect community prejudices in their assessments of
workplace hostility see Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual Harass-
ment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 813 (1998).
9 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
10 See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); see also EEOC, Policy Guidance on Employer Liability Under
Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, No. 915.048 (Jan. 12, 1990), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexu
alfavor.html [https://perma.cc/R8QU-Z5P7].
11 See generally, Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004) (to be actionable under
Title VII, plaintiffs must show “harassing behavior ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [their] employment’”) (quotingMeritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
12 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 891, 903–05 (11th Cir. 1982) (identifying elements
of a sexual harassment claim).
13 See Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 8, at 815 (discussing allocation of sexual harassment
determinations between judges and juries).
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The first step is determining whether the harassment occurred be-
cause of the plaintiffs’ sex.14 The harassing conduct need not be moti-
vated by sexual desire but only general hostility to the presence of a
certain sex in the workplace.15 While this standard appears to address
a broad category of gender-motivated harassment, courts have repeat-
edly rejected claims in which general hostility to women is evident but
not made explicit in sexualized comments.16 Claims based on behavior
that side-lines, humiliates, excludes, demeans, or otherwise treats
women in a hostile manner in the workplace are not necessarily consid-
ered by courts to be “because of sex.”17
The second requirement—that the harassment is sufficiently se-
vere and pervasive—is a threshold-setting standard for the behavior in
question. Courts have looked at the “frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliat-
ing, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably inter-
feres with an employee’s work performance.”18 The Supreme Court has
differentiated between the workplace (1) that is “permeated with ‘dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’” and (2) where there is
the “‘mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feel-
ings in an employee.’”19 In general, relatively isolated instances of non-
severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claim.20
“A recurring point in [our] opinions,” the Court stated in Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton,21 “is that ‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and
14 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“Title VII does not pro-
hibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminat[ion] . . .
because of . . . sex.’”).
15 Id. (“[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex.”).
16 SeeWilliams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 572 (6th Cir. 1999) (Ryan, J., dissent-
ing) (“The majority’s artificial construct-that non-sexual harassment of a female in the workplace
can give rise to Title VII sex discrimination liability if it evinces ‘anti-female animus’ is a radical
rewriting of settled Title VII sex discrimination jurisprudence.”); see also Faragher vs. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“Title VII does not prohibit ‘genuine but innocuous differences in
the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite
sex.’ A recurring point in [our] opinions is that ‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and
conditions of employment. These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to en-
sure the Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code.’”).
17 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 22
(2018).
18 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993).
19 Id. at 21.
20 The Supreme Court has distinguished between a workplace that is “permeated with ‘dis-
criminatory’ intimidation, ridicule, and insult” and one where there is the “mere utterance” of an
offense. Harris, 510 U.S. 17 at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67); see also Young v. Phila.
Police Dep’t, 94 F. Supp. 3d 683, 700 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d 651 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir. 2016).
21 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
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isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discrim-
inatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”22
The third element of the claim is whether the behavior created an
abusive work environment, an assessment involving an objective and
subjective determination. In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,23 the Supreme
Court rejected the approach taken by three circuits which had required
a “serious effect” since “concrete psychological harm [is] an element Ti-
tle VII does not require.”24 Instead, the Harris Court adopted a require-
ment that the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was
both objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive. To meet the objec-
tive standard, conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment.25 To meet the subjec-
tive standard, the plaintiff needs to prove that she or he perceived the
environment to be abusive.26
Both the subjective and objective determination of what constitutes
an abusive work environment have significantly limited the anti-dis-
criminatory impact of Title VII, circumscribing the universe of abusive
treatment that the statute deters. The objective standard, which re-
quires courts to determine how a reasonable person would receive the
harassment, has, unsurprisingly, led to complexities around the van-
tage point of the “reasonable person.” Some courts experimented with
adding specific attributes to the reasonable person, asking whether a
reasonable African American woman would find the harassment offen-
sive, or whether a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would find
the behavior offensive.27 To resolve this, in 1998, the Supreme Court
attempted to offer some clarification in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.,28 questioning whether “the objective severity of harass-
ment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in
22 Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75, 81 (1998)).
23 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
24 Id. at 22.
25 Id. (“So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile
or abusive . . . there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.”).
26 Id. at 21–22 (“If the victim does not subjectively perceive the environmental to be abusive,
the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no
Title VII violation.” However, “Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seri-
ously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing their
careers.”).
27 Compare Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F. 3d 1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding reasonable
person jury instruction as opposed to “reasonable African American or women” jury instruction)
with West v. Phila. Elec. Co. 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995) (where the objective standard was
reviewed as “reasonable person of the same protected class in that position.”).
28 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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the plaintiff’s position.”29 The Supreme Court set forth an analysis
based upon the objective reasonable person standard that looked at “the
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by
its target” which inevitably “depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully cap-
tured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts per-
formed.”30 While this standard attempted to provide more nuance, it
also yielded more discretion to draw upon problematic societal norms.31
The subjective test, which essentially asks whether the conduct
was unwelcome, is a complicity test of whether or not the plaintiff wel-
comed the behavior.32 Conduct is unwelcome if the plaintiff did not so-
licit or incite it and if the plaintiff regarded the conduct as undesirable
or offensive.33 Courts have held that certain conduct, particularly rape,
is unwelcome by definition.34 However, determinations of whether con-
duct was welcome have sent courts down the rabbit hole of assessing a
plaintiff’s behavior to determine if the alleged harassment was a com-
ponent of acceptable gendered interactions or not.35
The final question is whether employer liability is triggered or
whether the employer knew or should have known the harassment oc-
curred. For claims related to a supervisor, the employer is vicariously
liable but may utilize an affirmative defense. The employer may avoid
liability by demonstrating that (1) the employer exercised reasonable
29 Id. at 81–82.
30 Id.; see also E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 460 (5th Cir. 2013), (citing
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 (1998) (“We view the alleged harassment with ‘[c]ommon sense, and
an appropriate sensitivity to social context’ to determine whether it constitutes ‘conduct which a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile.’”).
31 For example, there is some indication in psychological research that juries are resistant or
unable to apply reasonable person standards from particular perspectives in discrimination cases.
Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination
Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1332–33 (2011).
32 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (for conduct to constitute sexual
harassment, it must be unwelcome to the victim).
33 See Frensley v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 440 F. App’x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2011); Burnes v.
McGregor Electr. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
34 See, e.g., Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (“It goes without saying that
forcible rape is ‘unwelcome physical conduct of a sexual nature.’”) (citing Little v. Windermere
Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2002)).
35 Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (Similarly, a plaintiff’s partici-
pation in foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting outside the workplace “does not
waive her legal protections against unwelcome harassment.”); E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
Nos. 97-02229, 97-02252, 1999 WL 1032963 (10th Cir. 1999) (Evidence that a plaintiff had consen-
sual sexual relationships with other co-workers outside of work “is not relevant to [plaintiff]’s
claims of harassment at work.”); see alsoWilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2006)
(evidence of female employee’s sexual behavior and comments in the workplace was “highly pro-
bative of issue of whether the alleged harassment was unwelcomed.”); Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165
F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1999) (evidence of alleged sexual relations between employee and ex-hus-
band outside the workplace during period when harassment occurred should be excluded).
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care to prevent and correct sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of this protection.36 The
employer is liable for harassment by non-supervisory employees or non-
employees over whom it has control, if it knew or should have known
about the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate cor-
rective action.37 An employer is merely required to be responsive—hav-
ing an available anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure
which the employee unreasonably failed to use would defeat the claim.38
Overall, this complex test has created barriers to claimants39 and
failed to provide effective guidance to employers and employees.40 The
core legal concepts the test relies on—“severe and pervasive”, “unwel-
come” and “offensive”—remain vague and have often resulted in incon-
sistent and narrow assessments of sexual harassment claims.41 Schol-
ars have proposed various reforms that seek to alter the allocation of
fact-finding determinations between judges and juries in hopes of better
capturing the reformative aims of Title VII. Some have proposed that
the judiciary should exercise greater influence in factual determina-
tions as it has done in other contexts in which uniformity and predicta-
bility are paramount.42 Excessive reliance on juries to assess the sever-
ity and offensive nature of harassment, scholars have argued, yields
inconsistent decisions without precedential value, often reflecting the
predominating prejudices Title VII seeks to transform.43 In contrast,
some researchers have found that judges consistently downplay and
minimize instances of harassment to the detriment of litigants.44 The
current composition of the judiciary, it is argued, is far too disconnected
36 See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Faragher vs. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
37 EEOC, Harassment; Employer Liability for Harassment, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/
harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/A9RD-84AY].
38 Id.
39 Sean Captain,Workers Win Only 1% of Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits at Trial, FASTCOMP-
ANY, (July 31, 2017), http://www.fastcompany.com/40440310/employees-win-very-few-civil-rights-
lawsuits [https://perma.cc/4J5A-U5VZ] (finding that, of the cases filed in court that are not settled
or voluntarily dismissed, less than 1 percent result in a favorable outcome); Eyer, supra note 31 at
1299 (exploring the reasons for the low success rates of discrimination lawsuits).
40 See generally SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW (Oxford University Press, 2017); Scheindlin & Elofson, supra
note 8; U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS COMMITTEE, 115TH CONG., So I
Tolerated It—HowWork Places Are Responding to Harassment and the Clear Need for Federal Act-
ion: Minority Staff Report (December 2018) [henceforthMinority Staff Report] [https://www.help.s
enate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senator%20Murray%20Harassment%20Report%20Final.pdf].
41 Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 8; U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND
PENSIONS COMMITTEE,Minority Staff Report, supra note 40 at 31–33.
42 Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 8 at 834–37.
43 Id.
44 Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap between What Judges and Reasonable
People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 809–17 (May 2002).
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from the realities of the workplace to effectively assess harassment
claims.45
Both perspectives reflect a similar concern that the legal frame-
work developed by the courts impedes the policy goals of Title VII. With-
out a path towards the social reform Title VII seeks, sexual harassment
determinations in our courts are bound to be vague and regressive.46 As
one commentator noted, “[s]ociety can hardly be expected to reform it-
self without notice as to what title VII requires.”47 That this problematic
adjudicative process is placed within an administrative process that
most agree also limits the reform aims of Title VII is even more con-
cerning. In hostile work environment claims, employees must first file
with their employer’s internal complaint process. Then they must file
their claims through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(EEOC) administrative process and must do so within 180 to 300 days
of the offense.48 Due to limited resources, the EEOC only pursues a
small portion of reported claims, often issuing right to sue letters for
complainants to pursue private litigation, a costly undertaking which
is prohibitive to many.49 Thus, the cases that make it to court already
represent a small portion of the claims filed with the EEOC.50
The result of these administrative process hurdles and our legal
determination of harassment is that few instances of gender-motivated
abusive workplace behavior are held to account under Title VII.51 Ulti-
mately, the costs of litigation, both financial and otherwise, are rarely
worth it to the aggrieved party. Loss of career status, pursuit of claims
45 33.3 percent of Supreme Court justices are women, 36.8 percent of Circuit Court of Appeals
judges are women, and 34 percent of Federal District Court judges are women. AM. BAR ASS’N, A
Current Glance at Women in the Law, at 5 (Jan. 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/women/a-current-glance-at-women-in-the-law-jan-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2KHX-XPAC].
46 Researchers have concluded that features of American culture create reluctance by any fact-
finder (judge or jury) to attribute workplace wrongs to status discrimination. Eyer, supra note 31,
at 1299.
47 Scheindlin and Elofson, supra note 8, at 834.
48 EEOC, Time Limits for Filing a Charge, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm [ht
tps://perma.cc/CHE6-6D7Q].
49 EEOC,What You Can Expect After You File A Charge, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/pro-
cess.cfm [https://perma.cc/LWA9-N225].
50 EEOC, All Charges Alleging Harassment (Charges Filed with the EEOC) FY 2010-FY2018,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all_harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/N535-9W
WF].
51 U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS COMMITTEE, Minority Staff Re-
port, supra note 40, at 10–15 (discussing EEOC charge data and lack of reliable data on sexual
harassment charge success).
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resulting in job losses, personal investments, cost of legal representa-
tion, and the emotional drain of the process all make harassment claims
a burdensome pursuit.52
II. RECONSIDERING THEU.S. APPROACH
Half a century later, Title VII’s original transformative goals ap-
pear to have been, at best, curtailed and, at worst, rendered ineffectual,
by a complaint-dependent, liability-focused process, saddled with un-
der-resourced administrative hurdles and courts that have narrowed
the statute’s potential. Our unwillingness to address the misogyny and
sexism that underpins harassment—maintaining instead a focus on its
individual and inter-personal nature—has undermined Title VII’s im-
pact on women in employment, undercutting its original aim to “liber-
ate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and
thereby to implement the goals of human dignity and economic equality
in employment.”53 The question is now whether we can reorient our ap-
proach to sexual harassment and fulfill Title VII’s transformative in-
tention.
A return to the goals of Title VII and the intention of Congress to
“liberate the workplace” from gender inequality requires a more for-
ward-looking approach than the one we have employed thus far. Like
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which sought to end segregation in schools,
Title VII sought to fundamentally alter the workplace, a task its imple-
mentation has not achieved.54 A transformative approach to discrimi-
nation is one that understands that inequalities are rooted in history,
and that divisions are not arbitrary or irrational but often deliberately
preserve current structures.55 This approach requires an inquiry into
the values, behaviors, institutions, and power relations that maintain
women’s inequality through sexual harassment.56
By this measure, determinations ungrounded in policy goals or re-
liance on dominant cultural norms and public opinion is misguided. A
legal assessment of sexual harassment that seeks transformation would
not aim to reflect social norms but instead would pursue an assessment
52 Christine O. Merriman and Cora G. Yang, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harass-
ment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &SOC. CHANGE 83, 84 note 6 (1985) (citing an unpublished
1979 Working Women’s Institute Study (WWI)).
53 Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998).
54 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
55 The Constitutional Court in South Africa provides a good example of a transformative ap-
proach to discrimination claims. See Catherine Albertyn, Substantive Equality and Transfor-
mation in South Africa, 23 S. AFR. J. ONHUM. RTS. 253 (2007).
56 Id.
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of harassment that advances women’s workplace equality and recog-
nizes the barriers to that equality. In other words, our laws on sexual
harassment and their implementation should move us forward rather
than merely reflect our discriminatory surroundings.
A. Sexual Harassment and the Structure of the Workplace
As discussed, our legal conception of sexual harassment focuses pri-
marily on ensuring those with authority in the workplace do not use it
to elicit sexual services, favors, and interactions, and that extreme sex-
ually degrading and/or intrusive behavior is punished.57 While these
are important features of sexual harassment, they do not address the
broader context and elements of the American workplace that make
harassment possible and advantageous. By focusing on the bad ac-
tors/rotten apples that abuse their authority or openly degrade their
female coworkers, our legal approach to sexual harassment misses and
renders acceptable many other forms of sexual harassment that impede
women from attaining their full economic potential through employ-
ment.
The last decade of research has painted an increasingly clear pic-
ture of sexual harassment—its nature, benefit and impact—which dif-
fers from the one reflected in our jurisprudence. Research indicates that
sexual harassment is often not an isolated event nor one disconnected
from other features of a workplace, but a tactic that defines certain
workplaces and is a critical component of them. Sexual harassment is
not merely the experience of a few unlucky women but a practice that
advances, entrenches, and preserves workplace inequalities, discourag-
ing women from pursuing higher-level positions or even entering cer-
tain industries. This more complex understanding of harassment puts
into question the judicial approach of requiring “a showing of tremen-
dous harm done to a flawless plaintiff.”58
Studies have identified various predictors of harassment, including
particular workplace practices and industries prone to high levels of
harassment. Male-dominated workplaces (e.g., construction),59 low-
wage workplaces populated by women (e.g., retail and care providers),60
57 Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment Discrimination
Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2018), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/open-
statement-on-sexual-harassment-from-employment-discrimination-law-scholars/ [https://perma.c
c/6CAK-UW65].
58 See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 1271.
59 Kim Parker,Women in Majority-Male Workplaces Report Higher Rates of Gender Discrimi-
nation, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 7, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/07/
women-in-majority-male-workplaces-report-higher-rates-of-gender-discrimination/ [https://perma
.cc/47DZ-6TMJ].
60 Jocelyn Frye, Not Just the Rich and Famous: The Pervasiveness of Sexual Harassment
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and industries where workers are excluded from labor law protections
(e.g., domestic work and farm labor)61 are all associated with higher lev-
els of sexual harassment. Poorly structured work environments (e.g.,
laborer working in isolation, poor management structures, excessive su-
pervisory discretion, lack of clear rule making and enforcement) and
workplaces with inadequate complaint systems also evidence higher
levels of harassment.62
Male-dominated workplaces have consistently been found to have
higher rates of harassment of female workers than gender-balanced
workplaces.63 For example, a study relying on charge data from the
EEOC found that, in a male majority industry like construction (91%
male workers), women were 27 times more likely than men to report
sexual harassment. In comparison, in health care and social assistance
industries, where 21% of workers are male, women were only 1.2 times
more likely to report sexual harassment than men.64 In male-majority
industries, female supervisors are also more likely to experience har-
assing behaviors than in predominately female industries.65
Women in female-dominated workplaces where women are in low-
wage positions with high levels of turnover, such as retail and elder or
child care, also report high levels of sexual harassment. EEOC charge
data, again, revealed that the largest number of claims were filed in the
accommodation and food services industry followed by retail trade. Both
industries are dominated by women and pay low-wages at high turno-
ver rates.66 Domestic (household) workers have long been subjected to
harassment and abuse in isolated and unregulated workplaces, many
instances even rising to the level of human trafficking and servitude.67
The infrastructure of the work environment has also been found to
impact the prevalence of sexual harassment. For example, an Institute
for Women’s Policy Research study identified several work-related fea-
tures associated with increased risk of sexual harassment and assault




62 Elyse Shaw, Ariane Hegewisch & Cynthia Hess, Sexual Harassment & Assault at Work:
Understanding the Costs, B376 IWPR 1–12 (Oct. 2018), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
10/IWPR-sexual-harassment-brief_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X58H-9CWT].
63 See Parker, supra note 59.
64 Women’s Initiative, Women Disproportionately Report Sexual Harassment in Male-Domi-
nated Industries, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/is-
sues/women/news/2018/08/06/454376/gender-matters/ [https://perma.cc/JR4J-AQD2].
65 Heather McLaughlin, Christopher Uggen & Amy Blackstone, Sexual Harassment, Work-
place Authority, and the Paradox of Power, 77(4) AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 625, 634 (2012),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0003122412451728 [https://perma.cc/MWE7-WCCN].
66 See Frye, supra note 60.
67 See Shaw et al., supra note 62, at 3.
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in the workplace, including: compensation mechanisms that relied on
tips; work environments in which workers labored in isolation; employ-
ment of workers with irregular immigration status (or where their sta-
tus was dependent on their jobs); and work settings with employees
with significant power differentials.68
Other elements of the workplace—e.g., lines of management, su-
pervisory discretion, mechanisms for employee well-being and reten-
tion—can all impact the prevalence of sexual harassment.69 A commit-
tee of experts analyzing the agricultural industry in an International
Labor Organization (ILO) report, for example, found that the preva-
lence of sexual harassment was impacted by unequal power relations,
discriminatory work practices, the precariousness of the workers’ em-
ployment, frustration of the right to association and collective bargain-
ing,70 poor working conditions, work intensity or unrealistic production
goals, the prevalence of informal work,71 and weak enforcement mech-
anisms.72
Many of these factors, if not all, are features of a workplace within
the employer’s design and control. Who employers hire, how they treat
their employees, how they expose them to customers, what forms of
safety mechanisms are in place, and employee job security all appear to
have some impact on the prevalence of sexual harassment in the work-
place and are all decisions employers make in designing and maintain-
ing a workplace. While an employer may not have absolute control over
68 Id. at 4. The last example has been highly publicized in this past year through articles by
women harassed in the entertainment industry, as well as law clerks and in academia, and, in
general all professions that instill certain individuals with high levels of unchecked authority. See,
e.g., Nancy Gertner, Sexual Harassment and the Bench, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2018) https:
//review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Gertner-1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TY5Z-YKAS]; see also Katie Benner,Women in Start-Up World Speak Up Ab-
out Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/04/insider/technolo
gy-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/K7AQ-BSQK]; Pamela Hutchinson, #MeToo and
Hollywood: What’s Changed in the Industry a Year On? THEGUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2018, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/08/metoo-one-year-on-hollywood-reaction [https://perma.cc/A5YY
-AAQT].
69 Int’l Labor Org, Conditions of Work and Equality Dept. [ILO], Final Report, at ¶ 62, 105,
110, Meeting of Experts on Violence against Women and Men in the World of Work, MEVWM/201
6/7 (Geneva, 3–6 October 2016), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/do
cuments/meetingdocument/wcms_546303.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QGE-BYVH].
70 Id. at ¶ 12, 13, 101; see also Int’l Labour Office, Ending Violence and Harassment Against
Women and Men in the World of Work, ILC.107/V/1 29, 70 (2018), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/gro
ups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_553577.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B38L-VA6J].
71 Id. at ¶ 12, 101.
72 Id.
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whether harassment occurs, the employer is clearly in a position to sig-
nificantly reduce the opportunity, motivation, and reward systems that
enable and promote it.73
Finally, the negative impact of harassment, both on the intended
victims and the workplace more generally, is clear. Studies have iden-
tified a variety of negative consequences on the health and well-being
of workers, including increased stress for victims (which can lead to a
variety of physical ailments), inability of victims to focus on doing their
tasks correctly and safely, inability of co-workers and managers to ef-
fectively respond to or deal with sexual harassment, intimidation that
causes victims to be reluctant to raise legitimate safety issues for fear
of being ridiculed, and workplace violence.74
B. Redefining Sexual Harassment
When placed in the context of this research, our legal definition of
and policy approach to harassment appears badly in need of updating.
While research has made it evident that harassment is an institutional
and societal problem, Title VII’s implementation continues to focus on
isolated inter-personal issues among individuals, such as badly worded
jokes and inappropriate sexual pursuits of aberrant actors.75 For more
than a decade now, scholars and advocates have urged lawmakers,
courts, and employers, with little success, to treat sexual harassment
claims as part of a larger pattern of workplace discrimination and ine-
quality, consistent with the spirit of Title VII.76 Our current approach
has not only failed to capture the nature and full range of behavior that
causes inequality of women in the workplace, but it has undermined
Title VII’s ability to eradicate gendered employment discrimination, at
the significant cost of many women and men.
Vicki Schultz and others77 have proposed the adoption of an ap-
proach to harassment that more comprehensively captures the nature
of the problematic behavior. Schultz has argued that the sexual com-
ments and behavior courts focus on ignores many of the sex-based
words and actions in the workplace that are aimed at and succeed in
73 Ann C. Hodges, Strategies for Combating Sexual Harassment: The Role of Labor Unions, 15
TEX. J. WOMEN& L. 183 (2006).
74 See, e.g., ILO, Final Report, supra note 69, at ¶ 49; Shaw et al., supra note 62, at 4–6; see
also Chelsea R. Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Con-
sequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 127 (2007); Morton Niel-
son, et al., Prospective Relationships between Workplace Sexual Harassment and Psychological
Distress, 62(3) OCCUP. MED. (LOND) 226 (Mar. 2012).
75 Lawton, supra note 1.
76 Id. at 820–21.
77 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 17.
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undermining women and limiting their achievements.78 As Schultz has
explained, even traditional forms of sexual harassment are not, as was
previously understood, power used to gain access to sex but sexualized
behavior used to maintain or attain power.79 This understanding builds
off of Catharine McKinnon’s original framing of sexual harassment as
domination of one sex over another.80
Under this framework, sexual harassment is a tool of male workers
to maintain their status in the workplace and limit economic advance-
ment and opportunities for women (and men who do not meet accepted
standards of masculinity).81 When understood as a systematic form of
workplace advantage-seeking behavior, an institutional response by the
employer seems called for. As discussed in Section II(A), studies show
that such interventions are impactful.82 Moreover, if this behavior is
aimed at and succeeds in preserving the very gender inequality our pol-
icies seek to eradicate, interventions that go beyond merely adjudicat-
ing employee complaints through litigation also seem advisable. Our
failure to do any of this begs the question of whether we seek to eradi-
cate sexual harassment or merely regulate it to a socially acceptable
degree. And, if the latter, isn’t the tolerance for sexual harassment a
symptom of the very sexism Title VII was intended to address?83 Are we
resigned to the contention that sex-based harassment and abuse are
simply a part of women’s working life even if such behavior leads to
perpetuating the exclusion of women from the workplace and creating
barriers to their economic equality?
III. INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACHES
The ILO standard setting process, “Ending Violence and Harass-
ment Against Women and Men in the World of Work,” began at its 325th
Session in November of 2015 and provides some insight into alternative
78 Id. at 26.
79 Id. at 27.
80 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OFWORKINGWOMEN 27–28 & n. 13
(1979).
81 McLaughlin et al., supra note 65 (explaining that sexual harassment is used to counterbal-
ance women in positions of power and might be motivated more by desire for control and domina-
tion than sexual desire).
82 Ryan K. Jacobson and Asia A. Eaton, How Organizational Policies Influenced Bystander
Likelihood of Reporting Moderate and Severe Harassment at Work, 30:1 EMPLOY. RESPONSE
RIGHTS J. 37 (2018) (Participants in zero-tolerance policy condition were more likely to intend to
formally report the harassment to their organization).
83 Brenda L. Russell and Kristin Y. Trigg, Tolerance of Sexual Harassment: An Examination
of Gender Differences, Ambivalent Sexism, Social Dominance, and Gender Roles, 50(7–8) SEX
ROLES 565 (2004) (explaining that ambivalence and hostility toward women are much greater
predictors of tolerance of sexual harassment than is gender alone).
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ways to address sexual harassment in the workplace.84 The ILO initi-
ated this process with the goal of achieving a consensus among its 187
member states on the nature of violence and harassment in the work-
place and developing a framework for prevention and response.85
Through this process, the ILO has consolidated national laws and ex-
plored the policy approaches to sexual harassment that have emerged
through international agreements and within member states.
As captured in the ILO’s report, the international human rights
legal system, as well as some of our peer countries, address sexual har-
assment within the larger context of workplace rights and standard vi-
olations. Sexual harassment is treated as a form of violence and abuse
that burdens the workplace.86 It is considered to be rooted in gender
discrimination that results in violations of human dignity and equality,
two historically core principles of the international human rights legal
system.87 Human dignity is the fundamental principle that an individ-
ual should be treated as an end rather than a means and is considered
the basis for all human rights.88 The concept of equality requires some
equal distribution of rights, benefits and opportunities, and ensures
that any distinctions made among groups that create any disparate en-
joyment of the above is justified. Without a foundation, equality alone
does not determine what rights, benefits, and privileges must be redis-
tributed.89 Human dignity provides that guide and allows an assess-
ment of whether group distinctions are justified, serving as the basis
upon which they can be judged as permissible or impermissible.90
84 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment Against Women and Men in the World of Work, Re-
port [henceforth Ending Violence and Harassment] V(1), ILC. 107/V/1, 1–31, 45–59, 77–83 (May
12, 2017), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdoc-
ument/wcms_553577.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW68-KCRF].
85 Id. at 33–44, 63–75.
86 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at 6, 9, 14–16, 34, 41, 76, 97.
87 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the foundation of the human rights
system, begins with an assertion of the “inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Pmbl., Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),
one of the system’s first and still most widely recognized treaties, asserts that basic human rights
“derive from the inherent dignity of the human person” and that the animating principle of the
covenant is the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family [as] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
88 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights.
19(4) EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 689–92 (2008).
89 Susie Cowen, Can Dignity Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence, 17 S. AFR. J. ON
HUM. RTS. 34, 48 (2001).
90 McCrudden, supra note 88; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-
4/84 of 19 Jan. 1986 (Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of
Costa Rica requested by the Government of Costa Rica), at ¶¶ 55–56 (“notion of equality springs
directly from the oneness of the human family and is linked to the essential dignity of the individ-
ual.”).
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Various international human rights treaties explicitly protect the
right to dignity and equality in the workplace. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR) recognizes that “everyone who works has
the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and
his family an existence worthy of human dignity.”91 ILO conventions
have been interpreted to prohibit sexual harassment as a form of phys-
iological coercion, sex discrimination, and violation of workplace health
and safety, among other grounds.92 Under the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), sexual harassment is not only a direct violation of dignity,
but a form of inequality that interferes with women’s ability to enjoy
other basic human rights, such as the right to work, safety, and health
in the workplace, and equal conditions of employment.93 Under other
treaties, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), sexual harassment interferes with women’s
right to just and favorable conditions of work on par with men.94 Sexual
harassment in the workplace is understood to undermine basic tenets
of human dignity—self-respect, self-worth, physical and psychological
integrity, and autonomy.95
Against this background, a state duty to exercise due diligence in
preventing and protecting individuals from sexual harassment viola-
tions in the workplace has emerged.96 State parties to the relevant trea-
91 G.A. Res. 217 (III), supra note 87, art. 23.
92 ILO, ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-Binding Principles and Guid-
elines for a Rights-Based Approach to Labour Migration, at 9 (2006).
93 Though the text of CEDAW is silent on sexual harassment, in 1992, the CEDAWCommittee
issued a comment on gender-based violence, explaining that the state duty to eradicate all forms
of gender-based violence, including sexual harassment and domestic violence, was implied under
the treaty obligations to eliminate all forms of gender discrimination. UN Comm. on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on its Eleventh Session, G. Rec. No. 19 (1992).
94 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A supra note 87, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Dec. 16, 1966) at 2–3, ¶ 7, (“rights of every-
one to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work” with regard to fair wages and
“equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work”).
95 McCrudden, supra note 88, at 689–92; The importance of providing economic justice was
understood as a crucial part of this international movement to secure peace and stability. Article
23 of the League of Nations Covenant included the “fair and humane conditions of labour for men,
women, and children” and envisioned the establishment of international organizations to realize
this objective. This goal was the focus of the International Labour Organization (ILO) established
in 1919 in Paris to promote fair and humane conditions for workers through legal mechanisms and
monitoring procedures.
96 CEDAW, supra note 93; Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al. v. United States, Merits Report,
Inter-Am. Commission on H.R., No.80/11 (July 21, 2011) (explaining that states must exercise due
diligence to protect women from all forms of gender-based violence).
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ties are required to put in place legal and policy mechanisms that pre-
vent harassment rather than merely responding to it once it has oc-
curred.97 One such mechanism has been imposition of a duty of care on
employers that requires them to address, investigate, and respond to
harassment as a workplace well-being matter.98 This duty requires not
only an effective and responsive complaint mechanism, but also a
searching assessment of workplace conditions that cause and enable
harassment.99 An employer must ensure, as far as is practicable, the
health and safety of its employees, including protection from harass-
ment. Employers must address badly structured workplace mecha-
nisms that facilitate or enable bullying and abusing of women. Accord-
ing to the ILO, which reviewed the sexual harassment laws and policies
of 80 countries, 18 countries in Europe and Central Asia, seven coun-
tries in Asia and the Pacific, six countries in the Americas, and one
country in Africa (none in the Arab States) required employers to take
some preventative steps to eliminate harassment.100
The European Union has issued directives on sexual harassment
that frame it as a discriminatory violation of dignity and requires state
97 For instance, Article 26(1) and (2) of the Council of Europe European Social Charter (Re-
vised) of 1996 requires states to adopt rules on violence and harassment, which include requiring
state parties to work with employers and workers to promote awareness, provide information and
prevent both sexual and moral harassment in the workplace (although a third of the states who
have ratified do not consider one or both of these paragraphs of the Charter to be binding); the
2011 Council of Europe Convention (Istanbul Convention) obligates ratifying members to “pro-
hibit, prevent, prosecute and eliminate violence against women, including sexual harassment, and
all forms of domestic violence, including economic violence,” ILO, Ending Violence and Harass-
ment, supra note 84, at 41, § 3.5, ¶ 174 and ¶ 175.
98 Id. at 56, ¶ 221, p. 65, § 5.3, ¶ 249 and ¶ 251. See also McAleenon v. Autism Initiatives NI
[2013] NIIT 815/12 [¶ 65] (N. Ir.) (explaining the “danger of an employer not being proactive in
circumstances where members of staff are known to engage in physical contact”); Grobler v.
Naspers 2004(4) SA 220(C) (South Africa Labor Court) (finding the employer liable where harass-
ment was a foreseeable risk); Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc.,
Jan. 30, 2019, Bull. Civ. V, No. 17-28905 (Fr.) (finding obligation of the employer to take effective
measures to protect their employees when it is in a situation to exert de facto authority on non-
salaried persons who are responsible for the sexist harassing behavior.)
99 EEOC, Enforcement Guide on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors, (April 6, 2010), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [https://perma.cc/
XJ4N-6HDC]. See also Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“Ellerth and Faragher do not, as the defendants seem to assume, focus mechanically on the formal
existence of a sexual harassment policy, allowing an absolute defense to a hostile work environ-
ment claim whenever the employer can point to an anti-harassment policy of some sort;” defendant
failed to prove affirmative defense where it issued written policies without enforcing them, painted
over offensive graffiti every few months only to see it go up again in minutes, and failed to inves-
tigate sexual harassment as it investigated and punished other forms of misconduct.); see also
Dees v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 168 F.3d 417, 422 (11th Cir. 1999) (employer can
be held liable despite its immediate and appropriate corrective action in response to harassment
complaint if it had knowledge of the harassment prior to the complaint and took no corrective
action).
100 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at 63–64, § 35.1, ¶¶ 244–47.
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members and employers to enact policies aimed at prevention.101 In the
United Kingdom, for example, sexual harassment is considered a
“health and safety problem” that an employer has a duty to address,
ensuring, as far as is practicable, that employees are protected from
it.102 Employers must conduct risk assessments to identify groups and
individuals who may be vulnerable to sexual harassment and take ac-
tion.103 Fulfilment of the duty can include, among other things, encour-
aging access to counseling services for sexual harassment victims, for
example. Employers generally have a full legal defense if they can
demonstrate they have taken all practicable steps to prevent sexual
harassment by active workplace policies and awareness strategies.104
Other countries have focused more broadly on systemic work envi-
ronment management which includes taking measures that reduce op-
portunities for sexual harassment and other forms of “bullying.” The
Swedish Work Environment Authority (SWEA) conducts inspections
that are aimed at “strengthening the workplace’s own ability to prevent
risks.”105 The investigations conducted are corrective and restorative in
nature. Investigators are instructed to “carr[y] out [inspections] with a
preventative purpose in mind” and that they “[s]hould not dwell on the
101 EP Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM), Article 31 of EU Resolu-
tion onMeasures to Prevent and Combat Mobbing and Sexual Harassment at Workplace, in Public
Spaces, and Political Life in the EU (2018) calls on Member States and social partners to ensure
that employers organize “mandatory training on sexual harassment and bullying”; Article 33
“stresses that companies should have a zero tolerance approach to sexual harassment. Resolution
on Measures to Prevent and Combat Mobbing and Sexual Harassment at Workplace, in Public
Spaces, and Political Life in the EU, Eur. Parl. Doc. P8_TA-PROV(2018)0331; see also Article 26
of the European Directive on Sexual Harassment “Prevention of discrimination[:] Member States
shall encourage, in accordance with national law, collective agreements or practice, employers and
those responsible for access to vocational training to take effective measures to prevent all forms
of discrimination on grounds of sex, in particular harassment and sexual harassment in the work-
place. Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the
Implementation of the Principle of Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment of Men and Women
in Matters of Employment and Occupation (recast), 2006 O.J. (L 204) 3, https://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006L0054&from=EN [https://perma.cc/5S26-
2Q5S]; Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment
Law: Discrimination versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241 (2002).
102 Part I, Section 2 of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 “It shall be the duty of every
employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health safety and welfare at work of
his employees,” Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, 1, § 2, (Eng.).
103 The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 were introduced to rein-
force the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Regulation 3 states that employers “shall make a
suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks to the health and safety of his employees to which
they are exposed whilst they are at work,” The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regu-
lations 1999, SI 1999/3242, art. 3, ¶ 1 (Eng.).
104 Id. at sec. 7, ¶ 1–5., generally a defense to an alleged breach of sexual discrimination legis-
lation by employers.
105 Swedish Work Env’t Auth., Inspections, Investigations and Checks, https://www.av.se/en/
work-environment-work-and-inspections/inspections-investigations-and-checks/inspection/ [http
s://perma.cc/PB9J-T4TH].
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question of blame.”106 In determining whether harassment may be al-
tering work conditions impermissibly or creating a hostile work envi-
ronment, the SWEA follows an ordinance on violence and menaces in
the working environment that identifies several signs of victimization,
bullying, and harassment among individuals and groups.107 Signs of vic-
timization in an individual employee can include, reduced performance,
high stress, physical illness, and suicidal thoughts.108 Victimization
among a group of workers can include reduced efficiency and productiv-
ity, erosion of existing rules or freezing of rules, criticism of the em-
ployer, increased friction, and high sickness absenteeism.109
In Finland, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSH) sends out a survey to all employees before periodic inspections
which include questions on harassment and workplace bullying and
then target those issues.110 The OSH Administration defines harass-
ment as a psychosocial workload factor—“properties related to work
content, work organization and social interaction in the work commu-
nity” that can cause “harmful work-related strain.” These factors cause
harmful work-related strain if they are not appropriately managed or if
workplace conditions are poor.111 In reference to violence and harass-
ment, the Finnish Occupational Safety and Health Act No. 738/2002
includes specific sections both on the threat of violence and on harass-
ment, requiring employers to prevent any harassment or inappropriate
behavior towards employees.112 In courts, the same conduct can be rec-
ognized as a work-safety offense and work discrimination.113
Canadian provinces have incorporated violence and sexual harass-
ment in their occupational health and safety laws as well.114 In Ontario,
106 Id.
107 Ordinance on Violence and Menaces in the Working Environment (Swedish Work Environ-
ment Authority’s Statute Book [AFS] 1993:17) (Swed.).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Psychosocial Workload, Occupational Safety and Health Administration Finland, 2 (2017)
TYOSUOUJELU.FIWEBSITE OF THEOCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ANDHEALTHADMINISTRATION IN FINLA-
ND, https://www.tyosuojelu.fi/web/en/about-us/publications [https://perma.cc/J2WT-4YXR].
111 Id.
112 Malgorzata Milczarek,Workplace Violence and Harassment: A European Picture, Eur. Age-
ncy for Health and Safety at Work, EU-OSHA, 29 (2010), https://osha.europa.eu/en/tools-and-pub-
lications/publications/reports/violence-harassment-TERO09010ENC [https://perma.cc/TK3U-9LE
7].
113 Riitta Sedig,Hidden Issue Brought to Daylight, Labor & Employment Law Strategic Global
Topics: Sexual Harassment Law in the Workplace Around the World, 1 (2018).
114 For example, New Brunswick has amended the General Regulation—Occupational Health
and Safety Act NB Reg 91-191 [General Regulation] Amendment, (2019) (“OHSA”) in order to pro-
tect employees from violence and harassment (other jurisdictions in Canada have already enacted
this kind of legislation).
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for example, the Workplace Violence & Harassment under the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act115 gives inspectors fromMinistry of Labour
broad powers to investigate complaints, enter workplaces without no-
tice or warrants, make orders requiring the employer to make changes
to the workplace, and compel them to investigate workplace harass-
ment.116 According to the Ministry of Labor, “[w]orkplace harassment
includes, but is not limited to: offensive comments or jokes; bullying or
aggressive behavior; inappropriate staring; sexual harassment; isolat-
ing or making fun of a worker because of their gender identity.”117 These
are just a few examples of the sorts of mechanisms that attempt to ad-
dress harassment in a more systemic manner with emphasis on preven-
tion.
IV. DIGNITY AND EQUALITY IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT
Some U.S. scholars have viewed the dignity-based approach that
places sexual harassment in the context of other workplace abuses with
skepticism. In particular, scholars engaged with women’s equality have
been concerned that it lacks a focus on the gendered elements of sexual
harassment to its detriment.118 U.S. scholars argue that sexual harass-
ment benefits from its special status, and that a generalized legal obli-
gation aimed at reducing workplace abuse would redirect resources for
sex-based sexual harassment as well as undermine the gravity with
which the law approaches it.119
Similarly, U.S. scholars have viewed the focus on dignity, particu-
larly in Europe, as a preoccupation with civility, inappropriate for the
American social context and meriting a far lower place on the scale of
legal importance than status discrimination.120 America’s history of rac-
ism, the mobility of its workforce, and cultural ethos of unregulated
115 Ontario Women’s Justice Network,Workplace Violence and Harassment – Occupational He-
alth and Safety Act, OWJN, (August 1, 2016), owjn.org/2016/08/workplace-violence-and-harass-
ment-occupational-health-and-safety-act/ [https://perma.cc/3474-7553].
116 HR Proactive Inc., An Employer’s Guide to Conducting Harassment Investigations, https://h
ttps://harassmentinvestigation.ca/employer_guide_harass_invest.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9KS-G2C
N]; Crisis Prevention Institute, Nonviolent Crisis Prevention, CPI, http://educate.crisispreven-
tion.com/OntarioBill168NowKnownAsSection32OntarioOHSA.html?code=ITG081PSRW&src=Pa
y-Per-Click [https://perma.cc/6EHC-GCRL].
117 Being Harassed at Work? Information for Workers, ONTARIOMINISTRYOFLABOR (May 2017)
, https://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/hs/pubs/fs_wvh_atwork.php [https://perma.cc/645H-8
NCH].
118 Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality—Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections,
86 IND. L. J. 1219 (Fall 2011); Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Friedman and Whitman, supra note 101, at 273.
119 Abrams, supra note 118, at 1249.
120 Friedman and Whitman, supra note 101, at 264–65.
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speech are thought to make the focus on workplace dignity and regula-
tion of workplace behavior ill-suited to the U.S. context. 121
These objections raise a number of questions. The first is whether
women have really experienced gains through the separation of sexual
harassment from general workplace protections.122 Second is whether
our aversion to dignity-focused protections has deprived us of meaning-
fully assessing what we have, implicitly, already recognized as viola-
tions of dignity—behavior that offends, humiliates and abuses. The
third is whether the competing values we seek to protect (speech and
authenticity in the workplace, prioritization of status discrimination,
and dogged deterrence through liability) are being served or would be
at risk were reforms to involve increased workplace interventions.
Alternatively, embracing a dignity-based approach could provide
us with a positive vision of the workplace, which we currently lack.
Without a positive vision for the workplace, it is difficult for us to deter-
mine what it should look like for women, and consequently it is difficult
to discern our policy goals for gender equality in the workplace. Juris-
dictions that address harmful workplace dynamics and dignitary issues
necessarily proceed with an understanding of how employees should re-
late to one another in the workplace and what workers may expect in
terms of standards and norms in their place of employment.123 Our re-
luctance to recognize social patterns of harassment and aversion to reg-
ulating private conduct has caused us to struggle to develop a concep-
tion of a sexual harassment free work environment.
Moreover, we have missed out on the practical and policy-oriented
advantages of an approach that prioritizes prevention of workplace
practices that promote or facilitate harassing behavior. Systems that
focus on prevention avoid complaint dependence, an approach that bur-
dens women and produces irregular and ineffective deterrence.124 A fo-
cus on prevention, along with involvement of both the state and em-
ployer, would better position us to make systemic change and
ultimately alter the incentive system that rewards harassment with
gains in benefits and power.125Conceiving of harassment as a workplace
wellbeing issue would also more effectively compel employer responsi-
bility for crafting responsive workplaces,126 as harassment would not be
121 Friedman & Whitman, supra note 101, at 269–71.
122 At various points, scholars and commentators have seen the advantages of an approach
that conceives of harassment as a dignitary workplace safety and wellbeing issue. Anita Bernstein
and Catherine McKinnon have both noted the regulatory and preventative advantages. See
MACKINNON, supra note 80, at 159; Bernstein, supra note 5 at 1256–1311.
123 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at ¶ 12, 13, 29, 70, 101.
124 See, e.g., SPERINO& THOMAS, supra note 40, at 177.
125 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 17, at 30, 59–66.
126 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at ¶ 25 and 44.
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conceived as an inevitable feature of work itself (which studies suggest
it is not), but an element specific to particular workplaces that facilitate
or promote it.127 Conceiving of sexual harassment as an occupational
health and safety issue, for example, has allowed other jurisdictions to
focus on the psychological well-being and safety of employees in an af-
firmative sense. Contrast this with our approach that asks just how
abusive the harassment must be before we allow legal action against
the harasser.
Finally, and perhaps key, this approach allows us to better under-
stand how harassment works and how to address it. Sexual harassment
as a manifestation of gender discrimination is both unique (in the sense
that it is rooted in and seeks to preserve gender inequality) and not
unique in the sense that workplace harassment can also be rooted in
and seek to preserve other forms of inequality (based in race, caste, dis-
abilities, economic status, ideology).128 By placing sexual harassment in
context to focus more on the bullying and abuse and less on sex, we can
begin to understand harassment as a tool for workplace (and economic)
benefits and craft a better strategy to eradicate it.
Pursuing an approach that considers dignity and equality, as inter-
twined, does not mean we must abandon prioritizing gender discrimi-
nation. A focus on dignity does not mean a failure to focus on equality;
dignity provides content to anchor the goals of equality. We can draw
from the concept of substantive equality under CEDAW which under-
stands gender discrimination as a barrier that impedes women’s enjoy-
ment of their fundamental rights.129 Here, dignity has long been the
complementary foundation for equality, as women’s inequality is under-
stood as policies and practices that deprive women of their human dig-
nity and other basic rights.130 Jurisdictions, like South Africa, that have
prioritized addressing matters of non-discrimination have long ap-
proached equality determinations with an implicit foundation of human
127 Arianna Rossi, Ending Violence at the Workplace, WORLD OF WORK MAGAZINE OF ILO
(2017) at 37–40.
128 Workers in poor working conditions, atypical employment (particularly temporary jobs),
women entering industries traditionally dominated by men, and self-employed or low-hours work-
ers who are outside the scope of labor law are particularly vulnerable to violence. ILO, Ending
Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at ¶ 108. See also Article 35 of EU Measures to Prevent
and Combat Mobbing and Sexual Harassment at Workplace, in Public Spaces, and Political Life
in the EU which “calls on Member States to take measures to ensure equal pay between women
and men . . . as a means of promoting gender equality and respect for human dignity, which is
fundamental to combating VAW. EU Measures, supra note 101.
129 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 18 December 1979, A/RES/34/180, Art. 11, ¶ 18; G.A. Res. 1325, Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1979); UN Comm. on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women on its Thirtieth Session, G. Rec. No. 25 (2004).
130 Id.
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dignity.131 An approach rooted in human dignity would both preserve
our focus on eradicating status discrimination while also providing a
touchpoint for workplace rights and standards that comport with our
sense of what human dignity requires.
The balance between general workplace rights and a focus on sta-
tus discrimination has been described as a targeted universalist ap-
proach—an approach which identifies a basic standard and analyzes
how groups are being deprived of that standard.132 As an example, a
goal set for a population could be access to health care and groups would
be evaluated for their access to that goal.133 While this may move us in
the right direction, the additional challenge in this context is that we
lack an actual standard. Including more groups into those with access
to rights, benefits, or resources is necessary, but not sufficient to ad-
dress harassment in our workplaces.134 We need first a concept, and I
have suggested human dignity, around which to orient workplace
norms and standards.
The better conceptual model for addressing sexual harassment in
the U.S. is that of transformation, which goes beyond ensuring that
more groups are brought into the fold of existing circumstances and
benefits. As Catherine Albertyn has explained, in reference to the juris-
prudence of the South African Constitutional Court, inclusivity often
struggles with fundamental transformation—inclusive approaches re-
sist altering basic structures, seeking instead to preserve the status quo
but with a broader base of beneficiaries. An inclusive approach may fo-
cus on hiring more women in a particular workplace, whereas a trans-
formative approach may ask what policies and practices were excluding
them in the first place (e.g., lack of maternity leave or comprehensive
health insurance), whether skills and talents valued rely on gender ste-
reotypes (e.g., approaches to marketing or making sales that reward
stereotypical gendered behavior), or whether the women who are hired
are being hampered in some way that is encouraging turn over or lim-
iting their advancement. A transformative approach would then ask
whether these conditions are necessary features of the work being per-
formed and how they can be altered so as to create a workplace that
equally incorporates and supports women. A transformative approach
to equality demands an analysis of fundamental social and institutional
structures, what they prioritize, who they exclude, and the values they
131 For an example of how dignity and equality interact in other jurisdictions, see Cowen, supra
note 89, at 34–58.
132 John A. Powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 802–03
(2008).
133 Id.
134 See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 118, at 1281–84.
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are based on. This approach identifies the why and how with the goal
of reconceiving the system so as to alter its present dynamics.135
The creation of a standard that provides content to human dignity
in the workplace along with a re-evaluation of existing inequalities
would provide a more robust strategy for addressing sexual harass-
ment. It would require development of a policy goal—a model of the
workplace as a healthy, productive, and safe environment that nurtures
all worker capacity and discourages and addresses abuses, humilia-
tions, and avoidable burdens.
Such a conception or model for the workplace would give us a better
sense of the goals in eradicating harassment as well as a yardstick by
which to measure the progress towards ensuring all enjoy and have full
access to the workplace and the economic benefits it provides. An ap-
proach based in equality and dignity with a positive vision of the work-
place would also be responsive to our major jurisprudential challenge—
the difficulty courts have had in extracting a norm against which sexual
harassment is measured due to significant elements of sexism and mi-
sogyny that dominate our culture. Without a marker of what is and is
not permissible in the workplace, courts cast about for intuition of what
is a bridge too far when it comes to humiliation and objectification of
women.
Ultimately, a standard for the workplace would elevate judicial in-
quiries (and that of juries under judicial guidance) from a realm of ar-
bitrating disputes in personal relationships to one with institutional
import. This kind of standard would also engage employers in the work
of prevention. To build a better workplace for women, we need to simply
build a better workplace—one that, at the outset, understands the so-
cial inequality it seeks to correct.
V. A POSITIVE VISION OF THEWORKPLACE
The task is now to cultivate a positive vision of the workplace in
which to root a legal and policy framework that addresses workplace
sexual harassment. To transform the American workplace, a positive
vision must express value for the worker generally and for the female
worker specifically, addressing both notions of human dignity and
equality. With a positive vision of the workplace, our society can define
the workplace more clearly, including what conditions of employment
workers can expect and the role of the employer in providing them.With
this vision, we can better gauge when humiliations, abuses, and other
tactics are employed by individuals in the workplace to discriminate
135 Albertyn, supra note 55.
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against women and gain advantage from gender inequality. We can es-
tablish what constitutes discrimination, not by measuring behavior
against social norms that may be discriminatory themselves, but by
measuring against standards of human dignity and equality. Our as-
sessment of sexual harassment can be grounded in an understanding of
its role in exploiting and reinforcing “socially constructed power imbal-
ances”136 to the benefit of harassers, the ill Title VII sought to remedy.
We are not entirely without a positive vision of the American work-
place. For example, some American companies have stepped forward to
craft better workplaces for their female employees.137 Though now out-
dated and significantly weakened, we once enacted a legislative
scheme, the Fair Labor Standards Act, aimed at protecting the Ameri-
can workforce and respecting the dignity of the worker that set basic
wages and some conditions for employment.138 We have recognized the
importance of sexual harassment prohibitions in implementing “the
goals of human dignity and economic equality in employment”139 but
we lack a contemporary vision in which to ground a renewed effort to
transform the workplace.140
136 Eric Stener Carlson, The ILO’s Innovative Approach to Ending Gender-Based Violence and




137 As of 2017, 14 percent of the US workforce was offered an employer-sponsored paid family
leave program. See Trish Stroman et al., Why Paid Family Leave Is Good Business, BOSTON
CONSULTING GROUP (February 2017) at 3–4, 17; Microsoft and Uber have eliminated forced arbi-
tration agreements for employees or customers who make sexual harassment claims. See Nick
Wingfield and Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Microsoft Moves to End Secrecy in Sexual Harassment
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/technology/microsoft-sex
ual-harassment-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/2H8P-TCTT]; Sarah Ashley O’Brian, Uber Will
No longer Force Victims of Sexual Assault into Arbitration, CNNBUSINESS (May 15, 2018), https://
money.cnn.com/2018/05/15/technology/uber-eliminates-forced-arbitration/index.html [https://per
ma.cc/85KC-PFHE].
138 As President Franklin Roosevelt stated when he sent the FLSA bill to Congress on May 24,
1937, “a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy can plead no justification for the existence
of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling worker’s wages or stretching worker’ hours . . .
conditions that do not meet rudimentary standards of decency should be regarded as contraband
and ought not to be allowed to pollute the channels of interstate trade,” See Jonathan Grossman,
US Dep’t. of Labor, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage,
(quoting Franklin Roosevelt, Public Papers VI (May 24, 1937) at 209–14).
139 Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998).
140 The primary federal employment and labor legislation are the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 203, that sets a national minimum wage and requires overtime for hours worked over
40 per week for qualifying workplaces; the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169,
that provides protections for workplace organizing and the formation of unions; the Occupations
Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651, that provides basic standards of health and safety in U.S.
workplaces; the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, which guarantees basic unpaid leave
for pregnancy, illness and caretaking; the Agricultural Workers Protection Act (AWPA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1801, that provides some basic protections to farmworkers in contracting and recruitment,
wages, working conditions, and compliance; the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemploy-
ment Rights Act (USERRA) 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–35 ensures that workers who enter the military for
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For numerous reasons commented on by many—the U.S. individu-
alistic culture, the mobility of our population and workforce, commit-
ment to free market principles, corporate influence and flexible commu-
nities—we have never fully developed robust labor and employment
legal protections.141 In comparison to similar economies and societies
with our institutional capacity, the American worker labors at the will
and whims of an employer, under terms set almost exclusively by that
employer with little intervention by the government.142 Thus, our work-
ers rely on a minimum wage that has not been updated in nearly a dec-
ade143 (that many argue has increased poverty levels in the U.S.);144
overtime pay that excludes a large and vulnerable sector of the labor
market (including farmworkers and domestic workers, among oth-
ers);145 the absence of pension requirements or other retirement guar-
antees provided as par for the course in many other jurisdictions;146 and
at-will employment arrangements that create insecurity.147 Similarly,
short periods can return to their private sector job without loss of seniority or benefits, and the
statutes that prohibit status discrimination such as Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34, and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1801.
141 Friedman & Whitman, supra note 101, at 265–70; see also, Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisit-
ing the At-Will Employment Doctrine: Imposed Terms, Implied Terms, and the Normative World of
the Workplace, 36 INDUS. L. J. 84, 84–86 (2007); see also generally, Clyde W. Summers, Employ-
ment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3:1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65
(Fall 2000).
142 See Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. out on a Limb – Comparing the U.S. Approach to Man-
datory Consumer and Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002)
(Though widespread in the U.S., mandatory arbitration policies are rarely employed in other coun-
tries); see also Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Balancing Respective Rights in the Employment Contract:
Contrasting the U.S. “Employment-At-Will” Rule with the Worker Statutory Protections against
Dismissal in European Community Countries, 4 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 441, 442 (1995) (Benefits re-
quired by European domestic statutes include a guaranteed paid vacation time of four weeks or
longer and an average of fourteen to sixteen weeks of paid maternity leave. By contrast in the U.S.
vacation time “is a privilege rather than a right” and the Family and Medical Leave Act only man-
dates twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year for family-related medical needs).
143 The minimum wage in the U.S. is $7.29 an hour and was last updated in 2009, see U.S.
DEP’T OFLABOR,MinimumWage, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage [https://
perma.cc/SSL9-7M98]. In comparison, as of 2013, Australia had the highest minimum wage of
$9.54 an hour, followed by Luxembourg at $9.24. See Paul Muggeridge, This Is What the Minimum
Wage Looks Like Around the World, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (June 30, 2015), https://www.wefo-
rum.org/agenda/2015/06/this-is-what-the-minimum-wage-looks-like-around-the-world./ [https://p
erma.cc/W7SU-WZQR].
144 Ben Zipperer, The Erosion of the Federal MinimumWage Has Increased Poverty, Especially
for Black and Hispanic Families, ECONOMICPOLICY INSTITUTE (June 13, 2018), https://www.epi.or
g/publication/the-erosion-of-the-federal-minimum-wage-has-increased-poverty-especially-for-blac
k-and-hispanic-families/ [https://perma.cc/RRQ7-4JWH].
145 For a complete list seeU.S. DEP’T OFLABOR, Exemptions, ELAWS Fair Labor Standards Act
Advisor, https://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/whd/flsa/screen75.asp [https://perma.cc/46FL-P8KL].
146 Pensions at a Glance in 2017: How Does the United States Compare?, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION ANDDEVELOPMENT (OECD) (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/PAG
2017-USA.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHK3-PLYH].
147 Stone, supra note 141, at 84.
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sick pay, unemployment benefits, and annual leave are far less gener-
ous in the U.S. in comparison to our peers. In a recent study of 14 Eu-
ropean countries and the U.S., we fared worse than all comparators.148
For example, unemployment compensation in our peer countries is of-
ten provided at a rate of 90% of previous earnings for an approximate
100 weeks. We provide between 40% and 50% of earnings for up to 26
weeks, depending on the individual state.149
Even those protections we do grant by virtue of the employer and
employee relationship do not extend to all American workers. One in
ten workers in the US labor market is in a “contingent and alternative
employment arrangement.”150Nearly 7% of these workers are classified
as independent contractors.151 These designations, though often ar-
ranged very similarly to an employee and employer relationship, liber-
ate the employer from paying the minimum wage and overtime under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, paying for unemployment and compen-
sation benefits, as well as from providing accommodations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.152 Employers have become wise to this
option and have increasingly classified their employees as independent
contractors, which has led to a rash of litigation.153
Thus, we have primarily left it to the employer to craft a just and
functional workplace. Workers are expected to either accept the terms
set by the employer or leave. Members of our workforce have few legal
rights and employers have few restrictions or obligations to ensure
worker well-being. Time and again courts have defended the principle
of at-will unregulated employment, resisting contractual obligations
148 The report, conducted in cooperation with Llewellyn Consulting, reveals that the countries
offering the most generous workplace and welfare benefits overall are Denmark, France and Spain,
with Denmark and Belgium in particular offering the best unemployment benefits (pay and eligi-
bility period). See Llewellyn Consulting, Which Countries in Europe Offer Fairest Paid Leave and
Unemployment Benefits, GLASSDOOR at 12 (2016), https://www.glassdoor.com/research/app/upload
s/sites/2/2016/02/GD_FairestPaidLeave_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP9K-E2Z5].
149 Id. at 11.
150 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS (June 7, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm [https://perm
a.cc/388N-RY6V].
151 Id.
152 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,Wage and Hour Division (WHD), https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/m
isclassification/ [https://perma.cc/4PUZ-347F].
153 See, e.g., Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1, 42
(Cal. 2018), (where the California Supreme Court held that delivery drivers were employees rather
than independent contractors and announced a new test for establishing independent contractor
status that considers franchise or licensing relationships); see also, Simpkins v. DuPage Housing
Authority, 893 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2018) (reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment
and holding that the plaintiff was an independent contractor, as opposed to an employee);
Thornton v. Mainline Commc’ns. LLC, 157 F. Supp. 3d 844 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (where the district
court found that cable repair and installation technicians were misclassified as independent con-
tractors).
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and, time and again, any effort to demand workplace security or mini-
mal terms has been struck down.154 Even in situations where workers
are under the control and behest of their employers (such as temporary
foreign labor programs, where the worker’s presence in this country is
subject to their employment), courts have rarely and reluctantly found
any entitlements or obligations.155
These conditions have meant that particularly vulnerable popula-
tions, such as our low-wage sector, which is populated by many immi-
grants with irregular immigration status,156 has been marred by wage
violations and abuses.157 The limited capacity of the Department of La-
bor,158 as well as the weakening of our unions, has made the workplace
a difficult place for low-wage workers.159Anti-immigrant messaging has
created even greater room for exploitation of the low-wage sector. Im-
migrant workers labor in industries often excluded from our already
154 See, e.g., Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (upholding the validity of
employer requirement that employees submit to individual arbitration of wage-and-hour and other
work place conditions claims).
155 See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compound v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (holding that an undoc-
umented worker who was not authorized to legally work in the U.S. was not eligible to receive
back pay under the NLRA); for an example of recent acknowledgments by courts that some con-
tractual obligation may exist for temporary foreign laborers see, Jimenez v. GLK Foods LLC, No.
12-CV-00209, Dkt. 50 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (finding contractual obligations for H2-B workers).
156 See Miriam Jordan, 8 Million People are Working Illegally in the U.S. Here’s Why That’s
Unlikely to Change, THENEWYORKTIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/us
/undocumented-immigrant-workers.html [https://perma.cc/Y33B-LT4H]; Lisa Rapaport, U.S. Re-
lies Heavily on Foreign-Born Healthcare Workers, THOMPSONREUTERS (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-health-professions-us-noncitizens/u-s-relies-heavily-on-foreign-born-healt
hcare-workers-idUSKBN1O32FR [https://perma.cc/8V5K-LEJD].
157 In 2016, research from Oxfam found that one in four low-wage workers in the US did not
have a single day of earned sick time, see OXFAM, Millions of Low-Wage Workers in the US Are
Struggling to Survive, (June 21, 2016), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/millions-of-
low-wage-workers-in-the-us-are-struggling-to-survive/ [https://perma.cc/Z9VC-A2L4].
158 During the last three decades, funding levels for agencies that enforce laws against work-
place violations have declined precipitously despite the fact that the labor force has grown. For
instance, the number of inspectors enforcing minimum wage and overtime laws declined by 31%,
while the labor force increased by 52% between 1980 and 2007. See Annette Bernhardt, et al.,
Broken Law, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities,
NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT at 52 (2009).
159 In 2017, only 10.7% of wage and salaried workers in the U.S. were members of labor unions,
while in 1983, 20.1% of wage and salaried workers were members of labor unions, see, Hanna
Fingerhut, More Americans View Long-Term Decline in Union Membership Negatively than Posi-
tively, PEW RES. CENTER (June 5, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/05/more-
americans-view-long-term-decline-in-union-membership-negatively-than-positively/ [https://perm
a.cc/7L6N-2MK5].
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thin employment protections.160 These industries, unsurprisingly, have
reported high levels of sexual harassment.161
The low value we place on the worker is then compounded by our
even lower estimation of the woman worker, a consequence of which is
the dearth of women in decision-making positions in most fields.162 On
all protections and benefits aimed at facilitating women’s participation
in the workforce, we provide little. The U.S. is one of the few countries
(and alone among its economic peers) that does not provide paid mater-
nity leave.163 In addition, the lack of any real child care alternatives for
women, certainly none that are legally mandated, makes child care a
nearly prohibitive cost for many working women.164 In contrast, flexible
working practices that benefit employees with childcare responsibilities
are common in countries like Denmark, Germany, and the Nether-
lands.165 In the Netherlands, the Dutch government has developed
160 Domestic workers are not covered by the NLRA (“the term “employee” . . . shall not include
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home”“); farmworkers are not covered by the NLRA (“the term “employee” . . . shall
not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any
family or person at his home”“). See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1935). See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Handy
Reference Guide to the Fair Labor Standards Act, https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/hrg.ht
m#2 [https://perma.cc/SM4T-FED9]. Farmworkers, with few exceptions, are not covered by the
FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum hour requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1938) at ¶ 6 (“Min-
imum wage and maximum hour requirements . . . shall not apply with respect to . . . any employee
employed in agriculture . . . “).
161 700,000 Female Farmworkers Say They Stand with Hollywood Actors Against Sexual As-
sault, TIMEMAGAZINE (November 10, 2017), http://time.com/5018813/farmworkers-solidarity-hol-
lywood-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/98NN-GFKU].
162 Our lack of prioritization of the woman worker is reflected in women’s workplace participa-
tion. In most industries, women are absent in management and supervisory positions, longevity
in employment and other positions of influence. Women make up 44 percent of the S&P 500 labor
force, and 36 percent of first or mid-level officials and managers in those companies, however only
25 percent of executive and senior level officials and managers are women; only 20 percent of board
seats are held by women; and only 6 percent of CEOs are women. Women make up 54 percent of
the workforce in the financial services industry, but only 29 percent of executive and senior level
managers and 2 percent of CEOs are women. In the legal field, 45 percent of associates are women,
but only 22 percent of partners are women and 18 percent of equity partners. In the medical field,
37 percent of all physicians and surgeons are women, but only 16 percent of permanent medical
school deans are women. Judith Warner and Danielle Corley, The Women’s Leadership Gap:
Women’s Leadership by the Numbers, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (May 21, 2017).
163 The United States and Mexico are the only two OECD countries that do not guarantee at
least 14 weeks of paid leave to mothers of infants, see Amy Raub et al., Paid Parental Leave: A
Detailed Look at Approaches across OECD Countries, WORLD POLICY ANALYSIS CENTER (2018).
Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) shows that
among 41 nations, the U.S. is the only country that does not mandate any paid leave for new
parents, See Gretchen Livingston, Among 41 Nations, U.S. is the Outlier When it Comes to Paid
Parental Leave, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (September 26, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/09/26/u-s-lacks-mandated-paid-parental-leave/ [https://perma.cc/HD5K-ABWR].
164 Drew Desilver, Rising Cost of Child Care May Help Explain Recent Increase in Stay-at-
Home Moms, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (April 8, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2014/04/08/rising-cost-of-child-care-may-help-explain-increase-in-stay-at-home-moms/ [https://pe
rma.cc/4XPZ-GUPR].
165 Lisa Harker, The Family-Friendly Employer in Europe, in THEWORK-FAMILY CHALLENGE:
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childcare centers that are partly funded by the government and partly
by employers.166 This, combined with the unwillingness of employers to
provide access to health insurance plans that cover women’s reproduc-
tive health,167 mean women’s career choices and experiences at work
are impacted heavily by their reproductive choices.168
Our employer policies to keep compensation private also make it
difficult for women to determine whether (or more realistically to what
extent) they are being compensated at lower rates than their male
peers. As of 2019, the Institute for Women’s Policy Research reported a
20 percent gender wage gap between men and women in the U.S., with
female full-time, year-round workers making 80.5 cents for every dollar
earned by men.169 The gender wage gap in the U.S. is higher than that
of France, Ireland, Spain, Mexico, Switzerland, Germany, and the
UK.170
Why does this matter? As the research discussed earlier suggests,
sexual harassment is likely to thrive in environments where workers
are not valued, where women workers are particularly undervalued,
and where employers have not provided a functional environment that
discourages exploitation of existing societal status-based hierarchies
RETHINKING EMPLOYMENT 49 (Suzan Lewis & Jeremy Lewis eds., 1996).
166 Id., at 54. Publicly funded or employer sponsored childcare provisions have also become
popular in countries like the UK, where the percentage of parents receiving support for childcare
from their employer is rising. Dep’t of Education, Childcare and Early Years Survey of Parents in
Education, (Dec. 2017) at 11, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/669857/SFR73_2017_Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT66-N4ZP].
167 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 574 U.S. 958 (2014)
(holding that the college was not required to follow the mandate under Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and related regulations that it provide its employees and students with
health insurance coverage for contraceptive services). See also Religious Exemptions and Accom-
modations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 26 CFR 54,
147, 2590 (2015); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Ser-
vices Under the Affordable Care Act, 26 CFR 54, 147, 2590 (2015).
168 In October of 2017, the Trump administration issued rules that provide exceptions to the
Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive coverage, allowing employers to cite religious or moral beliefs
to avoid ACA requirements. Amy Goldstein, Juliet Eilperin and William Wan, Trump Administra-
tion Narrows Affordable Care Act’s Contraception Mandate, WASH. POST, (Oct. 6, 2017), https://w
ww.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trump-administration-could-narrow-affordable-
care-acts-contraception-mandate/2017/10/05/16139400-a9f0-11e7-92d1-58c702d2d975_story.html
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.316e32c6961d [https://perma.cc/PYM9-MUJ6]. At the same time, wo-
men continue to suffer career consequences as a result of childbearing, in part because gender
roles are “lagging behind labor force trends,” and because of the way that society views the “bond
betweenmothers and their children.” SeeKim Parker,WomenMore thanMen Adjust Their Careers
for Family Life, PEWRESEARCH CENTER, (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/201
5/10/01/women-more-than-men-adjust-their-careers-for-family-life/ [https://perma.cc/N3FT-LV8
Q].
169 Pay Equity Discrimination, INST. FORWOMEN’S POL’Y RES., https://iwpr.org/issue/employm
ent-education-economic-change/pay-equity-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/Q4ZC-XQBC].
170 Gender Wage Gap, ORG. FORECON. CO-OPERATION ANDDEV., https://data.oecd.org/earnwag
e/gender-wage-gap [https://perma.cc/PJ4G-MPGF].
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and inequalities. As discussed above, job insecurity, excessive discre-
tion, workforce turn-over, ineffective management practices, inade-
quate reporting mechanisms, uneven workload distribution, and the ab-
sence of messaging around employer values and priorities can all enable
environments in which sexual harassment will thrive. #MeToo reports
circulated in the media this year were filled with examples of work-
places with no regulation, little worker value, and the absence of work-
ing systems of accountability. Law clerks to the judiciary,171 seasonal
farmworkers,172 interns for star record producers,173 and graduate stu-
dents174 all emerged as examples of workers left by their institutional
employers to labor at the mercy of their supervisors in environments
where the female worker was clearly not the employers’ priority.
We cannot disassociate the general workplace environment from
sexual harassment practices, nor should we try. Women work in con-
texts where harassment persists because that is what is available to
them. Workplaces fail to correct this behavior because they do not have
to. In this context, it is simply unrealistic to expect that we would target
sexual harassment in a culture of workplace neglect and unrealistic to
think courts should reach for larger themes of employee and worker
protection and rights when few currently exist. The message of the
workplace is already that workers are not priorities, and women work-
ers even less. To change this approach, we must change how the work-
place values the woman worker and set standards and practices that
facilitate women’s presence, prioritize their equality and human dig-
nity, and remove any reward systems that encourage sexual harass-
ment and abuse.
As discussed above, research and comparative country examples
provide some guidance for how to address dynamics in the workplace
that are promoting a culture of gender-motivated abuse. A case study
from within the U.S. also illustrates what a transformation could look
like, courtesy of the very group of workers provided with the least pro-
tections and often subject to the highest levels of abuse—low-wage im-
migrant farmworkers.175 The Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW),
171 See Vanessa Romo, Federal Judge Kozinski Retires Following Sexual Harassment Allega-
tions, NPR, (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/18/571677955/fed-
eral-judge-retires-in-the-wake-of-sexual-harassment-allegations [https://perma.cc/3EZW-BZVJ].
172 The Farmworker Sexual Violence Technical Assistance Project, Sexual Violence Against
Farmworkers: A Guidebook for Legal Providers, https://www.victimrights.org/sites/default/files/Fa
rmworkers%20Legal%20Providers_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHT6-SYE4].
173 See, e.g., Shelley Cobb and Tanya Horeck, Post Weinstein: Gendered Power and Harassment
in the Media Industries, 18:3 FEMINISTMEDIA STUDIES 489–91 (2018).
174 Alexandra Witze, Sexual Harassment Is Rife in the Sciences, Finds Landmark US Study,
558 NATURE INT’L J. OF SCI. 352–53 (June 12, 2018).
175 Tracie Cone, Report: Sexual Abuse of Female Farmworkers Common, WASH. POST, (May 16,
85] BEYOND THE BAD APPLE 117
recent recipients of the MacArthur Genius grant, in an effort to sidestep
our broken labor enforcement system, have created a private regulation
program based on worker dignity and equality that has drastically re-
duced sexual harassment in agriculture.176 Through an innovative or-
ganizing campaign that received much acclaim, CIW managed to com-
pel the U.S. tomato-growing industry (which amounts to 50%–90% of
U.S. tomato consumption) to agree to transform their workplaces into
ones grounded in concepts of dignity and equality committed to provid-
ing fair wages and conditions of employment and environments free of
sexual harassment and abuse.177
This private regulation system, known as the Fair Food Program
(FFP), consists of a complex system of education, prevention, enforce-
ment, and accountability that involves the employer, supervisors, and
workers in a collaborative process to jointly transform their work envi-
ronments.178 The program was formed by leveraging consumer influ-
ence over tomato buyers (fast food restaurants, grocery chains, and res-
taurants suppliers) to compel tomato farms to participate in a joint
program to regulate and improve worker conditions.179 To date, 90% of
tomato growers in Florida, approximately 12 growers and over 30,000
workers, participate in FFP, along with major tomato buyers such as
McDonalds, Whole Foods, Walmart, Burger King, Subway, and Taco
Bell.180 The program, which is designed around the concept of human
dignity in the workplace (both as a right and expectation) has, after six
years, reported virtual elimination of repeat sexual harassment inci-





176 Bernice Yeung, What Hollywood Can Learn From Farmworkers, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/09/farmworkers-janitors-sexual-harassment-training.html
[https://perma.cc/623B-6GWL]; Joann Lo and Ariel Jacobson, Human Rights from Field to Fork:
Improving Labor Conditions for Food-Sector Workers by Organizing across Boundaries, 5:1
RACE/ETHNICITY: MULTIDISCIPLINARYGLOBALCONTEXTS 61 (2011); Greg Asbed and Sean Sellers,
The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive, verifiable and sustainable change for farmworkers, 16 U.
PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 39 (2013).
177 FAIR FOOD PROGRAM, 2017 Annual Report, http://www.fairfoodprogram.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/06/Fair-Food-Program-2017-Annual-Report-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C68-BT7T].
178 FAIRFOODPROGRAM, About the Fair Food Program, http://www.fairfoodprogram.org [https:
//perma.cc/5P2A-H9AE].
179 Michael Sainato, Farmworker Campaign Heads to Wendy’s Headquarters: Will the Fast
Food Giant Finally Listen?, THE NATION (June 4, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/farm-
worker-campaign-heads-wendys-headquarters-will-fast-food-giant-finally-listen/ [https://perma.c
c/7BAE-FXXS].
180 Fair Foods Standards Council, Partners, FAIRFOODPROGRAM, http://www.fairfoodprogram.
org/partners/ [https://perma.cc/C2JJ-QE5A].
181 FAIR FOOD PROGRAM, 2017 Annual Report, supra note 177.
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The program consists of four components: a workplace code of con-
duct, worker to worker education, external auditing, and a complaint
resolution mechanism that prioritizes timely resolution and immediate
consequences along a graduated system that has, to date with one ex-
ception, avoided recourse to arbitration. The code of conduct is built
around the concepts of fair and just conditions and worker dignity. It
was developed by the workforce to address practical challenges of agri-
cultural employment. It sets employment practices along with a tiered
system of violations and consequences for employees and employers. It
regulates wages, health and safety (e.g., shaded structures, protective
gear, rest breaks, availability of medical treatment), conditions of ter-
mination, workplace violence, sexual harassment, and anti-discrimina-
tion.182
The worker education component involves yearly on-site and inter-
active training sessions (for workers and supervisors), focused on the
right to be safe, secure, and respected in the workplace; scenarios on
sexual harassment are debated through group discussions and work-
shop breakouts. It discusses, among other things, power dynamics and
what abuse of power means, societal discrimination based on gender,
race, and ethnicity, and sexual harassment in various forms and its con-
sequences for women workers and the workplace more generally.183
Participating employers agree to pay worker representatives to be
trained and facilitate sessions.
The Fair Food Standards Council (FFSC), which consists of 15 em-
ployees under the direction of retired New York State Judge Laura
Safer Ezpinoza, monitors workplaces through yearly audits (and some-
times unannounced audits). These audits involve interviews with at
least 50% of workers on each farm with employer cooperation, including
open access to records. In 2017, the FFSC conducted approximately 200
field and financial audits.184
Finally, the program contains an independent complaint mecha-
nism that includes a 24-hour hotline for worker reports, which has ad-
dressed 1800 complaints since 2011, or approximately 400 a year. An
investigation is conducted and findings are issued, often within weeks.
There are three levels of violations around workplace violence and
abuse within the system. Tier 1 is forced labor or the repeated use of
child labor; Tier 2 is status discrimination, abuse, sexual harassment,
or the systemic failure to pay wages; and Tier 3 is the failure to afford
182 FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, Fair Food Code of Conduct, http://www.fairfoodstandards
.org/resources/fair-food-code-of-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/JT9P-M7DQ].
183 FAIR FOOD PROGRAM,Worker Education Modules 1–4.
184 FAIR FOODS STANDARDS COUNCIL, About, http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/about/ [https://
perma.cc/WEU5-T8UJ].
85] BEYOND THE BAD APPLE 119
rest breaks or adequate drinking water. The required employer re-
sponses to abuse and harassment vary depending on its severity. Sex-
ual harassment that involves physical contact, for example, requires
immediate termination upon issuance of a finding, or the participating
employer is suspended from the program. Harassment that did not in-
clude physical contact requires specified remedial action to avoid sus-
pension or probation, which can include progressive discipline (a writ-
ten warning and second time termination) and a corrective action plan
for hostile work environment. Finally, the program contains sanctions
for non-compliant employers which can include suspension, probation,
and elimination from the program.
The FFP aptly illustrates several features fundamental to trans-
formation of any workplace. It is based on a positive vision of the work-
place that is grounded in human dignity—respect, security, and valua-
tion of the worker—and places sexual harassment in this context, while
still acknowledging its roots in gender inequality. It builds employee
consciousness through worker to worker trainings and sets clear expec-
tations for workplace behavior in an effort to define workplace culture.
More broadly, it creates a dialogue in the workplace community about
sexual harassment and gender discrimination which itself, over time,
can serve to transform the culture. It supports women workers specifi-
cally by developing women’s leadership through trainings and monitor-
ing, increasing women’s power and leverage in the workplace. It is
structured so as to create workforce buy-in at all levels with low and
mid-level supervisor training and peer-to-peer engagements, better en-
suring that messaging and direction is consistent at all levels of man-
agement. Finally, it has robust but graduated consequences that allow
for correction and adaptation before concerns about liability and dam-
age awards begin to disincentivize the employer from acknowledging
the existence of harmful workplace dynamics. The goals of the correc-
tive consequences are at once restorative and prompt, allowing the
workplace to transform while maintaining its integrity.
These approaches could be applied to workplaces more broadly
with employer engagement. For example, workers could be invited to
participate in creating dignity-based workplaces. Women workers could
be encouraged to take leadership roles in defining what such a work-
place would look like. Corrective mechanisms could be, at least in initial
stages, aimed at improving workplace dynamics through restorative
justice and other means rather than focusing on punishment and legal
consequences. The FFP model, coupled with a legal framework that in-
volves employers in preventing and addressing dynamics that facilitate
harassment, could be more effective in sustainably combatting work-
place sexual harassment.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is a unique moment for the issue of sexual harassment, which
often struggles to gain the attention of policy makers and the public.
Following #MeToo reports, stars pledged to add inclusion riders to their
contracts, corporations declared they would abandon practices of man-
dating arbitration agreements, and coalitions of powerful female influ-
encers called for action. These are all encouraging developments, but,
beneath these efforts, we are left with a policy approach and legal mech-
anism that do not effectively address the workplace violations they seek
to target.
The ILO has tried to provide a framework for conceiving of sexual
harassment within a larger vision of a just workplace, one rooted in re-
spect for human dignity and correction of inequalities that violate that
dignity. The framework acknowledges that women are deprived of their
basic human rights because of the “socially constructed power imbal-
ances”185 which society at large and workplaces, in particular, exploit
and further entrench. The Coalition of Immokalee Workers’ Fair Food
Program provides a worker-run private sector model for self-regulation
in an industry attempting to change workplace culture and values. The
program targets sexual harassment while addressing workplace dignity
violations in a holistic manner.
Both approaches recognize the inefficacy of any attempt to address
inequality without a foundation of rights and expectations. Our current
approach to sexual harassment (and gender discrimination more gen-
erally) falls into this very trap. We ask only whether a claimant was
treated with sex-based hostility against some unidentified social norm
left to the discretion of a judge or jury. Our legal framework has yet to
make explicit norms or expectations on the treatment of individuals in
the workplace, which would allow us to determine whether the treat-
ment in question violated these expectations. We need to understand
not only that gender discrimination in the workplace is prohibited, but
what rights, benefits, and privileges the workplace affords that require
equal distribution and access between the genders. For this, we need a
positive vision of a just and functional workplace to guide expectations
and then determine how to ensure it is realized for all workers.
Various reforms would move us in the right direction. Legislation
and policy reforms aimed at better protecting worker’s rights (job secu-
rity, benefits, limitations of independent contractor classifications,
wage violations), the passage of healthy workplace legislation186 estab-
lishing a duty of care for employers (that addresses harassment and
185 Carlson, supra note 136.
186 One example for such legislation (albeit status-blind) has been proposed by David Yamada.
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other forms of abuse), and extra-discrimination remedies187 (that assist
in ensuring available benefits are accessible to all) would provide a
foundation for workplace standards and expectations. Supplementing
this, reforms that target harassment, such as congressional clarifica-
tion of Title VII’s intent and definition of sexual harassment, promul-
gation of industry-specific recommendations on harassment,188 and in-
corporation of harassment into Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s preventative mandate189 would assist in addressing
sexual harassment directly. Finally, policies that accommodate women
in the workplace, such as paid maternity leave and comprehensive
health insurance, make women more secure and communicate their
value to the workplace. These policy changes could, in turn, decrease
opportunities for harassment by lessening women’s vulnerability to
abuses of power. Reforms such as these would provide our judiciary and
juries with a standard against which to measure liability for sexual har-
assment cases and employers and employees direction on expectations
and duties. As the Court recognized in Obergefell v. Hodges,190 the
recognition of women’s dignity and equality is a process of evolution, as
“women gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society be-
gan to understand that women have their own equal dignity.”191 To
move forward towards recognition of women’s equal dignity, we must
protect and identify workplace rights and benefits as well as ensure
that women are afforded their equal enjoyment.
See e.g., David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for Status-
Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000).
187 Eyer, supra note 31, at 1341–1360.
188 U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS COMMITTEE, Minority Staff Re-
port, supra note 40, at 38–40.
189 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is the only agency besides the EEOC
responsible for regulating the workplace and, unlike the EEOC, OSHA engages in preventative
activities and general mandate inspections. OSHA has jurisdiction over about 7 million worksites
where it conducts inspections of workplaces in order to investigate (in the following order of prior-
ity): imminent danger situations; severe injuries and illnesses; worker complaints; referrals from
other government bodies or individuals; high hazard industries or workplaces that have experi-
enced high rates of injuries or illnesses, and past violations. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., About Inspections, https://www.osha.gov/Osh-
Doc/data_General_Facts/factsheet-inspections.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH6E-ZAZ8]; while there are
no current OSHA standards that specifically address workplace violence, courts have understood
OSHA’s general duty clause as a legal obligation for employers to provide workplaces free of con-
ditions that could result in serious physical harm. OSHA has developed enforcement procedures
to address occupational exposure to workplace violence, which include inspections related to work-
place violence, see U.S. DEP’T OF LABOROCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ANDHEALTH ADMIN., Enforcement
Procedures and Scheduling for Occupational Exposure to Workplace Violence CPL 02-010-058,
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/directives/CPL_02-01-058.pd
f [https://perma.cc/7RR6-ELBZ]. Thus, regulating employer duty of care to prevent sexual harass-
ment would be a natural extension of OSHA’s mandate.
190 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
191 Id. at 2597.
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Witch Hunts: Free Speech, #MeToo, and the Fear
of Women’s Words
Mary Anne Franks†
“What would happen if one woman told the truth about her life?
The world would split open.”
– Muriel Rukeyser, Käthe Kollwitz (1968)
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most seductive truism of free speech jurisprudence is
that the First Amendment protects, in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
words, “the thought we hate.”1 The sentiment dominates both the for-
mal doctrine and informal public understanding of free speech. The con-
cept of offensive speech in the United States was associated for some
time with marginalized speakers, such as Communists, civil rights ac-
tivists, and union workers. However, it has over the last few decades
become increasingly identified with speakers more closely tied to power
and privilege, such as white supremacists, corporations, and members
of mainstream religions. Public discourse on free speech has been dom-
inated in the last few years by far-right figures such as Milo Yiannopou-
los and Richard Spencer, whose speech tend to denigrate women, racial
minorities, and the LGBTQ community.2 Some of the fiercest defenders
of this speech are self-identified civil libertarians, who claim to hate
what such speakers are saying but who will “defend to the death their
right to say it.”3 These defenders do not dismiss the idea that such
speech causes harm but maintain that it is this very characteristic that
compels its protection.
† Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; President and Legislative & Tech
Policy Director, Cyber Civil Rights Initiative.
1 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 Talib Kwali Greene, Free Speech or Die?, MEDIUM (Feb. 26, 2018), https://medium.com/s/sto
ry/free-speech-or-die-53a206027143 [https://perma.cc/4YMH-2D8L].
3 A cliché frequently but erroneously attributed to Voltaire.
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It is clear, then, that classification as “the speech we hate” confers
a great deal of power within free speech jurisprudence. While the deter-
mination of what is offensive or injurious is often presented as neutral
and objective, it is in reality anything but. This is most clearly illus-
trated by comparing the treatment of men’s speech versus women’s
speech throughout American history. While the politics of the most fa-
vored speech has shifted over time, what has remained largely constant
is that free speech theory and practice has focused on men’s speech.
There is a great irony here, as it is women’s speech that has been most
feared, and thus extensively regulated, criticized, and prohibited
throughout American history.
One of the only acknowledgments of the widespread and longstand-
ing legal, political, and cultural efforts to silence women appears in Jus-
tice Louis Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v. California
(1927): “Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.”4
Justice Brandeis’s invocation of witch hunts and the burning of women
to underscore this point is more illuminating than he may have in-
tended. It points towards the historical attempts to suppress women’s
speech, exemplified not only by witch hunts, but also by a wide range of
legal, political, and cultural deprivations.
If it were actually true that the animating principle of free speech
theory and practice is that the most feared speech is that most deserv-
ing of protection, then it is women’s speech that should be valorized as
free speech par excellence, and attempts to suppress it should be con-
demned as censorship. A mass movement of women speaking out about
experiences and abuses that have long been suppressed, such as the
#MeToo movement, should be praised as the quintessential exercise of
free speech. And yet, nearly as soon as it began, the movement was con-
demned for being so offensive and injurious to men that demands were
made to curtail it. It is debatable in the first instance whether the char-
acterization of #MeToo as harmful to men is accurate, but the more rel-
evant point here is that to the extent that it is harmful to men, this
should mean that women’s #MeToo speech is more, not less, deserving
of protection. The efforts to silence these women should be seen as mod-
ern-day witch hunts, carried out by men in “the bondage of irrational
fears”5 that the mere word of a woman has the power to destroy men’s
lives.
Instead, the very term “witch hunt” has been energetically and
ironically repurposed to convey the persecution and silencing of men by
4 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
5 Id.
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women. In this Orwellian inversion, women’s speech about men’s
abuses is characterized as a dangerous form of censorship, while men’s
criticism of that speech is characterized as a brave refusal to be si-
lenced. This development makes clear that despite Justice Brandeis’s
fine words, offensive and injurious speech seems to be far less valued as
“free speech” when it is spoken by women about men. Whether women
are cast as witches who must be burnt or witch hunters who must be
stopped, their speech continues to be feared and repressed rather than
celebrated and protected.
This article argues that this unbroken history of suppressing
women’s speech demonstrates that the supposed American commit-
ment to free speech is a seductive fraud. What is truly valorized in
American free speech doctrine and practice is not free speech as such,
but speech that advances or at least does not directly challenge white
men’s monopoly on power. Part I examines the claim that offensive and
injurious speech should receive the greatest degree of protection under
the First Amendment. It reveals that this claim, which purports to be
the product of a neutral commitment to the rights of the vulnerable,
masks a preference for the speech of the powerful. Free speech doctrine
blurs the line between the merely offensive and the truly injurious, at
least with regard to men’s offensive and injurious speech, and particu-
larly when that speech advances white male supremacy. Part II demon-
strates that if we are to take the insistence on protection for “offensive
and injurious speech” by vulnerable groups seriously, then a quick sur-
vey of history makes clear that it is women’s speech, particularly
women’s speech perceived as offensive or injurious to men, that should
take pride of place. Part III describes how women’s speech that inspires
fear in men is not only under-protected, but is, in an Orwellian twist,
increasingly denounced as censorship. The whiplash-inducing critique
of the #MeToo movement as a “witch hunt” dramatically illustrates this
point, revealing the hollowness of our supposed commitment to “free-
dom for the thought we hate.”
I. THE SPEECHWEHATE
The American commitment to free speech is often described in
terms of “freedom for the thought we hate.”6 This phrase comes from
Justice Holmes’s dissenting opinion in the 1929 case United States v.
Schwimmer:
[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more impera-
tively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of
6 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis’s influential book on the First Amendment. ANTHONY LEWIS,
FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHTWEHATE (2007).
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free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate.7
The case often cited as the clearest illustration of the radical Amer-
ican commitment to freedom of speech for even the most hateful ideas
is Collin v. Smith, which involved a proposed Nazi march in Skokie,
Illinois, in 1976. Members of the National Socialist Party of America
(NSPA) announced their intention to march in Skokie, a Chicago sub-
urb, wearing Nazi-style uniforms and displaying banners with swasti-
kas on them. Members distributed flyers and made unsolicited phone
calls to Skokie residents with Jewish-sounding names promoting the
march. At the time, around half of Skokie’s population was Jewish, in-
cluding hundreds of Holocaust survivors. The town of Skokie passed a
series of ordinances to prevent the march from happening, which the
NSPA, represented by the ACLU, challenged in court. Eventually, the
ordinances were found to violate the First Amendment, and the NSPA
was given permission to march.
In striking down Skokie’s efforts to prevent the march, the Illinois
Supreme Court analogized the case to the 1971 Supreme Court case
Cohen v. California.8 In that case, the Court reversed the conviction of
Robert Cohen, who had been charged with disturbing the peace for
wearing a jacket displaying the words “Fuck the Draft” inside a court-
house.9 The Court rejected the argument that speech could be restricted
on the basis of its offensiveness.10 The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned
that if it is not permissible under the First Amendment to punish Cohen
for a profane phrase on his jacket, then it is equally impermissible to
prohibit neo-Nazis from displaying swastikas.11 The court asked,
How is one to distinguish [the swastika] from any other offensive
word (emblem)? . . . [W]hile the particular four-letter word (em-
blem) being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most
others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man’s
vulgarity is another’s lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because
governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in
this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style
so largely to the individual.12
7 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8 Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ill. 1978).
9 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
10 Id. at 23.
11 Skokie, 373 N.E.2d at 24 (decided on remand from the Supreme Court).
12 Id.
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Though the court described itself as simply following the insights
of Cohen, the speech at issue in the two cases differed in several sub-
stantive ways. Cohen wore on his clothing a profane phrase expressing
an undeniably political statement against the war while in a court-
house. Defendant Collin and his neo-Nazi confederates, however, in-
tended to wave the most immediately recognizable symbol of the Holo-
caust in the faces of people who had escaped genocide, while marching
through their streets dressed in SS uniforms. Cohen’s speech was ad-
dressed to no one in particular at the courthouse, and the term he used,
while crude, did not suggest violence. Collin, on the other hand, chose
Skokie precisely because of its Jewish population, and the swastika con-
veys a far more specific and ominous meaning than a general profanity.
As one expert involved in the Skokie case testified,
[T]he words of any Nazi to any Jew have, by definition, lost the
usual intent and limitation of words: they are symbolic continu-
ations of the Holocaust, literal perpetuations of the climate of
the Holocaust, and preparations for a new Holocaust. No matter
what words their placards bear, when Nazis march in Skokie,
their presence and their regalia says to Jews: “You thought you
escaped. You did not. We know where you are. When our
strength is sufficient and when the time is ripe, we will come and
get you.”13
An expression of profanity with political import and a deliberate
attempt to terrorize a particular group were both, according to the
court, simply “matters of taste and style.” In essence, the court found
that “offense” and “injury” were the same for the purposes of the First
Amendment. This elision of offense and injury is a profoundly depoliti-
cizing move. In Cohen, the speaker was a lone citizen criticizing an of-
ficial governmental policy; his speech could accurately be described as
“speaking truth to power.” The greatest harm his act could inflict was
inspiring offended reactions in those around him. In Collin, a group of
speakers of a privileged race and gender sought to terrorize a vulnera-
ble minority—the very antithesis of speaking truth to power. The harm
that this act was likely to inflict was not of causing potential offense but
of inspiring terror and trauma in people who had escaped mass exter-
mination. The obfuscation of the power dynamics in the two cases has
contributed greatly to the modern-day understanding of “freedom for
the thought we hate.”
13 Mark A. Rabinowitz,Nazis in Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler’s Veto?, 28 DEPAULL. REV.
259, 281 n.143 (1979).
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The ACLU has become perhaps the most visible and vocal advocate
for the principle of freedom of speech for the thought we hate, and it has
fully embraced the depoliticizing approach of Collin. The ACLU calls
itself the “largest and oldest civil liberties organization” in the U.S. It
was the ACLU that won the NSPA’s right to march in Skokie in 1978,
and it was the ACLU that secured the right for the extremist organizers
to hold their white supremacist rally in Emancipation Park in Char-
lottesville, Virginia in 2017. Aryeh Neier, who was the ACLU’s execu-
tive director at the time of Collin, stated that the lesson to be learned
from the case is that “[i]n a country where free speech generally pre-
vails, it is best to take hate speech in stride. Ignoring it sometimes
works, as does overwhelming it with the peaceful expression of contrary
views.”14
This casual attitude to injurious speech is much easier to maintain
when the event in question never takes place. Frank Collin never held
his march in Skokie, having secured the right to rally in Marquette
Park.15 But, in contrast to Neier’s assertion, there is good reason to con-
clude that Collin’s decision not to march in Skokie was as likely due to
concerns of violent counter-demonstrations by members of the Jewish
community as by the “peaceful expression of contrary views.” The blood-
less outcome of Skokie stands in sharp contrast to the white suprema-
cist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, where multiple violent confronta-
tions broke out. One of the far-right demonstrators drove his car into a
crowd of unarmed counter-protesters, injuring thirty-five people and
killing a thirty-two-year-old woman named Heather Heyer. Two state
troopers died when their helicopter crashed while monitoring the
demonstration from the air. Among the other violent incidents were a
man firing a gun into a crowd of people and six men beating a young
black man in a parking garage.
The Skokie and Charlottesville incidents are only two of the many
controversial cases the ACLU has taken on throughout its history, help-
ing to cement its reputation as an organization willing to do the right
thing even at great cost. In explaining its solicitude toward hateful
speech and why it so often defends “controversial and unpopular enti-
ties” such as neo-Nazis and the KKK, the organization has stated,
14 Aryeh Neier, Lessons in Free Speech 40 Years after Nazis Planned Skokie March, CHI. SUN
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/lessons-in-free-speech-40-years-af
ter-nazis-planned-skokie-march/ [https://perma.cc/Y7NU-EEGT].
15 Douglas E. Kneeland, Nazis Backed on Rally in Chicago; Move Could Avert Skokie March,
NEWYORKTIMES (June 21, 1978), https://www.nytimes.com/1978/06/21/archives/new-jersey-pages
-nazis-backed-on-rally-in-chicago-move-could-avert.html [https://perma.cc/UD4Q-5FYS].
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We do not defend them because we agree with them; rather, we
defend their right to free expression and free assembly. Histori-
cally, the people whose opinions are the most controversial or
extreme are the people whose rights are most often threatened.
Once the government has the power to violate one person’s
rights, it can use that power against everyone. [W]e subscribe to
the principle that if the rights of society’s most vulnerable mem-
bers are denied, everybody’s rights are imperiled.16
The principle described in this passage, that the rights of the vul-
nerable should be protected not only for their sake but for the sake of
the general welfare, is admirable. It echoes the social justice insights of
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectional scholarship17 and Mari Matsuda’s
concept of “looking to the bottom.”18 Indeed, for some time, civil liberties
groups did devote considerable effort to securing the free speech rights
of vulnerable populations.19 Much of the ACLU’s early free speech ad-
vocacy was devoted to protecting political dissidents and advocates for
gender and racial equality. But contemporary First Amendment theory
and practice has shifted to further shoring up powerful white men’s
freedom of speech. As Lincoln Caplan observed in 2015, free speech ad-
vocates today “are not standing up for mistrusted outliers . . . or for the
dispossessed and powerless,” but instead advocate on behalf of “the su-
per-rich and the ultra-powerful, the airline, drug, petroleum, and to-
bacco industries, all the winners in America’s winner-take-all society.”20
John Coates notes that “corporations have increasingly displaced indi-
viduals as direct beneficiaries of First Amendment rights,” as almost
“half of First Amendment legal challenges now benefit business corpo-
rations and trade groups, rather than other kinds of organizations or
individuals.”21
16 ACLU History, AM. CIV. LIBERTIESUNION, https://www.aclu.org/about/aclu-history [https://
perma.cc/GP9R-5E33] (last visited Mar. 2, 2019).
17 Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEG-
AL F. 139, 140 (1989).
18 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
19 Mary E. Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 975, 1020 (1993) (“Initially, free speech claims were brought by draft resisters, labor
organizers, civil rights activists, pacifists, communists, and similar progressive or left groups with
less than their share of power and all too easily silenced by a hostile majority.”).
20 Lincoln Caplan, The Embattled First Amendment, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR (Mar. 4, 2015),
https://theamericanscholar.org/the-embattled-first-amendment/#.V7toqI5eyVp [https://perma.cc/
WBB2-6PXP].
21 John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implica-
tions, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223–24 (2015).
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Like the court’s decision in Collin, the ACLU’s defense of its choice
of the cases and clients it represents deliberately obscures the power
dynamics at work. The ACLU makes the empirical claim that “[h]istor-
ically, the people whose opinions are the most controversial or extreme
are the people whose rights are most often threatened.”22 But as the
passage does not define the vague terms “controversial” or “extreme,” it
is all but impossible to verify the claim that people with such views are
more vulnerable than others. What is more, there is simply no evidence
to support the claim that “unpopular entities” like neo-Nazis, KKK
members, and pornographers are the “most vulnerable members” of so-
ciety. While these groups may be disliked by some, they are clearly nei-
ther universally disliked nor singled out for official discrimination. In-
deed, what these groups tend to have in common is that they target
truly vulnerable groups, such as women and minorities.
This can be stated even more strongly: many of the groups that the
ACLU spends enormous amounts of resources to protect promote white
male supremacy. One of the lesser-known details about the neo-Nazis’
planned march in Skokie is that they planned to carry placards stating
“Free Speech for the White Man.”23 The sign was probably intended as
a crude provocation, but it is also an inadvertently apt description of
the state of free speech in the United States, before and after 1976.24
I use the term “white male supremacy” here to refer not only to the:
ideology of violent extremists who openly call for the exclusion
or elimination of women and nonwhite men, but also to that of
groups and individuals who express “softer” forms of racial and
gender superiority, including members of the so-called alt-right
as well as more mainstream conservatives. It also includes the
ideology of many self-described liberals who espouse commit-
ment to racial and gender equality in theory but reinforce exist-
ing hierarchies of power in practice. White male supremacy can
be subtle and even seemingly benevolent as well as overt and
violent. And because white male supremacy is an ideology, not
an identity, its adherents are not limited to people who are white
or male.
22 ACLU History, supra note 16.
23 Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 366 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Ill. 1977), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978)
24 See Mary Anne Franks, Beyond ‘Free Speech for the White Man’: Feminism and the First
Amendment, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 366 (Robin West & Cynthia
Grant Bowman eds., 2019).
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White male supremacy demands, in essence, that the interests
of white men take priority over those of all others.25
So defined, white male supremacy is essentially America’s found-
ing ideology, not some marginal and repressed viewpoint. The First
Amendment, like the rest of the Constitution, was written and enacted
by a group of white men, who deliberately excluded all women and peo-
ple of color from participation in the political process. White male su-
premacy has been defended throughout America’s history, through
slavery, lynching, segregation, police brutality, domestic violence, rape,
and sexual harassment. Members of the Ku Klux Klan have served in
law enforcement26 and on the Supreme Court;27 wife beaters and sexual
abusers have sat in the Oval Office.28 Donald Trump was elected Presi-
dent on a platform of misogyny,29 racism,30 and xenophobia;31 the KKK
and the extreme right32 consider him a champion of their world view.33
A 2017 poll found that nearly one-third of respondents “strongly or
somewhat agreed that the country needs to ‘protect and preserve its
White European heritage,’” and nearly 40% agreed or somewhat agreed
with the statement that “white people are currently under attack in this
25 MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION: OUR DEADLY DEVOTION TO GUNS
AND FREE SPEECH 6 (2019).
26 The Ku Klux Klan and the End of Reconstruction, HISTORY CHANNEL (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.history.com/topics/reconstruction/ku-klux-klan [https://perma.cc/V7EY-Y4T2].
27 Thad Morgan, How an Ex-KKK Member Made His Way Onto the U.S. Supreme Court,
HISTORY CHANNEL (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/kkk-supreme-court-hugo-black-
fdr [https://perma.cc/7BF6-PK8W].
28 Jack Bernhardt,Why Lyndon Johnson, a Truly Awful man, Is My Political Hero, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/22/lyndon-johnson-anniver
sary-death-awful-man-my-political-hero [https://perma.cc/E3XG-3DHN]; Becky Little, Richard
Nixon’s Wife Alleged That He Hit Her, Says Memoir, HISTORY CHANNEL (Aug. 31, 2018), https://w
ww.history.com/news/pat-nixon-abuse-allegations-richard-nixon-seymour-hersh-memoir [https://
perma.cc/YB3G-3HD8].
29 Nadia Khomani, Donald’s Misogyny Problem: How Trump Has Repeatedly Targeted
Women, GUARDIAN, (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/08/trumps-mis
ogyny-problem-how-donald-has-repeatedly-targeted-women [https://perma.cc/446L-C4FE].
30 Paul Waldman, Donald Trump Is Running the Most Explicitly Racist Campaign since 1968,
THE WEEK (Nov. 25, 2015), https://theweek.com/articles/590711/donald-trump-running-most-ex-
plicitly-racist-campaign-since-1968 [https://perma.cc/K4EN-2F6F].
31 Greg Sargent, Trump Returns to His Old Standbys: Xenophobia, Hate, Lies, and Yes, Mass
Deportations, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/20
16/09/01/trump-returns-to-his-old-standbys-xenophobia-hate-lies-and-yes-mass-deport ations/?ut
m_term=.301d1bac2a09 [https://perma.cc/NG6Q-GYUD].
32 “The term extreme right is used to describe right-wing political, social and religious move-
ments that exist outside of and are more radical than mainstream conservatism.” Extreme Right
/ Radical Right / Far Right, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://www.adl.org/resources/glossary-
terms/extreme-right-radical-right-far-right [https://perma.cc/5CAF-ALZL] (last visited Aug. 7,
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33 Tom Jacobs, Research Finds That Racism, Sexism, and Status Fears Drove Trump Voters,
PACIFIC STANDARD (Apr. 24, 2018), https://psmag.com/news/research-finds-that-racism-sexism-an
d-status-fears-drove-trump-voters [https://perma.cc/55LJ-VHV3].
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country.”34 One-in-ten Americans believe that the country has “gone too
far” to bring about gender equality;35 nearly 40% believe that women
should be forced to carry pregnancies to term against their will in at
least some cases.36 Less than half of Americans believe that having com-
mitted sexual assault should disqualify a person from becoming a Su-
preme Court Justice.37 Racist and sexist views are openly and routinely
articulated by public officials, broadcast by traditional and social media
outlets, and invoked in outbreaks of physical violence against women
and minorities.38 The Supreme Court, the final arbiter of who and what
the First Amendment protects, was composed entirely of white men un-
til 1967 and entirely of men until 1981; of the 113 Supreme Court Jus-
tices that have served in its 228-year history, all but six have been white
men. Of the roughly 500 First Amendment freedom of expression cases
the Supreme Court has heard, 89% were brought by men,39 and 93%
were litigated by men.40 Of the top twenty most-cited constitutional law
scholars from 2013 to 2017, nineteen are male.
Simply put, free speech in the United States has never truly been
about “freedom for the thought we hate,” or protecting the speech of the
vulnerable. Free speech doctrine and practice has instead been domi-
nated by the interests of powerful groups, even when their speech
causes injury rather than mere offense.
34 New Poll: Some Americans Express Troubling Racial Attitudes Even as Majority Oppose
White Supremacists, U. VA. CTR. FOR POLITICS (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/c
rystalball/articles/new-poll-some-americans-express-troubling-racial-attitudes-even-as-majority-
oppose-white-supremacists/ [https://perma.cc/RXQ9-YBJE].
35 Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Kim Parker & Renee Stepler,Wide Partisan Gaps in U.S. Over
How Far the Country Has Come on Gender Equality, PEWRESEARCHCTR.: SOCIAL&DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS (Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/10/18/wide-partisan-gaps-in-u-s-ov
er-how-far-the-country-has-come-on-gender-equality/ [https://perma.cc/6UFA-LLND].
36 Public Opinion on Abortion, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: RELIGION& PUBLIC LIFE (Oct. 15, 2018),
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/27EE-VXM6].
37 A majority of Republicans—55%—felt that it should not. Tim Marcin, Sexual Assault
Should Not Disqualify Kavanaugh if Proven, Majority of Republicans Believe: Poll, NEWSWEEK
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/sexual-assault-should-not-disqualify-kavanaugh-pr
oven-majority-republicans-1141877 [https://perma.cc/WG7V-TVMD].
38 Max Boot, Fox News and the Rest of the Right-Wing Media Can’t Escape Responsibility,
WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ask-the-questions-about-
right-wing-terrorists-that-we-ask-about-islamist-militants/2018/10/28/64403b32-daec-11e8-b3f0-
62607289efee_story.html?utm_term=.2b7ffcdae5cc [https://perma.cc/TAH4-DYMQ].
39 Research compiled from Westlaw searches, finding 515 cases involving First Amendment
freedom of expression, of which 59 were brought by women.
40 Ronald K. L. Collins, FAN 199 (First Amendment News) SPECIAL ISSUE: 38 Women Who
Argued First Amendment Free Expression Cases in the Supreme Court: 1880 -2018, CONCURRING





If a commitment to free speech truly entails, as the ACLU describes
it, protecting the speech of “the people whose opinions are the most con-
troversial or extreme . . . [whose] rights are most often threatened,”
then it is women’s speech that should be the most protected. Women’s
speech, particularly when it challenges the power and authority of men,
has been prohibited, regulated, and punished from ancient times to the
present.
A. A Brief History of Silencing Women
In a 2015 article in the Telegraph, historian Amanda Foreman
writes,
[T]he silencing of women is as old as civilization itself. Two thou-
sand years before Homer labeled speech as “the business of men”
and Sophocles wrote that “silence is a woman’s garment,” the
first laws to have come down to us included a speech code for
women. The people responsible for these laws were the Sumeri-
ans of Mesopotamia, in now modern Iraq.41
Foreman notes that Sumerian law codes dating back four thousand
years include a specific provision regarding women’s speech: “a woman
who speaks out of turn to a man will have her teeth smashed by a burnt
brick.”42 This ancient legal restriction on women’s speech confirms, con-
cludes Foreman, that “freedom of speech is the ultimate power strug-
gle.”43
Historian Mary Beard concurs, observing that one of the opening
scenes of the Odyssey, the foundational text of Western literature writ-
ten almost 3000 years ago, is of young Telemachus telling his mother
Penelope to “go back up into your quarters, and take up your own work,
the loom and the distaff . . . speech will be the business of men, all men,
and of me most of all; for mine is the power in this household.”44 Beard
notes that “Telemachus’ outburst was just the first case in a long line of
largely successful attempts stretching throughout Greek and Roman
41 Amanda Foreman,Why I’m Shouting about the 4,000 Year Campaign to Gag Women in Our





44 Mary Beard, ‘Mansplaining’ and Silencing of Women a Problem That Goes Back to Ancient
Times, SYDNEYMORNINGHERALD (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/mansplaining-
and-silencing-of-women-a-problem-that-goes-back-to-ancient-times-20180123-h0n0uj.html [https
://perma.cc/ZF6V-WFMW].
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antiquity, not only to exclude women from public speech but also to pa-
rade that exclusion.”45While women were permitted to speak in limited
circumstances, such as in defense of their families, a woman was gen-
erally expected to “‘as modestly guard against exposing her voice to out-
siders as she would guard against stripping off her clothes.’”46 Examples
of silencing women are particularly abundant in Greek mythology, from
Tereus cutting out Philomela’s tongue after he rapes her, to Apollo curs-
ing Cassandra so that her truthful prophecies will never be believed
after she rejects his sexual advances.47
Roberta Magnani details the longstanding prohibition and punish-
ment of women’s speech in the Christian tradition, noting St. Paul’s ad-
monition that women must not be permitted to teach “because of their
inherent sinfulness and moral corruption:” in his words, “[l]et the
woman learn in silence, with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to
teach, nor to use authority over the man: but to be in silence. For Adam
was first formed; then Eve.’”48 Magnani suggests that men’s need to si-
lence women stemmed from their desire to reduce women to “disposable
commodities, a mirror reflecting back the predator’s own sense of dom-
inance and superiority.”49 She recounts the grisly fates of the virgin
martyrs who resisted sexual assault, including the story of St. Agnes,
who was stabbed in the throat and then thrown into a fire for rejecting
the sexual advances of a Roman official’s son; St. Petronilla, tortured
on the rack for refusing to marry the pagan king Flaccus; and St. Aga-
tha, whose breasts were cut off after she resisted a Roman prefect’s sex-
ual overtures, concluding, “this brutality was done to silence them.
Much like they are now, women’s voices were seen as troubling.”50
In Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, the offense
of being a “common scold” (communis rixatrix) was punishable by being
“placed in a certain engine of correction called the trebucket, castiga-
tory, or cucking stool, which in the Saxon language signifies the scold-
ing stool; though now it is frequently corrupted into ducking stool, be-
cause the residue of the judgment is, that, when she is so placed therein,
she shall be plunged in the water for her punishment.”51 The offense,
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 SeeMary Anne Franks, A Thousand and One Stories: Mythology and the #MeToo Movement
IN #METOO AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE 85, 85–95 (Biance Fileborn & Rachel Loney-
Howes eds., 2019).
48 Roberta Magnani, Powerful Men Have Tried to Silence Abused Women since Medieval Time-




51 IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 13.5.8 111 (Wilfrid
Prest, ed.) (2016).
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which involves arguing noisily with one’s neighbors, was understood to
be almost exclusively committed by women.52
And then, of course, there were the witch hunts. Author Stacy
Schiff explains that while “witches and wizards extend as far back as
recorded history,” the figure conjured up by the Salem trials married
general superstition with specific fear of women.
The witch as Salem conceived her materialized in the thirteenth
century, when sorcery and heresy moved closer together. She
came into her own with the Inquisition, as a popular myth
yielded to a popular madness. The western Alps introduced her
to lurid orgies. Germany launched her into the air. As the magi-
cian molted into the witch, she also became predominately fe-
male, inherently more wicked and more susceptible to satanic
overtures. An influential fifteenth-century text compressed a
shelf of classical sources to make its point: “When a woman
thinks alone, she thinks evil.” As is often the case with questions
of women and power, elucidations here verged on the paranor-
mal. Though weak willed, women could emerge as dangerously,
insatiably commanding.53
Women were considered so dangerous, in fact, that they could be
hanged for offenses such as “having more wit than their neighbors” as
one “witch” was in Massachusetts in 1656.54 What are now known as
the “SalemWitch Trials” began in Salem, Massachusetts, some decades
later in 1692.55 Events were set in motion by the strange behavior of
several school-aged girls, who claimed that their fits of screaming and
contortions were being caused by forces pinching and attacking them
with pins. Serious investigations began after a sermon by the Reverend
Deodat Lawson was interrupted by the girls’ outbursts.56
The first woman to be accused of causing the girls’ afflictions was
a South American Indian slave from the West Indies named Tituba.
Tituba fell under suspicion because of her tendency to regale the girls
52 Id. (“our law-latin confines it to the feminine gender”); See also SANDY BARDSLEY, VENOM-
OUS TONGUES: SPEECH AND GENDER IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 109–10, 122–25 (2006).
53 Stacy Schiff, The Witches of Salem, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.newyorker.c
om/magazine/2015/09/07/the-witches-of-salem [https://perma.cc/2ECG-WJTG].
54 Id.
55 Jess Blumber, A Brief History of the Salem Witch Trials, SMITHSONIAN (Oct. 23, 2007),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/a-brief-history-of-the-salem-witch-trials-175162489/ [h
ttps://perma.cc/ZM4W-ZQFA].
56 DEODAT LAWSON, A BRIEF AND TRUE NARRATIVE OF SOME REMARKABLE PASSAGES
RELATING TO SUNDRY PERSONS AFFLICTED BYWITCHCRAFT, AT SALEMVILLAGE: WHICH HAPPENED
FROM THENINETEENTH OFMARCH, TO THE FIFTH OF APRIL, 1692 3 (1692).
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with fantastical and often sexual stories from the Malleus Malefi-
carum.57 Accusations against two other women soon followed: Sarah
Good, who was homeless and despised by the community for begging for
food and shelter; and Sarah Osborne, who had engendered suspicion
among her neighbors by only rarely attending church and having inti-
mate relations with a servant.58 The list of the accused soon expanded
beyond the community’s outcasts, however, and the upstanding charac-
ter of some of the alleged witches only served to fan the flames of the
hysteria: if seemingly God-fearing, churchgoing pillars of the commu-
nity could be revealed to be witches, then truly anyone could be.
A pair of father and son ministers, Increase and Cotton Mather,
were influential figures in the progression of the witch trials. The two
disagreed initially about what constituted sufficient evidence for deter-
mining the presence of witchcraft. Increase Mather maintained “that a
‘free and voluntary confession’ remained the gold standard . . . ‘I would
rather . . . judge a witch to be an honest woman than judge an honest
woman as a witch.’”59 His son Cotton “worried less about condemning
an innocent than about allowing a witch to walk free,”60 but as the list
of the condemned and accused continued to grow, he eventually came
around to his father’s view. Cotton Mather submitted a letter request-
ing the court to no longer allow “spectral evidence” (i.e., “testimony
about dreams and visions”),61 a request that went largely ignored until
the intervention of Governor Phipps.
On October 29, 1692, Governor Phipps dissolved the court that had
been set up to prosecute the witchcraft accusations, released many of
those accused, and prohibited further arrests. Phipps was apparently
responding both to Mather’s request and “his own wife being questioned
for witchcraft.”62 He set up a new court to handle the witchcraft prose-
cutions that barred the use of spectral evidence and eventually par-
doned many of the individuals accused of witchcraft still living in 1693.
By this time, however, “the damage had been done”: nineteen people
were hanged on Gallows Hill, a seventy-one-year-old man was pressed
to death with heavy stones, several people died in jail and nearly 200
people, overall, had been accused of practicing “the Devil’s magic.” In
57 SeeMatt Markgraf & Kala Dunn, Datebook: March 1 - Salem Witch Trials Begin 320 Years
Ago, WKMS (Mar. 2, 2012), https://www.wkms.org/post/datebook-march-1-salem-witch-trials-begi
n-320-years-ago#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5G4U-BVCM].
58 BRIAN ALEXANDER PAVLAC, WITCH HUNTS IN THE WESTERN WORLD: PERSECUTION AND
PUNISHMENT FROM THE INQUISITION THROUGH THE SALEM TRIALS 139 (2009).
59 Schiff, supra note 53; see also, Blumber, supra note 55 (“It were better that ten suspected
witches should escape than one innocent person be condemned.”).
60 Schiff, supra note 53.
61 Blumber, supra note 55.
62 Id.
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Salem and elsewhere in New England, more than two-thirds of the in-
dividuals who were accused and found guilty of witchcraft were
women.63
B. Justice Brandeis’s “Curious Concurrence” in Whitney v. California
When Justice Brandeis invoked the fear of women and the burning
of witches in Whitney, he was perhaps not aware of just how apt the
reference truly was: for witch hunts reveal something extremely pow-
erful about speech, namely, the intense fear men have of women’s
speech. Why do men fear witches? Because they can wreak havoc
through mere words: their incantations make milk spoil, crops fail, chil-
dren corrupt, men impotent. Of course, women’s words cannot actually
do any of these things. The speech of women was blamed for conse-
quences that were either a product of natural forces or, in many cases,
of men’s own actions. The vilification of women’s speech was not just an
attempt at suppression, but of inversion: to portray men as helpless vic-
tims of women, as though men did not maintain a monopoly on legal,
political, and cultural power. Throughout Western history, women have
been denied the right to own property, the right to vote, the right to
enter contracts, the right to be educated, the right to hold public office,
the right to speak in public, the right of independent legal status from
their spouses, the right to serve on juries, the right to have their testi-
mony be given the same weight as men’s, and the right to refuse consent
to sexual relations. All of these denials have reduced women’s ability to
speak to a paltry shadow of men’s right to speech. And yet that shadow
has been more feared than men’s full-throated dominance of every form
of speech.
Whitney is one of the rare Supreme Court cases involving a female
petitioner. Fifty-two-year-old Anita Whitney, a member of the Com-
munist Labor Party of California was charged with aiding and abetting
criminal syndicalism after she gave a speech to the Women’s Civic Cen-
ter of Oakland on “the economic and political disenfranchisement of Af-
rican-Americans and the nation’s abhorrent practices of lynching.”64
Her speech was titled “The Negro Problem in America,” and as Ronald
K. Collins and David M. Skover detail, it included “shocking statistics
on and descriptions of the abhorrent practice of lynching.”65 Whitney
concluded her speech with an appeal to patriotism:
63 ELIZABETH REIS, DAMNED WOMEN: SINNERS AND WITCHES IN PURITAN NEW ENGLAND xvi
(1997) (noting that “approximately 78 percent” of accused witches were women).
64 Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, Curious Concurrence: Justice Brandeis’s Vote in
Whitney v California, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 333, 337.
65 Id. at 344–45.
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It is not alone for the Negro man and woman that I plead, but
for the fair name of America that this terrible blot on our na-
tional escutcheon may be wiped away. . . . Let us then both work
and fight to make and keep her right so that the flag that we
love may truly wave “O’er the land of the free / And the home of
the brave.”66
Whitney was convicted and given an indeterminate sentence of one
to fourteen years. Her case generated significant public sympathy, and
an “Anita Whitney Committee” was soon formed to prevail upon the
governor to pardon her.67Whitney, however, insisted that she had “done
nothing to be pardoned for.”68Moreover, she told a reporter, “If the Gov-
ernor is disposed to pardon anyone, let him liberate the poor men who
are now imprisoned for violation of this same law and whose guilt may
be less than mine.”69
The press response to Whitney’s conviction was divided. While one
newspaper “censured her for betraying her social and cultural status to
consort with outlaws,”70 the San Francisco Call situated her sentence
within the history of repressive attempts to throttle dissent: “The colo-
nists were wrong when they burned witches; the people were wrong
when they spat upon the abolitionists. And the people of California may
be equally wrong when they send Anita Whitney to prison.”71
In 1927, two years before the Schwimmer case, the Supreme Court
ruled against Anita Whitney and upheld her conviction. Perhaps pick-
ing up the thread that the San Francisco Call had dropped, Justice
Brandeis penned the famous passage, “Fear of serious injury cannot
alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared
witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from
the bondage of irrational fears.”72 Justice Brandeis’s opinion reads so
much like a defense of Whitney that it is easy to overlook the fact that
he concurred, not dissented, in the Court’s judgment. Indeed, more than
one free speech advocate has erroneously referred to Justice Brandeis’s
concurrence in Whitney as a dissent, including Anthony Lewis in his
influential book Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of
the First Amendment73 and Nadine Strossen in a 2007 law review article
66 Id. at 345.
67 Id. at 363.
68 Id. at 377.
69 Id. at 363.
70 Id. at 349.
71 Id.
72 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
73 See LEWIS, supra note 6, at 36–37 (“Brandeis’s opinion did not then represent the law, but
it helped Anita Whitney. A month after the Supreme Court turned down her appeal, the governor
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warning that the United States might again be “fearing witches and
burning women” in the wake of the terror attacks of 9/11.74
Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Whitney was indeed a “curious con-
currence,” as Collins and Skover call it,75 in that Brandeis simultane-
ously championed the right to engage in injurious speech, while agree-
ing that Whitney should be punished for hers. It is also telling that the
gulf between the theoretical commitment to protecting injurious speech
and its practical application should be so vividly exposed in a case about
a woman’s words—words that directly challenged white male suprem-
acy. It is almost as though Justice Brandeis invoked the idea of the
“witch hunt,” a historical phenomenon that targeted women’s speech in
particular, only to strip it of its specific lessons of gender and power.
III. #METOO& THE INVERSION OF THEWITCHHUNT
While Justice Brandeis’s rhetorical invocation of the witch hunt
may have failed to fully reckon with its gender and power dynamics,
this pales in comparison to the grotesque repurposing of the concept in
modern times to portray women’s very speech as censorship. This is the
gist of the critique of the #MeToo movement. The labeling of the #MeToo
movement as a “witch hunt” perversely appropriates a phrase used to
describe men’s actual persecution of women and applies it to the imag-
inary persecution of men by women. This contemporary usage of the
term does not merely erase the gendered history of violence, but inverts
it.
The #MeToo movement is many things. It is an attempt to grapple
with the reality of men’s systematic sexual abuse of women, as well as
other forms of sexual abuse. It is an outpouring of previously silenced
or disregarded personal stories. It is a political and cultural framework
for understanding the relationship between sexual objectification and
gender inequality. But at its most fundamental, it is speech by women
that frightens men. As such, it is exactly the kind of offensive and inju-
rious speech by a vulnerable group that should earn it the attention and
protection of free speech defenders. And yet #MeToo is not only not gen-
erally framed as a free speech issue, but it is instead, in true Orwellian
fashion, characterized as censorship.
of California, C. C. Young, pardoned her, quoting the Brandeis dissent at length in his pardon
message”).
74 Nadine Strossen, Freedom and Fear Post-9/11: Are We Again Fearing Witches and Burning
Women?, 31 NOVA L. REV. 279, 311 (2007) (“This anti-immigrant tradition also infused the World
War I era ‘Red Scare’ atmosphere that fueled the law under which Anita Whitney was convicted,
leading to Justice Brandeis’s eloquent dissent”).
75 Collins, supra note 64, at 335.
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Before “Me Too” went viral as #MeToo, it was a phrase used by
Tarana Burke, an American social activist and community organizer.76
Around 2006, Burke began using the phrase on the social network
MySpace as part of a campaign to promote “empowerment through em-
pathy” among victims of sexual abuse, especially women of color within
underprivileged communities.77 Following the disclosure of multiple
sexual abuse allegations against Hollywood producer HarveyWeinstein
in October 2017, the actress Alyssa Milano encouraged Twitter users to
reply with the hashtag #MeToo if they had experienced sexual harass-
ment or abuse. Within a few hours of her original post, the phrase had
been used more than 200,000 times, and tweeted more than half a mil-
lion times by the following day. On Facebook, the hashtag had been
used more than 4.7 million times in over 12 million posts during the
first 24 hours. Thousands of individuals, mostly women, shared #MeToo
stories, including many celebrities.
The #MeToo movement is notable because it emerged in spite of, or
because of, the longstanding censorship of women’s speech described
briefly in the previous section. The movement emerged on the heels of
months-long media attention to far-right provocateurs such as Milo
Yiannopoulos and Richard Spencer, whose racist and sexist tirades
against women, minorities, LGBTQ individuals, and immigrants were
fiercely defended as free speech not only by their ideological supporters,
but by many civil libertarians and liberals.78
Yet even as Yiannopoulos and Spencer were being hailed as free
speech martyrs, the women speaking out as part of the #MeToo move-
ment quickly encountered backlash from influential individuals from
across the political spectrum.79 The #MeToo movement has been criti-
cized for “going too far,” for not being subtle or careful enough, for pun-
ishing innocent behavior; in short, for being harmful to men.80 This is
76 Leah Fessler, Tarana Burke, Creator of Me Too, Believes You Don’t Have to Sacrifice Every-
thing for a Cause, QUARTZ (Feb. 6, 2018), https://qz.com/work/1193569/me-too-movement-creator-
tarana-burke-says-you-dont-have-to-sacrifice-everything-for-a-cause/ [https://perma.cc/2N3Q-DF
2M].
77 Abby Ohlheiser, The Woman behind ‘Me Too’ Knew the Power of the Phrase When She Cre-
ated It—10 Years Ago, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-in-
tersect/wp/2017/10/19/the-woman-behind-me-too-knew-the-power-of-the-phrase-when-she-create
d-it-10-years-ago/?utm_term=.22b83af69ff6 [https://perma.cc/RUY9-8RG5].
78 See Katie Herzog, Counterpoint: Yes, There’s a Free Speech Crisis and No, I Won’t Shut Up
About It, THE STRANGER (Mar 15, 2018), https://www.thestranger.com/ slog/2018/03/15/25912839/
counterpoint-yes-theres-a-free-speech-crisis-and-no-i-wont-shut-up-about-it [https://perma.cc/HC
M6-LPS8].
79 See Jia Tolentino, The Rising Pressure of the #MeToo Backlash, NEW YORKER (Jan. 24,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-rising-pressure-of-the-metoo-backlas
h [https://perma.cc/XBH7-78Y8].
80 See, e.g., Agence France-Presse, Catherine Deneuve Says Men Should Be ‘Free to Hit on’
Women, GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/jan/09/catherine-deneu
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despite the fact that the #MeToo movement, unlike the alt-right move-
ment, has not inspired or advocated violence. For that matter, many
within the #MeToo movement have refrained from even specifying pre-
cisely what consequences should obtain for egregious conduct. Most
#MeToo stories have neither been intended to, nor have in fact had legal
repercussions; only a handful have resulted in reputational or financial
consequences for the alleged perpetrators, all of which may prove to be
short-lived. For better or worse, the #MeToo movement has, to date,
been almost exclusively pure speech, not action. And yet it is already
too much for the many high-profile individuals who have referred to
#MeToo as a “witch hunt.”81
The first notable characterization of the #MeToo movement as a
witch hunt came from the director Woody Allen, who told the BBC in
October 2017 that while he was glad that the allegations against Wein-
stein had led to criminal investigations, “You also don’t want it to lead
to a witch hunt atmosphere, a Salem atmosphere, where every guy in
an office who winks at a woman is suddenly having to call a lawyer to
defend himself. That’s not right either.”82 In January 2018, the actor
Liam Neeson similarly expressed support for the #MeToo movement
but stated that it has created “a bit of a witch hunt.”83 Neeson went on
to say, “There’s some people, famous people, being suddenly accused of
touching some girl’s knee or something and suddenly they’re being
dropped from their program.”84 This comment was apparently referring
to Minnesota Public Radio personality Garrison Keillor, whom MPR
ve-men-should-be-free-hit-on-women-harvey-weinstein-scandal [https://perma.cc/38KP-ZQPT]; L-
aura Kipnis, Has #MeToo Gone Too Far, or Not Far Enough?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2018), https://w
ww.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/13/has-me-too-catherine-deneuve-laura-kipnis [htt
ps://perma.cc/5Y5X-CYUC]; Daphne Merkin, Publicly, We Say #MeToo. Privately, We Have Mis-
givings, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/golden-globes-me
too.html [https://perma.cc/DM6S-YLRC].
81 These include the film director Woody Allen, actress Catherine Deneuve, director Michael
Haneke, and actor Liam Neeson. See discussion infra.
82 Emma Stefansky, Woody Allen Warns of “Witch Hunt Atmosphere” Following Weinstein
Scandal, VANITYFAIR (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2017/10/woody-allen-
harvey-weinstein-witch-hunt-atmosphere [https://perma.cc/HM6X-RXNG] (“Allen himself has be-
en accused of abusing his daughter, Ronan [sic—Allen’s daughter’s name is Dylan] Farrow, and
the BBC notes that Weinstein has been credited with ‘reviving Allen’s career’ after that scandal
broke in the 1990s.”).
83 LiamNeeson: “Bit of aWitch Hunt” Over Sex Allegations,ASSOCIATEDPRESS (Jan. 13, 2018),
https://apnews.com/4ac64c7334db423f842692587c011974 [https://perma.cc/6EQF-WLB9]. Actress
Catherine Deneuve joined in signing a letter by one hundred women that expressed similar senti-
ments. Paul Pradier and Lesley Messer, Catherine Deneuve: #MeToo Movement Is a ‘Witch Hunt’




142 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
says it fired after receiving multiple allegations over an extended pe-
riod. Neeson also dismissed allegations against Dustin Hoffman, in-
cluding that he “touched some girls’ breasts” as “childhood stuff.”85
In February 2018, Austrian filmmaker Michael Haneke, two-time
winner of the Cannes Palme d’Or, bemoaned
This new puritanism coloured by a hatred of men, arriving on
the heels of the #MeToo movement . . . this hysterical pre-judg-
ment which is spreading now, I find absolutely disgust-
ing . . . This has nothing to do with the fact that every sexual
assault and all violence—whether against women or men—
should be condemned and punished. But the witch hunt should
be left in the Middle Ages.86
The import of the label “witch hunt” is clear, though often not di-
rectly expressed: women’s speech is so dangerous that it should not be
considered merely speech, but violence, and as such must be stopped.
This backlash against #MeToo has not simply been on the level of rhet-
oric. Women who have accused men of sexual misconduct, or provided
channels of communications to disseminate warnings about predatory
men, face threats, harassment, and defamation lawsuits, all aimed at
silencing their speech.87
In Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s account of how now-Supreme Court
Justice Brett Kavanaugh had attempted to rape her at a party when
the two were both teenagers, one detail in particular stood out: her de-
scription of Kavanaugh’s hand over her mouth. Her testimony so many
years later, in an open Senate hearing on September 27, 2018, seemed
like a long-delayed breaking away from that silencing grip. But Dr.
Ford faced many more attempts at silencing before she stood before the
Senate on that day. After she went public as the source of the allega-
tions that had been anonymously reported by theWashington Post, Dr.
Ford’s private information was posted online, and she received death
85 Roisin O’Connor, Liam Neeson Calls Allegations against Dustin Hoffman ‘Childhood Stuff’,
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/liam-neeson-ho
llywood-sex-scandal-dustin-hoffman-childhood-stuff-weinstein-spacey-behaviour-late-a8157411.h
tml [https://perma.cc/4XAU-JLRA].
86 GwilymMumford,Michael Haneke: #MeToo Has Led to a Witch Hunt ‘Coloured by a Hatred
of Men,’ GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/feb/12/michael-han-
eke-metoo-witch-hunt-coloured-hatred-men [https://perma.cc/3JRT-UGM4].
87 See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, As More College Students Say “Me Too,” Accused Men Are Suing
for Defamation, BUZZFEED (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tylerkingkade/as
-more-college-students-say-me-too-accused-men-are-suing [https://perma.cc/3BLX-F55E]; Tara G-
olshan, Study Finds 75 Percent of Workplace Harassment Victims Experienced Retaliation When
They Spoke Up, VOX (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/10/15/16438750/weinstei
n-sexual-harassment-facts [https://perma.cc/X8DV-86DZ].
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threats that forced her and her husband and sons to leave their home.88
In addition, someone hacked her email account and sent out messages
recanting the allegations.89 Her credibility and character were im-
pugned by multiple Republican members of Congress and by President
Donald Trump.90 Her lawyers stated that Dr. Ford had made the deci-
sion to testify “[d]espite actual threats to her safety and her life.”91
Olympic medalist Jamie Dantzscher was the first victim to report
being sexually assaulted by USA Gymnastics team doctor Larry Nas-
sar. After a newspaper article disclosed details of her anonymous 2016
lawsuit against Nassar and USA Gymnastics without identifying her,
Dantzscher was outed by coaches and friends on social media.92 Attor-
neys for USA Gymnastics called her former boyfriends, making inquir-
ies about her sexual past. Dantzscher became worried about her safety
and “wondered if people who wanted to protect Nassar were ‘going to
send somebody after me.’”93
When Moira Donegan created the “Shitty Media Men List,” a
crowdsourced Google spreadsheet that allowed women to anonymously
communicate with each other about predatory behavior by men in the
media industry in October 2017, she had no idea that the list would go
viral within hours.94 When Donegan realized this, and learned that
BuzzFeed was planning to publish an article about the list, she took the
spreadsheet down. The list had been captured in screen shots before she
did so, however, and these shots were posted to various online sites.
One of the men whose name was added to the list, Stephen Elliott, the
founder and former editor-in-chief of the literary website “the Rumpus,”
88 Jessica Contrera et al., Kavanaugh Accuser Christine Blasey Ford Moved 3,000 Miles to




89 Bryan Logan, ‘My Greatest Fears Have Been Realized’: Christine Blasey Ford Reveals ‘Con-
stant Harassment and Death Threats’ Have Turned Her Family’s Lives Upside-Down, BUS. INSIDER
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/christine-blasey-ford-testimony-threats-brett-k
avanaugh-sexual-assault-2018-9 [https://perma.cc/6EWE-TBNH].
90 Peter Baker, In Risky Shift, Trump and G.O.P. Directly Assail Christine Blasey Ford, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/us/politics/blasey-ford-trump-republi-
cans.html [https://perma.cc/ZU6F-V9YW].
91 Oliver Laughland,Brett Kavanaugh Accuser Will Testify before Congress on Thursday, GUA-
RDIAN (Sept. 23, 2018),https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/23/brett-kavanaugh-accus
er-set-to-testify-before-congress [https://perma.cc/H93Z-4ACZ].
92 Ashley May, Sexual Assault Survivors Risk Lives, Reputations to Stand Up To Powerful




94 Moira Donegan, I Started the Media Men List-My name is Moira Donegan, THE CUT (Jan.
10, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/01/moira-donegan-i-started-the-media-men-list.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/6SAP-T3ZW].
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sued Donegan for $1.5 million in damages for what he characterized as
malicious actions “taken solely to damage [his] reputation and career.”95
Elliot intends to subpoena Google to determine the identities of all in-
dividuals who submitted his name to the list and has stated his plans
to sue them, as well as Donegan.96
The stories of Ford, Danztscher, and Donegan represent only three
examples of the physical, professional, financial, psychological, and
other risks women face when they speak out about sexual assault, es-
pecially against powerful and influential men. Their speech is treated
as so frightening and offensive as to inspire threats, harassment, and
litigation, all aimed at silencing them. And yet they are not the names
associated with free speech martyrdom in popular discourse, or the fig-
ures championed as bravely resisting censorship, or cited as examples
of mavericks whose “tell-it-like-it-is” attitudes inspire respect even in
their detractors. Instead, these women are vilified as censors, witch
hunters, and a lynch mob.
The figures who do get celebrated as free speech martyrs are very
often high-profile “alt-right” provocateurs. This is despite the fact that,
unlike the women of the #MeToo movement, these figures say very little
that can be characterized as brave; have been known to engage in direct
and personal attacks on vulnerable individuals; and attract followers
who exhibit violent tendencies. Take, for example, Milo Yiannopoulos.
Yiannopoulos is a senior editor for the far-right publication Breitbart
and an enthusiastic Donald Trump supporter who is notorious for rac-
ist, misogynist, homophobic (despite being gay himself), and Islamopho-
bic diatribes.97 Yiannopoulos helped facilitate an online harassment
campaign against Leslie Jones, an African American actress who
starred in the 2016 reboot of Ghostbusters, which temporarily drove the
actress off Twitter. During an appearance at the University of Wiscon-
sin-Milwaukee, Yiannopoulos named and ridiculed a transgender stu-
dent by name.98 During a protest of Yiannopoulos’s speech at the Uni-
versity of Washington, a Yiannopoulos supporter shot a demonstrator
in the stomach, critically wounding him.99Or consider Richard Spencer,
95 Christina Cauterucci, Does Stephen Elliott’s Lawsuit Against Moira Donegan Have a
Chance to Succeed?, SLATE (Oct. 12, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/stephen-el-
liott-moira-donegan-lawsuit-analysis.html [https://perma.cc/6YMF-QM9Z].
96 Id.
97 Lloyd Grove, How Breitbart Fell Back in Love With Alt-Right Troll Milo Yiannopolous,
DAILY BEAST (July 13, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-breitbart-fell-back-in-love-with-
alt-right-troll-milo-yiannopolous [https://perma.cc/99ZH-URLY].
98 Claire Landsbaum, Alt-Right Troll Milo Yiannopoulos Uses Campus Visit to Openly Mock
a Transgender Student, THECUT (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.thecut.com/2016/12/milo-yiannopou-
los-harassed-a-trans-student-at-uw-milwaukee.html [https://perma.cc/7ZRD-5GXQ].
99 SeeMike Carter & Steve Miletich, Couple Charged with Assault in Shooting, Melee during
UW Speech by Milo Yiannopoulos, SEATTLE TIMES (April 24, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/
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who was an organizer of the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Char-
lottesville, Virginia, which left a female counter-protester dead. Follow-
ing a speech Spencer gave at the University of Florida in October 2017,
three men allegedly made Nazi salutes, chanted slogans involving Hit-
ler, and fired at a group of protesters, narrowly missing them.100
Both Yiannopoulos and Spencer received an extraordinary amount
of news coverage and attention from free speech advocates as their
scheduled appearances on college campuses were rocked by protests.
According to the civil libertarian narrative, their speech should be pro-
tected precisely because of, not in spite of, the serious offense it causes,
because that is what the First Amendment is intended to protect.101
Those who attempted to protest their events were ridiculed as “snow-
flakes” and denounced as anti-civil liberties. Speech is, after all, only
speech, not violence.102
#MeToo allegations, on the other hand, are widely treated as vio-
lence, instead of speech. Dr. Ford’s testimony was characterized as de-
priving Justice Kavanaugh of his good name, and of endangering his
rightful entitlement to a seat on the Supreme Court; Jamie Dan-
tzscher’s accusations against Larry Nassar were viewed as destroying
his professional reputation; Stephen Elliott complained that the allega-
tions against him within the Media Men spreadsheet “caused him to
become depressed, get disinvited from multiple book readings, be de-
friended or blocked on social media by several people, and lose the op-
portunity to sell his book for film or television adaptation.”103 While
these supposed injuries pale in comparison to targeted harassment
campaigns and physical violence, they have been used to justify the sup-
pression and backlash against women who speak out about men’s sex-
ual abuses. Even if the offenses supposedly inflicted by women’s speech
were as significant as #MeToo’s detractors make them out to be, this
should only serve as more reason to protect women’s speech, not sup-
press it.
But there has been no attempt by the ACLU or prominent civil lib-
ertarians to champion the women of the #MeToo movement as free
speech heroes or to denounce the aggressive attempts to censor them.
There was no similar national handwringing over the free speech crisis
seattle-news/crime/couple-charged-with-assault-in-shooting-melee-during-uw-speech-by-milo-yia
nnopoulos/ [https://perma.cc/J3WW-7UJ9].
100 Eric Levenson, Police: 3 Men Made Nazi Salutes, Shot at Protesters after Richard Spencer
Event, CNN (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/20/us/richard-spencer-florida-speech-ar
rest-shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/3Z7Z-9VWE].
101 See, e.g., Nathan Kreider, Free Speech: No Exceptions, BEING LIBERTARIAN (July 6, 2018),
https://beinglibertarian.com/free-speech-no-exceptions/ [https://perma.cc/Q6DE-Y4MC].
102 Id.
103 Cauterucci, supra note 95.
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created by the threats, harassment, and lawsuits against women who
spoke out about male sexual abuse as there was over the supposed free
speech crisis on college campuses when students protested appearances
by white male supremacists.
The reaction to speech supporting white male supremacy and the
speech challenging it could not be more different. Speech that comports
with or at least refrains from threatening white male supremacy is re-
garded as mere speech: it is at most offensive, and offensive speechmust
be given the maximum amount of breathing room possible. At the same
time, speech that challenges white male supremacy is treated as not
speech, but as violence that must be stamped out.
CONCLUSION
The case that led to Justice Holmes’s ringing defense of “freedom
for the thought we hate” was, like Whitney, one of the few Supreme
Court free speech cases that involved a female petitioner. It was also
one of the few First Amendment cases that involved a female lawyer.104
Olive H. Rabe represented Rosika Schwimmer, a Hungarian-born pac-
ifist, whose citizenship application was denied due to her stated refusal
to take up arms to defend the country.105 The majority held that this
refusal indicated that Schwimmer was “not well bound or held by the
ties of affection to any nation or government,” and thus “liable to be
incapable of the attachment for and devotion to the principles of our
Constitution that are required of aliens seeking naturalization.”106
In dissent, Justice Holmes wrote that while Schwimmer’s position
“might excite popular prejudice,” this was not an adequate basis for
punishing it.107 The principle of “freedom for the thought we hate” was
inspired by an immigrant woman refusing to commit violence in the
name of patriotism.
For all of Justice Brandeis’s eloquence regarding fearing witches
and burning women, it is perhaps Justice Holmes in Schwimmer who
came closest to understanding what a true commitment to the principle
of free speech demands: an examination of gender and power. If Amer-
ican commitment to free speech is ever to be more than a seductive
fraud, it must grapple with the history of gender inequality and the re-
ality of power.
104 See Mary Anne Franks, FAN 200 (First Amendment News) Mary Anne Franks, “The Free
Speech Fraternity,” CONCURRINGOPINIONS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://concurringopinions.com/archiv
es/2018/09/fan-200-first-amendment-news-mary-anne-franks-the-free-speech-fraternity.html [htt
s://perma.cc/LC6P-AYNM].
105 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 646–47 (1929).
106 Id. at 652.
107 Id. at 654.
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Although sexual harassment imposes costs on both victims and organizations, it is
also costly for organizations to reduce sexual harassment. Legislation, education,
training, and litigation have all been unsuccessful in eradicating workplace sexual
harassment. My proposal is to establish financial incentives of sufficient magni-
tude to incentivize organizations to eliminate sexual harassment. The key chal-
lenge is in monetizing the harm caused by sexual harassment. I propose a new
approach that draws on my research, which calculated the risk of sexual harass-
ment by gender, industry, and age based on charges filed with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. Using these risk measures, I established that
workers receive a hazard pay premium for exposure to risk of sexual harassment.
This premium reflects the higher pay workers need to work in a more hostile work
environment and monetizes the aggregate societal evaluation of exposure to risk of
an abhorred workplace behavior. Using my estimates of the pay premium, I calcu-
late a value that I refer to as the “value of statistical harassment” (VSH). This
amount is $7.6 million, far greater than the current federal cap of $300,000 for the
largest firms. Raising the damages cap on awards to this level would provide or-
ganizations with the necessary financial incentive for efficient deterrence.
INTRODUCTION
The #MeToo movement has graphically revealed the widespread
decades-long practices of unwelcome and often criminal sexual acts per-
petrated by men at the top of their industries. The acts described in
mainstream media go well beyond misaimed courting overtures. The
treatment by these harassers has been career destroying for victims.
† Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Law and Economics, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st
Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203. joni.hersch@vanderbilt.edu. (615) 343-7717. The author
would like to thank participants at The University of Chicago Legal Forum Annual Symposium,
the Legal Forum editors, Jessica Clarke, and W. Kip Viscusi for valuable feedback, and Sarah
Dalton, Danielle Drory, and Erin Meyers for their outstanding research assistance and excellent
suggestions and comments.
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Meanwhile, the harassers continued to victimize subordinates with im-
punity, often with tacit assent of numerous observers and colleagues
who were in the position to stop their behavior.1
Although the #MeToo movement has raised awareness of sexual
harassment2 and has been costly to some individual harassers that have
lost jobs and suffered reputational harm, the bulk of the cost continues
to be borne by victims. The continued prevalence of sexual harassment
does not merely reflect the harasser’s or their organization’s failure to
consider the consequences that may result from such behavior but ra-
ther that the expected consequences have been largely inconsequential.
Low reporting, an even lower probability of a successful lawsuit, and a
low federal cap on damages awards combine to create a situation in
which organizations rarely suffer substantial financial consequences
from tolerating workplace sexual harassment. In contrast, there are
countervailing costs associated with monitoring workplace behavior
and sanctioning or removing from their positions some of the most val-
ued or highly-placed employees.
Damages awards can be used to deter risky or illegal workplace
behavior in an efficient manner. Currently, however, damages awards
in employment discrimination cases are not structured to provide a de-
terrence function. A fundamental problem can be traced to the federal
cap on damages awards in employment discrimination cases, which,
based on my analysis reported in this Article, is currently set at a level
far short of that required for efficient deterrence.3
To address this shortfall, I propose that there be statutory changes
to increase the cap to a more effective level. To establish the efficient
deterrence level for sexual harassment, I follow the same economic prin-
ciples used to establish efficient deterrence values for workplace mor-
tality risks. The deterrence values for mortality risks is based on the
pay that workers require to face mortality risks; I correspondingly de-
rive the deterrence value for sexual harassment based on the pay that
workers require for such hostile work environments. This value is about
$7.6 million (in 2017 dollars) per sexual harassment claim filed with
1 Many examples have been described in the media. See, e.g., the highly detailed New York
Times article reporting on Harvey Weinstein’s “complicity machine.” Megan Twohey et al., Wein-
stein’s Complicity Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/1
2/05/us/harvey-weinstein-complicity.html [https://perma.cc/9AM8-9ZAH].
2 A note on terminology: Sex-based harassment is a term used to describe behavior that in-
cludes sexual harassment among other forms of gender-based harassment. The legal issue in my
empirical analysis described in Part IV is recorded as “sexual harassment” in the EEOC charge
data. I therefore use the term “sexual harassment” throughout this Article, but note that the term
“sex-based harassment” is commonly used to characterize the broader workplace issues associated
with workplace harassment. See Jennifer L. Berdahl, Harassment Based on Sex: Protecting Social
Status in the Context of Gender Hierarchy, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 641, 641–42 (2007).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2012).
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the EEOC, far above the current maximum damages award under Title
VII of $300,000 for the largest firms.4
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I summarizes the costs of
sexually harassing behavior to victims and to organizations. These costs
are disproportionately borne by the victims; indeed, sanctioning sexual
harassers can be costly to the organization. Part II summarizes survey
evidence that demonstrates that sexual harassment is still common in
the workplace. Part III provides an overview of possible approaches to
deterring sexual harassment. The continuing high prevalence of sexual
harassment confirms that current approaches provide inadequate in-
centives for deterrence.
In light of the inadequacy of current approaches, Part IV describes
how damages awards can serve a deterrence function by analogy to the
approach government agencies use to set efficient deterrence amounts
for mortality risks. The key challenge to using damages awards as a
deterrent is monetizing the harm caused by sexual harassment. I de-
scribe my approach, which is based on recognizing sexual harassment
as a job risk. I discuss the tradeoffs for individuals working in jobs with
high levels of sexual harassment, provide measures of the risk of sexual
harassment, and summarize my research that demonstrates that
women receive a hazard pay premium for exposure to the risk of work-
place sexual harassment. This hazard pay premium serves as the basic
building block for establishing the amount that firms should be penal-
ized for sexual harassment. In Part V, I argue that the compensation of
victims of sexual harassment should be based on what I term the Value
of Statistical Harassment (VSH) derived from the hazard pay premium
and provide the calculations of this measure. The VSH is the sexual
harassment risk counterpart to the commonly used value of a statistical
life (VSL), which is generally used to establish optimal deterrence levels
for morality risks. Part VI describes how the VSH can be used for effi-
cient deterrence by setting damages awards to the level of the VSH.
Doing so will raise both the costs to organizations of tolerating work-
place sexual harassment and the benefits to victims of filing an EEOC
claim. The greater potential benefits to victims will bolster the incentive
to file suits, thereby raising the probability of detection for sexual har-
assers and remedying the failure of Title VII to appropriately address
the systemic issue of sexual harassment.
4 See id.
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I. SEXUALHARASSMENT IS COSTLY TO VICTIMS AND
ORGANIZATIONS—BUTMOSTLY COSTLY TO VICTIMS
Organizational tolerance of sexual harassment has been identified
as the most important influence on whether sexual harassment occurs
in a workplace.5 It is more prevalent in traditionally male occupations
and in organizations with large power differences within a hierarchical
structure,6 such as the military.7
There is extensive evidence that victims of sexual harassment suf-
fer a range of physical, psychological, and career consequences. These
costs include lower job satisfaction, worse psychological and physical
health, higher absenteeism, less commitment to their organizations,
and higher quit rates.8Workers who report sexual harassment are more
likely to face retaliation, which is associated with even greater loss of
job satisfaction and worse health outcomes than those arising from the
harassment alone.9 The risk of retaliation is higher if the harasser is a
supervisor.10
The costs to workplaces are the flip side of the costs to victims. Sub-
stantial empirical evidence shows that workplaces in which sexual har-
assment is tolerated are subject to inefficient turnover, increasing ab-
senteeism, and generally wasted work time as workers attempt to avoid
interaction with harassers.11 Furthermore, the threat of litigation
5 Louise F. Fitzgerald et al.,Antecedents andConsequences of Sexual Harassment inOrganizations:
A Test of an IntegratedModel, 82 J.APPLIEDPSYCHOL. 578, 583–86 (1997); Chelsea R.Willness et al., A
Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Consequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 127, 135–39 (2007). A list of additional risk factors is provided in CHAI R.
FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM’N, SELECT TASK
FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, REPORT OF CO-CHAIRS 25–30 (2016)
[hereinafter EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT].
6 Remus Ilies et al., Reported Incidence Rates of Work-Related Sexual Harassment in the United
States: Using Meta-Analysis to Explain Reported Rate Disparities, 56 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 607, 609
(2003).
7 Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, The Sexual Harassment of Female Active-Duty
Personnel: Effects on Job Satisfaction and Intentions to Remain in the Military, 61 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 55, 59 (2006).
8 See EUROPEAN COMM’N. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, INDUS. RELATIONS, & SOC.
AFFAIRS, SEXUALHARASSMENT INTHEWORKPLACE INTHEEUROPEANUNION5 (1998); U.S. MERIT SYS.
PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS: PROGRESS, AND
CONTINUING CHALLENGES 24 (1995), https://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx?docnu
mber=253661&version=253948&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/EX8C-JATZ] [hereinaf-
ter USMSPB REPORT]; DariusK-S. Chan et al.,Examining the Job-Related, Psychological and Physical
OutcomesofWorkplaceSexualHarassment:AMeta-AnalyticReview,32PSYCHOL.OFWOMENQ.362,362–
64 (2008); Fitzgerald et al., supranote 5, at 583–86;Willness et al., supranote 5, 135–39.
9 Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Conse-
quences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 230, 231 (2002).
10 Blair Druhan Bullock, Judicial and Agency Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Laws (May
2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University) (on file at https://law.vander-
bilt.edu/phd/students/files/Bullock.pdf) [https://perma.cc/PKH9-XJUW].
11 See USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8, at 23–27; Fitzgerald et al., supranote 5, at 586; Willness
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looms, which may involve costly legal defenses as well as any payment
to victims.12 Firms may suffer reputational harm, which may lead to
difficulty in hiring or to lower firm profitability.13
However, comparing the costs of sexual harassment to the overall
monetary scale of organizations suggests that the costs to organizations
are relatively small. The costs of workplace sexual harassment in the
U.S. federal government over the two-year period from 1992 to 1994
were estimated to be $327.1 million.14 This takes into account lost
productivity due to job turnover, sick leave, individual productivity, and
workgroup productivity, with the loss to workplace productivity ac-
counting for 61 percent of the total.15 However, compared to the federal
budget, this cost represents rounding error, if that.16
A 1988 report estimated the costs to a typical Fortune 500 firm
were $6.7 million annually.17 These costs came from absenteeism, lower
productivity, increased health care costs, poor morale, and employee
turnover (but excluding litigation costs and damages awards).18 A dif-
ferent study reports an average sexual harassment liability loss esti-
mate of $600,000 in 1994 including legal fees.19 However, compared to
the value of a Fortune 500 firm in 1988 dollars, such costs are minor.
Take Ford Motor with 2017 revenues of $151.8 billion. In 1988 dollars,
this is $75.325 billion, making the average sexual harassment liability
loss equal to about 0.09 percent of revenues.20 Awards resulting from
EEOC litigation similarly show that liability loss is small. For example,
et al., supra note 5, at 136–37; Jana L. Raver & Michele J. Gelfand, Beyond The Individual Victim:
Linking Sexual Harassment, Team Processes, and Team Performance, 48 ACAD.MGMT. J. 387, 392–
94 (2005).
12 See Alexis Christoforous, The Cost of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, YAHOOFIN.(Dec.
5, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/cost-sexual-harassment-workplace-190250229.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/MGJ3-B7NK].
13 Joni Hersch, Equal Employment Opportunity Law and Firm Profitability, 26 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 139, 151–53 (1991) (showing that firms involved in employment discrimination litiga-
tion suffer substantial loss in the value of these firms). Studies showing costs due to reputation
are summarized in EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 22–23.
14 USMSPB REPORT, supranote 8, at 26.
15 Id.
16 In 1993 and 1994 combined, federal outlays totaled $2.87 trillion. OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET,FISCALYEAR2016HISTORICALTABLES:BUDGETOFTHEU.S.GOVERNMENT27(2016).
17 Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN 68–73 (Dec.
1988).
18 Id. at 71.
19 FRANCIS ACHAMPONG, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, LANDMARK
DEVELOPMENTS, AND FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE RISKMANAGEMENT 157 (1999).
20 The Top 10, FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/2017/ [https://perma.cc/G8RV-UF
T2] (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
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the EEOC recovered $164.5 million in 2015 for workers alleging har-
assment.21 But this too is a trivial share of the economy.22
In sum, although one might expect that profit-maximizing firms
would have an incentive to eliminate unproductive behavior, because
sexual harassment is costly for firms to monitor and eliminate, sexual
harassment clearly occurs in some workplace environments. The point
is not that sexual harassment isn’t costly to organizations—it is, and it
is clearly costly to victims—but that it is not costly enough for adequate
deterrence.
II. PREVALENCE OF SEXUALHARASSMENT
Although recent media coverage may seem to suggest that sexual
harassment is overwhelmingly common, reliable data on the prevalence
of sexual harassment, and especially data on harassment that would
meet the legal definition, is lacking. Because the bulk of sexual harass-
ment events goes unreported, most of our knowledge of its prevalence
is from surveys.23 Surveys utilize different definitions of sexually har-
assing behavior and also differ widely on time periods covered (request-
ing reports of sexual harassment from as little as three months to any
past experience with no time limit) and differ by population surveyed.24
Most surveys do not sample from a nationally representative population
but instead are based on specific groups (by occupation, industry, or
within a single workplace).25
Researchers primarily use two methods to elicit experiences of sex-
ual harassment.26 In the direct query approach, respondents are asked
to report whether they have been sexually harassed according to their
own definition of harassment.27 The second method is a behavioral ex-
periences approach in which respondents are asked to indicate whether
they have experienced any of the behaviors, such as sexual teasing,
looks, or gestures, on a provided list. Incidence rates based on a behav-
ioral experiences survey are higher than when based on direct query. A
meta-analysis using fifty-five probability samples from the U.S. finds
21 EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at v. This value includes recovery for any type of
workplace harassment, not only harassment on the basis of sex.
22 See OFFICEOFMGMT.&BUDGET,supra note 16, at 26–28.
23 Joni Hersch, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, IZA WORLD OF LABOR 3–3 (Oct. 2015),
https://wol.iza.org/articles/sexual-harassment-in-workplace/long [https://perma.cc/4SK4-99XZ].
24 Hersch, supra note 23, at 2.
25 See, e.g., EUROPEANCOMM’N,supranote 8.
26 Hersch, supra note 23, at 2.
27 Id. at 2; see also, e.g., Joni Hersch, Valuing the Risk of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 57
J. RISK&UNCERTAINTY 111, 116 n.11 (2018). For an example of a direct query question, the Gen-
eral Social Survey asks respondents: “In the last 12 months, were you sexually harassed by anyone
while you were on the job?”
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that the incidence rate is about double when based on the behavioral
survey than on direct query, with an incidence rate of 24 percent based
on direct query and 58 percent based on behavioral experiences.28
The Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ) developed by Louise
Fitzgerald and co-authors is the survey most commonly used to record
individual perceptions of whether they have been sexually harassed at
work.29 The authors intended the survey to measure psychological sex-
ual harassment, although they claim that the survey parallels the def-
inition of illegal sexual harassment.30 The survey has been revised by
Fitzgerald and colleagues over time, and various modifications have
been used in sexual harassment surveys, but the essential form is a
series of questions that are grouped into three categories: gender har-
assment, unwanted sexual attention, and sexual coercion.31
An insight into the potential disconnect between survey-based evi-
dence on sexual harassment and the legal definition is provided in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dial Corporation.32
Challenging expert evidence, Dial claimed that the SEQ did not meas-
ure sexual harassment within the meaning of Title VII.33 The EEOC’s
expert, Louise Fitzgerald, argued that what it measures is “sexual har-
assment under the social science definition” in the “commonly under-
stood sense of sex-related behavior that is unwanted and unrecipro-
cated by the recipient.”34 The trial judge did not consider this point
alone to invalidate the SEQ for legal purposes.35 However, he did find
that the SEQ did not truly measure what it purports to measure; that
is, truly offensive sex-related experiences at work during the time frame
alleged by the plaintiffs.36 The judge expressed further concerns over
28 Ilies et al., supranote 6, at 619–23.
29 See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in Ac-
ademia and the Workplace, 32 J.VOCATIONALBEHAV. 152, 157–59 (1988); Maria Rotundo et al., A
Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL.914,915 (2001).
30 See Fitzgerald, supra note 29, at 155. The relevance of the SEQ to the legal definition of
sexual harassment has been questioned in the academic literature. See Barbara A. Gutek et al., A
Review and Critique of the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ), 28 L.&HUM.BEHAV. 457, 459
(2004).
31 See Gutek, supra note 30, at 461.
32 No. 99 C 3356, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17543 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2002).
33 Id. at *9.
34 Id.
35 Id. at *9–10.
36 The survey requested reports of experiences during the time the respondent was employed
by Dial and not restricted to the time period at question in litigation. The survey requested fre-
quency of experiences without any indication of whether respondents found the experiences offen-
sive or unwelcome. Id. at *12–13.
154 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
bias introduced by self-selection of respondents.37 Fitzgerald’s report
was excluded from evidence.38
Although survey evidence may not reach legal standards, most of
our evidence on the prevalence of sexual harassment continues to be
derived from surveys. Perhaps the most reliable trend evidence on sex-
ual harassment is derived from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection
Board (USMSPB) survey, “Sexual Harassment in the Federal Work-
place.” This is a behavioral experiences survey of federal employees con-
ducted in 1980, 1987, 1994, and 2016.39 Among other questions, these
surveys asked respondents to report whether they had experienced any
of a series of the following unwanted or uninvited behaviors in the past
two years: sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, questions; sexual looks or
gestures; invasion of personal space by deliberate touching, leaning,
cornering; pressure for dates; communication of a sexual nature by let-
ters, calls, or sexual materials; stalking; pressure for sexual favors; and
actual or attempted rape or assault.40
Table 1 provides the summary of sexually harassing behaviors re-
ported in the USMSPB surveys in 1980, 1987, 1994, and 2016.41 As Ta-
ble 1 shows, a large share of workers, both male and female, report that
they have been sexually harassed, with women far more likely than
men to report that they have been sexually harassed. In 1994, the sur-
vey shows that 44 percent of women and 19 percent of men had experi-
enced unwanted sexual attention on the job in the preceding two years.
The values are fairly similar to the percent reporting unwanted sexual
attention in the 1980 and 1987 waves of the survey. Encouragingly, by
2016, the share of workers reporting that they had been sexually har-
assed in the past two years dropped considerably, to 6 percent for men
and 18 percent for women.
The trends provide some comfort and some concern. That actual or
attempted rape or sexual assault reported by 1 percent of both men and
women in 2016 is clearly concerning, and the rate has not consistently
diminished over the time period. But it is more comforting that most of
the harassment is not assault or rape and has diminished over time.
Note also that in the 1980 survey, 26 percent of women reported that
37 Id. at *31.
38 Id. at *33–34.
39 See USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8; U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., ISSUES OFMERIT 1–
5 (2017), https://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=1442317&version=14
47804&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/5WAC-4BAF] [hereinafter USMSPB ISSUES OF
MERIT] (providing highlights “[i]n advance of an upcoming report that provides a full analysis of
our research findings . . .”).
40 USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8, at 7; USMSPB ISSUES OFMERIT, supra note 39, at 2.
41 USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8, at 58–62 apps. 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6; see also USMSPB ISSUES OF
MERIT, supra note 39, at 1–2 (providing highlights in “advance of an upcoming report that provides
a full analysis of our research findings . . .”).
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they had been pressured for dates, and that the proportion dropped to
13 percent by 1994, and dropped further to 3 percent in 2016. There is
also a large share of women who reported that they had been pressured
for sexual favors—9 percent in 1980 and 1987 and 7 percent in 1994,
but that too dropped to 3 percent in 2016. What is not ascertainable
from the survey is whether these requests for dates or pressure for sex-
ual favors were quid pro quo in nature.
TABLE 1. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD SEXUAL
HARASSMENT SURVEY
Like almost all surveys that elicit information on sexual harass-
ment, the focus in the USMSPB survey is on sexual behavior and does
not request respondents to indicate whether they have been subjected
to other behaviors that are based on gender hostility. Furthermore, and
typical of such surveys, there is no indication recorded in the USMSPB
survey of the severity of the harassment.
Men Women








8 9 9 1 28 28 29 9
Unwelcome invasion
of personal space
3 8 8 3 15 26 24 12
Pressure for dates 7 4 4 1 26 15 13 3
Unwelcome communi-
cation of a sexual
nature
3 4 4 1 9 12 10 6
Stalking NA NA 2 1 NA NA 7 2
Pressure for sexual fa-
vors
2 3 2 1 9 9 7 1
Actual or attempted
rape or sexual as-
sault
0.3 0.3 2 1 1 0.8 4 1
Any behavior reported 15 14 19 6 42 42 44 18
Note: Percent experiencing unwanted behaviors in previous 2 years. For statistics for 1980,
1987, and 1994 see USMSPBREPORT, supra note 8. For statistics for 2016, see USMSPB ISSUES
OFMERIT, supra note 37. “NA” indicates not available. Table rows report category labels used
in Fall 2017 report. These differ slightly from the category labels used in the 1995 report as
follows (numbered in order of rows in table):
1. 1995 report did not include the word “Unwelcome”
2. 1995 report used the phrase “Sexual looks, gestures”
3. 1995 report used the phrase “Deliberate touching, leaning, cornering”
4. No difference
5. 1995 report used the phrase “Letters, calls, sexual materials”
6. No difference
7. No difference
8. 1995 report used the phrase “Actual/attempted rape, assault”
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III. WHATDOESN’TWORK: CURRENT APPROACHES TODETERRENCE
Currently, three mechanisms show potential to deter or prevent
sexual harassment to varying degrees of success. Training attempts to
change the preferences of harassers ex ante. In contrast, both legal con-
sequences under Title VII and market incentives act to impose an ex
post cost on sexual harassers. I next discuss the shortcomings of each
of these schemes in their ability to alter the behavior of sexual har-
assers.
A. Policies and Training
It is routine for large companies to have policies, workplace train-
ing, and reporting procedures to prevent sexual harassment.42 Work-
place training has been shown to raise awareness of what constitutes
sexual harassment,43 although there is little evidence that such train-
ing is effective in reducing sexual harassment in the workplace. How-
ever, the consensus in the literature is that best practices for organiza-
tions are to have in place strong policies and a reporting procedure.44
This would also be the guidance of lawyers responsible for protecting
employers, as these policies and procedures may serve as a legal defense
against liability.45 Availability of confidential counselors is another pro-
cedural tool utilized to encourage reporting. But studies confirm that
this too fails to be effective.46
Furthermore, as the litany of harassers shows, it is quite clear that
these organizational efforts have been insufficient to prevent workplace
sexual harassment or costly settlements to victims who were not pro-
tected by the organization’s structure. Before the #MeToo movement
gained momentum, in 2016, Fox News CEO and chairman Roger Ailes
was ousted in light of a barrage of evidence of longstanding sexual har-
42 Id.
43 See Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, Does Sexual Harassment Training Change
Attitudes? A View from the Federal Level, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 826, 838–40 (2003).
44 See, e.g., Peter Aronson, Justices’ Sex Harassment Decisions Spark Fears: Companies Re-
view Policies to Avoid ‘Ellerth’ Liability, 21 NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 9, 1998), at A1; David Rubenstein,
Harassment Prevention is Now a Must for U.S. Companies, 93 CORP. LEGAL TIMES 31 (Aug. 1999).
45 See Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUALEMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITYCOMM’N, https://www.eeo
c.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/4H6N-GTP5] (last visited Jan. 16, 201-
9).
46 SeeEUROPEANCOMM’N, supra note 8, at 17 (“The functioning of the confidential counsellor is
unsatisfactory. Few of the harassed employees contacted a confidential counsellor. From the stud-
ies reviewed it appears that confidential counsellors often lack the necessary facilities to do their
work, are too close to management, and are relatively unknown or not trusted. It is also difficult
for confidential counsellors to work in organisations that lack an awareness of the problem.”).
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assment against many female Fox News employees, despite formal pol-
icies, workplace training, and reporting procedures.47 Ultimately this
behavior proved costly to the organization: A lawsuit filed by former Fox
News host Gretchen Carlson resulted in a $20 million settlement.48
The failure of established procedures to deter harassment is not
limited to the top of the corporate structure: Despite a successful law-
suit for sexual and racial harassment by blue-collar workers at Ford
plants in Chicago in the 1990s, and established procedures to deter har-
assment as well as union representation, workers continued to be sex-
ually harassed.49
B. Legal Ramifications under Title VII
The EEOC characterizes sexual harassment as “unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical har-
assment of a sexual nature.”50 Employers have a possible defense
against liability if (1) the employer takes reasonable care to prevent
harassment (such as disseminating a policy against harassment and
establishing reporting procedures), (2) the employer promptly corrects
any sexually harassing behavior, and (3) the employee unreasonably
fails to take advantage of the employer’s preventive or corrective oppor-
tunities.51 In such cases, the employee is only entitled to relief if she
takes advantage of the employer’s procedures and remedies, which gen-
erally means that the employee must report sexual harassing behavior
to their employer.52
Title VII allows for the award of both compensatory and punitive
damages. However, the total damage award is capped and determined
47 John Koblin et al., Roger Ailes Leaves Fox News, and Rupert Murdoch Steps In, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/business/media/roger-ailes-fox-news.html [h
ttps://perma.cc/U4BQ-2E7V].
48 Sarah Ellison, Fox Settles with Gretchen Carlson for $20 Million–and Offers an Unprece-
dented Apology, VANITY FAIR (Sep. 6, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/fox-news-se
ttles-with-gretchen-carlson-for-20-million [https://perma.cc/639J-JJVE].
49 See Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of Harassment?
Ask Women at Ford. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/
us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/X4FF-TCTG]; Susan C-
hira & Catrin Einhorn, Ford Apologizes for Sexual Harassment at Chicago Factories, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/us/ford-apology-sexual-harassment.html [http
s://perma.cc/QK6Y-RBP6].
50 Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 45.
51 Id.
52 An exception to the requirement to report sexual harassment to the employer would arise
if the employee is being harassed by a supervisor, and there is no one else to whom to report the
harassment. See Monteagudo v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 554
F.3d 164, 171–72 (1st Cir. 2009). In addition, a jury may find that “a failure to file a complaint
[was not] unreasonable . . . .” Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.
2003).
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by the number of employees of the defendant firm, with the total award
capped at a maximum of $300,000 (excluding back pay) if the employer
has 500 or more employees.53
These compensatory damages can be fairly low, especially with re-
spect to back pay, which is directly connected to the victim’s pay. The
Supreme Court decision State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Campbell54 usually limits punitive damages to less than a ten to one
ratio to compensatory damages.55 Subject to this punitive to compensa-
tory damages ratio constraint, the current limit on the sum of compen-
satory and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases of
$300,000 for the largest firms implies that any individual with compen-
satory damages of more than $27,273 is eligible for less than the maxi-
mum punitive damages award that would be available without the Title
VII caps. Raising the current cap on damages awards to my proposed
$7.6 million would mean that compensatory damages of up to $690,972
would be eligible for the maximum punitive damages award.
It should be clear that there are steep barriers to launching a suc-
cessful lawsuit against an employer for sexual harassment. Most em-
ployers have policies prohibiting sexual harassment and typically pro-
vide training of some kind.56 Because claimants usually need to report
the harassing behavior to their employer before filing a charge with the
EEOC, they risk retaliation within their current employment.57 Fur-
thermore, even when plaintiffs jump through the hurdles that Title VII
provides to both bring suit against their harassers and prove that the
sexual harassment occurs, their ultimate reward is not significant
enough to deter sexual harassment in the future.
53 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2012). The maximum total damages award for employers with 15 to
100 employees is $50,000; for those with 101 to 200 employees, $100,000; for 201 to 500 employees,
$200,000. These limits have not been raised since 1991. Damages awards may differ by state; for
example, $500,000 in punitive damages was awarded in Gyulakian v. Lexus of Watertown Inc., 56
N.E.3d 785, 799 (Mass. 2016).
54 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
55 Id. at 425–26; see also Alison F. Del Rossi and W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing Landscape of
Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 12 AM. L. &ECON. REV. 116, 120 (2010) (the authors found
“after the State Farm decision there has been a statistically significant drop in the number of
blockbuster punitive damages awards, their amount, and the ratio of punitive damages to com-
pensatory damages”); Benjamin J. McMichael and W. Kip Viscusi, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distri-
bution of Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 350, 350 (June
2014) (the authors found “State Farm shifts the fat tail of the distribution of blockbuster awards
down (or ‘thins’ the tail), which is consistent with a constraining effect on award size,” and that
“State Farm also has a negative influence on the probability of exceeding a single-digit ratio be-
tween punitive and compensatory damages”).
56 Megan Cole, 71 Percent of Organizations Offer Sexual Harassment Prevention Training,
ASS’N TALENT DEV. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.td.org/insights/71-percent-of-organizations-offer-
sexual-harassment-prevention-training [https://perma.cc/CL6K-D46V].
57 See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 49, 50 (2018).
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C. Corporate Oversight
There are a staggering number of examples of sexual misconduct
that appeared to be known by industry insiders but largely concealed
until publicly revealed by the #MeToo movement.58 But in situations in
which sexual harassers are considered essential to an organization’s
success, organizations have often been slow to respond to complaints.
Below are some prominent examples that highlight the tension between
protection of victims and corporate priorities.
The situation facing the Wynn Resorts board of directors is one
such example of this tension. On Friday, January 26, 2018, the Wall
Street Journal reported on decades-long practices of sexual harassment
by Steve Wynn, founder and billionaire owner of landmark Las Vegas
hotels and casinos.59 Wynn Resorts stock fell 10 percent on that Friday
and an additional 9 percent the following Monday.60
As a publicly traded company, the board of directors has a duty to
shareholders to protect their interests.61 The stock market hit clearly
reflected shareholder angst over the future of the company. But the
board debated whether to oust Wynn. Few companies are as closely
identified with their founder and chief executive as is Wynn Resorts.62
Although a number of the largest and most successful companies are
closely identified with their founder—think of Microsoft, Apple, Ama-
zon, and Facebook—few companies actually bear the founder’s name.
The Wynn brand is integrally entwined with Steve Wynn, his flagship
58 Perhaps the starkest example is provided by Harvey Weinstein, whose exposure as a serial
sexual predator is credited with invigorating the #MeToo movement. See Jodi Kantor & Megan
Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/JAL6-HU3W]. Weinstein’s reputation within the film industry was so widely known
that Family Guy creator Seth MacFarlane could joke about Weinstein’s sexual conduct at the 2013
Oscar ceremony, announcing the five nominees for best actress by saying, “‘Congratulations, you
five ladies no longer have to pretend to be attracted to Harvey Weinstein,’ which elicited a sus-
tained laugh from the audience.” Maya Oppenheim, Seth MacFarlane Made Joke about Harvey
Weinstein and Women at 2013 Oscars, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.independent.co.
uk/arts-entertainment/films/news/seth-macfarlane-harvey-weinstein-joke-oscars-2013-women-se
xual-harassment-allegations-a7994506.html [https://perma.cc/RDW8-G2QY].
59 Alexandra Berzon et al., Dozens of People Recount Pattern of Sexual Misconduct by Las
Vegas Mogul Steve Wynn, WALL STREET J., Jan. 27, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-
people-recount-pattern-of-sexual-misconduct-by-las-vegas-mogul-steve-wynn-1516985953 [https:/
/perma.cc/BEH3-9C7P].
60 Bill Peters, Could Wynn Resorts Be Sold in Wake of CEO’s Sexual-Misconduct Allegations?,
INV. BUS. DAILYNEWS (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.investors.com/news/wynn-keeps-diving-as-fall-
out-grows-over-ceo-steve-wynn-sexual-misconduct-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/V738-2TTL].
61 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179–80 (Del. 1986) (cit-
ing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)
overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
62 Elizabeth Winkler, Wynn Resorts Is the Biggest Test for Investors’ Tolerance, WALL STREET
J. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wynn-resorts-is-the-biggest-test-for-investors-151
7248977 [https://perma.cc/H447-R2XB].
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properties bear his name, and as founder, chief executive, and largest
stockholder of Wynn Resorts, he was considered essential to the brand
identity and success of the firm.63
Therein lay the board’s dilemma as to whether to oust Wynn from
his position. Removing Wynn may have salved short run stock price
concerns, but such removal may have longer run negative consequences
if Wynn was indeed essential to the firm’s success, which would make
retaining Wynn the preferred option. Wynn resigned as CEO of Wynn
Resorts following the media coverage.64
Not only may corporate boards fail to take action to oust leaders
when they have information about allegations of sexual misconduct and
settlement payouts, but information about sexual misconduct and pay-
outs can also be cleverly concealed. Again, Steve Wynn provides a
model. As public records from Wynn’s prior divorce litigation revealed,
he created a limited-liability company in 2005 for the sole purpose of
paying $7.5 million to the manicurist employed by Wynn Resorts who
had accused Wynn of forcing her to have sex with him.65
Moreover, prior allegations of sexual harassment do not seem to
provide sufficient deterrence to future employers. For example, Ross
Levinsohn, who has now been ousted as CEO and publisher of the Los
Angeles Times, had been a defendant in two sexual harassment law-
suits while in positions he held prior to the Los Angeles Times.66 And
harassers often ride out even highly publicized sexual harassment
charges and apparently suffer little long-term consequences. For exam-
ple, in 2007, a jury awarded $11.6 million to a woman in a sexual har-
assment suit against Isiah Thomas, President of the New York Knicks,
for behavior that began in 2004.67 During and after the suit, he was not
fired from his post at the Knicks.68He served as head coach for the Flor-
ida International University men’s basketball program from 2009–2012
63 Id.
64 See Everett Rosenfeld, Steve Wynn is Out as CEO of Wynn Resorts, CNBC (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/steve-wynn-is-out-as-ceo-of-wynn-resorts.html [https://perma.cc
/8KCW-MTDY].
65 Kate O’Keeffe, Steve Wynn Set Up LLC to Pay His Accuser, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/steve-wynn-set-up-llc-to-pay-his-accuser-1517858826 [https://perma
.cc/PM34-834Q].
66 Lydia O’Connor, L.A. Times Publisher Accused of Sexual Misconduct, ‘Frat House’ Behavior,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ross-levinsohn-la-times-sexual-
misconduct_us_5a60ecc3e4b01767e3d18eac [https://perma.cc/UAZ4-767J].
67 See Jonathan Abrams & Lynn Zinser, Thomas Returns to Knicks as Part-Time Consultant,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/sports/basketball/07knick.html?mt
rref=www.google.com&gwh=459376E6E8BBC677AD2CBDA7CEC54DA0&gwt=pay [https://perm
a.cc/3Q5N-EHGT]; Michael S. Schmidt & Maria Newman, Jury Awards $11.6 Million to Former
Knicks Executive, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/sports/basketbal
l/03garden-cnd.html [https://perma.cc/D922-EU5Q].
68 See Abrams & Zinser, supra 67.
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and became president and part-owner of the Knick’s WNBA sister team,
the New York Liberty.69
Furthermore, it is not necessarily to a firm’s benefit to take a hard
line on sexual harassment. One visible example is that of Mark Hurd,
former CEO of Hewlett-Packard (HP), who was accused of sexual har-
assment by Jodie Fisher, a former contractor to HP. Although HP did
not find that Hurd had violated the company sexual harassment policy,
HP board members considered his behavior to demonstrate a lack of
judgment that undermined his effectiveness, and he was forced to re-
sign. It is notable that the stock market and market for executives dis-
played a more favorable response to Hurd’s leadership of HP: HP’s stock
price dropped by 8.3 percent on the first day of trading following Hurd’s
forced resignation, and Hurd was quickly hired by Oracle as co-presi-
dent.70
And even when an organization successfully ousts an executive for
sexual misconduct, the organization may be responsible for paying legal
fees for any ensuing arbitration over the termination. These legal fees
can be substantial, as indicated in the termination of Leslie Moonves as
CEO of CBS, with a reported estimate of $50 million in legal costs to be
paid by CBS to represent CBS, its board, and Moonves.71
Settlements such as the $20 million awarded to Gretchen Carlson
would also seemingly provide a market incentive to corporations to de-
ter sexual harassment. However, what is perhaps most notable is that
the existence of and amount of this settlement was publicly reported
rather than concealed through a nondisclosure agreement. Any deter-
rence effects of even large settlements is reduced if information about
the prevalence and size of settlements is concealed. Furthermore, even
the higher pay workers receive as a compensating differential will be
insufficient to deter sexual harassment if the true risk is unrecognized
by workers because of low reporting, high turnover, and confidential
settlements.
As these examples indicate, despite market pressures to eliminate
unprofitable corporate activities, under the current legal regime, there
69 Ben Golliver, Former Knicks Executive Isiah Thomas Fired by FIU, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 6,
2012), https://www.cbssports.com/nba/news/former-knicks-executive-isiah-thomas-fired-by-fiu/ [h
ttps://perma.cc/D36U-ZTNJ?type=image]; Ben Mathis-Lilley, Knicks Hire Executive Who Lost $11
Million Sexual Harassment Suit to Run WNBA Team, SLATE (May 25, 2015), http://www.slate.com
/blogs/the_slatest/2015/05/05/certified_sexual_harasser_isiah_ thomas_hired_ to_run_women_s_b
asketball_team.html [https://perma.cc/A6UK-MY34].
70 See Ben Worthen & Pui-Wing Tam, H-P Chief Quits in Scandal, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 7,
2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703309704575413663370670900 [https://
perma.cc/XXT2-9KCL].
71 James B. Stewart, CBS Is Footing Moonves’s Legal Bills, Giving Him an Incentive to Fight,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/business/cbs-les-moonves-legal-f
ight.html [https://perma.cc/K765-UPZN?type=image].
162 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
are clear limits to the ability of the market to deter sexual harassment.
Markets cannot work to eliminate illegal and violent sexually predatory
behavior in the presence of misinformation and deceit and in the ab-
sence of meaningful sanctions or consequences.
IV. DAMAGE AWARDS AS ADETERRENT TO SEXUALHARASSMENT
A. Compensating Differentials for Job Risks
Title VII provides for compensatory as well as punitive damages
awards for workplace discrimination. Such damages awards serve the
dual purposes of compensating victims and providing an incentive to
firms to not discriminate. Damages caused by discrimination in pay,
promotion, and hiring are fairly easily monetized, for example, by com-
paring pay between those in a protected class to similar workers not in
a protected class. Although the exact estimate of damages may differ,
forensic economists routinely calculate compensatory damages in em-
ployment discrimination cases, and there is considerable agreement
over accepted methodology.72
The harm caused by sexual harassment is not so easily monetized.
In part, a large share of the harm caused by sexual harassment is psy-
chological, which would be difficult to quantify, and victims are unlikely
to be made whole with money. Another, more subtle problem with quan-
tifying the harm caused by sexual harassment is that an individual vic-
tim’s pay may actually be enhanced, possibly as a means to obtain com-
plicity or silence. Despite inherent measurement problems, sexual
harassment harm clearly is monetized in the form of financial settle-
ments paid to victims, with the few values that have been publicly re-
ported showing a substantial range.73
My approach to monetizing the harm caused by sexual harassment
starts by recognizing that sexual harassment is a job risk. It is by no
means a risk that is a necessary part of the workplace, but, as survey
72 See Michael R. Luthy et al., A 2015 Survey of Forensic Economists: Their Methods, Esti-
mates, and Perspectives, 26 J. FORENSIC ECON. 53–83 (2015).
73 For example, former Fox News host Gretchen Carlson received a $20 million settlement;
five sexually harassed Guess employees received a total $500,000 settlement; and two women who
alleged they were sexually harassed by former presidential candidate Herman Cain when he was
CEO of the National Restaurant Association received settlements of $45,000 and $35,000 (which
Cain described as severance payments). See Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Fox Settles
with Gretchen Carlson over Roger Ailes Sex Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/media/fox-news-roger-ailes-gretchen-carlson-sexual-har-
assment-lawsuit-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/P7DS-AWAV]; Valeriya Safronova, Paul Mar-
ciano Will Leave Guess after Sexual Harassment Settlements, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/style/guess-harassment-resignation.html [https://perma.cc/4WVP-7
3XT]; Michael D. Shear et al., Cain Accuser Tells of Pattern of Behavior, Lawyer Attests, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/us/politics/cain-accuser-tells-of-harassment-
pattern-lawyer-attests.html [https://perma.cc/G2S9-WRKG].
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evidence reviewed in Part II documents, it nonetheless is common. Most
activities involve tradeoffs, and often the tradeoff is between money or
time and safety. It is costly for firms to eliminate job risks such as risks
of fatality and injury—and of sexual harassment. It is also costly to
firms to not strive to eliminate these risks. Employers need to pay a
wage premium—referred to as a “compensating differential”—to attract
workers to risky jobs.74 A massive literature documents that workers in
jobs at greater risk of fatality are paid a premium for bearing greater
risk, and indeed, this premium pay forms the basis for calculating the
value of statistical life.75 Furthermore, in setting regulatory safety
standards, most federal agencies require comparison of the costs of im-
plementing safety improvements to the value of lives saved from im-
proved safety.76
It is not mere speculation that firms might pay a premium for ex-
posure to risk of sexual harassment. As coverage of Steve Wynn’s pat-
tern of sexually harassing employees made clear, the high pay at Wynn
casinos relative to alternative jobs in Las Vegas served to reduce turn-
over and attract employees despite widespread risk of sexual harass-
ment. Ex-employees reported to the Wall Street Journal that they tol-
erated workplace harassment because jobs at Wynn were among the
highest paying in Las Vegas.77
Despite a large literature investigating whether workers are paid
compensating differentials for a variety of working conditions, the eco-
nomics literature had only consistently established compensating dif-
ferentials for workplace risk of fatality or injury.78 My research, de-
scribed below, is the first to consider the possibility of compensating
differentials for risk of sexual harassment. To briefly summarize my
methodology and primary result, I created the first measures in the lit-
erature of risk of sexual harassment, estimated wage equations control-
ling for this risk, and identified that workers in industries at greater
74 The “theory of compensating differentials” originated with Adam Smith and is a standard
topic in economics textbooks. A review of the literature and discussion of the underlying theory is
W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1912 (1993). See also Robert
S. Smith, Compensating Wage Differentials and Public Policy: A Review, 32 INDUS. AND LAB.
RELATIONS REV. 339, 339–40 (1979).
75 See Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of
Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK&UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2003).
76 See id. at 40–42; W. Kip Viscusi,Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation
Criteria, 25 RAND J. ECON. 94, 94–95 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi, The Devaluation of Life, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 103, 105 (2009); U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG.
AFFAIRS, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
ENTITIES 94 (2003).
77 Berzon et al., supra note 59.
78 Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harassment, 101 AM. ECON. REV.:
PAPERS& PROC. 630, 630 (2011).
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risk of sexual harassment received a pay premium for exposure to a
working condition that workers found so heinous.79 It is worth noting
that my approach, which takes into account the risk of sexual harass-
ment, obviates concerns of reverse causality in which workers who are
at lower pay are more likely to be targets of harassment.80
B. Sexual Harassment Risks
The first step in examining the labor market implications of sexual
harassment claims requires calculation of sexual harassment risk.81 To
do so, I used data I obtained from the EEOC through a FOIA request. I
calculated gender-specific estimates of the risk of sexual harassment by
industry and age group,82 by dividing the number of individual charges
that include sexual harassment within each industry and age group by
the corresponding levels of employment in the same industry and age
group from the Current Population Survey (CPS).83 In contrast to sur-
vey evidence of sexual harassment prevalence, my methodology pro-
vides a well-defined measure of the risk of sexual harassment that al-
lows comparison across sectors of the economy.
Table 2 reports sexual harassment claim rates per 100,000 workers
by gender and major industry as well as the percent female in the in-
dustry based on the construction of sexual harassment risk described
above. Clearly women are far more likely to file a claim of sexual har-
assment than are men. The pattern across industries indicates that
women are at a greater risk of sexual harassment in male-dominated
79 Id. at 633–35.
80 If we observe that harassed workers have lower pay, we cannot be sure whether the har-
assment caused the individual worker to have lower pay, or if the worker is harassed specifically
because they are lower paid and potentially more vulnerable. Because any individual’s experience
of sexual harassment will have only a small effect on the risk measure for that industry and age
group, we can largely rule out the possibility that the individual’s pay level influenced the risk
measure for that industry and age group.
81 For more information, see Joni Hersch, Valuing the Risk of Workplace Sexual Harassment,
57 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 111, 117–19 (2018). See also Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 45.
82 Specifically, the numerators in this risk measure are the number of sexual harassment
charges by 2-digit industry (52 industries), six age groups (15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and
ages 65 and older), and gender. The denominators are the corresponding levels of industry employ-
ment by age group and gender from the Current Population Survey (excluding self-employed work-
ers who would generally not be able to claim sexual harassment against an employer). This follows
the methodology to construct fatality rates by industry, age, and gender in W. Kip Viscusi and Joni
Hersch, The Mortality Cost to Smokers, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 943, 944–48 (2008). See Joni Hersch,
supra note 811 (providing information on the construction of the risk measures and a table that
lists the risk values for women by detailed industry and age group).
83 The CPS is a monthly survey of households conducted by the Bureau of Census for the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. It provides comprehensive data on the labor force, employment, and
other demographic and labor force characteristics. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, https://www.bls.gov/cps/ [https://perma.cc/H3L4-
G8V9] (last visited Jan. 16, 2019).
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industries, with the pairwise correlation between the female rate and
percent female equal to –0.68 (p=0.01). The male sexual harassment
claim rate is not correlated with the female rate nor is the male rate
correlated with percent female.




Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and
hunting
18.10 0.72 25.21
Mining 72.02 2.31 9.71
Construction 20.28 0.48 9.58
Manufacturing 15.88 1.28 30.86
Wholesale and retail trade 10.21 1.33 45.46
Transportation and utilities 17.50 1.22 24.48
Information 19.35 2.73 43.40
Financial activities 6.98 1.49 57.58
Professional and business services 14.35 1.89 43.16
Educational and health services 3.71 1.66 75.13
Leisure and hospitality 14.53 2.15 51.55
Other services 6.64 1.29 52.70
Public administration 16.67 2.20 45.94
Labor market overall 8.61 1.35
Notes: Per 100,000 workers. Rates are calculated by the author from EEOC
Charge Data FY2000–FY2004 based on claims by individuals in which at
least one issue was sexual harassment and in which industry is reported.
Employment data calculated using 2004 Current Population Survey.
For the labor market sample that I analyze, the overall sexual har-
assment rate is 8.61 per 100,000 workers for females, and 1.35 per
100,000 workers for males. Female employees are consequently 6.4
times more likely to file a sexual harassment claim. Because of the
small number of sexual harassment claims brought by men, the ensuing
analysis focuses on sexual harassment rates based on claims brought
by women, as these rates are more reliable. The overall rates of sexual
harassment claims are in the same general range as the frequency of
workplace fatality rates, of about 4 in 100,000,85 which is about half the
sexual harassment claim rate for female employees.
84 This table appears in Hersch, supra note 78, at 632.
85 See Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries Summary, 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Dec. 18,
2018, 10:00AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/T7B8-DLMA].
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C. Wage Equations
The next step is to merge the sexual harassment risk measures
with data that includes wage information and detailed information on
other characteristics associated with wage in order to isolate the influ-
ence of sexual harassment risk on wage.86 In particular, I take into ac-
count detailed information on education, race, ethnicity, type of em-
ployer, union status, marital status, location, and potential work
experience. Importantly, I also take into account the percent female in
detailed industry and occupation; doing so accounts for the higher risk
of fatality and injury in male-dominated industries and occupation.
Using these data, I then estimate conventional log wage regres-
sions. These wage equation estimates are reported in my earlier work.87
The incremental effect on wage of a 1-in-100,000 increase in risk is 0.18
percent.88 For women, the log wage difference between a job with zero
sexual harassment risk and a job with the gender-specific mean sexual
harassment risk is 0.0155, or about 25 cents per hour for women. With
annual work hours of 2,000, this rate of compensation would be $500
annually for women. This value represents the average hazard pay pre-
mium for being in a job with average risk of sexual harassment relative
to a risk-free job.89 Importantly, because this estimated risk premium
is derived from labor market information on individual workers, this
pay premium reflects the value that the workers themselves place on
the risk of sexual harassment at their workplace that is severe enough
to result in an EEOC claim.
V. THE VALUE OF STATISTICALHARASSMENT (VSH)
To date, the only mechanism employed by organizations in efforts
to deter workplace sexual harassment is education and reporting and
mediating systems. When these approaches fail, the remaining recourse
for victims is to file a charge with the EEOC. Although the EEOC can,
and does, litigate some claims, this is quite rare, and most claims will
be filed and litigated privately.
There is no apparent connection between damages awards at their
current level and efficient deterrence, and in fact, to my knowledge, no
86 The standard wage equation specification used in the hedonic wage literature is of the fol-
lowing form: ln 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝛼 𝛽𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑋𝛾 𝜀
where wage is the hourly wage rate; Risk is a measure of job risk (in this case the risk of sexual
harassment); X is a vector of explanatory variables such as years of education; 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾 are
parameters to be estimated; and ε is a random error term.
87 Hersch, supra note 78; Hersch, supra note 81.
88 Hersch, supra note 81, at 124–25.
89 Hersch, supra note 78, at 633.
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one has suggested using damages awards for the purpose of efficient
deterrence of sexual harassment.90 But thwarting the current ap-
proaches to curb sexual harassment is the lack of any monetary basis
for setting awards for efficient deterrence.
My proposal is to use the hazard pay premium described in Section
IV for sexual harassment risks to establish the efficient deterrence
value of awards. Specifically, following the same rationale by which the
value of a statistical life can serve as the appropriate deterrence meas-
ure for fatality risks, I propose using a measure that I term “the value
of statistical harassment,” (VSH) to set the total damages amount in
sexual harassment cases in order to provide optimal deterrence.
This hazard pay premium has an important implication in terms of
the rate at which workers are compensated for the risk. To provide a
numerical illustration, suppose that a group of 100,000 workers each
receive an extra $50 to incur a sexual harassment risk of 1/100,000.
Then together this group will experience one expected case of sexual
harassment (i.e., 100,000 workers × 1/100,000 risk) and will receive $5
million in compensation (i.e., 100,000 workers × $50 per worker). In this
example, $5 million is the amount of money that workers receive for
facing risks that lead to one expected case of sexual harassment to the
group. By analogy to the approach in the economics literature for the
value of a statistical life, this amount represents the value of statistical
harassment (VSH).91
The procedure for calculating the VSH directly from the empirical
estimates requires information on the effect of the sexual harassment
risk on the log of wages (0.0018), the average hourly wage rate ($16.33
for women), the number of hours in a full-time work year (based on the
assumption of 50 weeks per year at 40 hours per week), and any adjust-
ment for units (in this case the risk is per 100,000 workers).
If we denote the effect of fatality rates on the log of wages by b, then
parallel to the calculation of the VSL,92 the VSH is calculated as𝑉𝑆𝐻 𝑏 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 2000 100000.
Following this procedure yields VSH estimates of $5.88 million in
2005 dollars. Converted to 2017 dollars, the VSH is equal to $7.6 mil-
90 See, e.g., Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty Years of Compromise: How the Caps on Damages in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Codified Sex Discrimination, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 249 (2014)
(making it clear that the cap was not intended for deterrence and citing in her footnote 342 some
articles critiquing the cap because of inadequate deterrence).
91 See Elissa Philip Gentry & W. Kip Viscusi, The Fatality and Morbidity Components of the
Value of Statistical Life, 46 J. HEALTH ECON. 90, 93 (2016) (Equation 10).
92 See id.
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lion. This value reflects the additional amount that is generated by sex-
ual harassment claims filed with the EEOC. It will consequently cap-
ture both the effect of the harassment claim itself but will also embody
the influence of all harassment incidents in that industry that are cor-
related with the claim.
VI. USING THE VALUE OF STATISTICALHARASSMENT FOR EFFICIENT
DETERRENCE
To understand how the VSH can be used to set damages for effi-
cient deterrence of sexual harassment, it is useful to review the role of
the VSL in promoting deterrence of workplace fatalities. As noted
above, government agencies use the VSL to establish the value of pre-
venting one expected death, which corresponds to the value of deterring
behavior that leads to one expected death. By providing a measure of
the extra compensation workers receive for fatality risk, the VSL de-
rived from the labor market establishes both the value of safety to the
worker and the price of safety for the injurer. Specifically, it represents
the amount of money a firm should be willing to spend to reduce the
risk of fatality. This tradeoff between safety and money is common to
many other market contexts. Consumers choose between cars with
more or less safety equipment, with prices reflecting the higher costs to
manufacturers of greater safety equipment as well as how much con-
sumers value the safety improvement. Manufacturers respond to work-
ers’ tradeoffs by producing cars with less safety equipment that sell at
lower prices and with more safety equipment that sell at higher prices.
If car manufacturers find no market for their cars at a particular safety-
price combination, they will alter the mix to meet consumer demand.
Continuing the analogy of the value of a statistical life to the sexual
harassment situation, the VSH establishes the value of avoiding har-
assment to female workers and the price of reducing harassment to em-
ployers. Setting damages in EEOC claim cases equal to the VSH will
send the appropriate price signal to firms of the economic value of har-
assment risks to workers; such damages would represent the amount of
money employers should be willing to spend to reduce the risk of sexual
harassment at their organization. As noted above, the VSH corresponds
to the value of all sexual harassment incidents that women experience
or are aware of at their workplace so that it will have a broad deterrent
effect and is not limited to the single case in which the claim has been
brought. My proposal is that for efficient deterrence, the sum of com-
pensatory and punitive damages should equal the VSH. Unfortunately,
damages are capped at a level that bears no relation to the value of VSH
so that the statutory cap would need to be removed or at least increased
to $7.6 million.
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This proposal also implicitly embodies the key concepts of the eco-
nomic theory of deterrence. It not only recognizes the fact that sexual
harassment involves irreplaceable nonmonetary harms, but it also em-
bodies the broader incidence of sexual harassment at the workplace.
The advantage of the VSH approach is that it implicitly incorpo-
rates aspects of the probability of detection in that an entire toxic work
environment will affect the VSH to the extent that the employees are
aware of this environment. While the risk measure pertains to the risk
of EEOC charges, this measure will likely be correlated with cases of
sexual harassment that do not lead to charges. The VSH measure con-
sequently captures both the value attached to the risk of an EEOC
charge and will also capture the valuation of other harassment inci-
dents that are known to workers but which do not lead to an EEOC
claim.
CONCLUSION
Workplace sexual harassment is a widespread problem that has
proven immune to legislation and workplace policies designed to pre-
vent such behavior. It is costly to victims. And, although it is also costly
to organizations, I demonstrate in this Article that it is not costly
enough to deter workplace sexual harassment: The substantial market
pressures that organizations currently face have proven inadequate as
a deterrence. My policy proposal is to raise damages awards to a level
that will properly incentivize organizations to eliminate sexual harass-
ment. To establish the necessary award amount, I draw on labor market
data documenting the premium workers receive for bearing the risk of
sexual harassment. Using this pay premium, I calculate the value of
statistical harassment, which establishes the award level that will cor-
rectly provide incentives to organizations to deter workplace sexual har-
assment. To implement this proposal, the statutory cap on damages
must be removed so that the penalties can reach a level sufficient to
deter sexual harassment and to reflect the value of a reduction in har-
assment to the women who are being protected. The recent #MeToo
movement has raised visibility about the prevalence and severity of sex-
ual harassment and may lead to further deterrence by raising the prob-




Schools as Training Grounds for Harassment
Ann C. McGinley†
INTRODUCTION
The #MeToo movement, which burgeoned in response to allega-
tions of Harvey Weinstein’s and others’ harassment of women who
sought careers in Hollywood and elsewhere, has led to increasing con-
cern about sexual harassment in workplaces and other venues.1 Signif-
icant online movements engage in naming and shaming alleged perpe-
trators, and workplaces are rewriting their policies in an attempt to
prevent and remedy harassment to escape liability for harassers’ con-
duct.2 News reports and op-ed articles focus on the prevalence of sexual
harassment and harm to women, but, as Professors Vicki Schultz and
Brian Soucek explain, media reports are limited to a narrow under-
standing of one type of harassment: harassment that is sexual (rather
than gendered) in nature and suffered predominantly by women at the
hands of more powerful men.3 By “sexual” harassment, I use the com-
mon term here to refer to unwelcome behavior that is expressed by sex-
ual means: groping, asking for sexual favors, sexual assault, and even
rape. The motive may be sexual desire, as the #MeToo movement seems
† William S. Boyd Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. J.D. 1982, University
of Pennsylvania Law School. Thank you to Dean Dan Hamilton for his support on this project.
Thank you also to Jeff Stempel and Nancy Chi Cantalupo, who have both supported my scholar-
ship in this area. Thank you to David McClure, Associate Director of the Wiener-Rogers Law Li-
brary at UNLV Boyd School of Law, and the students who work with him for their excellent re-
search on this project. Finally, thank you to Mary Anne Case, faculty advisor to The University of
Chicago Legal Forum, and my deepest thanks go to the student editors who worked so hard on
the forum conference and on editing this paper.
1 Actor Alyssa Milano borrowed the term from an earlier group started by Tarana Burke and
posted it online. Emma Brockes, #MeToo Founder Tarana Burke: “You Have to Use Your Privilege
to Serve Other People,”GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/15
/me-too-founder-tarana-burke-women-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/4NXH-6JAA].
2 Mira Sorvino: Me Too Can’t Just Be Naming and Shaming, USA TODAY (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2018/11/13/mira-sorvino-me-too-cant-just-naming-an
d-shaming/1985971002/ [http://perma.cc/E9WJ-TBG2]; Nicole Lyn Pesce, The #MeToo Movement
Has Changed Policies Across Industries, But There’s Still Work to Be Done, MARKETWATCH (Oct.
4, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-metoo-movement-has-changed-policies-across-i
ndustries-but-theres-still-work-to-be-done-2018-10-04 [https://perma.cc/KU9N-X82W].
3 See Vicki Schultz & Brian Soucek, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 227, 227–59 (2019).
172 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
to emphasize, but it may also be a desire to police gender expectations
of individuals in the workplace. Where there is an employment relation-
ship and a covered employer, this type of harassment is prohibited by
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,4 if sufficiently severe or pervasive.
It is also prohibited in schools, whether the harassment be perpetrated
by other students or teachers, by Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972.5
A less common but more accurate term that I use throughout this
paper is “sex- or gender-based harassment.” This term is much broader
than “sexual harassment” in that it refers to unwelcome behavior that
occurs because of the sex (biological sex) or gender (social stereotypes
and expectations that are related to a person of a particular biological
sex) of the victim that can be but is not necessarily sexual in nature:
derogatory comments or yelling, physically blocking a person’s way, se-
vere or pervasive treatment because of the victim’s failure to conform
to gender stereotypes or with an interest in maintaining the gendered
order of the workplace. These latter versions of harassment can be ei-
ther facially sex- or gender-based or can be neutral in their presentation
while still occurring because of the sex or gender of the victim.
As Schultz and Soucek explain, “sexual harassment” that the #Me-
Too movement generally targets may merely be the tip of the iceberg.
Harassment that is gendered but not necessarily sexual in nature, and
harassment, whether sexual or gendered, that is perpetrated by groups
of men (and sometimes women) on both male and female victims have
been virtually ignored by the movement and the media.6
Moreover, the link between sex-segregated workplaces, both hori-
zontally and vertically,7 and sex- and gender-based harassment is often
overlooked.8 In fact, much (if not most) of harassing behavior in work-
places occurs because of gender—the patriarchal structure that pro-
motes the superiority of masculine men over women and gender non-
conforming men.9
And, while there is considerable discussion about sexual violence
on college campuses (a form of “sexual harassment”)—how institutions
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
5 Pub. L. No. 92-318 tit. IX, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88).
6 See Ann C. McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 135 (2018).
7 Philip Cohen, The Problem with Mostly Male (and Mostly Female) Workplaces, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/03/the-problem-with-
mostly-male-and-mostly-female-workplaces/274208/ [http://perma.cc/895U-4RNY].
8 Schultz & Soucek, supra note 3.
9 See ANN C. MCGINLEY, MASCULINITY ATWORK: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH A
DIFFERENT LENS 58–82 (2016) (offering a number of scenarios in which harassment occurs and
demonstrating that, in most of these scenarios, the motivation is gender—both of the victim and
of the perpetrators).
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should respond, what their investigations and hearings should look
like, and how to protect both the accuser and the accused10—there is
little or no public discussion of sex- and gender-based harassment that
occurs in elementary, middle, and high schools.11 The behaviors in-
volved can be sexual, gendered, or neither; the common thread is the
motive of the harassers—it is based on the sex or gender of the victim
(as well as the harasser).
Even though few discuss the problem of sex-or gender-based har-
assment in pre-college schools, the reality is that elementary, middle,
and high schools serve as training grounds for sex- and gender-based
harassment later on in life, and the law is not providing an effective
remedy. Title IX of the Education Act Amendments12 forbids sex- and
gender-based harassment at all levels from kindergarten through col-
lege, but private causes of action brought under Title IX do little to deter
school administrators from tolerating serious peer sex- and gender-
based harassment or to compensate victims. This is because the Su-
preme Court has established extremely difficult proof requirements,
and many lower courts have applied these standards strictly.13 While
investigations by the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Educa-
tion (“OCR”) have historically done a better job of punishing schools for
permitting peer sex- and gender-based harassment and requiring im-
proved policies and procedures, the OCR may not have the capacity to
investigate the vast majority of incidents occurring in schools. Moreo-
ver, given the new regulations proposed by the Department of Educa-
tion under Secretary Betsy DeVos, which adopt the rigid court stand-
ards, there is serious concern that useful OCR investigations may not
continue.14
10 ADVOCATES FORYOUTH, 9 THINGS TOKNOWABOUTBETSYDEVOS’ PROPOSEDTITLE IXRULE,
https://actionnetwork.org/user_files/user_files/000/028/107/original/Two_pager_on_proposed_rule
.pdf [http://perma.cc/79GA-TLHV]; Victoria Yuen & Osub Ahmed, 4 Ways Secretary DeVos’ Pro-
posed Title IX Rule Will Fail Survivors of Campus Sexual Assault, CENTER FORAMERICANPROGRE-
SS (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2018/
11/16/461181/4-ways-secretary-devos-proposed-title-ix-rule-will-fail-survivors-campus-sexual-as-
sault/ [https://perma.cc/SL3T-AX9D].
11 Throughout this article, I use the term sex- and gender-based harassment in its broadest
sense to mean harassment in workplaces or schools that occurs because of the victim’s sex or gen-
der. There is a debate whether we should merely call this “sexual harassment,” or “sex harass-
ment,” but both seem to be under-inclusive so in the interest of being clear that I am talking about
illegal harassment that occurs because of sex or gender and may or may not be sexual or gendered
in nature, I use the more comprehensive term. This behavior, if sufficiently severe or pervasive,
violates Title VII in the workplace and Title IX in schools.
12 Pub. L. No. 92-318 tit. IX, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88).
13 See Part III infra.
14 See Part III.B. infra.
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The fact is that peer15 sex- and gender-based harassment of both
boys and girls in schools is rampant, and administrators are either un-
able or unwilling to curb it. One problem is adults’ normalization of sex-
and gender-based harassment by preteens and teens. When girls are
victims of harassment by boys, school administrators and teachers in-
terpret the behavior as age-appropriate interest in the “opposite sex.”
When boys are victims of harassment by other boys, administrators and
teachers call it normal “horseplay.” In both situations, teachers can ex-
acerbate the problem, often blaming the victims for causing trouble by
reporting the behavior to authorities, and thereby incurring the wrath
of fellow students.16 Teachers and administrators fail to understand the
role toxic masculinity plays in harassment, and they often fan the
flames by encouraging sex stereotyping and gender conformity of both
boys and girls by both boys and girls. The resulting peer harassment is
neither normal courting behavior, nor normal roughhousing.17
This article deals with the schools’ role in permitting and encour-
aging peer sex- and gender-based harassment of children and the law’s
role in failing to hold schools accountable for their negligent and inten-
tional behavior in sanctioning it. Part I discusses the evidence of ram-
pant sex- and gender-based harassment in schools. Part II analyzes the
problem through the lens of masculinities theory and explains how cul-
tural notions of masculinity create incentives for boys18 (and some girls)
to engage in peer sex- and gender-based harassment.
Part III analyzes court cases and OCR decisions and explains the
serious disconnect between the two; it demonstrates the proof difficul-
ties that victims experience when filing suit under Title IX and the re-
sulting lack of incentives for schools to correct the problems. It also
shows that, while the OCR has traditionally held schools to more exact-
ing scrutiny than courts, the new Secretary of Education has proposed
new regulations that would align its standards with those of the courts.
Ironically, if the proposed regulations are promulgated, the result in the
era of #MeToo will be to promote even more sex- and gender-based har-
assment in our schools.
Part IV proposes new legal standards and interpretations of exist-
ing standards for the courts that would hold schools more accountable
15 I limit this article to the discussion of illegal harassment by peers of other peers in the
school context—in other words, student-on-student harassment that occurs because of sex or gen-
der.
16 See, e.g., Patterson v. Hudson Area Schools, 551 F.3d. 438, 440 (6th Cir. 2009).
17 I have dubbed this reason for sex harassment as the “masculinity motivation.” See McGin-
ley, The Masculinity Motivation, supra note 6.
18 I call this the “masculinity mandate.” See Ann C. McGinley, The Masculinity Mandate: #Me-
Too, Brett Kavanaugh, and Christine Blasey Ford, 23 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POL’Y
J. __ (forthcoming 2019).
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for allowing and condoning peer harassment and argues that the courts’
standards should be more similar to those applied by those historically
applied by the OCR. To accomplish prevention, educators must under-
stand the role that toxic masculinity plays in peer sex- and gender-
based harassment while at the same time be aware of the potential un-
equal application of school rules to children of different races and clas-
ses. Finally, this article concludes that the law should create incentives
for schools to fulfill their responsibility to educate themselves and their
students to prevent and remedy peer sex- and gender-based harass-
ment. When schools ignore their responsibilities in this area, they be-
come important training grounds for future harassers, a role that the
#MeToo movement should not tolerate.
I. EMPIRICAL ANDQUALITATIVE EVIDENCE OF PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS
A. Empirical and Qualitative Studies on Peer Sexual Harassment
1. Definitions: legal vs. social science terminology
Social science data are crucial to the understanding of sex- and gen-
der-based harassment in the schools. But there is one caveat. Social sci-
ence studies can be confusing to lawyers and judges because of the dif-
ferent terms social scientists and lawyers use to describe behaviors.
Moreover, social scientists and lawyers at times use the same terms but
define them differently. Social scientists’ definitions consider behaviors
while the law considers not only behaviors but also motive or intent. For
example, under Title IX, behavior that is sexual, non-sexual, gendered,
or non-gendered in nature that is motivated by the victim’s sex or gen-
der and is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive is illegal harass-
ment.19 This legal definition may encompass many different behaviors
19 See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of
Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1207–32 (2008) (explaining different scenarios that constitute il-
legal sex- or gender-based harassment).
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identified by social scientists, including bullying,20 harassment, mob-
bing, sexual harassment, and physical, verbal, and relational aggres-
sion.21
When scientific surveys ask children whether they have suffered
from sexual harassment, they do not focus on the legal requirement that
the behavior be severe or pervasive. They merely ask if the child has
suffered a particular type of sex- or gender-based behavior over a par-
ticular period of time.22 This means that the survey results can be both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive by legal standards: over-inclusive
because the behavior may not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to qual-
ify as illegal; under-inclusive because behavior that is not sexual or gen-
dered in nature but whose motive is sex or gender will not be included
in the results. Thus, legal scholars, lawyers, and the courts must
acknowledge these weaknesses in translation between social science
and law when they predict the frequency of sex- and gender-based har-
assment. With this caveat in mind, however, below is a short summary
of some of the social science quantitative and qualitative evidence of
sex- and gender-based harassment in the schools as well as a descrip-
tion of facts from court and OCR cases to demonstrate the quality of
alleged harassment that occurs.
2. Social science and other evidence of sex- and gender-based
harassment
Recent surveys by the American Association of University Women
(“AAUW”) concerning sexual harassment in schools reveal that nearly
half of school children in grades seven through twelve (48%) report hav-
ing been subject to sexual harassment,23 and that 87% of those report-
ing that they suffered harassment also state that they have suffered
20 Traditionally, psychologists defined bullying, harassment, and mobbing as gender-neutral
because both victims and perpetrators can be male and female. Given the thin reed supporting the
conclusion that these behaviors are sex-neutral, feminists questioned this view and other social
scientists followed. Today, social scientists may disagree about the use of the term “bullying,” but
many agree that gender is often a cause of or motivation for these bullying behaviors. Moreover,
while the original psychologists who studied bullying believed it resulted from individual person-
ality traits that disposed perpetrators toward bullying (and perhaps victims toward victimhood),
social scientists, feminists, and sociologists see bullying as resulting from systemic gender and
other inequalities. See id. at 1169–80.
21 “Physical aggression” is physical but not sexual; “verbal aggression” comprises harmful
words and statements that are not physical or sexual; “relational aggression” describes behaviors
employed by children such as excluding others and passing rumors that are harmful to the child’s
relationship with others.
22 See, e.g., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, QUICK FACTS: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS (January 2017).
23 AMERICANASSOCIATION OFUNIVERSITYWOMEN, CROSSING THELINE: SEXUALHARASSMENT
AT SCHOOL 11 (2011) [hereinafter “CROSSING THE LINE”]. This survey asks questions about
whether the respondent suffered sexual (or gender-based) harassment within the past school year
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harm as a result.24 While a few students said that it did not bother
them, many described emotional, physical, and educational responses—
not wanting to go to school, feeling sick to their stomach, having trouble
sleeping, altering the path they took to school, behavior problems at
school, and quitting activities at school.25Half of those stating they were
harassed to the AAUW said that they had not reported the harassment
at the time it occurred.26 And, despite this evidence that harassment
and assault occur on school campuses, schools are drastically underre-
porting the incidences of sexual harassment.27 School information is
gleaned from data reported by schools receiving federal financial aid
under Title IX (98,000 schools, nearly half of them with students in sev-
enth through twelfth grades), as part of the Civil Rights Data Collection
(“CRDC”).28 Of schools with grades seven through twelve, for example,
79% reported that they had zero reports of sexual harassment or bully-
ing based on sex during the 2015–16 school year; 99% reported that they
had zero reports of rape during the same time frame; and 94% reported
that they had zero reports of sexual assault other than rape in school
during the same time period.29
In some schools, sexual harassment is the norm.30 Studies demon-
strate, moreover, that much sexual harassment (physical and verbal)
occurs in the open, with teachers looking on but doing nothing.31 When
teachers are not trained about what is sexual harassment and how to
but does not require severity or pervasiveness for the respondent to answer in the affirmative.
Neither does it require that the perpetrators be motivated by gender or sex. Nor does it include
sex- and gender-based harassment that is not sexual or gendered in nature but that is motivated
by sex or gender. Thus, this survey is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive when it comes to the
legal definition under Title IX. See notes 19–22 supra & accompanying text.
24 KEVINMILLER, SCHOOLS ARE STILL UNDERREPORTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.aauw.org/article/schools-still-underreporting-sexual-harassment-and-
assault/ [http://perma.cc/NU93-M5XZ] [hereinafter “SCHOOLS ARE STILLUNDERREPORTING”].
25 CROSSING THE LINE, supra note 23, at 22. Cases document other serious harms resulting
from sex- and gender-based harassment in schools. See infra note 94. T.Z. v. City of New York, 634
F. Supp. 2d 263, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reporting harms such as inability to go to school, self-cutting,
PTSD, attempted suicide, and, ultimately, in the most severe cases, suicide).
26 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, QUICK FACTS: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS (January 2017) [hereinafter “QUICK FACTS”].
27 Id; MILLER, supra note 24.
28 QUICK FACTS, supra note 26.
29 MILLER, supra note 24.
30 See J. Forber Pratt et al., A Qualitative Investigation of Gang Presence and Sexual Harass-
ment in a Middle School, 27 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 1929, 1935–36 (2018) (concluding that while
most of the sexual harassment seemed to be initiated by gang members, it was not all related to
gang membership; sexual harassment was the norm, and a failure of adults to respond to open
sexual harassment reinforced it as normal).
31 Id. The cases confirm this finding. See, e.g., S.K. v. North Allegheny Sch. Dist., 168 F. Supp.
3d 786, 796–99 (W.D. Pa. 2016).
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respond to it, they may validate the behaviors that constitute sexual
harassment as normal.32
Studies demonstrate that although girls and women tend to suffer
more adverse effects than boys and men from harassment, boys and
men do experience emotional damage, especially when sexual harass-
ment is used as a method of performing hegemonic masculinity, harass-
ing someone for the purpose of reinforcing the masculinity of the har-
assers, ridiculing the gender performance (either too masculine or too
feminine of male and female victims), or drawing acceptable boundaries
of how victims should perform their gender.33 Especially LGBTQ+ stu-
dents have “poorer mental and physical health, less engagement with
school, and higher suicide rates than their heterosexual peers.”34
Straight boys and men also suffer from homophobic slurs, which cause
increased anxiety and depression as well as alienation among middle
school children, especially boys.35 One study found that there existed
ample evidence of verbal harassment of LGBTQ+ students by both stu-
dents and educators.36 Approximately 90% of study participants had
heard a student verbally harass another because of bias against
LGBTQ+ individuals, whereas 44% had heard school staff engaging in
the same verbal harassment.37
Much harassment occurs in the open with victims and perpetrators
who are both boys and girls and with victims of different races. Studies
in middle schools confirm, however, that the perpetrators of sex- and
gender-based harassment against both girls and boys are most fre-
quently boys.38 One study found that the highest rate of physical sexual
assault was of African-American girls, followed by African-American
boys.39 And students reporting sexual harassment stated that it oc-
curred most frequently in hallways, followed by classrooms.40
32 Forber-Pratt, supra note 30, at 1936 (citing L. Charmaraman et al., Is It Bullying or Is It
Sexual Harassment? Knowledge, Attitudes and Professional Development Experiences of Middle
School Staff, 83 J. SCH. HEALTH 438 (2013)).
33 See James Gruber & Susan Fineran, Sexual Harassment, Bullying, and School Outcomes
for High School Girls and Boys, 22 VIOLENCE AGAINSTWOMEN 112, 117 (2016).
34 Id.; see also Tyler Hatchel et al., Sexual Harassment Victimization, School Belonging, and
Depressive Symptoms among LGBTQ Adolescents: Temporal Insights, 88 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCH.
422 (2018) (finding that middle and high school LGBTQ+ victims of sexual harassment suffer in-
creased depressive symptoms over a period of time).
35 Gruber & Fineran, supra note 33, at 117.
36 Eliza Dragowski et al., Educators’ Reports on Incidence of Harassment and Advocacy To-
ward LGBTQ Students, 53 PSYCH. IN THE SCH. 127 (2016).
37 Id. at 137.
38 SeeDorothy L. Espelage et al.,Understanding Types, Locations, & Perpetrators of Peer-Peer
Harassment in U.S. Middle Schools: A Focus on Sex, Racial, and Grade Differences, 71 CHILDREN
&YOUTH SERV. REV. 174, 180 (2016).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 181.
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Although social scientists traditionally have seen bullying and sex-
ual harassment as two separate phenomena and have thought of bully-
ing as gender-neutral, recently, social scientists have begun to question
the bullying paradigm that is both gender-neutral and based on indi-
vidual personalities rather than systemic causes.41 One problem with
the bullying literature is that it defines bullying as neutral and not gen-
der-based and thereby underestimates important injuries caused by
gender-based harassment.42 This is particularly important when it
comes to the law for two reasons: 1) anti-bullying efforts often ignore
gender-based harms, many of which are intentional, and 2) Title IX for-
bids sex- or gender-based discrimination and not bullying that does not
occur because of sex or gender of the victim. Schools do two contradic-
tory things that allow them to escape responsibility: they engage in
anti-bullying campaigns and, at other times, hide behind bullying
(which does not occur because of sex and is not illegal) in order to defend
Title IX claims. Some newer social science research demonstrates that
girls suffer from gender-based harms caused by sex-based peer aggres-
sion, and this research argues that bullying scholars should recognize
the gendered nature of much bullying.43 In fact, at least one study finds
that gender-based sexual harassment that employs stereotypes, both
sexist and anti-heterosexist, causes greater harm to victims’ school out-
comes than gender-neutral bullying does.44 Those harms include ero-
sion of victims’ school engagement, alienation of victims from teachers,
and decreased academic achievement of victims.45 It is important to un-
derstand that much of what some social scientists may label “bullying”
by looking at the behaviors alone is actually illegal harassment under
federal civil rights laws that occurs because of the victim’s sex or gender
nonconformity. Thus, although it is not possible to conclude that all bul-
lying behavior has a sex- or gender-based motive, especially in the
school context much of it does. Therefore, these behaviors can constitute
both bullying in the traditional social science definition and sex- or gen-
der-based harassment in the legal context.46
41 Id.
42 For an explanation of the bullying research and whether it is gender-neutral or gender-
based, seeMcGinley, supra note 19, at 1191–92 (explaining that many of the behaviors categorized
by social scientists as bullying also occur because of the victim’s sex, which would make them
illegal under Title VII).
43 See generally Rosalyn Shute et al., High School Girls’ Experience of Victimization by Boys:
Where Sexual Harassment Meets Aggression, 25 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 269
(2016); McGinley, supra note 19, at 1174–82 (arguing that bullying often does have a gendered
aspect to it and collecting feminist literature that agrees with this proposition).
44 James Gruber & Susan Fineran, Sexual Harassment, Bullying, and School Outcomes for
High School Girls and Boys, 22 VIOLENCE AGAINSTWOMEN 112 (2016).
45 Id. at 112–13.
46 See generallyMcGinley, supra note 19.
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Even social scientists are beginning to understand that their origi-
nal conclusion that bullying is not related to gender is likely erroneous.
Studies demonstrate that for boys and girls there is a positive correla-
tion between being perpetrators of bullying behaviors in middle school,
such as homophobic name-calling, and engaging in sexual violence later
on.47 A recent study found that both boys and girls who reported that
they engaged in bullying and homophobic name-calling during middle
school were more likely to be perpetrators of sexual violence in high
school.48 But the correlation between students who are victims of bully-
ing in middle school and their tendency to commit sexual violence in
high schools is gender dependent. Boys who are victims of homophobic
name-calling react by engaging in more sexual violence against others,
whereas girls who are victims of homophobic name-calling in middle
school are not more likely to perpetrate sexual violence in high school.49
Given that homophobic name-calling in middle schools (which
seems to be largely ignored by teachers) seems to increase the perpetra-
tion of sexual violence in high school, the authors of the study recom-
mended interventions and education of children that would occur before
middle school, in the later elementary school years, that would prevent
homophobic name-calling.50 Prevention of homophobic name-calling
seems to be important not only to reduce the stress of children but also
to reduce increased sexual violence in high school. The authors pointed
to social emotional learning (“SEL”), a system that enhances communi-
cation and empathy of middle school children that has proven success-
ful in reducing homophobic name-calling and sexual violence.51
47 See generally Dorothy L. Espelage, et. al, Longitudinal Examination of the Bullying-Sexual
Violence Pathway across Early to Late Adolescence: Implicating Homophobic Name-Calling, 47 J.
YOUTH&ADOLESCENCE 1880 (2018).
48 Id. at 1880–81, 1888. According to the authors of the study, bullying is engaging in recur-
rent aggressive acts that are physical, verbal, or relational; homophobic name-calling is gender-
based harassment using derogatory terms that indicate that the object is a member of a sexual
minority, but it is often directed at members of sexual majorities as well; sexual violence comprises
nonconsensual physical sexual acts as well as verbal harassment. The authors include both sexual
harassment in the legal sense and physical and verbal harassment in the definition of sexual vio-
lence. Of course, under Title IX, homophobic name calling itself could be a form of gender-based
harassment if it is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive and denies the victim equal access
to educational opportunities.
49 Id. at 1889–90.
50 Id. at 1889.
51 Id. at 1890.
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B. Case Studies of Sex-Based Harassment
Fact patterns alleged in cases and OCR complaints under Title IX
provide a qualitative view of the type of sex- and gender-based harass-
ment that occurs in schools.52 Court cases reveal allegations of egre-
gious harassment against girls and boys perpetrated by individuals and
groups of boys and girls. School officials react by neglecting the behavior
and even by hostile actions toward the victim. One case that demon-
strates the destructive behavior and the school’s failure to protect the
victims isWells v. Hense53 where the plaintiffs alleged54 that two tenth-
grade boys sexually assaulted two tenth-grade girls in a math classroom
with the shades drawn and the doors locked while other students looked
on.55 Afterwards, other students gossiped and harassed the victims ver-
bally. The plaintiffs alleged that the school assured them that they
would investigate and take prompt remedial action but that the school
did not do either. As a result, the girls were forced to leave school and
finish out the school year by studying at home.56
Severe sex- and gender-based harassment occurred in Thomas v.
Town of Chelmsford57where a ninth-grade boy was harassed repeatedly
and ultimately raped with a broomstick by fellow players at football
camp.58 The next day, the coach told the victim, Matthew, “This is part
of growing up.”59 As a result of the school district’s failure to take the
victim’s report seriously, male athletes began to bully and harass Mat-
thew, calling him “Broomstick,” making derogatory sexual comments
about him in school and social media postings, and threatening violence
against him.60 Teachers singled Matthew out in front of other children
in class, ridiculing him, and accusing him of being an “instigator.”61One
teacher failed to discipline a student who hit Matthew with a shoe in
class; another did not comply with Matthew’s Individual Education
52 Depending on the procedural posture of the cases described in this subsection, the facts in
court cases are as alleged or taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; the facts in OCR
investigation reports have been found by a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding of a
school’s liability.
53 235 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017).
54 Id. at 6 (the allegations in this case are taken as true because the court is deciding the
defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)).
55 Id. at 5.
56 Id. at 8–9. The court properly refused to grant the motion to dismiss because the complaint
plausibly alleged deliberate indifference when it alleged that the school did not do an adequate
investigation or punish the boys who were allegedly responsible for the sexual assaults, thus mak-
ing it impossible for the victims to continue in the school.
57 267 F. Supp. 3d 279 (D. Mass. 2017).
58 Id. at 290.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 290–91.
61 Id. at 292–93.
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Plan (“IEP”);62 another told the class, “[C]hildren who report something
are snitches and are the worst type of person.”63 The athletic director
swore at Matthew and told Matthew’s parents that the school had found
no wrongdoing by the alleged rapists.64 The harassment escalated for
months, lasting for the entire school year, with mocking and ridicule at
lacrosse tryouts, sexually explicit threats by one of the alleged rapists
toward Matthew, and a dean’s instruction to Matthew to “man up,” be-
cause the behavior was “boys just being boys.”65 The captain of the la-
crosse team yanked Matthew’s facemask and yelled in his face that he
“was going to f . . . ing kill” Matthew if he did not quit the team.66 Graf-
fiti appeared on the bathroom walls that stated, “Matt Thomas likes it
in the ass.”67 Ultimately, Matthew and his family reported twenty-four
incidents to the school during the school year.68
A female student entering the ninth grade alleged egregious har-
assment in S.K. v. North Allegheny School District.69 Even before the
school year began, the plaintiff received a text message from a tenth-
grade girl stating, “You f . . . ing bitch, I’m going to cut your f . . . ing
face.”70 After the plaintiff told her sister, the plaintiff received another
text message from a second girl stating, “You just dug your grave
deeper.”71 Many harassing posts on the plaintiff’s Facebook page fol-
lowed. This was just the beginning.
Continuous harassment included texts and oral threats from girls
such as “I am going to slit your (and your friend’s) throats, that’s a
promise, not a threat;”72 daily verbal insults in the school halls that the
plaintiff was a “slut” and a “c . . . t;” the altering of a photograph to show
the plaintiff with a banana in her mouth;73 football players throwing
bananas at her and proclaiming loudly that the plaintiff had herpes;
pushing, shoving, and touching by male students; football players pin-
ning the plaintiff against the lockers and groping her sexually; and es-
calating abuse during lunch period so that the plaintiff ultimately had
62 Id. at 293 (the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires schools to create IEPs
for students with disabilities who are covered by the Act. Pub. L. 101-476; 20 U.S.C. 1414).
63 Id. at 294.
64 Id. at 293–94.
65 Id. at 294.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 295.
68 Id.
69 168 F. Supp. 3d 786, 796 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (describing egregious harassment of a ninth-grade
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to eat lunch alone in a classroom. Things got so bad that the harassment
spilled into the plaintiff’s employment, and her employer became
alarmed and warned the principal.74
The plaintiff repeatedly reported these events to the principal. Her
parents filed a police report against a female student who had threat-
ened her.75 In response, the student escalated the harassment, physi-
cally assaulting the plaintiff on many occasions. Despite the relentless
harassment that the plaintiff reported, much of which was witnessed
by faculty members, male athletes who were perpetrators were never
punished. Female harassers and other male harassers were merely
talked to, but school authorities did nothing even remotely effective to
stop the harassment.76 In fact, the plaintiff tried to commit suicide after
more than six months of continuous harassment, but even that act led
to increased harassment.77 The school officials literally gave up; they
told the plaintiff that they could not stop the harassment and encour-
aged her to attend another school. Ultimately, the plaintiff transferred
for the rest of the school year, but she returned to the school the follow-
ing year, and the harassment continued so that the plaintiff was forced
to leave a second time.78
In Haines v. Metropolitan Government of Davidson County,79 an
eleven-year-old girl was subjected to more than twenty sexual assaults
at school by two eleven-year-old boys.80 The complaint alleged that the
boys threw the girl, Jessica, to the ground, laid on top of her in a sexual
manner, fondled her buttocks, breasts, and genitals, and verbally as-
saulted her. They told her that they were going to have sex with her,
and they asked her if she was a virgin and if she had been raped be-
fore.81 When Jessica tried to send a note to her teacher to tell her of the
abuse, her teacher tore up the note and told Jessica not to be a “tattle
tale.”82 Jessica also told the principal, and school authorities did virtu-
ally nothing to stop the harassment. The boys finally admitted to the
harassment, and they were given only one-day in-school suspensions.83
74 Id. at 797.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 799.
78 Id. at 798. Fortunately, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Title IX
claim, which was supposedly based on an argument that there were insufficient allegations of facts
constituting deliberate indifference. It is difficult to imagine that a court would ever dismiss a case
with these facts.
79 Haines v. Metro. Govern. Of Davidson Cty., 32 F. Supp. 2d 991 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
80 Id. at 995.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 996.
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The assaults continued even though Jessica’s psychiatrist warned the
principal about the serious effect of the assaults.84
Besides the cases decided by the courts, OCR case resolutions also
document severe harassment that occurs in schools. One OCR case res-
olution85 revealed that the complaining student had received a series of
private electronic messages attempting to extort nude photos of her,
and the school told her to report it to the police but took no further ac-
tion.86
In the West Contra Costal Unified School District, a spate of har-
assing and criminal behaviors was documented by the OCR. The reso-
lution described severe sexually harassing behavior that permeated the
education environments at school sites.87 The OCR found that a female
student was raped in a high school classroom by two male students in
2008.88 A year later, several men raped another female high school stu-
dent on school property; some of the perpetrators were current or for-
mer students in the district. A male girls’ basketball coach in the dis-
trict was accused the same year of watching female students change
clothes and inappropriate touching and sexual comments in the locker
room in the presence of the entire team.89 The OCR described frequent
nonconsensual sexual touching among students between classes and
during lunch periods. The behavior included groping, grabbing, forced
kisses and hugs, and “grinding.”90 A health center employee admitted
to counseling female students in the West Contra Coastal District every
year because they complained about forced oral sex, being grabbed and
held against their will, and being groped. While most of this behavior
was initiated by male students on female students, sometimes female
students initiated the behavior on male students or the behavior oc-
curred between students of the same sex. Female students sometimes
submitted to unwanted touching because they feared that if they re-
sisted, the behavior would escalate.91 Students often called each other
84 Id.
85 The OCR provides access through its website to case resolution letters and agreements that
were reached after October 1, 2013. These OCR case resolutions are particularly helpful in fur-
thering our understanding of how the OCR interprets the law and applies it to facts on the ground.
SeeU.S.DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.ed.gov/ocr-search-resolutions-letters-and-agreements (last
visited Feb. 5, 2019) [https://perma.cc/379J-LDBZ].
86 See Perris Union High Sch. Dist., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR No. 09-15-1263, 10 (Apr. 21,
2016).
87 West Contra Costal Unified Sch. Dist., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR No. 09-10-5002, 7 (Nov.
6, 2013) (this description gives only some of the facts concerning harassment in this district be-
cause harassment was so pervasive).
88 Id. at 6.
89 Id. at 7.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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sexually derogatory names, and slang about female anatomy was fre-
quent. Rumors circulated concerning female students’ sexual reputa-
tions.
Similar behaviors occurred in the middle and elementary schools
in the same school district, including a female middle school student
who was sexually assaulted by another girl in the restroom.92 There was
pervasive graffiti throughout the district; male students who appeared
feminine were labeled “faggot[s].”93 These student victims were, accord-
ing to a middle school principal, not necessarily gay but were perceived
as such because they did not participate in sports or had mostly female
friends.94
Many of these behaviors that took place in the West Contra Coastal
Unified School District were criminal in nature, and criminal authori-
ties should have investigated and prosecuted where necessary. But be-
cause criminal sanctions take place after the fact, it is crucial for school
authorities who are often present and aware of much of the behavior to
control the behavior before it reaches the criminal level. School admin-
istrators and teachers need to be taught how to recognize and deal with
these situations so they can prevent physical, emotional, and educa-
tional harm to students. Only risk of significant liability or OCR penal-
ties will be sufficient to create the proper incentives to train educators
to take action before the behavior gets out of control.
***
The empirical and qualitative studies and the cases alleging Title
IX violations demonstrate that sex- and gender-based harassment is
common and that it has severe effects. Children’s responses to peer har-
assment, as is obvious from the cases, include crying, inability to go to
school, self-cutting, PTSD, attempted suicide, and ultimately, in the
most severe cases, suicide.95
Cases and OCR complaints and investigation victims seem to be
disproportionately children with disabilities, even if there is no allega-
tion of disability-based discrimination. This finding is consistent with
the studies that demonstrate that children with disabilities are more
vulnerable to harassment than children who do not have disabilities.96
92 Id. at 10.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., T.Z. v. City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (cutting, diffi-
culty sleeping, PTSD).
96 See Jesse Krohn, Sexual Harassment, Sexual Assault, and Students with Special Needs:
Crafting an Effective Response for Schools, 17 U. PENN. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 29, 31–33 (2014).
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Moreover, many complainants in the OCR process allege race or na-
tional origin (as well as disability) and sex- or gender-based harass-
ment. Studies show that girls of color are more often victims of sex- or
gender-based harassment.97 A number of cases also arise in the setting
of very young children. Children as young as five years old are telling
their parents about sexual harassment and their parents are filing com-
plaints.98
One specific concern that arises in the complaints is the possibility
of racial motives for the complaints. While most of the cases do not dis-
cuss race unless the complainant files a race-based claim, race is often
erased from the picture. A proper response to the problem of sex- and
gender-based harassment in school should avoid creating additional
problems by listening to victims or disciplining perpetrators unequally
depending on their racial identities. All schools and OCR officials must
be aware: differential treatment of children based not only on their gen-
der but also on their race must be avoided.99
II. MASCULINITIES, MEANGIRLS, AND PEER SEXHARASSMENT
As noted above, most peer sex- and gender-based harassment in
schools is perpetrated by boys (often in groups), some of it on boys and
some of it on girls. Peer sex- and gender-based harassment stems from
a desire for status by performing masculinity in prescribed ways, and it
often not only solidifies the perpetrator’s place in the group, but also
adds to the group’s status. This article explains that masculinity is a
powerful motivation for sex- and gender-based harassment. While mas-
culinities theory may not completely explain all different types of har-
assment and bullying that occur in school, many cases, when examined
through the lens of masculinities theory, reveal that societal notions of
masculinity underlie a very large percentage of the harassment that
occurs.
Masculinities theory explains that masculinity is not a biological
imperative, but instead is a performance that is socially constructed.
97 See Espelage et al., Understanding, supra note 38.
98 See Amy B. Cyphert, Objectively Offensive: The Problem of Applying Title IX to Very Young
Children, 51 FAM. L. QUART. 325 (2017) (discussing cases of very small children accused of sexual
harassment); Hunter v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 456 F. Supp. 2d 255 (D. Mass. 2006) (alleging
that kindergartner was coerced by a third-grade male student into lifting up her dress, pulling
down her underwear, and spreading her legs every time she wore a dress on the school bus).
99 At the time I was writing this, a woman who was a high school and middle school principal
informed me that in the middle school in which she worked, a school of lower income families,
parents of white girls would frequently complain that black boys were harassing the girls. The
difficulties associated with these types of reports, given the historical context in the U.S. are obvi-
ous, and OCR workers and educators must be trained to handle these types of cases with sensitiv-
ity.
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Boys are encouraged to perform a particular type of masculinity. Mas-
culinity is defined by what one is not, not by what one is. That is, mas-
culine boys must constantly prove that they are not girls (or effeminate)
and not gay.100 Boys should be tough, not weak. A showing of emotion—
especially crying or tenderness—makes a boy weak. Boys are particu-
larly vulnerable to these messages and bullying from a failure to comply
with the masculinity code in their pre-teen years. As a result, as they
approach puberty, it is not uncommon for boys to engage in masculinity-
enhancing performances, including sex- and gender-based harassment
and violence against boys and girls in order to prove their masculinity
to themselves and to the boys surrounding them.101
Depending on the individual’s intersectional identities, there are
numerous ways to perform masculinity.102 Boys of different social clas-
ses and races tend to perform masculinity in different ways. Among
adults, the most powerful masculinity is that of the hegemonic mascu-
linity—the type of masculinity associated with upper-middle class
white men who are wealthy professionals. But, even in the adult world,
different groups in society approve of different types of performances,
100 See NANCY E. DOWD, THEMANQUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 36 (2010).
There is a strong current among progressive young adults that resists the binary classification of
sex as male and female. I recognize and applaud this movement and understand that not all per-
sons fit into the binary that society has established. Clearly, persons are born intersex as well as
male and female; moreover, trans and other non-cisgender persons may live on a gender spectrum
and perform their genders in different ways depending on their preferences or needs. See, e.g.,
Amanda Montañez, Visualizing Sex as a Spectrum, SCIENTIFICAMERICAN (Aug. 29, 2017), https://
blogs.scientificamerican.com/sa-visual/visualizing-sex-as-a-spectrum/ [http://perma.cc/46LQ-57Q
P]; Ritch C. Savin-Williams, What Everyone Should Know About Genderqueer and Nonbinary,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (July 29, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/sex-sexuality-and-
romance/201807/what-everyone-should-know-about-genderqueer-and-non-binary [https://perma.c
c/3YT6-KTUY]. The gender regime that I describe—an imposition of masculinity on boys – is par-
ticularly harmful to those individuals who do not wish to, or who cannot, alter their bodies or
genders to perform as society expects. It is difficult to explain gender theory given that much of
it—at least the language used—relies in large part on the binary that has previously been ac-
cepted, but I hope to avoid essentialism in my analysis. The binary itself is essentialist, and to
some extent, so is much of masculinities theory. But this theory is receptive to all persons, whether
cisgender or not, and should be supportive if we can find a language that works to describe the
reality that is society’s pressure on persons who are perceived to be men and boys to perform mas-
culinity in particular ways given their particular identities (racial, age-based, sexual orientation,
etc.) in certain contexts. I will leave for another day the effort to create a language that is more
inclusive should this essay fail to be so.
101 SeeMcGinley, supra note 6; Beth A. Quinn, Sexual Harassment andMasculinity: The Power
and Meaning of “Girl Watching,” 16 GENDER& SOC’Y 386 (2002).
102 SeeMCGINLEY, supra note 9.
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and individuals tend to perform the masculine identities that are fa-
vored by the groups to which they belong.103 These performances, too,
often take a toll on the individual.104
While different socio-economic groups express preferred masculin-
ity in different ways,105 common among all socio-economic groups is the
use of sex- and gender-based harassment of women and men (girls and
boys) as a means of proving their masculinity to themselves and oth-
ers.106 The victims are male and female, straight, gay, and trans. Work-
places are key locations for proving masculinity because men’s sense of
identity often derives from the work they do.107 But these behaviors ap-
pear much sooner in boys’ lives. Gender norms are ubiquitous in our
culture, and young children are aware of gendered expectations long
before they attend school. Once in school, boys from all social and racial
backgrounds feel pressure to prove their masculinity. Boys are admon-
ished not to be a “girl,” in other words, not to be weak.108 In schools, sex-
and gender-based harassment is rampant, both at the college and uni-
versity levels and from kindergarten through high school.109
In schools, boys are encouraged to demonstrate their masculinity
and to hide their feminine characteristics. One way of doing this at the
middle and high school levels is through sex- and gender-based harass-
ment.110 Groups of boys join to harass both girls and other boys. The
goal of harassing boys and girls is to elevate the masculinity of the har-
assers and to set group gender rules. Harassing both boys and girls es-
tablishes the superiority of masculinity over femininity.111 Boys who do
not conform their gender performances to accepted forms of masculinity
103 See Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L. REV. 221, 242–
47, 256–59 (2015) (examining the different forms of masculinity performed by male police officers
and young black men living in neighborhoods targeted by the police).
104 See DOWD, supra note 100, at 58–60.
105 SeeMCGINLEY, supra note 9, at 24–25; McGinley, Policing, supra note 103 (explaining that
men are responsible for more than 90% of violence internationally, compared to their female coun-
terparts who commit only about 10% of violent acts; that engaging in crime is a masculine perfor-
mance; that a large percentage of young men of all classes commit crimes, but the types of crimes
men commit vary depending on their class status, and middle and upper class young men tend to
“age out” of crime sooner because of the availability of paid work).
106 SeeMcGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, supra note 6.
107 MCGINLEY, supra note 9, at 29–32.
108 See PLAN INTERNATIONAL, THE STATE OF GENDER EQUALITY FOR U.S. ADOLESCENTS 4–5
(2018) (finding in a 2018 survey of 1,000 children ages 10–19 that 82% of boys surveyed had heard
someone tell a boy that he was acting like a girl, which they interpret to mean that the boy is
“emotional, crying, sensitive, weak, feminine, and moody/dramatic—and implicitly unbecoming.”).
109 See supra Part I, at 4–7. RAINN, CAMPUS SEXUAL VIOLENCE: STATISTICS (2019),
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/campus-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/BV9J-9DUK].
110 See generally, McGinley, supra note 6.
111 Id. at 104.
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are frequently the victims of this harassment. Moreover, boys, espe-
cially in segregated spaces such as sports teams, tend to harass other
boys who are new to the program in order to assure understanding of
and compliance with the rules of masculinity.112 In schools, some of the
cases reveal, coaches either join in or look the other way when this boy-
on-boy harassment is occurring.113
When girls join groups of boys to harass boys, they may do so in
large part in order to “fit in” with the most powerful group of boys who
perform their masculinity in a socially acceptable manner.114 At the
middle school level this type of harassment increases substantially,115
at a time when children are encountering their own gender and sexual
identities. The harassment serves to establish and preserve the soci-
ety’s gender hierarchy. Girls, as well as boys, police the gender perfor-
mances of boys by, for example, homophobic name-calling.116 This be-
havior is directed not only at boys who are gay but also at boys who
identify as straight.117 Thus, although the language used often refers to
the supposed sexual orientations of the victims, the behavior is used not
only to punish outsiders because of their sexual orientations but also
because their gender identities do not conform to the expected roles.
One purpose of the harassment is to assure the power of the binary gen-
der roles that the boys and girls play. The harassment not only confirms
the power of the masculine boys and feminine girls but also denigrates
the victims for their failure to perform their masculinity in socially ac-
ceptable ways.118
We often hear of “mean girls,”119 popular girls who engage in com-
petitive mistreatment of other girls, especially during middle and high
112 Id. at 106.
113 See Perris Union High Sch. Dist., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR No. 09-15-1263, 10 (Apr. 21,
2016).
114 There is some emerging research that shows that at least some girls use forms of relational
aggressive behavior as well as physical and verbal aggression toward boys as well. See, e.g., Si-
obhan Dytham, The Role of Popular Girls in Bullying and Intimidating Boys and Other Popular
Girls in Secondary School, 44 BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 212 (2018) (describing aggression of popular girls
toward other girls and boys in a white working-class school in England).
115 See, e.g., S.K. North Allegheny Sch. Dist., 168 F. Supp. 3d 786 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (sexually,
physically and verbally harassing behaviors against a ninth-grade girl).
116 See Espelage, supra note 47, at 1880–81.
117 Id.
118 See, McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, supra note 6.
119 “Mean Girls” was a movie starring Lindsey Lohan produced by Paramount Pictures in 2004.
The plot focuses on a clique of popular high school girls, known as “the Plastics” who mistreat
other girls in the school. See MEAN GIRLS (Paramount Pictures 2004). “Mean Girls” is also cur-
rently a Broadway musical. Both the movie and the play were inspired by Queen Bees and Wan-
nabes by Rosalind Wiseman. See ROSALINE WISEMAN, QUEEN BEES AND WANNABES: HELPING
YOURDAUGHTERSURVIVECLIQUES, GOSSIP, BOYS,AND THENEWREALITIES OFGIRLWORLD (2002).
See Esther Zuckerman, Revisiting ‘Mean Girls’ with Rosalind Wiseman (Apr. 28, 2014), https://ww
w.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/04/revisiting-mean-girls-with-rosalind-wiseman/3
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school years.120 Many of these behaviors, too, are likely attributable to
maintaining gender hierarchies in schools. The “mean girls” are aligned
with the popular boys who perform the most powerful form of mascu-
linity, and, generally, the girls’ power comes from their relationship
with these boys. Girls may use harassment of other girls to maintain
their competitive edge with the most powerful boys—the masculine
boys—and to assure that the hierarchy of the masculine over the femi-
nine continues to thrive.121 The relationships between gender dynamics
and bullying and harassment in schools are very complicated, but there
is no question that gender is involved.
Gendered behaviors are difficult to recognize because gender is of-
ten invisible. That is, because gender is embedded in our society, we
interpret learned gender behaviors as biological imperatives, and we
see the behavior as normal. But much learned behavior that is destruc-
tive of children, both boys and girls, does not result from biology but
from societal pressures to conform to certain gender norms. The cases
discussed below give a glimpse into the types of behaviors that children
are perpetrating on other children and the failure of adults to recognize
the seriousness of the behaviors and to respond to them appropriately.
The cases demonstrate that some teachers and administrators stand by
as sex- and gender-based harassment occurs between peers without dis-
ciplining the perpetrators. Even worse, other teachers, coaches, and ad-
ministrators join in verbal sex- or gender-based harassment of victims,
in essence demonstrating by their actions that this behavior is accepta-
ble and even condoned. As a result, schools have become training
grounds for sex- and gender-based harassment in the workplace and
other locations in society.122 But the research shows that it is not only
61283/ [http://perma.cc/R6HT-KPRA].
120 For a real-life example, see North Allegheny Sch. Dist., 168 F. Supp. 3d at 796–99 (describ-
ing harassment inflicted by groups of girls and boys and by individual boys and girls).
121 Feminist writers have criticized the “mean girls” trope. See, e.g., Jennifer Bethune and
Marnina Gonick, Schooling the Mean Girl: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Teacher Resource Ma-
terials, 29 GENDER AND EDUCATION 389 (2017). Feminist writers consider the “mean girls” litera-
ture to be anti-girl and responsible for creating and maintaining social stereotypes about girls and
boys and the gender-binary. Id. at 389–91. “Mean girls” texts also focus on individual behavior and
choice as a response but ignore systemic inequality of girls in our society while perceiving girls’
aggressive behavior as aberrant, but biological, and boys’ aggressive behaviors as normal. Id. at
392. Moreover, critics of the “mean girls” literature point out that it is class-based in that it sees
upper middle-class white girls as performing relational aggression and working-class girls who are
white or of other races as more physically and verbally aggressive. While a complete analysis of
girls and the “mean girls” phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article, it is important not to
accept the “mean girls” literature as merely a description of reality and to recognize that it may be
a discourse that is responsible for creating gender differences and expectations. Id. at 393.
122 I am not taking the position that schools are the only training grounds for this type of har-
assment. Harassment is pervasive both in the family and throughout society as well, but schools
have a unique role in their ability to take a stand to influence children’s views about sex and
gender, and they participate in the harassment by either standing by or outwardly condoning it.
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the schools where children are educated. Gender messages are ubiqui-
tous in our families and other institutions, but a reversal of the damag-
ing effects of gender in schools will only come once administrators and
teachers are educated about gender, educate their students and their
parents, and refuse to allow sex- and gender-based harassment to con-
tinue in the schools. Exposing schools to legal liability and penalties
imposed by the OCR should create the proper incentives for adminis-
trators and teachers to take this education seriously.
III. THE LAW’S RESPONSE TO PEER SEX- ANDGENDER-BASED
HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS
A. The Courts’ Extreme Deference to School Authorities
1. The Supreme Court
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits a student
from being excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or sub-
jected to discrimination under any educational program or activity that
receives federal financial assistance.123 The Act authorizes an adminis-
trative enforcement scheme for Title IX; federal agencies with authority
to provide financial assistance may promulgate rules, regulations, and
orders that enforce Title IX’s objectives of assuring equal access to edu-
cational opportunities for all students, no matter their sex or gender.124
Although the Act does not explicitly grant a private right of action for
damages against school boards, the Supreme Court has implied a cause
of action for damages where there is teacher-on-student harassment,125
or student-on-student harassment.126
Although the statute does not state standards for holding a school
authority liable for damages, the Supreme Court adopted stringent
standards for liability when it implied a cause of action for damages.127
These standards have made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to pre-
vail in cases against school districts. Additionally, although the stand-
ards set forth in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education128 for peer
harassment are very exacting, many lower courts, when applying the
Supreme Court standards to the facts before them, have interpreted
these standards to be even more difficult to meet than the original Su-
123 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
124 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
125 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
126 Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 635 (1999).
127 Id.; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
128 Davis, 526 U.S. 635.
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preme Court case appears to require. Thus, very few cases brought un-
der Title IX for sex- or gender-based harassment survive motions to dis-
miss or for summary judgment.
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,129 which was
decided the year before Davis, the Court had authorized liability of a
school district for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student only if “an
official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to insti-
tute corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of,
and is deliberately indifferent to the teacher’s misconduct.”130
A year later, in Davis, the Court held that a school board may face
liability for third-party harassment of its students only where it has
“substantial control” over both the harasser and the context in which
the harassment occurs.131 A school board will be liable for peer sex- and
gender-based harassment if the plaintiff proves that: 1) the school ad-
ministration had actual knowledge of the behavior; 2) exhibited delib-
erate indifference to the harassment; and 3) the harassment was so se-
vere, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denied the victim equal
access to educational opportunities.132 A plaintiff need not show physi-
cal exclusion from the educational opportunity in order to prove a denial
of equal access.133 Rather, a plaintiff must establish that the harass-
ment undermined and detracted from the victim’s educational experi-
ence so that she or he was effectively denied equal access to the institu-
tion’s resources and opportunities.134 In determining whether the
behavior itself is sufficiently severe and pervasive,135Davis cited an em-
ployment discrimination case brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, concluding that context matters. The “constellation of sur-
rounding circumstances, expectations and relationships” including, but
not limited, to the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number
of individuals involved must be considered.136
Moreover, the Supreme Court counseled that schools are different
from workplaces in that children regularly interact in ways that would
129 524 U.S. 274.
130 Id. at 277.
131 Davis, 526 U.S. at 645.
132 Id. at 651–52.
133 Id. at 651.
134 Id. at 651.
135 Under Title VII, the plaintiff must show either that the behavior is severe or that it is per-
vasive, which appears to be a lower standard than that applied in Title IX, which requires a show-
ing that the behavior is severe and pervasive. By the same token, as mentioned above, the Court
cited to a Title VII case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Service, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) when
it analyzed the standard.
136 Davis, 523 U.S. at 651, citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
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be unacceptable for adults.137 Thus, school students engage in “insults,
banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is
upsetting to the students subjected to it.”138 Damages are not available
to victims of “simple acts of teasing and name calling among school chil-
dren” even if the comments are gendered.139 The Court also noted that
it is possible but unlikely that a single incident of harassment would
deny equal access to educational opportunities, and that damages
should be limited to situations where the harassing behavior and the
school’s indifference to it have a systemic effect on educational pro-
grams or activities.140 Finally, the Court explained that it should be eas-
ier to recover damages against a school board based on teacher-on-stu-
dent harassment than peer harassment among students.141
Despite these rigid standards, the Court refused to affirm the lower
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s case. The complaint alleged that La-
Shonda Davis, a fifth-grade girl, suffered repeated sex-based physical
and verbal harassment over a five month period by a boy in her class
who ultimately pleaded guilty to sexual battery for his conduct.142 Both
LaShonda and her mother told a number of teachers of the incidents,
and one teacher told her mother that the principal had been in-
formed.143 The complaint also alleged that a group of girls (along with
LaShonda) who were sexually harassed by the same boy attempted to
speak to the principal, but a teacher told them that the principal would
call them if he wanted to speak to them.144 No call was made to the
girls.145 La Shonda’s mother, however, finally spoke to the principal who
never took disciplinary action against the boy.146 The complaint also al-
leged that LaShonda’s grades dropped because she could not concen-
trate, and, ultimately, she wrote a suicide note.147 Finally, the com-
plaint alleged that the Board of Education had not established a policy
on peer sexual harassment or instructed its personnel on how to re-
spond to student-on-student harassment.148
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 652.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 653.
142 Id. at 633.
143 Id. at 633–34.
144 Id. at 635.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 634.
148 Id.
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A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the allegations
were sufficient to state a cause of action under Title IX because La-
Shonda was a victim of repeated verbal and physical acts of sexual har-
assment over a five-month period, and the alleged behavior was severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive.149 The allegations suggest that the
harassment had a concrete negative effect on LaShonda, and that the
Board had actual knowledge and responded with deliberate indifference
when it made no effort to investigate or correct the harassment.150
2. The lower courts’ response to Davis
Many of the lower courts have interpreted Gebser and Davis in the
strictest fashion, concluding in subsequent cases with egregious facts
that the plaintiff did not, as a matter of law, meet the Supreme Court’s
standards. But a few other courts have taken a more measured ap-
proach to these standards. The following section analyzes cases with
reference to individual requirements of the Supreme Court’s standard,
and also as a whole.
a. Actual notice
Davis requires that school authorities have actual notice of the har-
assment before the school has a responsibility to correct the situation.
There are a number of questions concerning what this requirement
means in the peer harassment cases. First, it is unclear, because of con-
flicting and insufficient caselaw, whether notice to a supervising
teacher is sufficient to give the district actual notice. Second, it has not
been resolved whether notice of a perpetrator’s prior harassment of the
individual in question or of others is sufficient notice to constitute ac-
tual knowledge that would trigger the school’s responsibility to act to
prevent more harassment. Third, where the victims are very vulnerable
because of young age or intellectual disabilities, and therefore unable
to communicate to school authorities in a sex-specific way, it is unclear
what type of communication is sufficient to satisfy the actual knowledge
requirement.
i. Sufficiency of notice to supervising teacher
There remains a question as to who should have actual notice in
the peer harassment cases. Gebser states that actual notice exists only
if an official who has the authority to take corrective action has notice
149 Id. at 653–54.
150 Id.
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of the harassment in the teacher-on-student cases.151 Given that in
teacher-instituted harassment an administrator may be the lowest
level person with authority to take corrective action, a number of courts
of appeals have held that knowledge of a fellow teacher or guidance
counselor of ongoing sexual harassment of a student by a teacher is in-
sufficient to constitute actual notice for purposes of a school district’s
Title IX liability.152 Davis does not discuss this issue with reference to
peer harassment, but there is a non-trivial argument that notice to a
teacher who supervises both the perpetrator and the victim would be
sufficient to satisfy the actual notice requirement.153
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit declined to decide this question,
stating that it would be necessary to study how Florida organizes its
public schools and grants authority and responsibility by state law to
administrators and teachers, the school district’s discrimination poli-
cies and procedures, and the facts of the particular case.154 Other courts
have not yet decided the issue.
ii. Notice of perpetrator’s prior harassment
A second issue is whether school authorities’ knowledge of past har-
assment by the perpetrator is sufficient to fulfill the actual notice re-
quirement of Title IX regarding a new harassing event. The question is
whether a victim of a perpetrator’s harassment can point to school au-
thorities’ knowledge that the perpetrator had harassed this same victim
or a different victim in the past sufficient to constitute actual
knowledge. If so, the question would arise as to whether school author-
ities were under a duty to remedy the past harassment and to prevent
future harassment.
Courts in a number of circuits conclude that notice of prior sexual
harassment in a teacher-on-student harassment Title IX case is suffi-
cient to constitute actual notice in a subsequent case with the same
teacher and a finding of deliberate indifference follows if the prior har-
assment is not distant in time or type from the current harassment.155
151 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998).
152 See, e.g., Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1265 (1997).
153 The regulations proposed by the Department of Education actually conclude that knowledge
of a teacher in elementary and secondary school is sufficient to constitute actual knowledge of the
school. This is because the teacher has a duty to report and correct harassing behavior. See 83 Fed.
Reg. 61462 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt.106).
154 Hawkins v. Sarasota Cty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2003).
155 See, e.g., J.M. ex rel. Morris v. Hilldale Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1-29, 2010
WL 3516730 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2010) (upholding a jury verdict holding school district liable and
finding actual knowledge and deliberate indifference toward an inappropriate sexual relationship
between a student and teacher where another student reported to the school principal that he saw
the student lying on the teacher’s bed in a hotel room with the door closed on a band trip); see also
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These courts state that knowledge of prior acts of harassment is suffi-
cient to constitute actual notice to the school administration that a
teacher is a substantial risk to the students.156 But prior notice of a uni-
versity administration of a professor’s relationships with two older non-
traditional students, ten year-old accusations of inappropriate com-
ments, and one touching incident were not sufficiently similar or close
in time to the repeated groping and touching alleged in the later case
before the court to constitute actual notice that would trigger the uni-
versity’s responsibility to prevent injury to the current plaintiff.157
A lower court in the Second Circuit has concluded that, “In the con-
text of deliberate indifference, the actual notice standard may be satis-
fied by knowledge of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ where there
have been multiple prior allegations of the same or similar conduct that
is at issue.”158 And some courts hold that there is actual knowledge
when there is a substantial risk created by a person whom the author-
ities know has engaged in abuse of other students.159 This reading of
actual knowledge is more consistent with the goals of Title IX to prevent
unequal access based on gender or sex than requiring a showing that
school authorities had actual knowledge of the abuser’s behavior in the
particular case. Permitting schools to wait until the harm occurs before
they react gives schools near immunity from damages.
iii. Actual notice when vulnerable victim unable to com-
municate in sex-specific terms
A third related question arises as to the specificity necessary of the
student complaint to school authorities, especially when the student
victim is particularly vulnerable because of young age or intellectual
disability and is unable to communicate in sex-specific terms. In a num-
ber of cases, young students and those with intellectual disabilities
have reported to school officials in general terms that they were being
Escue v. N. Okla. College, 450 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that even under the more liberal
reading of Title IX that would permit a finding of actual knowledge based on prior incidents, two
consensual relationships with non-traditional students and a ten-year old report of repeated inap-
propriate comments and one touching were not sufficiently close-in-time or similar to the type of
non-consensual groping alleged by the plaintiff and therefore were insufficient to provide actual
notice to the university administration); Doe A. v. Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Nev. 2004)
(holding that reports to a principal that a fourteen year old girl was uncomfortable with attention
from a coach, and subsequent partial admission and denials by the girl were sufficient to trigger a
more rigorous investigation and to demonstrate actual notice by the school of the inappropriate
relationship).
156 See, e.g., Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1033–34.
157 Escue, 450 F.3d at 1153.
158 Carabello v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 627, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quot-
ing Zamora v. N. Salem Cent. Sch. Dist., 414 F. Supp. 2d 418, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
159 Id.
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bothered or that their perpetrators were acting “nasty.”160 Courts have
generally held that under these circumstances there is no actual notice
even if the victims are very young or intellectually disabled.161
For example, in Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs Re-2 Sch.
Dist.,162 a seventh-grade female student who was intellectually disabled
was repeatedly coerced into performing sexual acts on a number of boys
for a number of years. A few years into the coercive behavior, the vic-
tim’s mother asked the school psychologist to find out why the victim
did not wish to go to school. The victim testified in her deposition that
she told the school counselor that the boys were “bothering” her, but
that she did not know the word “assault” at that time.163 Her personal
therapist testified that the victim told him that she had told the coun-
selor at school about the coerced sexual behavior with the boys.164 The
court concluded, however, that the information given to the counselor
was insufficient to give the school actual notice that the child was being
harassed and assaulted.165 And, the knowledge the school did have cre-
ated no responsibility to investigate further.166
Similarly, in Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board,167 three
eight-year-old girls (Jane Does I, II, and III) were allegedly harassed
repeatedly over several months by an eight-year-old boy in their class
in a series of gestures; obscene comments, such as telling them he
wanted to “suck” their breasts, he wanted them to “suck the juice from
his penis,” and he wanted them to “have sex with him;” and actions such
as chasing them and touching them on their breasts and groin, attempt-
ing to kiss them, grabbing one of them and looking up her skirt, and
rubbing his body on hers.168 The girls cried frequently, were anxious
about going to school, and at least two of them pretended that they were
sick on four or five occasions so they would not have to go to school.169
Both boys and girls in the class had complained to the teacher that this
boy was bothering them, was disruptive, and that he had pushed chil-
dren on the playground.170 At one point, Jane Doe II and two other girls
told the teacher that he was being “disgusting.” The teacher testified,
160 See Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs Re-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir.
2008).
161 Id. at 1119.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1119–20.
164 Id. at 1120.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 322 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2003).
168 Id. at 1281.
169 Id. at 1281–82.
170 Id. at 1282.
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however, that it was not until she spoke with Jane Doe III’s mother a
number of months later that she heard of the explicit things John Doe
had said and done.171 The girls testified, however, that they had repeat-
edly and persistently described his behavior to the teacher, and the
teacher had ignored their complaints.172
These persistent complaints of three eight-year-old girls to their
teacher should be sufficient to create a responsibility on the teacher’s
part to investigate the issue further. Had she investigated (or even lis-
tened to Jane Doe III), she would have found out the explicit facts of the
boy’s behavior toward the girls. This is particularly troubling in this
situation, as in Rost, because these victims were vulnerable due to their
youth and may have been unable to describe the boy’s behavior explic-
itly without prompting. Clearly, these holdings protect school districts
from liability, but they do not encourage schools to act proactively when
they have sufficient information that should lead to a duty to investi-
gate more thoroughly general complaints from young or intellectually
disabled children who may be incapable of explaining the assaults or
harassment.
b. Deliberate indifference
In Title IX cases, the issue of deliberate indifference is linked to
actual knowledge.173 If there is no knowledge, it is impossible to show
deliberate indifference. Assuming that there is actual knowledge, how-
ever, the courts have applied the deliberate indifference standard very
strictly. Courts require that the school administration’s response to
known harassment be clearly unreasonable. Given this standard, some
courts have found almost any response short of ignoring the harass-
ment sufficient. At least some courts conclude that the school does not
have to stop the harassment, nor is it clearly unreasonable if it insti-
tutes a remedy but does not meet again to decide whether to continue
with the remedy.174Other courts hold that if the school authorities learn
that their remedy has been ineffective in that the remedy did not stop
the harassment, the school can be deliberately indifferent.175
171 Id.
172 Id. (the court ducked the issue of whether notice to the teacher alone would be sufficient
under Title IX, concluding that even if there was actual notice and deliberate indifference, the girls
had not been denied access to an education opportunity as a matter of law because the behavior
was not sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive and because the girls’ grades in
school did not suffer); see also id. at 1288.
173 See, e.g., Gant ex. rel. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d. 134, 141 (2d. Cir. 1999).
174 See, e.g., Pahssen v. Merrill Community Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2012).
175 See, e.g., Hunter ex rel. Hunter v. Barnstable Sch. Committee, 456 F. Supp. 2d 255, 265 (D.
Mass. 2006) (stating that there is a split in the circuits as to this issue); Wills v. Brown University,
184, F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that once school authorities find out that their remedy—
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A good example of the former is Pahssen v. Merrill Community
School District.176 In Pahssen, John Doe, a ninth grader, committed
three fairly serious acts of sexual harassment against Jane Doe, an
eighth-grade girl, and ultimately raped her at school.177 When notified
of the three incidents (before the rape), school officials met to discuss
an Individual Education Plan (IEP) for John, who was in special educa-
tion, to determine what to do about the boy’s aggressiveness.178 The
team decided to place John under constant adult supervision for thirty
days, but the team never met again to decide whether to lift the super-
vision; it was automatically lifted at the expiration of thirty days.179
Less than two months later, the boy raped the girl at school.180 Although
both the Justice Department, which joined as an amicus, and the girls’
father argued in briefs that the school had shown deliberate indiffer-
ence when it failed to continue to supervise the boy after thirty days
elapsed, the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment of the Title IX claim, holding that the school did not demon-
strate deliberate indifference.181
In this case and others, courts repeatedly emphasize that courts
should defer to school administrators, that schools have limited re-
sources, and that children are often cruel to each other in determining
that the school did not act in a clearly unreasonable manner and there-
fore did not display deliberate indifference.182 The courts require that
the harassing behavior against a particular individual reach the level
of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive and that the school know
about it before a responsibility to react is triggered.183 But as the cases
demonstrate, harassing behavior escalates.184 It starts as bothersome
pushing and name calling, but soon it moves to punching and shoving,
obscene comments and gestures, demands for oral sex, and sexual as-
sault. A school district should not escape liability for the ultimate severe
behavior when it knows in advance that some of these behaviors are
occurring and does nothing about it.
in a professor-on-student harassment case—has not worked “it may be required to take further
steps to avoid new liability.”).
176 668 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2012).




181 Id. at 363.
182 Id. at 363, 365.
183 See, e.g., Pahssen, 668 F.3d 356.
184 See, e.g., Patterson v. Hudson Area Schools, 551 F.3d at 439–42 (describing homophobic
name-calling, pushing, shoving, destruction of property, and ultimately sexual assault).
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In Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger County,185 a boy who weighed less
than eighty pounds in the seventh grade was continuously harassed,
bullied, and battered; he was punched in the face and in the stomach,
thrown to the floor, and kicked while he was on the floor.186 On at least
two occasions, D.S. was pushed, and he fell and hit his head.187 On an-
other, D.S. had his face slammed into a locker and had gum put in his
hair.188 As he was physically assaulted, D.S. was frequently called “fag-
got,” “pussy,” “pedophile,” and other insulting slurs regarding his gen-
der, sexual orientation and proclivities.189 Affidavits by third parties
stated that a friend of D.S. witnessed students ramming D.S.’s head
into a locker, another student threatened to kill D.S., and a third stu-
dent told D.S. to kill himself.190 This behavior occurred continuously for
two school years, and D.S. and his mother complained after many of the
assaults and batteries occurred.191 Despite that D.S.’s mother com-
plained repeatedly to the principal and the principal met with them a
number of times, the situation was never cured. D.S. testified that the
disciplinary supervisor for the county schools, Coombs, stated that he
could not keep D.S. safe, but Coombs denied making this statement.192
A number of investigations took place, and the instigators were pun-
ished, but to no avail.193
The court held that as a matter of law the school district did not
show deliberate indifference because it engaged in a number of investi-
gations, gave in-school suspensions to some of the harassers, and
changed class scheduling to separate D.S. from his harassers.194 The
Sixth Circuit had held earlier in Vance v. Spencer County195 that there
was a jury question of deliberate indifference when school officials had
actual knowledge that its efforts to cure the problem did not work and
continued to use those same efforts unsuccessfully.196 However, in
Stiles, it distinguished Vance, stating that the school had made many
185 819 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2016).
186 Id. at 834–46.
187 Id. at 842.
188 Id. at 846.
189 Id. at 845.
190 Id. at 846 n.7. These statements contained hearsay and therefore the court refused to con-
sider them on the motion for summary judgment. But see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986) (evidence creating issue of fact for nonmoving party need not be in admissible form).
191 Stiles, 819 F.3d at 834–46.
192 Id. at 845.
193 Id. at 850.
194 Id.
195 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000).
196 See Stiles, 819 F.3d at 849–50, citing Vance, 231 F.3d at 261.
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efforts and there were almost no repeat offenders in the Stiles case, un-
like in Vance.197
The court in Stiles also distinguished Patterson v. Hudson Area
Schools198 largely because school officials had reason to believe in Stiles
that D.S. was “at least an occasional instigator” of some of the physical
confrontations.199 The court’s adoption of this “defense” to a possible
finding of deliberate indifference appears to add an “unwelcomeness”
requirement into Title IX’s already stringent standards.200 This is an
inappropriate standard to graft onto the situation of a middle school boy
who suffers serious physical and verbal harassment, much of which, if
reported to the police, would constitute crimes against him. Grafting an
unwelcomeness requirement in this situation only serves to reward the
true perpetrators and to let the school off the hook for its failures to
control the situation.
Clearly, these are very complicated situations, and there was some
attempt by school officials in Stiles to remedy the situation, but a rea-
sonable jury could conclude that at some point during the two-year pe-
riod of harassment it became obvious that the school’s efforts to stop the
harassment were not working. At that point, a jury could conclude that
the school operated with deliberate indifference when it did not report
the abusers to the police and did not suspend or expel the abusers or
engage in any other disciplinary measure designed to stop the harass-
ment. This case demonstrates the difficulty of meeting the deliberate
indifference standard. While this standard was intentionally set by the
Supreme Court so as not to permit undue interference with the educa-
tional prerogatives of school officials, this case demonstrates that, at
least as it was interpreted in this case, it does not serve to protect school
children from gender-based discrimination. Even given allegations of
grossly dangerous harassment and bullying that rises to the level of
encouraging suicide, criminal batteries, and other severe behaviors, the
court concluded as a matter of law that the school’s knowing ineffective
response was not deliberate indifference.
197 Id. at 850.
198 551 F.3d. 438 (6th Cir. 2009).
199 Stiles, 819 F.3d at 851.
200 In Title VII sexual harassment cases, the plaintiff must prove that the harassing behavior
was unwelcome. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The original reason for this
requirement was related to the question of consent in a sexual harassment case of a supervisor
who imposed himself sexually on a subordinate. Although the Court made clear inMeritor Savings
Bank that the unwelcomeness requirement does not mean that the plaintiff must show that she
did not consent to the behavior because of the differential power between a supervisor and subor-
dinate, the plaintiff still had to demonstrate that she did not wish to engage in the behavior. Id.
at 68.
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c. Severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive sufficient to
deny equal access to educational opportunities
The severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive standard is linked
to whether the behavior is serious enough to deny equal access to school
opportunities because of the individual’s sex or gender. In determining
whether illegal harassment occurred, it would make sense, then, to take
into account the ages of victims and the victims’ subjective reaction to
the harassment as well as to its objective severity, but courts do not
always do so. In Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board,201 for ex-
ample, the court concluded that the behavior was “not so severe, perva-
sive, and objectively offensive that it had the systemic effect of denying
the [three eight-year-old girl victims] equal access to education.”202 The
court stated that the effect must be systemic, which means that a single
instance of one-on-one peer harassment would be insufficient, and “the
effects of the harassment [must] touch the whole or entirety of an edu-
cational program or activity.”203 This standard is incorrect. Other courts
have held that one single incident, if sufficiently severe, can deprive an
individual victim of access to equal educational opportunities.204
Moreover, inHawkins, the victims alleged ongoing, repeated verbal
and physical harassment of a sexual nature. But the court noted that
the girls did not suffer sufficiently. The court stated:
None of the girls suffered a decline in grades and none of their
teachers observed any change in their demeanor in classroom
participation. The girls simply testify that they were upset about
the harassment, although not enough to tell their parents until
months after it began. Two of the girls say they faked being sick
four or five times in order not to go to school. This falls short of
demonstrating a systemic effect of denying equal access to an
educational program or activity.205
How should a victim prove that there has been a systemic effect on
the entire educational program? It seems odd that a statute that was
intended to protect women and girls from unequal educations would re-
quire them to suffer in the extreme in order to get their education. As
Justice O’Connor stated for the Court in the Title VII context in Harris
v. Forklift Systems: 206
201 322 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2003).
202 Id. at 1288 (emphasis added).
203 Id. at 1289.
204 See, e.g., T.Z. v. City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
205 Hawkins, 332 F.3d at 1289.
206 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads
to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work envi-
ronment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ psy-
chological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’
job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the
job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover,
even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that
the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it cre-
ated a work environment abusive to employees because of their
race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad
rule of workplace equality.207
The behavior in question in Hawkins certainly created an unequal
educational environment for the girls who were harassed. It would
make little sense to assume that denial of equal access depends merely
on the subjective emotional strength or weakness of the victim or on the
systemic effect of the harassment. As in Title VII coverage, Title IX
should protect victims before they have psychological breakdowns.208
A number of other courts have concluded that harassing behavior
is not sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive as a mat-
ter of law. For example, in Pahssen, the court concluded that three acts
of harassment by a ninth-grade boy—smashing the eighth-grade female
victim up against her locker, telling her that if she did not perform oral
sex on the perpetrator that he would no longer hang out with her, and
making obscene gestures at the victim as she was playing basketball in
a public arena at school—were insufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact as to severity, pervasiveness, and objective offensiveness sufficient
to trigger the school’s responsibility to protect the victim who was later
raped by the same boy.209
In contrast, T.Z. v. City of New York210 concluded that one serious
episode of sexual harassment was sufficiently severe that it may have
had the effect of denying a student’s access to equal educational bene-
fits. Even though the language uses the terms “severe and pervasive,”
the court concluded that the “severe and pervasive and objectively of-
fensive” standard’s purpose was to predict whether the plaintiff would
207 Id. at 22.
208 Judge Illana Rovner would likely agree. See Gabrielle M. v. Park Forrest-Chicago Heights,
Illinois Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 827–28 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rovner, J., concurring) (concluding
that a female five year-old kindergartener can suffer even if the perpetrator, also a kindergartener,
may not be able to form the intent to harass; it is the school’s intent and response, not that of the
young perpetrator, that matters; Gabrielle’s sleepless nights, bed wetting, loss of appetite, and
emotional distress were sufficient to find unequal access to educational opportunities).
209 Pahssen v. Merrill Community Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2012).
210 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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suffer unequal access.211 Given the serious sexual assaults that the
plaintiff suffered in a classroom with the teacher present, and the seri-
ous effects on the plaintiff’s mental health that included sleeplessness,
panic attacks, PTSD, and self-cutting, the court held that this single
instance of sexual assault (perpetrated by a number of boys) was suffi-
cient to rise to the level of “pervasiveness;” therefore, there was a ques-
tion for the jury.212 Unlike many of the other cases decided above, I sub-
mit, this case was correctly decided.
d. Because of sex
Under Title IX in schools and Title VII in workplaces, sex- or gen-
der-based harassment is illegal only if it occurs because of the victim’s
sex.213 Many courts deciding Title VII cases have trouble recognizing
that harassment occurs because of sex in the same-sex environment.214
This problem occurs most frequently under two circumstances. First,
although same-sex harassment is illegal under Title VII,215 up until
very recently all federal courts had held that discrimination based on
sexual orientation was not prohibited sex discrimination.216 Thus, these
courts concluded that as a matter of law, based on language used in the
workplace, the discrimination occurred because of the victim’s sexual
orientation, not his sex, and was therefore not illegal.217 Fortunately,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a number of
courts of appeals have recently concluded that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is discrimination based on sex.218 But there is a seri-
ous question whether the U.S. Supreme Court, considering its current
composition, will agree with these decisions, and a number of cases
dealing with this issue are currently before the Supreme Court.219
211 Id. at 269.
212 Id. at 271.
213 Of course, Title VII also forbids discrimination in workplaces that occur because of race,
color, national origin, or religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
214 SeeMCGINLEY, supra note 9, at 46–48.
215 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
216 See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employ-
ment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 713, 714 n.3, 732 (2010).
217 This distinction would be very difficult to make. See id. at 738–44.
218 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(cause of action exists under Title VII for sex discrimination); Baldwin, 2012-24738-FAA-03 (2015)
(concluding that sexual orientation discrimination prohibited by Title VII); compare, Macy v. Dep’t
of Justice, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012) (concluding that
transgender status protected under Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination).
219 Bostock v. Clayton Cty, Georgia, 723 Fed. App’x. 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (sexual orientation is
not covered by Title VII); cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599, 203 L. Ed. 2d 754 (April 22, 2019) (No. 17-
1618); Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (a cause of action exists
under Title VII for sexual orientation discrimination), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599, 203 L. Ed. 2d
754 (April 22, 2019) (No. 17-1623). Compare, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G.
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The second issue that arises in Title VII cases regarding “because
of sex” results from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins’s220 holding that the
statute prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s failure to con-
form (or hyper-conformity) 221 to gender stereotypes. In other words, dis-
crimination “because of sex” also includes discrimination because of
gender. Even if the Supreme Court holds that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is not prohibited by Title VII, the sex stereotyping doctrine
allows causes of action for harassment that results from an individual’s
failure to conform (or hyper-conformity) to gender stereotypes, whether
the plaintiff is LGBTQ+ or straight.
Even in cases brought under Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc.222 and the sex stereotyping theory of Price Waterhouse, how-
ever, some lower courts have had trouble concluding, especially when
men harass other men, that the behavior occurred because of sex. They
conclude, instead, that the behavior is merely normal “roughhousing”
or “hazing.”223 This error results from amisreading ofOncale. The Court
mentions in Oncale that there is no Title VII cause of action for rough-
housing or hazing that is not sufficiently severe or pervasive. But the
Oncale court never held that roughhousing behavior that is severe
and/or pervasive is not actionable. Lower courts, without focusing
closely on Oncale, use this statement to hold that the behavior is rough-
housing, and, therefore, it did not occur because of sex. These decisions
are wrong because they distort Oncale’s language and meaning.
Masculinities theory also proves them to be wrong. Masculinities
theory explains that severe or pervasive harassment of men by men of-
ten occurs because of sex because the harassers are motivated by the
victim’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes and/or they harass the
victim in order to enhance their own masculinity, to buttress the mas-
culinity of their group, and to police the masculine norms of the work-
place.224
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (a cause of action exists under
Title VII for discrimination based on transgender status), pet. cert. filed (No. 18-107), June 24,
2018. The petitions for certiorari were granted on April 22, 2019 in all three of these cases. See
Amy Howe, Court to Take Up LGBT Rights in the Workplace, available at https://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2019/04/court-to-take-up-lgbt-rights-in-the-workplace/.
220 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
221 By “hyper-conformity,” I refer to discrimination or harassment motivated by the female
victim’s extreme performance of femininity or the male victim’s extreme performance of masculin-
ity.
222 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
223 See, e.g., Doe v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 179 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D. Conn. 2016).
224 See, McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, supra note 6.
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While less frequently, some courts deciding Title IX same-sex cases
also conclude that harassment does not occur because of sex either be-
cause the behavior occurred because of the victim’s sexual orientation225
or because the behavior is normal roughhousing or hazing among boys.
The mantra “boys will be boys” excuses the behavior as normal and not
occurring because of sex.
InDoe v. Torrington Bd. of Educ.,226 for example, the plaintiff, John
Doe, attended high school from Fall 2011 until Spring 2013, and was
regularly brutalized, bullied, and harassed by his classmates and his
teachers, coaches, and a paraprofessional working in the school.227 His
physical and verbal harassment culminated in a number of physical and
sexual assaults, including a rape at summer camp; after the rape, stu-
dents repeatedly harassed him in class, calling him a “faggot” and a “fat
ass.”228 Doe’s special education teacher characterized the assaults as
“everyday banter between boys” and did not take action.229 Finally,
Doe’s mother withdrew him from school when a State Trooper informed
her that that Doe had been sexually assaulted and that the police would
be filing a report on a second incident.230 The court dismissed the Title
IX claim because it did not “sufficiently allege that he was bullied, har-
assed and assaulted because of his gender” and, because the sexual as-
sault took place in the summer off school grounds, the school would not
be liable.231 This case employs a piecemeal approach to analyzing the
evidence, refusing to recognize the severely hostile educational environ-
ment that was tolerated and created by school officials as well as the
225 See, e.g., Tumminello v. Father Ryan High School, No. 3:15-cv-00684, 2015 WL 13215456
(6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss where the victim’s mother alleged
that her freshman son committed suicide after he was targeted with belts used as whips by other
students who called him “faggot,” and “gay” and told him to “go home and kill himself,” holding
that the Sixth Circuit had rejected the sex stereotyping theory and the theory that harassment
based on sexual harassment occurred because of sex); Eilenfeldt ex rel. J.M. v. United C.U.S.D.
#304 Bd. of Educ., 84 F. Supp. 3d 834, 838–42 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that merely using sexual
behavior or language does not necessarily show the behavior occurred because of male seventh
grade victim’s sex, and refusing to recognize at least in this case that the behavior may have oc-
curred for the victim’s failure to conform to gender norms even though the complaint alleged that
the harassment included inappropriate touching by other boys and students verbally taunting the
victim that he was a “rapist,” “pedophile,” and a child molester, saying he was attracted to young
boys, and physically bullying him by kicking, punching, pushing him, and threatening him with a
knife).
226 179 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D. Conn. 2016).
227 Id. at 184–88.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 186.
230 Id. at 187. The athletes in this school were engaged in other allegedly criminal behavior
against girls and boys. Two football players were charged and arrested for rape of minor girls;
another football player was charged with felony robbery related to jumping three fourteen-year-
old boys. Another football player was later arrested for the second assault of two thirteen-year-old
girls. Id. at 188.
231 Id. at 197–98.
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acts of physical, verbal, and sexual assaults directed at the plaintiff,
who regularly reported his attacks to school officials. Even the off-cam-
pus assault likely had its origins in school-based hostilities.
Another related barrier to liability for damages is the courts’ will-
ingness to accept a school’s defense that it knew about some behaviors
but did not know the behaviors had occurred on the basis of sex.232
Courts erroneously conceive of behaviors as simple bullying and ignore
gender-based motives.233 Simple bullying without a gender motive is not
illegal under Title IX. But behaviors that courts dismiss as simple “bul-
lying” are often the same as those that meet the definition of “sexual”
or “gender-based” harassment under the law.234 Moreover, if we look
closely at the behavior, we can recognize a gender motive in most of
these cases.
For example, in K.S. v. Northwest Independent School District,235
classmates ridiculed a sixth-grade boy because he had large breasts,
calling him “titty boy” and “Teddy titty baby.”236 Students touched and
twisted his breasts in the locker room, hallways, and other parts of the
school.237According to the court, however, this behavior was insufficient
to notify the school of “anything more than middle-school bullying.”238
These “bullying” behaviors, however, should constitute illegal sexual
232 The next three paragraphs are largely derived from McGinley,Masculinity Motivation, su-
pra note 6.
233 SeeN.K. v. St. Mary’s Springs Acad. Of Fond Du Lac, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1033 (E.D. Wis.
2013) (citing to cases that hold that the harassment occurred because of personal animus rather
than sex, gender, or race).
234 See McGinley, supra note 19, at 1191–92 (concluding that the behaviors involved in male-
on-male bullying and harassment are the same); Dorothy L. Espelage et al., Longitudinal Associ-
ations Among Bullying, Homophobic Teasing, and Sexual Violence Perpetration Among Middle
School Students, 30 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2541, 2544, 2554 (2015) (concluding that “[b]ul-
lying is in many ways a gendered phenomenon” and finding that male behavior characterized as
bullying escalates to sexual harassment later on). Although social scientists distinguish between
bullying and sexual harassment, the gendered bullying they describe meets Title VII’s and Title
IX’s definition of behavior occurring “because of sex.” Although it may prove too much to consider
all bullying to be masculinities-based, a full appreciation of the animating forces behind bullying
suggests that most of it results from the Masculinity Motivation and, if properly understood, would
be actionable pursuant to Titles VII and IX.
235 689 F. App’x 780 (5th Cir. 2017).
236 Id. at 781.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 787 n.8; see also Doe v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 179 F. Supp. 3d 179, 185, 197–98 (D.
Conn. 2016) (finding taunting and comments such as “faggot,” “fat ass,” “pussy,” “bitch,” and
“baby,” insufficient to conclude that the behavior occurred because of sex); J.H. v. Sch. Town of
Munster, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1092–93 (N.D. Ind. 2016) (calling amale high school student names
such as “cunt,” “pussy,” and “bitch” is insufficient evidence to show it occurred because of sex);
Eilenfeldt ex rel. J.M. v. United C.U.S.D. #304 Bd. of Educ., 84 F. Supp. 3d 834, 838, 842 (C.D. Ill.
2015) (dismissing complaint where harassers called junior high student “rapist,” “pedophile,” and
“child molester” and concluding that the victim was not harassed for being male or insufficiently
masculine and that it was “nothing more nor less than schoolyard cruelty and near-arbitrary ani-
mosity”).
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and gender-based harassment. They are severe, pervasive, and objec-
tively offensive, and they occur because of the plaintiff’s failure to com-
ply with expectations and stereotypes of how a boy should look and act.
In other words, they occur because of the victim’s perceived failed mas-
culinity. “Harassing those who violate prescribed gender norms helps
to sustain male privilege and power and serves to preserve the status
quo while maintaining the division of labor among the sexes.”239
Masculinities theory posits that perpetrators seek to enhance their
own power in school—to make the boys more masculine and, when girls
are involved in this type of harassment, to uphold the gender hierarchy
of how boys and girls should look, act, and interact. Masculinities stud-
ies explain that boys and men symbolically turn other boys and men
into girls or women by harassing and assaulting them sexually. By con-
verting male victims into symbolic females, the harassers denigrate the
victims and demonstrate their superiority to each other and the vic-
tims.240
Finally, some courts hold that using sex- or gender-based language
or behavior is insufficient to prove that the behavior occurred because
of sex or gender, especially where the student has another reason for
ridicule—in this case, a disability.241 Most problematic, most of these
cases are either dismissed in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Failing to understand
these intersectional claims and to recognize that a reasonable jury could
conclude that the behavior constituted illegal sex discrimination under
Title IX, these courts deny children who suffer from serious harassment
their days in court.
239 Brenda L. Russell & Debra Oswald, When Sexism Cuts Both Ways: Predictors of Tolerance
of Sexual Harassment of Men, 19 MEN&MASCULINITIES 524, 528 (2016).
240 See Paula McDonald & Sara Charlesworth, Workplace Sexual Harassment at the Margins,
30 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 118, 129 (2016) (noting that findings of male-on-male sexual harassment
supported the view that the purpose of such harassment is to enforce traditional heterosexual male
gender roles and that complaints by men in the study included taunts about “apparently unmas-
culine” conduct and “insinuations” that victims were gay); cf. Kathryn J. Holland et al., Sexual
Harassment Against Men: Examining the Roles of Feminist Activism, Sexuality, and Organiza-
tional Context, 17 PSYCHOL. MEN &MASCULINITY 17, 18 (2016) (citing Jennifer L. Berdahl, Har-
assment Based on Sex: Protecting Social Status in the Context of Gender Hierarchy, 32 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 641 (2007)).
241 See, e.g., Preston v. Hilton Cent. Sch. Dist., 876 F. Supp. 2d 235, 238–40 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)
(holding that victim who had Asperger’s Syndrome could not make out a cause of action for gender
discrimination even though he was called “gay,” “homo,” “bitch,” and “faggot,” and was constantly
subjected to vulgar and offensive language such as being asked whether he watched pornography,
was gay, or masturbated, and whether he would perform oral sex on another male student, and
once a male student asked if he could “put [his] dick in [the victim’s] ass” because the plaintiff
could not prove it was the victim’s gender and not his disability that caused the behavior).
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e. How the standard operates as a whole
While each of these parts of the Davis standard individually may
appear to balance the interests of the potential victims against those of
school districts to avoid expensive judgments, the way many courts in-
terpret and apply these standards as a whole creates a nearly impossi-
ble barrier to school district liability for damages when cases are
brought against them. Plaintiffs walk a virtual gauntlet of barriers to a
Title IX victory. This application of the legal standards does little to
encourage schools to be aware of the risks presented by particular stu-
dents and to try to avoid the risks of harm to the other children in the
school. In fact, given the discomfort that courts of appeals appear to
have with lawsuits against school authorities, it may be that legal in-
terpretation actually serves to discourage school authorities from acting
responsibly in the face of known risks. The result: young children in
schools (who are required to be there) have much less protection from
sex- and gender-based harassment and assault than their adult coun-
terparts in workplaces. In fact, the school authorities whom we must
trust to care for and educate our children are held to a much lower
standard than employers who permit hostile work environments to oc-
cur. The policy behind Title IX makes clear that unequal access to edu-
cational opportunities based on sex or gender is illegal. While schools
have important and expensive educational programs, those programs
cannot be allocated on the basis of sex and school districts should be
held to an equal grant of opportunities to its children. Given the little
success that Title IX cases have, it appears that this standard does little
to assure equal access to school programs.
Under Title VII, employers are liable for their negligence when
they have knowledge or constructive knowledge of a sexually harassing
environment created by peers and do not respond promptly and ade-
quately to correct the problem.242 Thus, if an adult at work is harassed
by a co-worker or a group of coworkers or if there is a sexually harassing
environment in the workplace caused by peers, the employer will be li-
able for money damages caused by the harassment if it acts negligently
by failing to investigate the situation and failing to take prompt reme-
dial action. While this standard, given the courts’ interpretation, is of-
ten not sufficient in the workplace to protect plaintiffs from having their
cases dismissed improvidently, the Title IX standard, as interpreted,
requires young children to negotiate extremely hostile conditions with-
out holding schools responsible.
242 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S.
421 (2013).
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Consider Pahssen v. Merrill Community School District—the facts
and risks known to the school, the school’s response, and the predictable
harm that eventually took place.243 In Pahssen,244 John Doe, the ninth-
grade perpetrator of numerous violent acts, including the rape of Jane
Doe, an eighth-grade student, had been in trouble regularly for years:
suspended for sexual harassment245 and for physically attacking other
students, and arrested twice for sexual assault.246
During the first few weeks back after a year’s suspension, John Doe
committed three acts of sexual harassment against Jane Doe. 247 The
victim’s stepfather wrote a letter to the school administration demand-
ing that something be done about this boy whom he correctly believed
was a “volcano” ready to erupt.248 At that point, John Doe was placed on
thirty days of adult supervision. Less than two months later, John Doe
raped Jane Doe on school property.249 The School Board expelled John
Doe forty days later upon the recommendation of the Superintendent.
Jane Doe’s mother filed suit against the school, and the federal dis-
trict judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all
causes of action, including a Title IX count for sex discrimination.250 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, con-
cluding that three incidents of harassment of Jane Doe that preceded
the rape were not severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive as a mat-
ter of law; the incidents of sexual harassment against other individuals
of which Merrill should have been on notice could not be considered in
determining whether John Doe posed a risk to Jane Doe,251 and the
court could not take into account those other incidents of which the de-
fendant had notice in determining whether the three incidents against
Jane Doe were severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.252
Second, the court held that even if the three incidents triggered the
school’s responsibility to act, it did act by holding the IEP meeting and
determining to have constant adult supervision of John Doe for thirty
days. The school, therefore, did not act with deliberate indifference at
that point.253
243 Pahssen v. Merrill Community Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2012).
244 These facts are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as this case was decided on
a motion for summary judgment.
245 Id. at 361.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 360.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 359.
251 See id.
252 Id. at 363.
253 Id. at 364.
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While the court’s analysis appears to track the requirements set
forth inDavis, a closer look at the court’s conclusions demonstrates that
it interprets Davis’s strict standards in a way that makes it impossible
for an injured plaintiff to recover in a Title IX case against the school
district. First, at the very least, the three sexually harassing incidents
suffered by Jane Doe before the rape should be sufficient to go to a jury
to determine whether the behavior was severe, pervasive, and objec-
tively offensive. This case deals with a girl in the beginning of eighth
grade—likely thirteen years old—whose “boyfriend” commits a physical
assault on her, threatens her with a demand of oral sex, and makes
obscene gestures toward her in public. Clearly, a reasonable jury could
conclude that this behavior was sufficient to deny the victim equal ac-
cess to educational opportunities. Instead, the court held that as a mat-
ter of law the sexually harassing behavior was not sufficiently severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive. And, the court concluded, even if it
were, the school authorities reacted sufficiently when they became
aware of these behaviors by calling an IEP meeting to discuss John Doe
and subjecting him to adult supervision for thirty days. Once again, the
court decides a factual question as a matter of law: according to the
court, school authorities did not act with deliberate indifference when
they discontinued adult supervision of John Doe even though they did
not even meet again to assure that the thirty-day adult supervision was
adequate.
Moreover, in determining that the school did not act with deliber-
ate indifference as a matter of law, the court refused to permit consid-
eration of the school’s prior experience with John Doe and actual
knowledge of his misbehavior. The rape confirms the danger that John
Doe posed both to Jane Doe and to other children at school, and, fortu-
nately, the school expelled John Doe forty days later. But its inadequate
discipline of a child who was clearly about to erupt and failure to protect
Jane Doe should be sufficient to send the issue of deliberate indifference
of school authorities at Merrill to the jury. There is no question that
Jane Doe suffered severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive behavior
that denied her access to educational opportunities because of her sex
and that the school authorities had actual knowledge of John Doe’s
criminal behavior toward both Jane Doe and others but made little at-
tempt to protect his most likely target from him. In slavishly applying
the deliberate indifference standard, the court not only refused to hold
the school accountable, but also refused to permit a jury to do so.
Pahssen is not an outlier among the cases decided under Title IX.
In most of the reported cases the courts of appeal hold that there is no
liability under Title IX as a matter of law without allowing a jury to
determine what seem to be genuine issues of material fact, even in the
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face of severe gender- and/or sex-based harassment that the school offi-
cials either knew about and ignored or participated in.
As we shall see in the next subsection, this has not been the case
with the administrative investigations of complaints by the OCR, but
things might soon change to the detriment of claimants.
B. Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education: Changing
Norms
The other important enforcement arm of Title IX is the Office of
Civil Rights of the Department of Education (“OCR”). The OCR issues
rules, guidance, and interpretations, including “Dear Colleague” letters
and “Questions and Answers” that explain and interpret the law. It also
investigates complaints by students (and their parents) alleging that
their schools have discriminated against them under Title IX based on
their sex or gender, under Title VI based on their race, color, or national
origin, and under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act based on their
disability.
Once the OCR determines that a complaint is timely and within its
jurisdiction, it decides whether an investigation is necessary.254 Upon
opening an investigation, it requests documents from the alleged victim
and the accused school district and interviews the claimants (who in the
pre-college context are usually the parents of the students who have
allegedly been subject to harassment), the student victim, and school
officials.255 The OCR determines whether there is sufficient evidence
(using the preponderance of the evidence standard) that the alleged vic-
tim suffered harassment and, as a result, a denial of access to equal
educational opportunities.256While the investigation proceeds, the OCR
considers whether the school district policies, training programs for ad-
ministrators and teachers, and reporting mechanisms are adequate.
Eventually, if the OCR concludes that the recipient has not complied
with the law, it attempts to reach a Resolution Agreement with the
school district that sets out requirements for compliance.257 If the school
district refuses, the OCR has the power to begin the very rare process
to cease federal funding of the institution.
After Gebser and Davis were decided, the Department of Education
issued its permanent revised Title IX guidance on sexual harassment





257 See OCR Complaint Processing Procedures, supra note 254.
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in 2001.258 The 2001 Revised Guidance replaced the 1997 guidance.259
All administrations subsequent to the 2001 Revised Guidance—both
Republican and Democratic (including the Trump Administration)—
have followed the 2001 Revised Guidance. The 2001 Revised Guidance
explained that the Supreme Court limited the actual knowledge and
deliberate indifference standards used in Gebser and Davis to court
cases of private parties seeking monetary damages only and did not ap-
ply to OCR investigations.260 Nor would the courts’ stringent standards
apply, the 2001 Revised Guidance opines, to plaintiffs in court cases
seeking injunctions and equitable relief and no monetary damages.261
Moreover, the Revised Guidance states that the Supreme Court
acknowledged the power of the Department of Education to enforce Ti-
tle IX even in cases where there would not be money damages.262 Be-
cause there are no money damages resulting from the OCR’s finding of
noncompliance, the 2001 Revised Guidance stated that the OCR would
continue to use a negligence standard (like that used before Gebser and
Davis, under the 1997 Guidance)—schools’ knowledge or reason to know
about harassment would trigger a responsibility to investigate and
promptly remedy the issue. 263 The next subsection analyzes the differ-
ences between the courts’ and the OCR’s standards in deciding Title IX
cases.
1. Courts’ vs. the OCR’s legal interpretations
The 2001 Revised Guidance interpretations vigorously protect the
rights of children who are abused in pre-college and college settings,264
and they stand in stark contrast to the meager protections provided by
the courts in litigation brought for peer-harassment in schools under
Title IX. Many (likely, the majority) of the OCR investigations in pre-
college cases result in findings that the school discriminated against the
alleged victim and in Resolution Agreements between the OCR and the
accused school districts.
In contrast to the courts’ legal standards and requirements under
Title IX, unlike the courts’ requirement of actual knowledge, OCR re-
quires that the school district have knowledge or reason to know that
258 See Notice of availability, 66 Fed. Reg. 5512 (Jan. 19, 2001) (hereinafter “2001 Revised
Guidance”).
259 See Final Policy Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 49 (Mar. 13, 1997).
260 See 2001 Revised Guidance, supra note 258, Preamble, at ii-iv.
261 Id. at iv n.2.
262 Id.
263 See 2001 Revised Guidance, supra note 258.
264 It also protected the interests of victims of sexual violence in colleges and universities, but
I am focusing in this article on harassment occurring in pre-college situations.
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the harassing behavior was occurring or had occurred.265 Once school
authorities have reason to know about harassment, they have a respon-
sibility to investigate and engage in a prompt remedial response if har-
assment has occurred. If the initial remedy is not effective, schools have
an ongoing obligation to assure that the victim does not continue to ex-
perience harassment from the harasser(s).266 This obligation contrasts
with the courts’ requirement that the school with actual knowledge act
with deliberate indifference to the harassment in order to be liable un-
der Title IX. As explained above, the deliberate indifference standard,
as interpreted by at least some of the courts, requires only minimal ac-
tion from the school.267 Literally, so long as the schools engage in half-
baked efforts to stop the harassing, they are safe in the courts. The
courts require a showing that the school’s response be “clearly unrea-
sonable” for a finding of deliberate indifference, a far greater showing
than the OCR requires in order to find the school district noncompli-
ant.268
There are other important differences between how the OCR inves-
tigators have interpreted Title IX when investigating a complaint and
how courts interpret Title IX when deciding a case. The OCR investiga-
tions and resolutions evidence an approach that is considerably more
demanding of schools and, consequently, more protective of students
who are harassed by peers. OCR investigations have concluded:
A police investigation does not relieve schools of continu-
ing obligations to investigate and remedy discrimination
under Title IX;269
Schools must take interim steps to protect the alleged vic-
tims before the final outcome of the investigation;270
Schools should not generally remove the complainant
from classes while allowing the alleged perpetrator to re-
main;271
It is improper to require the complainant to work out the
problem directly with the alleged perpetrator; 272
265 See 2001 Revised Guidance, supra note 258.
266 Id.
267 See, e.g., Pahssen v. Merrill Community Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2012).
268 See, Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 635 (1999).
269 See Perris Union, supra note 86.
270 See West Contra Costal, supra note 87.
271 Id.
272 Id.
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A recipient of federal funds must process all complaints
of sexual violence or assault (even if the allegations indi-
cate that the behavior occurred off campus) to determine
whether the conduct occurred in an off-campus education
program or if not, had continuing effects on campus.273
2. Procedural differences between courts’ and the OCR’s deter-
minations
To make matters worse for victims who sue in court, most of the
cases are decided for the defendants on motions to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment.274 The strict application of the substantive legal stand-
ard, combined with the federal courts’ proclivity to dispose of the cases
procedurally, allows for an emotional distance between the decision
makers (the judges) and the plaintiffs. When there is no trial, neither
judges nor juries must face the victim’s pain as he or she relates the
story from the witness box. It’s more efficient this way, especially in the
context of the federal judiciary that considers itself overburdened and
works to dispose of cases quickly. Contrast the judges’ lack of connection
to the victims with the relationship that OCR investigators have with
the victims based on interviewing the witnesses—the parents of the vic-
tim, and, depending on the victim’s age, the victim as well, and the
school authorities. The OCR investigator is likely to experience the
emotional power of the plaintiff’s situation as no federal judge will do
so if the case in court is decided on the papers using strict substantive
standards. Although some would say that legal decision makers should
be emotionally distant from the subjects whose fate they decide, a
purely rational approach to the law that shields the decision maker
from empathy may not yield the best result.275 The OCR investigator,
therefore, because of his or her personal connection to the complainant
and school officials, is more likely to understand the dynamics of the
situation that happened in the school. This leads us to an analysis of
the changes the Obama OCR made in its 2011 and 2014 “Dear Col-
league” letter and “Questions and Answers,” the Trump Administra-
tion’s rescission of these interpretations, and the proposed new regula-
tions by the Trump Administration.
273 See Greenup Cty. Sch. Dist., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OCR No. 03141163, (Mar. 18, 2015).
274 I have read all peer harassment cases decided under Title IX and published or available
online through Westlaw since 2012, and the vast majority are decided for the defendants on pro-
cedural motions.
275 See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH L. REV. 1574, 1576–77 (1987)
(explaining that better legal decisions are made when empathy, which includes both emotion and
cognition, is present).
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3. Obama Administration’s OCR: new interpretations
While honoring the 2001 Revised Guidance, the Obama Admin-
istration’s OCR issued a number of “Dear Colleague” letters and “Ques-
tions and Answers” with added interpretations of Title IX. These
Obama Administration interpretations (April 4, 2011 “Dear Colleague”
letter, and April 29, 2014 “Questions and Answers”) required, among
other things, that schools’ and colleges’ grievance processes use the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the accused
was responsible; they also banned use of mediation to resolve a conflict
between the accuser and the accused when sexual assault is alleged.276
On September 22, 2017, the Trump Administration rescinded the
Obama Administration’s April 4, 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter and the
April 29, 2014 “Questions and Answers”277 and issued a “Dear Col-
league” letter and “Questions and Answers” of its own.”278 While some
provisions in both the Obama and Trump Administrations’ documents
may apply universally to elementary and secondary schools, both focus
on college processes in sexual assault proceedings. The Trump rescis-
sion permits colleges to use either the “preponderance of the evidence”
or “clear and convincing evidence” standard, permits voluntary media-
tion, and clarifies that cross examination is permitted.279 The Trump
Administration “Dear Colleague” letter also states that it will issue pro-
posed regulations and use the notice and comment process to promul-
gate new regulations.280
276 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TITLE IX, SEXUAL
VIOLENCE ANDHARASSMENT (Apr. 4, 2011); U.S. DEP’T OFEDUC., OFFICE FORC.R., QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2011).
277 Rescinded Obama Administration interpretations include: U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TRANSGENDER STUDENTS (May 13, 2016) (granting
transgender students the right to use bathrooms and locker rooms that accord with their gender
identity); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TITLE IX, SEXUAL
VIOLENCE ANDHARASSMENT (Apr. 4, 2011). (requiring, among other things, that the school’s griev-
ance procedure use a “preponderance of the evidence” standard and forbidding use of mediation in
sexual assault cases); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE
IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014); see also U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., DEAR
COLLEAGUE LETTER RESCINDING PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON TRANSGENDER STUDENTS (Feb. 22,
2017); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TITLE IX, SEXUAL
VIOLENCEANDHARASSMENT (Sep. 22, 2017) [hereinafter DEP’T OFEDUC. DEARCOLLEAGUELETTER
(2017)]; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR C.R., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON CAMPUS SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT (2017) [hereinafter Q&A ONCAMPUSSEXUALMISCONDUCT (2017)]. For a list of Guid-
ances, Dear Colleague letters, etc., in force and rescinded, see CARNEGIEMELLON, OFFICE OFTITLE
IX INITIATIVES (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.cmu.edu/title-ix/law-and-guidance/index.html [https://p
erma.cc/GV7Z-KRJV].
278 DEP’T OFEDUC. DEARCOLLEAGUE LETTER (2017), supra note 277; Q&A ONCAMPUS SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT (2017), supra note 277.
279 Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUALMISCONDUCT (2017), supra note 277, at 4–5.
280 DEP’T OF EDUC. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (2017), supra note 277, at 2.
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4. Trump Administration’s OCR: proposed regulations
On November 29, 2018, the Secretary of Education issued proposed
regulations that would govern the OCR decision making process.281 The
focus of the proposed regulations is post-secondary enforcement of Title
IX; the proposed regulations address concerns about colleges’ and uni-
versities’ investigations and grievance proceedings resulting from
claims of sexual violence on campus. A discussion of the proposed rules’
effects on college campuses, however, is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle.282
This article deals with Title IX’s effectiveness in eliminating peer
sex- and gender-based harassment in elementary, middle, and second-
ary schools; viewing the proposed regulations through this lens reveals
a serious likelihood that sex- and gender-based harassment would in-
crease if the new regulations become law. The proposed regulations
would radically change the law as it applies to elementary, middle, and
secondary schools and the procedures that the OCR uses to enforce Title
IX in those institutions. They would not only reverse Obama Admin-
istration 2011 guidance, which has already been rescinded, but, more
importantly, would also overturn the 2001 Revised Guidance that has
been followed by all of the presidential administrations for the past
eighteen years. The new law would adopt new stringent standards for
finding a school district noncompliant. If these stringent standards be-
come law, they will seriously harm the rights of children to equal access
to education based on their sex and gender. Particularly at a time when
law and institutions are responding to the #MeToo movement, this
change would represent a serious setback that may affect generations
to come. In essence, the proposed regulations create disincentives for
schools to educate themselves and their students about the causes of
illegal sex- and gender-based harassment, the importance of avoiding
these behaviors, and of acting promptly when the behaviors occur.
Schools will solidify their roles as training grounds for future genera-
tions of harassers.
281 As I write this article, the notice and comment period has still not elapsed. It is unclear
whether the proposed regulations will be adopted, and if so, whether there will be changes made
to them. I focus here on the most problematic ones for pre-college students.
282 For analysis of the proposed regulations with reference to colleges and universities, see
NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, DEVOS’ PROPOSED CHANGES TO TITLE IX EXPLAINED (Feb. 7,
2018), https://nwlc.org/resources/devos-proposed-changes-to-title-ix-explained/ [https://perma.cc/6
SD3-CQ9H].
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5. Analysis of proposed regulations: back to the courts
The most problematic changes proposed in the new regulations for
pre-college institutions deal with definitions and legal standards that
the OCR would apply to complaints filed with the Department of Edu-
cation. Section 106.44 of the proposed regulations requires that the re-
cipient of federal funds have actual knowledge of sexual harassment and
respond in a manner that is deliberately indifferent in order for a viola-
tion to occur.283 Section 106.44(a) defines “deliberately indifferent” as a
response that is “clearly unreasonable.”284 Section 106.30 defines “sex-
ual harassment” as “unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a
person equal access to the [recipient’s] education program or activ-
ity.”285 Actual knowledge includes knowledge of the Title IX Coordina-
tor or of “an official of the recipient who has ‘the authority to institute
corrective measures on behalf of the recipient’” or in elementary and
secondary schools, a teacher in the context of peer harassment.286
These proposed standards would largely adopt for the OCR the
most stringent interpretations of the Supreme Court’s rigid standards
for monetary damages in Title IX cases.287 These new OCR standards
would require actual knowledge that the conduct described in the com-
plaint already be sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive to deny equal access to educational opportunities in order to trigger
a school district’s response to the behavior. And, once triggered, if that
response is not “clearly unreasonable,” the school district would be con-
sidered compliant.
As demonstrated above in Part III.A.1, the Supreme Court’s rigid
standards in private parties’ damages actions relieve school authorities
(even in some of the most egregious cases) of investigating and respond-
ing to ongoing sex- and gender-based harassment. Moreover, a number
of lower courts have interpreted the “deliberately indifferent” standard
very strictly, permitting a school to exonerate itself by responding only





287 One positive difference from the Supreme Court standards is the recognition that if a
teacher has knowledge of peer harassment in the elementary and secondary school context, that
knowledge is actual knowledge for purposes of triggering a duty on the school’s part to respond.
See NATIONALWOMEN’S LAWCENTER, § 106.30; supra Part III.A.2.a.i (discussing lower courts’ un-
even reading of whether a teacher would constitute a person with authority to take corrective
measures for purposes of fulfilling the actual knowledge requirement).
288 See e.g., Pahssen v. Merrill Community Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2012) and the
discussion, supra Part III.A.2.e.
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standards as applied by the courts differ drastically from the more rea-
sonable standards used traditionally by OCR of both Democratic and
Republican Departments of Education. As explained in Part III.B.1–2
above, the OCR has traditionally used a standard that requires a school
to respond when it believes or has reason to believe that the harassment
is occurring, and once the response takes place, to monitor it for effec-
tiveness. If the response is not effective, schools must attempt different
remedies until they have eliminated the problem.289 Consider again the
Pahssen case. If this case were investigated by the OCR using the 2001
guidance, there is no question that the OCR would have found the
school district was noncompliant when it failed to respond initially to
three incidents of sexual harassment by a student who had a history of
sexual assault and harassment and when it stopped monitoring John
Doe’s behavior after thirty days of surveillance. In contrast, under the
proposed rules, the OCR’s ability to find noncompliance by the school
would likely be hampered, which would prevent the OCR from entering
into a resolution with the school district requiring it to adopt new train-
ing, reporting, and investigatory methods. The same would be true if
the Stiles case, discussed in Part III.A. above, had been investigated by
the OCR. Using the 2001 standards, the OCR would certainly have
found that the school district was not in compliance with Title IX be-
cause the alleged victim in the case, a middle-school boy, was repeatedly
harassed verbally and physically over a two-year period and his mother
frequently reported the egregious harassment to school authorities. Alt-
hough the court concluded that the school did not act with deliberate
indifference because it had taken some steps to punish the harassers,
the OCR would have likely concluded that because school authorities
knew about the harassment, it had a responsibility to investigate and
engage in a prompt remedial response. If the initial remedy was not
effective, the OCR would have held the school to its ongoing obligation
to assure that the victim would not continue to experience harassment
from the harasser(s). If the proposed OCR amendments becomes law,
however, it is very likely that the OCR would follow the courts’ stand-
ards and conclude that the school was not deliberately indifferent be-
cause it took some minimal steps to punish the harassers.
Besides differing standards, the nature of the courts and the OCR
has influenced how Title IX has traditionally been enforced. Histori-
cally, the OCR process has permitted a back-and-forth between the
OCR and the school district that is under investigation.290 There are no
monetary damages, unlike in federal court, and the OCR investigators
289 See 2001 Revised Guidance, supra note 258.
290 See generally, The TEXAS BAR ASSOCIATION, OCR BASICS: UNDERSTANDING AND SURVIVING
A CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATION (2018) (“OCR BASICS”).
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can survey the policies and procedures in place and their implementa-
tion. This traditional structure permits the OCR and the recipients to
enter into Resolution Agreements that detail how the schools are ex-
pected to improve and, by doing so, avoid a loss of funding for the
schools. This structure encourages better future enforcement of Title
IX.
If the proposed regulations become law, the OCR will likely decline
to investigate many valid complaints and will abdicate its role of edu-
cating the educators about Title IX law. In essence, the administrative
oversight contemplated by the statute will be upended, and the preven-
tive and educative roles of the OCR will be eliminated. It is highly un-
likely that the drafters of the progressive legislation of Title IX, given
an understanding of changing cultural mores surrounding sex- and gen-
der-based harassment, would agree to interpret legislation to have such
a limited effect as that contemplated by the proposed regulations.
Moreover, as the notice of the proposed regulations acknowledges,
the Davis case does not apply to the Department of Education OCR
standards, and the OCR is free to follow its own standards in applying
Title VII. The Davis standards, the Court makes clear, are applied be-
cause the Court implied a private right of action in Davis for monetary
damages.291 The Court, in essence, was conscious of its responsibility
not to overstep Congressional authorization. As noted above, the stat-
ute authorizes the Department of Education explicitly to deal with Title
IX violations but does not explicitly create a cause of action in the
courts. It is clear that the Court concludes that the OCR may apply its
own standards, and the OCR has always done so. But the irony is this:
despite the possible justification for the strict standards that may exist
in lawsuits for damages against the school districts, no such justifica-
tion exists in an OCR investigation. The original statute292 sets out the
Department of Education as the enforcer of the statute, and the OCR
does not impose monetary damages. In the case of a recalcitrant school
district that refuses to comply or resolve a complaint with the OCR, the
OCR has the additional and scarcely-used remedy of denying federal
funding to the school district in the future, but this remedy is not ap-
plied without notice to the school district and an opportunity to engage
in negotiation and to resolve their differences with the OCR through a
Resolution Agreement.293
The drafters of the proposed regulations defend their choice to
adopt the Supreme Court standards by arguing that uniformity will
291 Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 635, 651 (1999).
292 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688.
293 See OCR BASICS, supra note 290.
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make compliance easier and that schools should have flexibility to de-
termine how to further their disciplinary processes. Furthermore, they
argue that the misconduct Title IX forbids is that of the educational
institution, not the underlying sex- or gender-based conduct. First, it
seems that the flexibility arguments may be more directed at colleges
and universities than at elementary and secondary schools because in-
stitutions of higher education have more developed grievance proce-
dures for all types of wrongdoing than do pre-college institutions. Sec-
ondly, while uniformity is one potential goal, my discussion above of the
poor results in cases following the Supreme Court standards suggests
strongly that if uniformity is such an important goal, the Supreme
Court should adopt the OCR standards, and not vice versa.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that use of a negligence stand-
ard—the standard applied in Title VII cases of peer harassment—is too
harsh on elementary and secondary schools that have control over our
children and all of the responsibilities to protect them that accompany
that control. The data show that children are suffering in schools from
sex- and gender-based harassment of not only their peers, but also from
the “loading-on” that teachers and coaches engage in after a child re-
ports harassment. While the Supreme Court standards do not always
rectify these situations, traditional OCR standards have worked to
eliminate this behavior.
IV. HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE TO PREVENT SCHOOLS’ ROLE AS
TRAININGGROUNDS
Parts I–III raise questions about what the law can do to resolve the
many problems I have identified in this article. We must recognize that
no matter what the condition of the law is, it is not sufficient to correct
all or even most of these problems. Despite the good work of the OCR
in previous administrations and Title VII law that forbids sex- and gen-
der-based harassment in workplaces, illegal discriminatory harass-
ment is still pervasive in schools and workplaces. Much of this harass-
ment will not disappear until there is social change, and changes in
society do not normally progress constantly on an upward trajectory.
Change moves forward; then, there is backlash, and change moves for-
ward again. But the law can play some role in effecting change: it can
create incentives and disincentives, and it can tailor remedies to im-
prove behaviors (and perhaps, attitudes) in schools and workplaces. If
the law does not move forward to effect positive change, it will become
a protector of those who harass and those who tolerate the harassment.
Masculinities theory sees gender as a structure that is constructed
upon and actively constructs inequalities. It is not men or women who
are the problem. It is the structure that dictates howmen, women, boys,
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and girls should act and the roles they should play. Until very recently
in the U.S., gender has been considered a binary structure that denies
the possibility of anything other than man (masculine) and woman
(feminine). While there seems to be a marked change in attitudes
among young Americans about the inevitability of binary gender iden-
tities, there is also a group of young folks that resists such change. Mas-
culinities theory posits that it is the gendered constructions—such as
masculinity, especially those forms of masculinity that are forced and
exaggerated—that create incentives to harass others. Often, however,
because gendered behaviors are considered the norm—in fact, are con-
sidered by many to be dictated by biological sex—gender is invisible to
many of us. So, in schools, even adults such as administrators, teachers,
and coaches reinforce gender norms that, in turn, motivate students to
harass others. Without an understanding of this dynamic, schools and
teachers will not be able to teach children not to harass, or even to rec-
ognize all of the illegal harassment that takes place.
Moreover, multidimensional masculinities theory encourages us all
to consider not only gender, but also all of the other co-existing identi-
ties of the parties in context of the situation.294 So, besides sex, sexual
orientation, and gender identity of the different participants when har-
assment takes place, we should consider the race, class, national origin,
and other identities as well as whether the alleged victims and perpe-
trators are persons with disabilities. A significant percentage of chil-
dren who have disabilities are victims of sex-or gender-based harass-
ment, and a significant number of OCR Title IX complaints also allege
intersectional claims, including racial, national origin, and disability-
based harassment. In formulating solutions, all of these facts must be
taken into account. Furthermore, research demonstrates that racial in-
equalities exist in schools, especially in the ways that discipline is
meted out.295 In formulating a solution, it is important that school au-
thorities understand the implicit biases that cause these differential
disciplinary measures and that they take actions to counteract them.
To complicate matters, schools are often large, overcrowded, and
lacking in resources, and their teachers are underpaid. It may create a
huge burden to ask schools to serve as the focal points to change gender
norms in society. By the same token, we cannot sacrifice our children
294 See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper,Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law:
Why They Need One Another, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH
(Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley, eds. 2012) (explaining that it is important to consider
not only the gender or sex of the victim but also the victim’s other identities in the context of the
situation).
295 Moriah Balingt, Racial Disparities in School Discipline Are Growing, Federal Data Show,
WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2018, at A.2.
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by allowing schools to ignore their responsibility to control the harass-
ing behaviors taking place under their noses. Reforms need to include
funding for education of teachers and children about the evils of sex-
and gender-based harassment and its causes.
A. Necessary Law Reform
First, it is clear that the regulations proposed by the Department
of Education should not become law. As the analysis of the court cases
in Part III.A. above demonstrates, the standards employed by the
courts permit school districts to escape monetary damages for their fail-
ure to control serious harassment in their midst. These standards
should not replace the standards successfully used by the OCR for more
than eighteen years to resolve complaints and assure ongoing compli-
ance.
Second, when Congress has the political will, it should pass amend-
ments to Title IX to assure better compliance. Those amendments
should include an express authorization of private lawsuits for damages
against school districts that would overruleDavis. Amendments to Title
IX should set negligence standards for both the court cases and the com-
plaints investigated and resolved by the OCR, thereby overturning the
proposed regulations should they become law.
Third, even in the absence of political power to make these changes,
the lower courts can interpret Gebser and Davis in a way that avoids
the harsh results and at the same time faithfully follows the Supreme
Court’s standards. First, in the context of peer harassment in elemen-
tary and secondary schools, a teacher, counselor, or other professional
who observes or hears about behavior that is either already severe or
appears to be escalating should have the responsibility to report and/or
correct the behavior. The professional’s knowledge should be sufficient
to constitute actual knowledge by school authorities and should trigger
a responsibility to investigate and take remedial measures. Where chil-
dren are very young or the victim has an intellectual disability, the pro-
fessional’s responsibilities to investigate should be triggered sooner if a
victim attempts to communicate with the professional but the victim is
not capable of communicating the details of the harassment. Second,
once there is actual knowledge, the professional, along with other school
authorities, must investigate the situation and promptly remedy it. A
finding of deliberate indifference can occur if school authorities’ remedy
is not effective, and the authorities do nothing more to correct the situ-
ation. As some courts conclude now, knowledge that the perpetrator has
a history of harassment of either the alleged victim or another victim
should constitute actual knowledge for the purposes of triggering a duty
to take a more cautious approach to the perpetrator, such as more adult
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supervision. Finally, lower courts should be more cautious in granting
dispositive motions in these cases. Many motions for summary judg-
ment, for example, are granted where there are genuine issues of ma-
terial facts for the juries to decide. These material facts include who had
knowledge, and when, the severity of the behaviors, and whether the
victim suffered a denial of access to educational programs as a result,
and whether the school’s response was deliberately indifferent. The dif-
ference between “unreasonable” (which is legal) and “clearly unreason-
able” (which is not) is something that a jury of the parties’ peers should
ordinarily decide based on the facts found at trial.
Fourth, if the proposed regulations become law, OCR investigators
should interpret the regulations in a way that comports with the law
but simultaneously holds schools responsible for ignoring damaging
harassment in the schools. Because of the different posture of the OCR
investigations from court cases, the OCR has the ability to continue to
use its investigations as a means of educating recipients concerning
how to assure compliance and avoid problems in the future. Continued
use of voluntary resolution agreements should help. Even if the OCR
finds that there is insufficient evidence of noncompliance in the partic-
ular case, the OCR should use its investigation to encourage procedural
compliance if the recipient, for example, has not appointed a Title IX
Coordinator,296 has not notified all students and teachers of its policies
and practices, etc. If this type of noncompliance exists, OCR investiga-
tors should encourage schools to sign agreements to resolve those is-
sues. The OCR should encourage educational institutions to offer edu-
cational and training programs for students and teachers that deal with
issues of harassment, and its causes, and how to respond. This training,
in accordance with the sophistication of the audience, should include
instruction on concepts of gender and masculinity.
B. Schools as Training Grounds for Eliminating Harassment
Finally, no matter what standards the OCR and the courts use, ed-
ucational institutions should be encouraged to adopt educational pro-
graming for administrators and teachers that explains implicit bias,
masculinity, gender stereotyping, and other phenomena that can lead
296 A recent study of California and Colorado schools found that many school districts have
failed to appoint a Title IX coordinator, contrary to their legal responsibilities. See Elizabeth J.
Meyer & Andrea Somoza-Norton, Addressing Sex Discrimination with Title IX Coordinators in the
#MeToo Era, 100 PHIDELTAKAPPAN 8 (Oct. 2018). Even when they have appointed Title IX coor-
dinators, most of the Title IX coordinators are not very knowledgeable about the law and their
responsibilities, have infrequently or never conducted trainings for the faculty and staff in their
district, have many other responsibilities that overwhelm those as Title IX coordinator, and are
often ignorant of their responsibilities especially with reference to transgender students. Id.
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to toleration of illegal harassment.297Without understanding that much
of the behavior described is caused by what many think is normal be-
havior of children, school officials will not be able to curb their own be-
haviors that encourage harassment or fail to recognize it in the school
children. Merely because the behaviors are common does not make
them normal in an egalitarian society. Thus, schools need educational
reform programs directed at all levels: administrators, teachers,
coaches, and students. Of course, the training of children must be age
appropriate.298 Only by educating school authorities, teachers, and chil-
dren can we avoid schools as training grounds for harassment and move
toward schools as training grounds for respect, citizenship, and elimi-
nating harassment. In the age of the #MeToo Movement, our society
deserves no less.
297 See, e.g., D.K. Whitford, et. al., Empathy Intervention to Reduce Implicit Bias in Pre-Service
Teachers, 122 PSYCH. REP. 670 (2019) (demonstrating reduced implicit bias in teachers who were
given training on empathy); P.G. Devine, et.al., A Gender Bias Habit-Breaking Intervention Led to
Increased Hiring of Female Faculty in STEM Departments, 73 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH, 211
(2017) (demonstrating anti-bias training increased hiring of female faculty in STEM); L. A. Rud-
man, et. al, “ Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes,
81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH, 856 (2001) (demonstrating that prejudice and bias seminar re-
duced stereotypes and bias in college students).
298 One concern when engaging in Title IX training and monitoring is what I would call the
“hyper-responsive” reports of very young children as sexual harassers. A response to sexual har-
assment in the schools needs to be aware that very young children often are not capable of sexual
harassment and attempting to enforce the “rules” against them can be devastating. See Amy B.
Cyphert, Objectively Offensive: The Problem of Applying Title IX to Very Young Children, 51 FAM.
L. QUART. 325 (2017) (discussing cases of very small children accused of sexual harassment).
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Sexual Harassment by Any Other Name
Brian Soucek and Vicki Schultz
INTRODUCTION
Last year, the New York Times won a Pulitzer for its reporting on
sexual harassment.1 Yet the Times does not seem to understand what
“sexual harassment” actually means. In both the definition it employs
and its choices of what stories to cover, the nation’s newspaper of record
continues to spread an overtly sexualized conception of sexual harass-
ment that, from a legal and social sciences perspective, is twenty years
out of date.
This Essay’s goal is, first, to call attention to this misdirection and
its harms. By defining away and often failing to report on the endless
ways employees are undermined, excluded, sabotaged, ridiculed, or as-
saulted because of their sex—even if not through words or actions that
are “sexual” in nature—the Times neglects the forms of sexual harass-
ment at work that researchers repeatedly find most pervasive.2
In this, the New York Times is hardly alone. However legally out-
dated it may be, the sexualized conception of sexual harassment—the
view that equates sexual harassment with unwanted sexualized ad-
vances, remarks, and misconduct—is so widespread that even agencies
charged with protecting against sexual harassment sometimes fail to
† Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of Califor-
nia, Davis School of Law. My thinking on these issues always benefits from conversations with
Vicki Schultz, Courtney Joslin, Jessica Clarke, and Tristin Green. Many thanks also to everyone
at the 2018 University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, to the editors of The University of
Chicago Legal Forum for their patient and skillful editing, to Meghan Brooks at Yale Law School,
and to Dean Kevin Johnson and the UC Davis School of Law for supporting this project through
the Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Fund.
†† Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Sciences, Yale Law School. I would like to thank
the University of Chicago Legal Forum 2018 Symposium attendees for helpful feedback on the
ideas expressed here. I am grateful to my co-author Brian Soucek, my research assistant Meghan
Brooks, and the Symposium editors for their insight and work on this Essay.
1 The 2018 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Public Service: The New York Times, for Reporting Led
by Jody Kantor and Megan Twohey, and The New Yorker, for Reporting by Ronan Farrow, PULITZ-
ER (last visited Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/new-york-times-reporting-led-jodi
-kantor-and-megan-twohey-and-new-yorker-reporting-ronan [https://perma.cc/HS8E-ESQ9].
2 See infra text accompanying notes 32–47.
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define it clearly in their public pronouncements.3 Indeed, the sexualized
conception is so tenacious that scholars and legislators sometimes feel
the need to coin a different name for harassment that lacks sexualized
content.4 Phrases like “gender harassment” get used to distinguish sex-
ist comments and actions from the sexualized come-ons and assaults
that many, like the Times, still exclusively associate with the term “sex-
ual harassment.”5
Readers might wonder, what difference does it make? This Essay’s
second aim is to show how much is at stake in what might otherwise
seem like an academic debate over words. The news media may have
its own reasons for clinging to the sexualized view of harassment, but
reporters who are serious about exposing sexual harassment (and re-
formers who are serious about eliminating it) cannot afford to cling to a
narrow sexualized definition. Rather, overcoming harassment and re-
lated injustices at work requires a reconceptualized account of sexual
harassment—something Vicki Schultz first offered fully two decades
ago.6 In the current #MeToo era, more than ever, we must rethink and
reinvigorate the term “sexual harassment,” not some new term put in
place of, or alongside, the one that is finally getting the public attention
it has long deserved. To do otherwise risks disaggregating sexual and
non-sexual forms of harassment, thus obscuring the larger patterns of
hostility and exclusion that include both forms.
Instead of trying to change the subject, this Essay aims to guide
the contemporary conversation unleashed by activists and media to
bring it in line with insights gained in the law, in social science, and in
the everyday experience of workers. Amidst all the attention the #Me
Too movement has generated, too many women and men are facing
forms of sexual harassment that the media still ignores.
I. “AGREE ONDEFINITIONS”
A. The New York Times’s Definition
In April 2018, the New York Times won a Public Service Pulitzer
for reporting that “uncovered the secret histories of prominent men
across industries who were accused of sexual harassment and miscon-
duct that affected women ranging from actresses to factory workers to
3 See infra text accompanying notes 65–75.
4 See infra note 38.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 11–15.
6 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). For an
updated account that discusses recent developments, see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. F. 24 (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/reconcep-
tualizing-sexual-harassment-again [https://perma.cc/2ZLB-LU8S].
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food servers.” According to the Times: “These articles . . . set off work-
place investigations, criminal inquiries—and the #MeToo movement.”7
Powerful and influential, these articles were largely limited to one
common narrative: a prominent man (like Harvey Weinstein) is re-
vealed to have made unwanted sexual advances, or even committed sex-
ual assaults, against women who worked for him or depended on him
for career advancement. The reported harassment is almost always
male-to-female, top-down, and sexualized in nature; it occurs in influ-
ential industries that receive heavy media coverage.8 The stories were
mostly exposés about powerful bosses or benefactors in prominent com-
panies preying on female subordinates for sex. Thus, a year into its re-
porting, a headline in the Times could trumpet, “#MeToo Brought Down
201 Powerful Men,” before going on to encapsulate the facts of each
downfall.9
More than just a theme that emerges in its selection of stories, the
New York Times’s sexualized conception of sexual harassment is liter-
ally definitional.10 In a January 2018 article containing a lesson plan to
help teachers use the paper’s #MeToo coverage to educate students
7 Harassed, N.Y. TIMES (last visited Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/har-
ass [https://perma.cc/4Z2Q-F9HC].
8 Among the fourteen articles that the Times identifies as connected to its Pulitzer, the sub-
jects are Harvey Weinstein (four articles), Bill O’Reilly of Fox News (two articles), the comedian
Louis C.K., the “power restaurateur” Ken Friedman, the “top-down ethos of male entitlement” at
Vice Media, and the “lopsided” relationship between largely male venture capitalists and female
entrepreneurs in the tech industry. Daniel Victor, The Times Just Won 3 Pulitzers. Read the Win-
ning Work, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/business/media/new-
york-times-pulitzers.html [https://perma.cc/5ANJ-83XF]; Emily Steel, At Vice, Cutting-Edge Me-
dia and Allegations of Old-School Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/12/23/business/media/vice-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/XW4F-6Q2
U]; Katie Brenner,Women in Tech Speak Frankly on Culture of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speak-out-sexual-h
arassment.html [https://perma.cc/A35G-NFC9]. One article that does not fit the pattern is Susan
Chira and Catrin Einhorn’s powerful investigation of sexual harassment at two Chicago Ford
plants.How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/EZ8J-BWAR]. Alongside the stories of sexualized harassment told in that ar-
ticle are others about the non-sexualized harassment female workers faced by fellow (male) work-
ers who thought women “belonged at home in the kitchen.” Female workers were physically
blocked from doing their jobs, had their tires slashed, and were denied bathroom breaks. Id.; cf.
Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J. F. 67 (2018), https://www.yalelaw
journal.org/forum/queering-sexual-harassment-law [https://perma.cc/DH8R-NPDL] (describing
how harassment of women in largely male workplaces often takes both sexualized and non-sexu-
alized forms); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6. Notably, complaints
against Ford, settled for over $10 million in August 2017, included both sexual and racial harass-
ment allegations. See Ford Motor Company to Pay up to $10.125 Million to Settle EEOC Harass-
ment Investigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/newsroom/release/8-15-17.cfm [https://perma.cc/Q78Y-LGHZ].
9 Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Re-
placements Are Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/
23/us/metoo-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/98NM-FGUJ].
10 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra note 6, at 3132.
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about sexual harassment, the Times adopted an official definition of
sexual harassment that limits it to sexual conduct. In a section near the
start, entitled “Agree on Definitions,” the country’s paper of record says:
The Times defines sexual harassment in the workplace this way:
‘Sexual harassment in the workplace is an umbrella term that
encompasses a range of unwanted behaviors. This includes non-
physical harassment, including suggestive remarks and ges-
tures, or requests for sexual favors. Physical harassment in-
cludes touches, hugs, kisses and coerced sex acts.’11
In a later section styled a note to teachers, the article clarifies: “The
Times uses the terms ‘sexual harassment’ and ‘sexual misconduct’ to
refer to a range of behaviors that are sexual in nature and nonconsen-
sual. The term ‘sexual assault’ usually signifies a felony sexual offense,
like rape.”12 This is not the only time the New York Times has adopted
a sexual definition of harassment. A November 10, 2017 New York
Times article used the same definition.13
The Times thus limits “sexual harassment” to nonconsensual be-
haviors “that are sexual in nature”14—not to all harassment “based on
sex,” as the legal definition does. This limitation is all the more surpris-
ing because the Times supports it with a cite to the broader legal defi-
nition. The 2018 article sends those seeking “more information” to an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) website on “Sex-
ual Harassment,” which broadly prohibits all harassment based on sex,
regardless of whether it is sexual in nature.15 After noting in the first
paragraph that harassment can include unwanted sexual conduct, the
EEOC’s second paragraph explicitly provides: “Harassment does not
11 Natalie Proulx, Christopher Pepper & Katherine Schulten, The Reckoning: Teaching About
the #MeToo Moment and Sexual Harassment with Resources from the New York Times, N.Y. TIMES




13 Valeriya Safronoya, When You Experience Sexual Harassment at Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/10/style/sexual-harassment-work-advice-lawyers.ht
ml [https:// perma.cc/5745-4NSM] (adopting the same narrow sexual definition in an earlier piece).
14 Proulx et al., supra note 11.
15 Id. (linking to Laws, Regulations and Guidance: Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY EMP. COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm [https://per
ma.cc/DJM7-69PW] (“It is unlawful to harass a person (an applicant or employee) because of that
person’s sex.”).
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have to be of a sexual nature, however, and can include offensive re-
marks about a person’s sex. For example, it is illegal to harass a woman
by making offensive comments about women in general.”16
Last year, we asked about the discrepancy between the Times’s def-
inition and the legal definition the Times itself references. A staff mem-
ber responded that, according to its Standards Editor, the Times “defers
to the dictionary definition of sexual harassment.”17 “[W]e don’t see it
as our role to define sexual harassment for the world,” she added.18
There is an irony in the New York Times disclaiming any role in
defining sexual harassment even as the paper itself publishes lesson
plans that include (and promote) an official Times definition of sexual
harassment. And there is some circularity in deferring to the dictionary
definition of “sexual harassment” when descriptive dictionaries look to
authoritative cultural sources like the Times when tracing such terms’
usage and meaning.19
Whatever the Times might say, its definition and use of the term
“sexual harassment” matters. And today’s almost unprecedented focus
on sexual harassment by the Times, among other media sources, makes
it crucial to ask, perhaps now more than ever, whether they are focused
on the right thing.
B. The Broader Definition
Over twenty years ago, Vicki Schultz began challenging what was
then—and in the New York Times, apparently still is—the prevailing
view of sexual harassment. Schultz explained that, according to what
she called the “sexual desire paradigm,” the quintessential case of har-
assment “involves a more powerful, typically older, male supervisor,
who uses his superior organizational position to demand sexual favors
from a less powerful, typically younger, female subordinate.”20 She doc-
umented the way this prevailing sexualized view of harassment had
shaped, and adversely affected, legal and cultural responses.
16 Laws, Regulations and Guidance: Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP.
COMM’N, supra note 15.
17 Email from Lara Takenaga, Reader Center, N.Y. TIMES, to Brian Soucek (May 14, 2018,
09:17 EST) (on file with authors).
18 Id.
19 For example, theOxford English Dictionary cites to a 2002New York Times Magazine usage
in its entry defining “quid pro quo.” Quid pro quo, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2007) (citing
Margaret Talbot,Men Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2002), (“A lot of workplace harassment
consisted not of bluntly quid pro quo sexual solicitations . . . but of sexual jokes and vulgarity.”))
20 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1692; see also id. (“This
sexual desire-dominance paradigm governs our understanding of harassment. Its influence is re-
flected in the very fact that the category is referred to as ‘sexual’ harassment rather than, for
example, ‘gender-based’ or ‘sex-based’ harassment.”).
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Schultz offered a broader understanding of harassment as a means
of undermining the competence, authority, and inclusion of women, and
some “lesser” men, in favored, male-dominated jobs and spaces. Har-
assment of this sort serves to “reinforce gender difference and to claim
work competence and authority as masculine preserves.”21 By driving
away women and gender-nonconforming men, or labeling them as “dif-
ferent” and inferior, Schultz theorized, dominants could shore up their
superior economic position, social status, and sense of masculine iden-
tity. On this conception, sexual harassment is both a consequence and
further cause of sex-segregated or gender-unbalanced workplaces.22
Schultz’s theory was one of the first to characterize sexual harass-
ment as primarily a means of policing gender boundaries, not securing
sexual liaisons.23 In this new approach, law and policy should focus on
eliminating gender hierarchies and discrimination, not on prohibiting
sexuality per se. For this reason, the reconceptualized view defines sex-
ual harassment both more broadly and in some respects more narrowly
than the traditional sexualized paradigm. “Sexual harassment,” recon-
ceptualized, includes derogatory comments and actions that are di-
rected at people because of their sex or gender but have no sexualized
content; yet it does not extend to benign sexual remarks and actions
that have no harmful gender-based motivations or effects, but which
many employers are nonetheless often eager to ban.24 Trying to sup-
press all hints of sexuality risks reinforcing dominant but unacknowl-
edged sexual hierarchies, thus punishing people of color, lesbians and
gay men, and others sterotyped as sexual deviants.25
In the reconceptualized view, then, sexual harassment law should
aim at gender hierarchy, not sexuality alone. But, of course, sexual be-
havior can be used to foster gender disadvantage. Schultz noted that,
particularly in traditionally male-dominated settings, sexual assault
and ridicule are often used as weapons to exaggerate women’s or gay
men’s difference and reinforce the dominants’ superiority. She argued
that “nonsexual forms of harassment frequently are accompanied by
more sexual ones, such as crude sexual overtures, or sexual taunting
21 Id. at 1755, 1759.
22 See id. at 1760.
23 Id. at 1762 (describing harassment as “conduct that is rooted in gender-based expecta-
tions—not simply conduct that is sexual in nature”); see also Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong
with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997) (characterizing sexual harassment as a
“technology of sexism”).
24 See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003); see also Vicki
Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment on Behalf of Employment Discrimination Law
Scholars, STANFORDL. REV. ONLINE (2018), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/open-state-
ment-on-sexual-harassment-from-employment-discrimination-law-scholars/ [https://perma.cc/9R
F7-FFNU].
25 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1729, 1784–85, 1789 n.540.
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and mockery.”26 Sexual misconduct is often a telltale sign of a larger
pattern of gender-based hostilities.27
Writing two decades apart, each of us has described in disturbing
and depressingly similar detail the varied ways both sexual and non-
sexual behaviors have been used to harass women in East Coast fire
departments.28 Lawsuits against New York City and Providence, Rhode
Island, revealed sexually crude comments, sexual advances, invasions
of privacy, and sexual assaults that were inflicted by male firefighters
on their female colleagues.29 But equally pervasive and pernicious were
the non-sexualized ways in which men tried to undermine female fire-
fighters and drive them out of their departments. In New York City in
the early 1980s, female firefighters were denied the training given to
men and were then blamed for their lesser ability to perform the tasks
for which they had been denied training. Equally humiliatingly, male
firefighters deprived the women of meals, cooperation, and “the unique
forms of communal living that are characteristic of the firefighters’
workplace.”30 In Providence, twenty years later, a lesbian lieutenant in
the fire department was actually poisoned during the communal meals.
More than one male subordinate flicked the pin signifying her rank and
said they would never take an order from her. One man under her com-
mand so resented the lieutenant’s orders that he snapped off his rubber
gloves in the back of a rescue vehicle, flinging a patient’s blood and
brain matter onto his superior’s face.31
All of this is sexual harassment. Regardless of whether the harass-
ment involved sexual advances or taunts, gender-specific slurs, or acts
of hostility and exclusion, the antagonistic actions, assaults, ridicule,
ostracism, marginalization, and sabotage these women endured all
served the same aim: policing gender boundaries and preserving the
gendered character of firefighting. All of this was done to shore up the
men’s gendered—which is to say heterosexual and stereotypically mas-
culine—position, status, image, and sense of identity.
26 Id. at 1766.
27 See id. at 1755–62, 1764–66; see also Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again,
supra note 6, at n.32 and accompanying text.
28 See Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment, supra note 8; Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, supra note 6, at 1769–73.
29 See Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 755 F.2d 913 (2d
Cir. 1985) (described in Schultz,Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment Law, supra note 6, passim);
see also Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (described in Soucek, Queering
Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, passim).
30 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment Law, supra note 6, at 1771 (quoting Berk-
man v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. at 232).
31 Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment, supra note 8, at 71–72.
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These women, these types of stories, are hardly unique. Research
has repeatedly found that the most pervasive forms of workplace har-
assment are not sexual advances and attention, but rather non-sexual
hostile or offensive behaviors directed at women (and gender-noncon-
forming men) because of their sex or gender performance.32 In light of
these findings, today, many social scientists have moved away from the
older sexual desire paradigm in favor of a broader gender-policing the-
ory like the one proposed by Schultz.33 In this view, harassment is more
about gender-based put-downs than about sexual come-ons.34 Evidence
suggests that unwanted sexual attention and advances typically do not
occur in isolation, but instead co-occur with broader gender-based or
other hostilities.35 Thus, even the come-ons often prove to be less about
sexual desire than a desire to “devalue women or punish those who vi-
olate gender norms.”36
Reviewing recent research, a 2016 report by an EEOC task force
concluded that “sexist or crude/offensive behaviors” that are “devoid of
32 See Jennifer Berdahl & Jana L Raver, Sexual Harassment, 3 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N
HANDBOOK OF INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 641, 646 (2011); EEOC REP., infra note 37
(collecting recent studies). See also Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra
note 6, at 33–42 (discussing recent research and examples involving women); Brian Soucek, Per-
ceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715, 731–738, 744–760
(2014); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6 (discussing early research
and examples).
33 See George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Economics and Identity, 3 Q. J. ECON. 715, 733 &
n.37 (2000); Jennifer L. Berdahl,Harassment Based on Sex: Protecting Social Status in the Context
of Gender Hierarchy, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 641 (2007); Emily A. Leskinen, Lilia M. Cortina &
Dana B. Kabat, Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-Based Harassment at
Work, 35 J. L. & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 36 (2010); Sandy Welsh, Gender and Sexual Harassment, 25
ANN. REV. SOC. 169, 175 (1999) (citing Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note
6, to acknowledge broader, nonsexual forms of harassment, and calling on social science research-
ers to take account of harassment that does not fit the “top-down, male-female sexual come-on
image of harassment” paradigm).
34 See Emily A. Leskinen et al., Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-
Based Harassment at Work, supra note 33, at 36 (“Taken together, our empirical results support
the legal theory that ‘much of the time, harassment assumes a form that has little or nothing to
do with sexuality but everything to do with gender”‘) (citing Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, supra note 6, at 1687). For the origin of the “put downs” versus “come ons” distinction,
see Louise F. Fitzgerald, Michele J. Gelfand & Fritz Drasgow,Measuring Sexual Harassment: The-
oretical and Psychometric Advances, 17 BASIC &APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 425, 431–32 (1995) (“[I]t
is sometimes difficult to determine whether a sexualized conversation is a come on or a put down
(the essential distinction between unwanted sexual attention and gender harassment.”).
35 See, e.g., Berdahl & Raver, Sexual Harassment, supra note 32 (collecting studies showing
that unwanted sexual attention and sexual coercion co-occurs with gender-based harassment, as
well with other types of harassment); Sandy Lim & Lilia M. Cortina, Interpersonal Mistreatment
in the Workplace: The Interface and Impact of General Incivility and Sexual Harassment, 90 J.
APPLIEDPSYCHOL. 483, 487, 490 (2005); see also Louise F. Fitzgerald et al.,Measuring Sexual Har-
assment: Theoretical and Psychometric Advances, supra note 34, at 438.
36 Paula A. Johnson et al., Sexual Harassment of Women: Climate, Culture, and Consequences
in Academic Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, MED. 49 (2018)
(hereinafter “NAT’L ACADS. REP.”).
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sexual interest”37—behaviors the literature sometimes refers to as “gen-
der harassment’’38—are far more common than acts of unwanted sexual
attention and sexual coercion.39 In surveys based on probability sam-
ples, the report notes, 25 percent of women say they have experienced
“sexual harassment” at work,40 and 40 percent say they have experi-
enced one or more specific sexual behaviors.41 But in similar surveys
asking about broader forms of gender-based hostility and harassment
toward women, a much higher 60 percent of women report experiencing
such harassment.42 The figures are even higher for some women in
male-dominated settings. Large-scale studies of women working in the
military and in law firms reported, for example, that nine in ten har-
assment victims had experienced sex-based or gender-harassment “in
the absence of unwanted sexual attention or coercion.”43
A 2018 report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineer-
ing, and Medicine similarly found that “gender harassment ([defined
as] behaviors that communicate that women do not belong or do not
merit respect) is by far the most common type of sexual harassment.”44
Indeed, according to this report, “unwanted sexual attention and sexual
37 Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace: Report of Co-Chairs Chai
R. Feldblum & Victoria A. Lipnic, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (June 9, 2016), https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.cfm#_Toc453686302 [https://perma.cc/Z2KP-77
CZ] (hereinafter “EEOC REP.”).
38 Id. at 9. The widely used Sexual Experiences Questionnaire developed by psychologist
Louise Fitzgerald and her colleagues coined the term “gender harassment” to refer to hostile or
offensive behaviors conveying negative attitudes toward women but devoid of sexual interest.
Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in Academia and
the Workplace, 32 J. VOC. BEHAV. 152, 157 (1988). Many social scientists have adopted this term,
treating it as a subset of a larger body of sexual or sex-based harassment that includes gender
harassment, sexual coercion, and unwanted sexual attention. See, e.g., Emily A. Leskinen et al.,
Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-Based Harassment at Work, supra
note 33.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 8 & n.15.
41 Id. at 8 & n.16.
42 Id. at 8–9 & n.21. See also NAT’L ACADS. REP., supra note 44, at 31 (“[W]omen who experi-
ence the gender harassment type of sexual harassment are more than 7 times less likely to label
their experiences as ‘sexual harassment’ than women who experience unwanted sexual attention
or sexual coercion. This illustrates what other research has shown: that in both the law and the
lay public, the dominant understandings of sexual harassment overemphasize two forms of sexual
harassment, sexual coercion and unwanted sexual attention, while downplaying the third (most
common) type—gender harassment.”).
43 Emily A. Leskinen et al.,Gender Harassment: Broadening Our Understanding of Sex-Based
Harassment at Work, supra note 33, at 36.
44 NAT’L ACADS. REP., supra note 36.
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coercion are almost never experienced by women without simultane-
ously experiencing gender harassment.”45 Notably, gender harassment
more commonly comes from peers than superiors.46
Despite the greater prevalence of these non-sexual acts of sexism
and hostility, many women do not understand them to be actionable
sexual harassment. The public conversation that highlights sexual ad-
vances, while neglecting less salacious forms of sexism, undoubtedly
limits employees’ understanding of what counts as sexual harassment.
Disturbingly, the National Academies Report also found that:
Women who experience the gender harassment type of sexual
harassment are more than 7 times less likely to label their expe-
riences as ‘sexual harassment’ than women who experience un-
wanted sexual attention or sexual coercion. This illustrates what
other research has shown: that in both the law and the lay pub-
lic, the dominant understandings of sexual harassment overem-
phasize two forms of sexual harassment, sexual coercion and un-
wanted sexual attention, while downplaying the third (most
common) type—gender harassment.47
The New York Times is surely a contributor to this limited lay un-
derstanding, given the paper’s narrow sexual definition and coverage.
But the Times would not have to look far to broaden its horizons. Iron-
ically, the paper’s own recent survey of full-time male workers revealed
a greater prevalence of sexual harassment that lacks sexual designs. In
December 2017, the Times asked 615 men whether they had engaged
in any sort of sexist “objectionable behavior or sexual harassment” at
work during the previous year.48 Of the ten behaviors listed in the sur-
vey, the two that are most consistent with what the literature terms
“gender harassment” received the highest responses. One—“[t]old sex-
ual stories or jokes that somemight consider offensive”—got the highest
response, at 19%. The second highest response came from the 16% of
men who admitted to making “remarks that some might consider sexist
or offensive.” The options more clearly involving sexual advances, as-
saults, or coercion—those involving dates, sexual discussions, gestures
or body language “of a sexual nature,” uncomfortable touching, unin-
vited fondling or kissing, and sexual quid pro quo offers—all received
45 Id. at 171.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 31.
48 Jugal K. Patel, Troy Griggs & Claire Cain Miller,We Asked 615 Men About How They Con-
duct Themselves at Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12
/28/upshot/sexual-harassment-survey-600-men.html [https://perma.cc/BS2Z-M5YS].
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lower responses in the range of one to four percent.49 According to the
Times’s official definition, however, the sexist and offensive remarks to
which more men admitted would count only as objectionable behavior—
not sexual harassment.
C. The Law’s Definition
The law prohibits all harassment based on sex, regardless of
whether it is sexual in motivation or means. Authoritative judicial de-
cisions have made this clear for twenty years. Writing for the Supreme
Court in 1998, Justice Scalia emphasized both that “harassing conduct
need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of dis-
crimination on the basis of sex,”50 and that workplace behavior is not
“automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words
used have sexual content or connotations.”51 What matters, the Court
said in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, is not the sexualized
nature of certain words or actions, but the way words and actions affect
working conditions for some people because of their sex or gender.52 On-
cale and other decisions clarify that sexual harassment is actionable
whenever it amounts to sex discrimination in the terms and conditions
of employment—not under some special offshoot of Title VII that per-
tains specifically to sexual conduct.
U.S. law did not always take this clear stance. Feminist scholars
and lawyers had to fight for judicial recognition of non-sexual but still
sex-based forms of sexual harassment.53 Since Oncale, however, nearly
all the federal courts of appeals have similarly clarified that “sexual
harassment” encompasses actions that are, in the Seventh Circuit’s
words, “sexist rather than sexual.”54 Increasingly—and crucially for
claims brought by LGBT workers—the courts of appeals have also
49 Id.
50 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
51 Id.
52 Id. Oncale also clarified that same-sex sexual harassment is fully actionable under Title
VII, regardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser.
53 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at nn.81, 82; Schultz, Re-
conceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra note 6, at nn.194–199, and accompanying text.
54 Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F. 3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2007). See also O’Rourke
v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 730 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2001); Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217
F.3d 141, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2000); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 1999);
Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2003); Beard v. Southern Flying J,
Inc., 266 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2001); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001);
Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 1999). But see Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1069 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on fact that the alleged misconduct
was sexual in nature to hold same-sex harassment actionable). The D.C. Circuit was the first to
hold that actionable harassment need not be sexual in nature, see McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d
1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985), but the decision was widely ignored, as Schultz demonstrated. Recon-
ceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1732–38.
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acknowledged in recent years that workers harassed for deviating from
gender-based stereotypes and expectations have an actionable sexual
harassment claim under Title VII.55 These cases show the continuity
between claims rooted in gender stereotyping and those sounding in
sexual orientation or gender identity.56 LGBT employees who are har-
assed because of their partners’ sex or gender or their display of gender-
atypical interests or clothing,57 like women who dare to invade fields
dominated by men,58 or men who openly use wet wipes on a construction
site59—all face hostility because they have violated their employers’ or
coworkers’ views of how “real” men and women should behave.60 They
have run afoul of the gender police at work. Protecting them from such
gender policing, at least when it becomes severe or pervasive, is among
Title VII’s aims—as most courts now recognize.61 This is true regardless
of whether the harassment is predominantly “sexual.”
Despite the formal judicial consensus on this question, however,
some confusion over whether sexual harassment refers only to sexual
conduct still appears in certain public pronouncements by the EEOC
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), the two leading agencies charged
with enforcing federal employment discrimination law.
55 Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VI, supra note 32, at 748–
760.
56 See Brief of Anti-Discrimination Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees,
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., No. 17-1618 (U.S., July 3, 2019), at 8–16; Soucek, Queering Sexual
Harassment Law, supra note 8, at 72–75. But see Brief of U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. Jul. 26, 2017) (ECF No. 281) (arguing that a gay plaintiff’s Title
VII discrimination claim is impermissibly based on his sexual orientation, rather than his sex);
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 154 (2d Cir. 2018), (Lynch, J., dissenting) (acknowl-
edging the government’s amicus argument, and concluding similarly), cert. granted, 2019 WL
1756678 (2019) (consolidated with Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Ga., cert granted, 2019 WL 1756677
(2019)); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 361 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not discrimination
“because of sex” under Title VII); Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254–5 (11th Cir.
2017) (“[T]he lower court erred because a gender non-conformity claim is not ‘just another way to
claim discrimination based on sexual orientation,’ but instead, constitutes a separate, distinct av-
enue for relief under Title VII.”)
57 Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2006) (where plaintiff’s friendship
with a gay man sparked harassment); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir.
2009) (where plaintiff’s “effeminate” style of dress and mannerisms made him a target for harass-
ment). See also Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals:, supra note 32; Schultz,Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, supra note 6, at 1777–89.
58 Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018); Soucek, Queering Sexual Har-
assment Law, supra note 8, at 75.
59 EEOC. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2013).
60 See Brian Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J. F. 115, 123 (2017),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/hivelys-self-induced-blindness [https://perma.cc/6D8Z-7C3
6].
61 Supra notes 54–56.
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A search for “sexual harassment” on the EEOC’s website points in
different directions. A page on “Types of Discrimination”62 links to an
excellent page titled simply “Harassment.”63 Commendably, the latter
page treats harassment as something that can be based on sex, race,
religion, or any of the other protected categories; all are treated as
equivalent. As a result, the examples given are, by necessity, not sexu-
alized; they include “offensive jokes, slurs, . . . physical assaults or
threats, intimidation, ridicule . . . , insults or put-downs, offensive ob-
jects or pictures, and interference with work performance.”64 Further,
the website makes clear that harassment need not be top-down. Har-
assers can be co-workers or even non-employees, too.
By contrast, the EEOC devotes a separate link on the “Types of
Discrimination” page to a page on “Sexual Harassment”—the site to
which the Times linked in its lesson plan.65 That page makes clear that
harassment may include but “does not need to be of a sexual nature,”
as discussed above. Yet, it confusingly also seems to limit “sexual har-
assment” to sexualized conduct, stating that “[h]arassment can include
‘sexual harassment’ or unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature.”66
Put in quotes and defined in overtly sexualized terms, “sexual harass-
ment” is presented as a subset of the sex-based harassment that is the
subject of the page as a whole. Worse, links on the side direct readers
to pages offering “Facts about Sexual Harassment,”67 a March 1990
“Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment,”68 and the
Code of Federal Regulations section on sexual harassment.69 All three
use now-obsolete language from 1980 that says: “Unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment. . . . ”70
62 Discrimination by Type, U.S. EQUALEMP. OPPORTUNITYCOMM’N (last visited Jan. 20, 2019),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/ [https://perma.cc/RC28-DC5M].
63 Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/PTP8-MM6R].
64 Id.
65 See Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited Jan. 20,
2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/8SNB-9LA9].
66 Id. (emphasis added).
67 Id. (linking to Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N
(last visited Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm [https://perma.cc/8J
HR-WG4W]).
68 Id. (linking to EEOC-N-915-050 Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment,
U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Mar. 19, 1990), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentis-
sues.html [https://perma.cc/8ZLA-MEZC]).
69 See Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2018).
70 Id. § 1604.11(a).
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This narrow description comes from the EEOC’s 1980 Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of Sex,71 which codified the sexualized defi-
nition that some feminist theorists, and eventually most courts, reacted
against in the following two decades. The law has since moved on, but
the original guideline and the Code of Federal Regulations remains un-
changed. The EEOC has not updated either, but only issued policy pro-
nouncements reflecting the broader understanding. In a Policy Guid-
ance released in March 1990, for example, the agency took note of a
1985 D.C. Circuit decision and acknowledged that “[a]lthough the
Guidelines specifically address conduct that is sexual in nature, sex-
based harassment—that is, harassment not involving sexual activity or
language—may also give rise to Title VII liability.”72
This lack of clarity creates an opening that those who wish to re-
turn to the older, sexualized definition of harassment can exploit. In-
deed, it is the language of the 1980 Guidelines that officials and man-
agers often import into policy statements. Take, for example, the DOJ’s
latest memorandum on sexual harassment, released in April 2018 after
an internal investigation by the DOJ’s Inspector General led to a de-
partment-wide working group, convened to address the problem.73 Not
only does DOJ’s memo adhere to the 1980 Guidelines in defining sexual
harassment as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature,”74 it goes on to
illustrate the targeted misconduct though a series of exclusively sexu-
alized examples, which include: “displaying ‘pinup’ calendars or sex-
ually demeaning pictures, telling sexually oriented jokes, making sex-
ually offensive remarks, engaging in unwanted sexual teasing,
subjecting another employee to pressure for dates, sexual advances, or
unwelcome touching.”75 The DOJ’s important, newly implemented re-
porting and tracking procedures thus get triggered only by actions that
fit the now obsolete, sexualized conception of sexual harassment.
71 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74, 677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11) (“Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment . . . ”).
72 EEOC-N-915-050, supra note 68, at § C.4.
73 Rod Rosenstein, Memorandum on Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct (Apr. 30,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1059401/download [https://perma.cc/7H2Y-KADG].
See also Katie Benner, Justice Department Releases New Sexual Harassment Guidelines, N.Y.
TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/us/politics/justice-department-sexual-
harassment.html [https://perma.cc/7788-CKUP].
74 Id. In fact, the DOJ goes further than the 1980 Guidelines in sexualizing “sexual harass-
ment”: where the Guidelines said verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature et cetera constitute
sexual harassment—at least leaving open the possibility that other non-sexualized activity might
also constitute sexual harassment—the DOJ says that “sexual harassment” refers to verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature (et cetera).
75 Id.; see also Prevention of Harassment in the Workplace, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (last visited Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/eeos/sexual-harassment [https://p
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Notably, the definition of “sexual harassment” in these internal
policies that the DOJ applies to its own employees is narrower than the
definition the agency uses in litigation efforts on behalf of employees
generally. DOJ’s Civil Rights Division recently launched a major initi-
ative against “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,” focusing on public
sector employers.76 The initiative began with a lawsuit against the Hou-
ston Fire Department, alleging that male firefighters had engaged in
hostile work environment harassment by directing brutal insults,
threats, pranks, property damage, and sabotage—but no sexual ad-
vances—against the only two female firefighters at Houston’s Station
54.77 The men made the made the workplace hellish for the two women
who dared to enter their domain.78 Though no sexual activity was in-
volved, the harassment was surely based on sex. The federal courts
should have no difficulty condemning their behavior as unlawful sexual
harassment; they have long done so in other cases, as discussed above.79
But fact patterns like these would not qualify as sexual harassment un-
der the DOJ’s own new internal policies, under the EEOC’s old 1980
guideline, or under language on some of the governmental websites
meant to instruct the public on the meaning of sexual harassment.
There is, in sum, a split in the way sexual harassment is defined
and understood. On one side is a broad gender-based conception re-
flected in federal caselaw and the extensive social science documenting
the varied forms of workplace harassment experienced by both women
and men, especially those who deviate from dominant gender stereo-
types. On the other side is the exclusively sexualized, implicitly male-
to-female notion of sexual harassment offered by the 1980 EEOCGuide-
lines, the DOJ’s internal policy, and the New York Times.
erma.cc/3EFM-KLKL]. The examples are derived from a June 1993 memorandum from then-At-
torney General Janet Reno on the “Prevention of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace.” Memo-
randum to Dep’t of Just. Emps. (June 29, 1993). A follow-up memo released after Oncale noted
that DOJ had reviewed that case and found its policies “consistent” with it. Janet Reno,Memoran-
dum on the Prevention of Sexual Harassment (Dec. 14, 1998).
76 Justice Department Launches Initiative to Fight Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-launches-ini-
tiative-fight-sexual-harassment-workplace [https://perma.cc/5GSZ-XEEJ].
77 U.S. v. City of Houston, No. 4:18-cv-00644 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2018) (ECF No. 1),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1040081/download [https://perma.cc/5JQ8-JDGN].
78 Id. at 3–14.
79 Numerous courts have condemned similar patterns of behavior as hostile work environment
harassment that violates Title VII, as discussed above. See supra note 29 and accompanying text;
see also supra note 54.
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II. WHY THEDEFINITIONMATTERS
It matters which conception of sexual harassment the New York
Times and other media adopt—especially now, as the #MeToo move-
ment itself teeters between the two conceptions. The movement’s name
derives from an earlier effort to combat sexual abuse.80 Its resurgence
was spawned by a tweet that gave voice to millions who have been “sex-
ually harassed or assaulted.”81 Yet, after the initial emphasis on sexu-
alized harms, the movement began to focus attention on wider forms of
workplace sexism. For example, #MeToo activists helped create “Time’s
Up,” an initiative designed to address “the systemic inequality and in-
justice in the workplace that have kept underrepresented groups from
reaching their full potential.”82 And some prominent supporters urged
a broad gender lens for analyzing sexual violations, in line with the re-
conceived view of harassment.83 Thus, #MeToo encompasses both the
older sexual desire paradigm that emphasizes male-to-female sexual
misconduct predation as the quintessential problem and the recon-
ceived view that focuses more broadly on gender-based harassment and
discrimination against women, LGBT people, and others who challenge
gender norms.
The question is which version will—or more importantly, should—
capture the public imagination going forward. Are there good reasons
for re-embracing the older sexualized view in the current era?
To answer this question, we first speculate on why the New York
Times might have adopted an exclusively sexual definition and view of
harassment. The point is not to figure out the Times’s actual motiva-
80 See Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/ULT8-MD4J] (describing activist Tarana Burke’s efforts to create the #MeToo cam-
paign).
81 “Me too. Suggested by a friend: ‘If all the women who have been sexually harassed or as-
saulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.”





82 About TIME’S Up, TIME’SUP, https://www.timesupnow.com/about_times_up [https://perma
.cc/B49D-C4K2] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019). For discussion of similar reform efforts generated by
#MeToo, see Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra note 6, at 61.
83 Melissa Gira Grant, The Unsexy Truth About Harassment, N.Y. REV. BOOKSDAILY (Dec. 8,
2017), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/12/08/the-unsexy-truth-about-harassment [https://per
ma.cc/FN8U-86LZ]; Anna North, What I’ve Learned Covering Sexual Misconduct This Year, VOX
(Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/27/16803610/sexual-misconduct-harass-
ment-reckoning-metoo [https://perma.cc/2DKA-2P7N]; Rebecca Traister, This Moment Isn’t (Just)
About Sex. It’s Really About Work, CUT (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/12/rebecca-
traister-this-moment-isnt-just-about-sex.html [https://perma.cc/FEC9-GPRH].
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tions, but rather to ask why any responsible media outlet that is appar-
ently committed to exposing workplace harms against women would
adopt such a view. We then discuss some of the harms of the sexualized
view.
A. Reasons for Adopting a Sexual Definition
1. Publicity. Perhaps part of the answer has to do with the fact that
salacious stories generate publicity. Sex sells.84 Stories like those told
about movie mogul Harvey Weinstein are the stuff of tabloids. Sear-
ingly personal, and painful as they are to read, the revelations made by
actors such as Ashley Judd,85 Gwyneth Paltrow,86 Salma Hayek,87 and
Lupita Nyong’o88 are also stories of sex, stars, and movie deals, set in
exotic locations from Hollywood to Cannes. These stories are destined
to find a wide audience that similarly disturbing descriptions of harass-
ment on Ford’s factory line89 likely never will.90
2. Effectiveness. A more charitable explanation may lie in a belief
that reporting on the wrongs committed by powerful figures like Harvey
Weinstein, Matt Lauer,91 and Louis C.K.,92 can lead to greater change
than stories about more entrenched cultures of harassment, often car-
ried out by coworkers or subordinates. After all, Harvey Weinstein’s
sexual demands and assaults stopped when the New York Times ex-
posed them.93 The top-down, sexualized paradigm of harassment allows
84 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1693–96 (describing
outsize media focus on the sexualized details of harassment cases).
85 Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for
Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2xVPfVW [https://perma.cc/3Y4H-GFTB].
86 Jodi Kantor & Rachel Abrams, Gwyneth Paltrow, Angelina Jolie and Others Say Weinstein
Harassed Them, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2gapaOJ [https://perma.cc/4BJ8-
22L3].
87 Salma Hayek, Harvey Weinstein Is My Monster, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2nXntXL [https://perma.cc/F346-E68T].
88 Lupita Nyong’o, Speaking Out About Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2l0MXCm [https://perma.cc/AL2F-X28N].
89 Chira & Einhorn,How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford,
supra note 7.
90 Maggie Adams, Ari Isaacman Bevacqua & Anna Dubenko, The Most-Read New York Times
Stories of 2017, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2BNssfH [https://perma.cc/9H74-J2GH]
(noting that the stories cited in the previous four footnotes were, respectively, the 10th, 45th, 9th,
and 80th most-read New York Times stories in 2017).
91 Ellen Gabler et al., NBC Fires Matt Lauer, the Face of ‘Today’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2k93ZOw [https://perma.cc/C8D8-VR8W] (this was the 7th most read New York
Times article of 2017, Adams, Bevacqua & Dubenko, supra note 90).
92 Melena Ryzik, Cara Buckley & Jodi Kantor, Louis C.K. Is Accused by 5 Women of Sexual
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2ho0aE0 [https://perma.cc/S3E2-CXA6]
(this was the 16th most read New York Times article of 2017, Adams, Bevacqua & Dubenko, supra
note 90).
93 Supra notes 85–88.
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for this kind of immediate, dramatic resolution: the guy at the top gets
fired (an event which is often itself an important news story that gen-
erates more publicity).
Collecting such stories, the Times’s infographic about the “201 Pow-
erful Men” brought down by #MeToo in its first year94 stands as a sym-
bol of the movement’s—and reporters’—effectiveness. A similar follow-
up to the Times’s reporting about the sexually and racially hostile work
environment at Ford plants is harder to imagine. Indeed, the 2017 re-
porting on Ford was itself a follow-up to stories (and lawsuits) that
emerged from the same Chicago-area plants in the 1990s.95 De-
pressingly little had changed in twenty years. The problem could not be
fixed with a single well-publicized personnel change.
But it remains to be seen whether the harassment problems in in-
dustries such as Hollywood and Silicon Valley can be fixed by firing in-
dividual harassers. In industries and workplaces plagued by harass-
ment, deeper structural problems, such as entrenched sex segregation,
unchecked supervisory authority, and informal “who-you-know” hiring,
give dominants the upper hand.96 As Schultz wrote recently after sur-
veying these entrenched problems in both industries: “Sooner or later,
other harassers will take their place—unless the underlying conditions
that foster harassment in the first place are addressed.”97 In other
words, focusing on the traditional, sexualized, male boss/female subor-
dinate(s) vision of sexual harassment may not end up being as effective
in the long run as it is dramatic in the short term.
3. Pervasiveness or Seriousness. Perhaps, however, the Times and
other media focus on workplace sexual abuse out of a belief that that it
is more pervasive, or its harms more serious, than other types of sexist
misconduct. Such a view has long been promoted by some strands of
feminism.98 Early in the development of sexual harassment law, for ex-
ample, some feminists argued that “harassment is problematic pre-
cisely because it is sexual in nature—and because heterosexual sexu
al relations are the primary mechanism through which male
dominance and female subordination are maintained.”99 Early sexual
94 Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Re-
placements Are Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/
23/us/metoo-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/4C3D-Z4KA].
95 U.S. and Ford Settle Harassment Case,N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 1999), https://nyti.ms/2IYFTgw
[https://perma.cc/83GA-AYQY].
96 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, supra note 6, at 48–53.
97 Id. at 26.
98 For a discussion of such feminist thought and its influence on the development of sexual
harassment law, see Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1697–1705.
99 Id. at 1705 (discussing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A
Case of Sex Discrimination 59–77 (1979); Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery 164-65 (1979);
Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse 126 (1987)).
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harassment cases challenged “precisely the sort of top-down, supervi-
sor-subordinate, male-female sexual extortion” decried by these femi-
nists.”100
Some journalists may simply take this point of view for granted,
but this is not the only feminist perspective on sexual harassment law.
Members of the media should educate themselves and the public about
the rich variety of feminist and progressive thought on the subject.
Many writers reject the notion that sexuality is uniquely harmful, or
that heterosexuality itself somehow generates harmful structures of
gender, race, class, and homophobia in the workplace and other social
realms.101
Theoretical debate aside, it turns out that some key factual as-
sumptions used to defend the sexualized view of harassment are not
well grounded. We discuss some of these inaccuracies, and associated
harms, below.
B. Counterarguments: The Harms of a Sexualized Definition.
1. Pervasiveness. First of all, it is simply wrong to think that sexu-
alized forms of harassment are more pervasive than the types of sexual
harassment sometimes referred to as “gender harassment.” (More on
this term in Part III.) To the contrary, non-sexual, sex-based harass-
ment is far more common than sexual advances and attention, as dis-
cussed above.102 Defining it out of existence vastly underestimates the
amount of harassment and discrimination facing working women, and
many men, and leaves them ill-informed about their rights.
2. Harmfulness. There is little if any evidence that overtly sexual
harassment is more harmful than other forms. To the contrary, re-
search suggests that non-sexual harassment causes harm similar to
that caused by more sexual forms.103 Indeed, in the workplace, the for-
mer may be even more harmful, precisely because it is not widely
100 Id. at 1705.
101 See e.g., Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 24, at 2136–2139 (arguing that sex-
uality is not inherently subordinating or degrading, but rather sexualized behavior is used as only
one tool among many for maintaining masculine superior status and identity); Ann C. McGinley,
The Masculinity Motivation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99 (2018), https://review.law.stanford.edu/w
p-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-McGinley.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ7H-9
ET9] (extending the analysis of the pervasiveness of non-sexual, sex-based harassment to school
settings); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo
Movement, 128 YALE L.J. F 105 (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/what-about-ustoo
[https://perma.cc/68N6-4N8C] (discussing the often overlooked racialized dimensions of sexual
harassment and sex-based harassment); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling
Harassers in an At-Will World, 128 YALE L.J. F. 85 (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/fo-
rum/of-power-and-process [https://perma.cc/5RNW-RA7C] (discussing class-based dimensions of
sexual harassment law).
102 Supra notes 39–46, and accompanying text.
103 See Leskinen et al., supra note 34, at 37; M. Sandy Hershcovis & Julian Barling, Comparing
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acknowledged as a social problem. Thus, “unlike with overtly sexual
harassment, women and other victims may also be more likely to inter-
nalize and blame themselves for nonsexual harassment, rather than at-
tributing it to sexism and gender bias for which they are not responsi-
ble.”104
3. Skewed Focus. Focusing solely on sexualized forms of harass-
ment not only underestimates the incidence and harm of sexual harass-
ment generally: it also disproportionately neglects the types most often
faced by women in supervisory positions and male-dominated job set-
tings,105 and by LGBT workers.106 According to the National Academies’
study, LBGT employees working in higher education report experienc-
ing “gender harassment” at two-and-a-half times the rate reported by
heterosexual employees.107 These are people who by definition are cross-
ing traditional gender boundaries about their “proper place” or defying
gender stereotypes about how proper “women” and “men” should be-
have. Harassment is a way of punishing them for gender non-conform-
ity.108
Indeed, neglecting non-sexualized harassment and ignoring har-
assment against people who violate gender norms are dynamics that
reinforce each other in a self-perpetuating cycle. Focusing only on New
York Times-type stories in which a powerful heterosexual man makes
sexual advances on the beautiful women who work for him makes a de-
sire-based account of sexual harassment all too easy to accept. After all,
readers may think, what man wouldn’t want these women? Fore-
grounding less visible stories in which the person harassed is not a
beautiful ingenue but a butch lesbian, harassed because she is the
Victim Attributions and Outcomes for Workplace Aggression and Sexual Harassment, 95 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 874, 875 (2010).
104 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment Again, supra note 6, at 43 & n.101 (citing
sources).
105 Heather McLaughlin et al., Sexual Harassment, Workplace Authority, and the Paradox of
Power, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 625, 634 (2012) (finding that female supervisors “report a rate of harass-
ment 73 percent greater than that of nonsupervisors”); see also Jennifer Berdahl, The Sexual Har-
assment of Uppity Women, 92 J. APPL. PSYCH. 425, 425 (2007) (finding that women with more “mas-
culine” personality traits like aggressiveness are sexually harassed more than “women who meet
feminine ideals.”).
106 See generally Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law, supra note 8.
107 In a study of 629 employees in higher education, nearly 76.9 percent of sexual minorities
(of both genders) experienced gender harassment, whereas only 30 percent of heterosexuals (of
both genders) experienced gender harassment. Julie Konik & Lilia M. Cortina, Policing Gender at
Work: Intersections of Harassment Based on Sex and Sexuality, 21 SOC. JUSTICE RESEARCH 313,
324 (2008).
108 Schultz, Open Statement, supra note 24, at 19; Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law,
supra note 7, at 72–72; Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals, supra note 32, at 748–760; Schultz, Re-
conceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1774–1777.
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boss,109 makes it easier to see something other than sexual interest and
opportunism as harassment’s cause.110
At the same time, rooting sexual harassment in sexual desire ra-
ther than gender policing makes it much more difficult to see the har-
assment of LGBT and other gender non-conforming people as a form of
sex discrimination.111 By focusing only on sexual desire, we miss the
common thread linking a male boss’s sexual advances, a co-worker’s ho-
mophobic slurs, and the insubordination faced by a female authority
figure from the men who work for her: All are attempts to police gender
and reinforce gendered spaces, professions, and prerogatives. Disrupt-
ing such gender boundaries has always been part of the contested
meaning of Title VII.112
4. Misunderstood Motivations. This last observation suggests an-
other cost of ignoring non-sexualized forms and causes of sexual har-
assment: Doing so can lead observers to misunderstand and downplay
even the sexualized forms.113
Consider, for example, one of Donald Trump’s standard defenses
against allegations of predatory sexual advances and assaults: “She’s
not my type.”114 Or, as his then-lawyer Michael Cohen said of the accus-
ers, “they’re not somebody that he would be attracted to, and therefore,
109 Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018); Soucek, Queering Sexual Har-
assment Law, supra note 8.
110 As commentators have recognized, expanding the stories that are told about sexual harass-
ment helps shift social and legal understanding of its causes and effects. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green,
Was Sexual Harassment Law A Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128 YALE L.J. F. 152 (2018), https://
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/was-sexual-harassment-law-mistake [https://perma.cc/DW2U-AW
C9].
111 See Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law, supra note 8.
112 Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, supra note 60, at 125 (citing Cary Franklin, In-
venting the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1328, 1331,
1377–80 (2012); Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENVER U. L. REV. 995,
1014–46 (2015)). This insight is especially crucial now that the Supreme Court has taken up the
question of whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 WL
1756678 (2019); Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Commissioners, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018),
cert. granted, 2019 WL 1756677 (2019) (consolidated with Zarda)); R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 WL 1756679 (2019); Brief
of Anti-Discrimination Scholars, supra note 56.
113 For an example in addition to those that follow, see Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Har-
assment, Again, supra note 6, at 46–47 (discussing this point and supporting research). In this
piece, Schultz shows how even famed sexual predator Harvey Weinstein engaged in a pattern of
non-sexual misogyny and homophobic insults against female and male employees, in addition to
his sexual assaults and advances. Despite the lack of media attention to these broader forms of
sexual harassment and discrimination, Schultz argues, analyzing them helps illuminate Wein-
stein’s motivations and reveals that he wasn’t just a sex-crazed pervert, but an industry kingpin
bent on displaying a variety of gendered prerogatives. Id. at 34–38.
114 Peter Baker & Neil Vigdor, ‘She’s Not My Type’: Accused Again of Sexual Assault, Trump
Resorts to Old Insult, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/us/poli-
tics/jean-carroll-trump.html [https://perma.cc/FGK8-G5FR]; see also Ryan Teague Beckwith, Read
Donald Trump’s Speech Attacking His Accusers, TIME (Oct. 14, 2016), http://time.com/4532181/do
248 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
the whole thing is nonsense.”115 This defense only makes sense if mis-
placed sexual desire is the sole reason men sexually harass women. But
it is not. Unwanted sexual advances can also serve to maintain mascu-
line status in the eyes of other men—not just by carrying them out, but
also, often, by boasting about them, lording them over other men, or
using them as a means of bonding.116
This point helps explain a crucial but unappreciated moment in the
recent confirmation hearings of now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Senator
Patrick Leahy asked Dr. Christine Blasey Ford about her strongest
memory from the day she was attacked. Her answer is now famous:
FORD: Indelible in the hippocampus is the laughter, the laugh—
the uproarious laughter between the two, and their having fun
at my expense.
Senator Leahy continued:
LEAHY: You’ve never forgotten that laughter. You’ve never for-
gotten them laughing at you.
FORD: They were laughing with each other.
LEAHY: And you were the object of the laughter?
FORD: I was, you know, underneath one of them while the two
laughed, two friend[s]—two friends having a really good time
with one another.117
Despite his sympathetic questioning, Senator Leahy was unable to
see what Dr. Ford instantly realized. The laughter was not at her or
about her, just as the attack she described was not about sexual grati-
fication. Before all else, the whole thing was a form of homosocial bond-
ing: two privileged boys from an all-male school showing off for each
nald-trump-north-carolina-accusers-speech-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/JX6Y-DNBU] (“Believe
me, she would not be my first choice.”).
115 See also Bryan Logan, Donald Trump’s Attorney: Trump’s Sexual-Assault Accusers “Aren’t
Even Women He’d Be Attracted to,” BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.businessinside
r.com/michael-cohen-donald-trump-accusers-sexual-assault-trump-lawyer-2016-10 [https://perma
.cc/HWF5-NECM].
116 See Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments about Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html [https://perma.cc/B3P
R-WTTC].
117 Kavanaugh Hearing: Transcript,WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-transcript/?utm_term=.102e203ecf30 [htt
ps://perma.cc/JY6P-T66T] (emphases added).
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other, abusing alcohol and a young woman in order to “hav[e] a really
good time.”118
Dr. Ford’s insight into what she endured helps explain the rele-
vance of other stories told about Brett Kavanaugh around the same
time—ones typically dismissed as irrelevant because they did not in-
volve sexual misconduct. The stories of aggression and blackout-level
drinking at his all-male high school and his notorious all-male frater-
nity at Yale College all fit the pattern.119 They illustrate the antics men
often use to compete, bond, and prove themselves to each other, espe-
cially in sex-segregated settings. These stories in no way contradict the
counternarrative of ambition and success that Kavanaugh himself told.
Instead, demonstrative masculinity—the beer and sports and yearbook
jokes about girls—provided the path to success in the single-sex envi-
ronments where Kavanaugh thrived.120
Thus, any alleged misconduct by Kavanaugh toward Dr. Ford was
in service of his social ambition among other young men, not just teen-
age lust. Kavanaugh distanced himself from the latter explanation, per-
haps truthfully, claiming that he remained a virgin until well after col-
lege.121 But he doubled down on his embrace of the male-dominated
institutions where he came of age. Focusing on solely his sexual inten-
tions obscures just how aggressively gendered those institutions were
and are. To deny sexual intent is not to deny sexual harassment. Even
sexual misconduct and assault can be motivated by things other than,
or in addition to, a desire for sexual contact.
The selective focus of Kavanaugh’s denials at the hearings was mir-
rored in written answers to questions Senator Chris Coons asked about
another important homosocial relationship in Kavanaugh’s life: his
clerkship and later friendship with Alex Kozinski, former judge on the
Ninth Circuit. When asked whether he had ever witnessed Kozinski be-
having badly toward a law clerk, Kavanaugh understood each question
and framed each answer to refer only to conduct of a sexual nature.122
118 Id.
119 See Stephanie Saul et al., In a Culture of Privilege and Alcohol at Yale, HerWorld Converged
with Kavanaugh’s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25/us/politics/d
eborah-ramirez-brett-kavanaugh-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/E7KJ-C2HK]; Eren Orbey,
The Long Decline of DKE, Brett Kavanaugh’s Fraternity at Yale, THENEWYORKER (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-long-decline-of-dke-brett-kavanaughs-frater
nity-at-yale [https://perma.cc/MU9U-TQNV].
120 For discussions of the important role of such sex-segregated, mostly-male environments as
both a cause and consequence of sexual harassment, see Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Har-
assment, Again, supra note 6, at 49–50.
121 Emily Birnbaum, Kavanaugh: I Was a Virgin Through High School and College, THEHILL
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/408172-kavanaugh-i-was-a-virgin-through-
high-school-and-college [https://perma.cc/AHH7-UVSW].
122 See text accompanying note 70.
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Asked whether he had ever witnessed Kozinaki “engaging in inappro-
priate behavior,” for example, Kavanaugh replied, “Judge Kozinski was
known to be a tough boss, but I did not witness him engaging in inap-
propriate behavior of a sexual nature.”123
COONS: Did you ever see Judge Kozinski mistreat a law clerk
or law clerk candidate? Please explain any such incident(s).
KAVANAUGH: Over the course of my relationship with Judge
Kozinski, I never saw him sexually harass a law clerk or law
clerk candidate.
COONS: Did Judge Kozinski ever use demeaning language
when discussing women?
KAVANAUGH: I do not remember hearing Judge Kozinski use
demeaning language of a sexual nature when discussing women.
COONS: Did anyone ever raise concerns with you about Judge
Kozinski’s behavior? Who? When?
KAVANAUGH: To the best of my memory, no one ever raised
concerns with me regarding inappropriate behavior of a sexual
nature on the part of Judge Kozinski.124
Even assuming that Kavanaugh never observed any sexualized be-
havior by Kozinski, as others claim to have done,125 Kavanaugh’s an-
swers are still remarkably unresponsive.126 They evade the questions
123 Responses of J. Brett Kavanaugh, Nominee, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, to Questions for the Record from Sen. Christopher Coons, Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, 115th Cong. 157–58 (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/kavanaugh-
responses-to-questions-for-the-record [https://perma.cc/VK3W-5WF5] (emphases added).
124 Id.
125 See Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual Mis-
conduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-secu-
rity/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1763e
2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html?utm_term=.ed3e9e8ebdb7 [https://perma.cc/D3TD-
2885]; Heidi Bond, I Received Some of Kozinski’s Infamous Gag List Emails. I’m Baffled by Ka-
vanaugh’s Responses to Questions About Them, SLATE (Sept. 14, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/09/kavanaugh-kozinski-gag-list-emails-senate-hearings.html [https://perma.cc/M6A
4-WKZF]; Dahlia Lithwick, He Made Us All Victims and Accomplices, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/12/judge-alex-kozinski-made-us-all-victims-and-accom-
plices.html [https://perma.cc/2BKJ-JEJT].
126 The worst instance: asked if he had received emails from Judge Kozinski’s sexually explicit
email list, Kavanaugh said he didn’t “remember receiving inappropriate emails of a sexual nature
from Judge Kozinski.” Then asked, “[h]ave you conducted a search of your email accounts and/or
correspondence with Judge Kozinski in an effort to provide an accurate response to the preceding
question? If not, why not?,” Kavanaugh just repeated: “I do not remember receiving inappropriate
emails of a sexual nature from Judge Kozinski.” Responses of J. Brett Kavanaugh to Sen. Patrick
Leahy’s Questions for the Record, supra note 124, at 73.
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by reducing all mistreatment to sexual harassment, and all sexual har-
assment to language and behavior “of a sexual nature.”
Yet, a superior or peer can demean women, mistreat them, under-
mine their work or reputations, and even drive them from a workplace,
job, or social space through harassing conduct and language not “of a
sexual nature.” To leave this kind of harassment or motive out of the
discussion is to ignore a major part of the sexual harassment clerks like
Kozinski’s have said they endured. Indeed, it is to misunderstand the
broader underlying harms of even the sexualized forms of harassment.
Furthermore, it minimizes the problem of sexual harassment by limit-
ing it to a few sex-crazed bad apples.
In the wake of the Kozinski scandal, a working group appointed by
Chief Justice Roberts to help “protect all court employees from inappro-
priate conduct in the workplace,” largely avoided this trap. The group’s
June 2018 report focused on harassment in all its forms, with the goal
of promoting “an inclusive and respectful workplace.”127 It recom-
mended that the Judicial Conference issue clearer proscriptions on sex-
based harassment, including harassment based on sexual orientation
and gender identity,128 and similarly clarify its Model Employment Dis-
pute Resolution Plan.129 Commentary to subsequently enacted amend-
ments to the Judicial Code of Conduct make clear that “harassment en-
compasses a range of conduct having no legitimate role in the
workplace, including harassment that constitutes discrimination on im-
permissible grounds and other abusive, oppressive, or inappropriate
conduct.”130
Yet even in this admirable report and the reforms it spurred, the
sexualized conception of sexual harassment retains a foothold. Amend-
ments to the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Pro-
ceedings enacted in March 2019 identify and address “unwanted, offen-
sive, or abusive sexual conduct, including sexual harassment or
assault” separately from what Rules refer to as “intentional discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, gender, gender identity, pregnancy, sexual
127 Report of the Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group to the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States 1–2 (June 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/workplac
e_conduct_working_group_final_report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWA7-XZXX] [hereinafter WORK-
ING GROUP REPORT]. See also id. at n.15 (“[H]arassment for any reason is problematic, and the
Working Group’s references to harassment are therefore not limited to harassment of a sexual
nature”); id. at 27 (“[N]or should [confidentiality requirements] discourage[] an employee from
revealing abuse or reporting misconduct, including sexual or other forms of harassment, by a
judge, supervisor, or other person . . . “).
128 Id. at 24, 30.
129 Id. at 34.
130 Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2: Ethics and Judicial Conduct, Pt. A: Codes of Conduct, Ch.
2: Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3(B)(4) 11 (Mar. 2019), https://www.uscourts.
gov/file/document/code-conduct-us-judges-effective-march-12-2019 [https://perma.cc/3D29-L429].
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orientation, religion, national origin, age, or disability.”131 The concern
here is that decision makers might limit sex- or gender-based “discrim-
ination” to tangible employment decisions, while limiting broader con-
cerns about hostile workplaces to complaints about “sexual conduct.”
Such a process of disaggregation would limit responsibility for both, and
allow non-sexual but still sex-based harassment to evade scrutiny alto-
gether. 132
III. WHY THENAMEMATTERS
Even if we all agreed that non-sexual but still gendered forms of
harassment are harmful and should be eliminated, the question re-
mains: What is at stake in calling them “sexual harassment”? Must we
insist on reconceptualizing the very term “sexual harassment,” instead
of replacing it with another overarching term that includes both sexual
and non-sexual misconduct—perhaps “sex-based harassment,” as some
have proposed?133 Or alternatively, could we preserve the sexualized
definition of “sexual harassment” but add to it another term, such as
“gender harassment,” to capture all the sexism and abuse that the sex-
ualized notion of sexual harassment leaves out?134
Were we writing on a blank slate, substituting an umbrella term
like “sex-based harassment” might well be better: more accurate, less
easily misleading than the term “sexual harassment.” But the slate isn’t
blank; it bears the marks of one of the most widespread popular legal
education efforts in the country. Aside from traffic laws and drivers’ ed-
ucation, perhaps no topic is the subject of more mandatory legal train-
ings than sexual harassment. Furthermore, in major media outlets like
the New York Times, as well as on social media, “sexual harassment” is
131 Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2: Ethics and Judicial Conduct, Pt. E: Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act and Related Materials, Ch. 3: Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability
Proceedings, Rule 4(a)(2)(A) and 4(a)(3) (Mar. 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/judi-
cial-conduct-and-disability-rules-effective-march-12-2019 [https://perma.cc/YW79-NTPW]. For cr-
iticism of this aspect of the reforms, see Comment of Yale Law Student Working Group, Proposed
Changes to the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges and Judicial Conduct and Disability Rules 11–12,
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/file/24922/download [https://perma.cc/4Q3C-FEHE].
132 See infra notes 156–158 and accompanying text.
133 See, e.g., Berdahl, The Sexual Harassment of Uppity Women, supra note 105, at 435 (using
“sex-based harassment”). When we, alongside other antidiscrimination scholars, circulated an
Open Statement on Sexual Harassment, see Schultz, supra note 24, one thoughtful response we
received from a potential signatory asked “why the choice was made to call this a statement on
‘sexual harassment,’ rather than a statement on ‘sex-based harassment’? It seems to be in tension
with many of the points in the statement itself,” she continued, “which make clear that sexualized
harassment is just one type of sex-based harassment, and that all forms of sex-based harassment
work together to create barriers in the work place.” This Part can be understood as a response to
her question—an explanation of why we use a term that has so often been misunderstood.
134 Supra note 38.
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the term most often deployed. The terminological train having left the
station, the best we can do is to guide its tracks.
To step back a moment: there are three possibilities for describing
the varieties of harassment described in the previous two parts. First,
we could take the route offered by theNew York Times, defining “sexual
harassment” to encompass only behaviors “of a sexual nature,” and us-
ing another term such as “gender harassment” to cover everything else
that is sex-based but not sexualized. Second, we could follow the recent
EEOC task force, whose 2016 report follows many social scientists in
relying on “sex-based harassment” or “harassment based on sex” as its
descriptively accurate umbrella term, and then uses “unwanted sexual
attention,” “sexual coercion,” and “gender harassment” as sub-catego-
ries under that umbrella.135 Third, we could follow the National Acade-
mies report, which adopts the same three sub-categories, but treats
them all as types of sexual harassment.136
To see all three of these approaches in action, we can look to the
biggest economy and labor pool in the country: California, whose non-
discrimination laws, although progressive, still hedge on the meaning
of “sexual harassment.” That ambiguity creates an opening for those
who, for their own purposes, may prefer to limit the term to its narrower
sexualized meaning, as shown below.
Overall, California law contains a broad definition of sexual har-
assment, much like the one for which we advocate. California courts,
like their federal counterparts, have long recognized that “[s]exual har-
assment does not necessarily involve sexual conduct. It need not have
anything to do with lewd acts, double entendres or sexual advances.”137
In addition, the dozen or so bills recently enacted in California in re-
sponse to the #MeToo movement have largely avoided singling out sex-
ual harassment for special treatment in comparison to other forms of
sex discrimination—though media reporting on those bills often misses
this fact. The Sacramento Bee, for example, has described Senate Bill
820 as “prohibit[ing] secret settlements and non-disclosure agreements
in sexual harassment cases.”138 In fact, the bill, which became law in
September 2018, applies not only to sexual harassment in professional
relationships outside the workplace (those defined in Civil Code § 51.9),
135 EEOC REP., supra note 37, at 10. See also supra note 38.
136 NAT’L ACADS. REP., supra note 44, at 28–29.
137 Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 341, 345 (1993); see also Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual
Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California as a Model, 128 YALE L.J. F. 121, 123–124
(2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/sexual-harassment-law-after-metoo [https://perma.
cc/XA8K-S63F].
138 See, e.g., Alexei Koseff, California Bans Secret Settlements in Sexual Harassment Cases,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-aler
t/article218830265.html [https://perma.cc/YPE6-9GSW].
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but also to harassment or discrimination based on sex in workplaces
and housing as defined in Government Code Sections 12940 and
12955.139 Confidential settlements are thus banned in all cases involv-
ing sex discrimination. Newly enacted bills banning retaliation against
whistleblowers,140 and bonuses or raises contingent on liability waiv-
ers,141 have a similarly broad sweep. The latter bill also expands liabil-
ity for harassment, formerly just sexual harassment, by non-employ-
ees.142
Civil Code § 51.9, the California state law that provides a cause of
action for people sexually harassed by their teachers, accountants, law-
yers, directors, and others with whom they have a professional relation-
ship, defines sexual harassment capaciously to include “sexual ad-
vances, solicitations, sexual requests, demands for sexual
compliance . . . or . . . other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature or of a hostile nature based on gender.”143
But California’s employment discrimination law terms things dif-
ferently. The statute defines the umbrella term as “‘harassment’ be-
cause of sex,” which, it says, “includes sexual harassment, gender har-
assment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.”144 In 1993, when this language was added, the Leg-
islature noted that the state’s “prohibitions against harassment be-
cause of sex have always included sexual harassment, gender harass-
ment, and pregnancy harassment.”145 The Legislature only made the
subcategories explicit, it said, “to more clearly identify them, for pur-
poses of education and training, as harassment because of sex.”146 This
approach is thus similar to the one employed by the EEOC task force
which uses sex-based harassment as the overarching term and enumer-
ates specific subsets of conduct within it.
139 See Settlement Agreements, Confidentiality, S.B. 820 2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (CA 2018),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB820 [https://per
ma.cc/RVR4-GJPD].
140 SeeWhistleblowers, S.B. 419, 2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (CA 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca
.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB419 [https://perma.cc/9VHY-FEBS], (defining
“discriminatory harassment” as “harassment based on race, religious creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital
status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and
veteran status” and protecting those who report it from retaliation by state legislators).
141 See Unlawful Employment Practices, S.B.1300, 2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (CA 2018),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1300 [https://per
ma.cc/G7UN-FQXY] (protecting the right to “right to disclose information about unlawful acts in
the workplace, including, but not limited to, sexual harassment”).
142 Id.
143 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.9(a)(2)–(3) (West 2018).
144 CAL. GOV. CODE § 12940(j)(4)(C) (West 2018).
145 CAL. ASSEMB. BILL 675 § 1(c) (1993) (emphasis added).
146 Id., at § 1(d).
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Despite the progressive intent of this final approach, the California
example shows how it can be unduly limited. For even though the over-
arching definition of harassment is broad, California’s increasingly ro-
bust education and training requirements do not mandate training
about “harassment because of sex.” What California law actually re-
quires is that employers display posters and offer training on sexual
harassment.147
The California example illustrates a key danger of placing “sexual
harassment” alongside “gender harassment” (and other terms). Treat-
ing sexual harassment and gender harassment as subsets of some
larger category with a different name, even an accurate name like “har-
assment because of sex,” creates ambiguity that can prove harmful. The
danger is that the awareness built up around sexual harassment—
through media coverage, through the #MeToo movement, and not least,
through employers’ practices under laws like those in California, which
mandate legal training for nearly every employee in the state—will fo-
cus on a narrow sexualized conception of sexual harassment that dis-
tinguishes it from gender harassment, instead of threating them to-
gether.
This is not merely a theoretical concern. There is evidence that Cal-
ifornia employment discrimination law, the language of which was
drafted to clarify the many forms sex-based harassment can take, in-
stead ends up not only separating the terms, but devoting vastly more
attention to one form of harassment—the sexualized variety, termed
“sexual harassment”—over the others. Consider, for example, the sex-
ual harassment posters and brochures distributed by the California De-
partment of Fair Employment and Housing. They lead with a list of six
“behaviors that may be sexual harassment,” all of which reinforce a sex-
ualized definition:148
1) Unwanted sexual advances
2) Offering employment benefits in exchange for sexual favors
147 See CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 12950, 12950.1 (West 2018). Senate Bill 1343 expanded the training
requirement to employers with five or more employees rather than fifty or more, as before. The
Bill also instructs the state’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing to develop its own
online training courses “on the prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace.” S.B. 1343,
2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (CA 2018). Notably, the law requires that sexual harassment training in-
clude coverage of “harassment based on gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orienta-
tion.” See CAL. GOV. CODE § 12950.1(c).
148 Sexual Harassment, CAL. DEP’T OFFAIREMPL. &HOUSING (Dec. 2018), https://www.dfeh.ca.
gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/32/2018/12/DFEH_SexualHarassmentPoster.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y
8YC-ZEVW]; Behaviors That May Be Sexual Harassment, CAL. DEP’T OF FAIR EMPL. & HOUSING
(Dec. 2018), https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2018/12/DFEH_SexualHarassm
entPamphlet.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPJ8-K5XE].
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3) Leering; gestures; or displaying sexually suggestive objects,
pictures, cartoons, or posters
4) Derogatory comments, epithets, slurs, or jokes
5) Graphic comments, sexually degrading words, or suggestive
or obscene messages or invitations
6) Physical touching or assault, as well as impeding or blocking
movements.
The fourth and sixth of these behaviors could be interpreted to
extend beyond sexualized content. But the Department’s online “Sexual
Harassment FAQs” page, which expands on some of the categories, em-
phasizes that they refer to “[v]erbal abuse of a sexual nature, graphic
verbal commentaries about an individual’s body, [and] sexually degrad-
ing words used to describe an individual.”149 The Department goes on to
emphasize: “State regulations define sexual harassment as unwanted
sexual advances, or visual, verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture,” removing any lingering doubt about what kinds of behavior the
Department seeks to target under its training requirements.150
Thus, the regulatory approach uses, and encourages California
employers to use, an explicitly sexualized definition of harassment in
their policies and training programs, notwithstanding the broader
reach of California law.
Insofar as California employers are adopting and promulgating a
sexualized notion of sexual harassment in their policies and trainings,
they are not alone. Sixteen years ago, Schultz comprehensively ana-
lyzed the content of employers’ sexual harassment policies reported in
research surveys or otherwise publicly available.151 She found that U.S.
companies had almost universally adopted policies prohibiting sexual
harassment and that these policies “define harassment exclusively in
terms of sexual conduct (as opposed to conduct that discriminates on
the basis of sex more generally).”152 At that time, “most of the . . . poli-
cies track[ed] the language of the EEOC guidelines, which, as we saw
earlier, define harassment in terms of “[u]nwelcome sexual advances,




151 Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 24, at 2094 & n.96 (citing policies reflected in
surveys); id. at 2098 (discussing other published policies).
152 Id. at 2094 & n.97 (noting that, in those days, employers and the researchers who surveyed
them defined sexual harassment exclusively in sexual terms).
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requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature.”153 The policies proscribed a wide range of sexual talk and
behavior, and referred to sexualized examples154 that would not neces-
sarily amount to legally actionable harassment.
This analysis is not obsolete; a similar finding emerges in a recent
study also. In an extensive content analysis of sexual harassment train-
ings offered by employers between 1980 and 2016, Elizabeth Tippett
found that even after the Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Oncale, 59
percent of the sampled training programs continued to define sexual
harassment in sexual terms, often including among their examples of
prohibited harassment sexual jokes, flirting, relationships, and com-
ments about appearance that would not be counted as sexual harass-
ment in any court.155 Only half of these trainings even mention discrim-
ination. Reiterating a point made earlier by Schultz,156 Professor
Tippett writes, “harassment has become unmoored from its larger pur-
pose of ensuring access to equal workplace opportunity.”157
Recent research also confirms newer iterations of another problem
documented years ago by Schultz: “disaggregation” of evidence of sexual
and non-sexual forms of misconduct.158 In a perceptive student note, El-
eanor Frisch demonstrates that this problem arises when state laws
separately identify sexual harassment as something distinct from non-
sexualized harassment on the basis of sex.159 Looking to cases in Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota, Frisch shows how courts have
created entirely bifurcated pleading and evidentiary regimes for the two
types of harassment. “[M]erely mentioning ‘sexual harassment’ in
pleadings can be fatal to” a case involving non-sexualized harassment,
she argues.160
These examples show only a couple of the pitfalls that may arise
when “sexual harassment” is conceptualized exclusively in sexual
153 Id. at 2094 & n.98 (discussing policies reported in research surveys and citing 1980 EEOC
guidelines); id. at 2098–2099 (reporting same finding about other reviewed policies).
154 Id. at 2095–2099.
155 Elizabeth Tippett,Harassment Trainings: A Content Analysis, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 481, 511 (2018) (“Even in current trainings, the large majority of examples are devoted to sexual
conduct, equally divided between severe forms of sexual harassment—like physical harassment,
or quid pro quo harassment—and relatively less severe conduct—like suggestive jokes, comments
about appearance, and inappropriate emails.”).
156 Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 24, at 2119 (noting that “sexual harassment
law has taken on a life of its own, uprooted from the larger project of gender equality that animates
Title VII”).
157 Tippett, Harassment Trainings, supra note 155, at 511.
158 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 6, at 1711 (demonstrating how
such disaggregation works to plaintiffs’ disadvantage in the federal courts).
159 Eleanor Frisch, State Sexual Harassment Definitions and Disaggregation of Sex Discrimi-
nation Claims, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1943 (2014) (showing the disaggregation problem in state courts).
160 Id. at 1962.
258 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
terms. Nice as it might be to use a more generic overarching term like
“sex-based harassment” to refer to the full panoply of harassment that
occurs because of sex, or to use a parallel term like “gender harassment”
to describe certain non-sexual forms, there is no denying that the term
“sexual harassment” has achieved a place in legal and popular culture
that is unlikely to be rivaled. By now, “sexual harassment” is a familiar
category of antidiscrimination law at both the federal and state levels.
“Sexual harassment” is what most workers in the country are now
trained to avoid and prevent.161 Thanks to #MeToo, “sexual harass-
ment” is part of the national conversation like never before. The im-
portant thing, then, is to make sure that within this conversation,
within the law, and within the policies and trainings so common in
nearly every workplace (and campus), people are talking about the right
thing: the entire spectrum of ways that gender is policed through har-
assment that sometimes is sexualized, but even more often is not.
These days, both the #MeToo movement and major media outlets
like the New York Times can take credit for shining a spotlight on sex-
ual harassment. People are talking about the problem again, and
rightly so. A time when everyone is talking about sexual harassment is
not the best time to change the term being used. But it is a crucial time
to make sure the term is properly understood, so the problem of sexual
harassment can be properly confronted.
CONCLUSION
Two decades ago, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment prompted
scores of women to write letters and emails describing how they recog-
nized in their own lives the range of gendered harassment the article
described. The authors were grateful that someone had acknowledged
their lived experience—and had called out the harassment they faced
as something harmful, and illegal.
In the age of #MeToo, people remain hungry for media representa-
tions that accurately reflect their everyday realities. The attention the
#MeToo movement has given to sexual assault is necessary and valua-
ble. But to collapse sexual harassment into sexualized advances and
assaults is to ignore many of the ways that most women, andmanymen,
experience hostility in the workplace (and beyond). To ignore those sto-
ries is to fail to recognize and understand the variety of ways in which
gender gets policed, and gendered spaces get maintained.
161 Similar issues are presented under Title IX. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harass-
ment, Again, supra note 6, at n.19.
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This is why what gets named as “sexual harassment” matters,
whether it be in the New York Times or in mandated workplace train-
ings. Both help shape popular understanding. Thus, choices about how
to define and talk about sexual harassment end up affecting what ordi-
nary employees and others feel they can and should report. And since
popular understanding in turn seeps back and shapes the law, media
reports and workplace policies on sexual harassment end up affecting
the actions bystanders, employers, agencies, and courts feel compelled
to stop.
By adopting an outdated conception of sexual harassment—one
that most of the legal system and social science have moved beyond—
the media misses a chance to educate the public and policy makers
about the real scope and causes of sexual harassment. The New York
Times may be right in urging its readers to engage in discussion about
sexual harassment and “agree on definitions.” But when it comes to sex-
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ABSTRACT
Why do revolutions happen? Why are they so difficult to anticipate? Some of the
most instructive answers point to three factors: (1) preference falsification on the
part of rebels or revolutionaries, (2) diverse thresholds for revolutionary activity,
and (3) social interactions that either do or do not trigger the relevant thresholds.
Under conditions of actual or perceived injustice or oppression, true preferences
and thresholds are probably impossible to observe; social interactions are impossi-
ble to anticipate. Even if we could observe factors (1) and (2), the challenge of an-
ticipating factor (3) wouldmake it essentially impossible to foresee revolutions. For
all their differences, and with appropriate qualifications, the French Revolution,
the Russian Revolution, the fall of Communism, and the Arab Spring were unan-
ticipated largely for these reasons. And in light of factors (1), (2), and (3), it is haz-
ardous to think that the success of successful revolutions is essentially inevitable.
(The same is true for the failure of unsuccessful revolutions.) History is only run
once, so wewill never know, but small or serendipitous factorsmight have initiated
(or stopped) a revolutionary cascade. The #MeToo movement can be seen as such
a cascade, marked by factors (1), (2), and (3). For that movement, as for successful
revolutions, we might be able to point to some factors as necessary conditions, but
hindsight is hazardous. It is also important to note that in revolutions, as in #Me-
Too, preferences and beliefs are not merely revealed; they are also transformed.
Revolutionary activity, large or small, puts issues about preference falsification,
experience falsification, and adaptive preferences in a new light.
I. UNPREDICTABLE REVOLUTIONS
Why do revolutions happen? Why are they so hard to anticipate?
Why do they seem to come out of nowhere? My aim here is to cast some
light on these questions and, in the process, to help explain #MeToo. I
shall begin with some general remarks on revolutions and their genesis
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and then turn to #MeToo—which is not quite a revolution, of course,
but which has something in common with one.
To vindicate the premise of my opening questions: Lenin was
stunned by the success and speed of the Russian Revolution.1 Tocque-
ville reported that no one foresaw the French Revolution.2 The Iranian
Revolution of 1789 was unanticipated.3 More recently, the Arab Spring
was unanticipated by many of the best analysts in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and elsewhere.4 Puzzlingly, revolutions seem to
come in waves; they spread rapidly within countries and across coun-
tries, for reasons that remain unclear.5 It is tempting, and not unhelp-
ful, to speak of demonstration and contagion effects. But what exactly
do those terms mean?6 In what sense is revolution, or some kind of re-
volt, “contagious”?
A. Three Factors
Some of the most illuminating explanatory work on this subject
points to three factors: (a) preference falsification, (b) diverse thresh-
olds, and (c) interdependencies.7When the three are taken together, the
difficulty of anticipating such movements, or revolutions in particular,
becomes less puzzling. I will introduce complications in due course, but
these three factors tell us much that we need to know.
1. Preference falsification
Preference falsification exists when people conceal, or do not reveal,
what they actually prefer.8 They might say they like the existing regime
1 Asef Bayat, The Arab Spring and its Surprises, 44 DEV. & CHANGE 587, 587–88 (2013).
2 Id. at 587.
3 Id. at 588.
4 Id. at 587.
5 KURT WEYLAND, MAKING WAVES: DEMOCRATIC CONTENTION IN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA SINCE THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848, 1–7 (2014).
6 See id. at 7–11, for valuable discussion, emphasizing the availability and representative-
ness heuristics. Weyland’s exploration of availability and representativeness has implications for
rebellions of many kinds, and not merely revolutions; #MeToo could easily be studied with refer-
ence to those heuristics. I offer some brief remarks at various points below.
7 See generally Timur Kuran, The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises, 100 AM. J.
SOC. 1528 (1995); Timur Kuran & Diego Romero, The Logic of Revolutions, in 2 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC CHOICE (Roger D. Congleton et al. eds., 2018); MEROUAN MEKOUAR,
PROTECT ANDMASSMOBILIZATION: AUTHORITARIAN COLLAPSE AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN NORTH
AFRICA (1st ed. 2016); Muzammil Hussain & Philip Howard,What Best Explains Successful Protest
Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring, 15 INT’L STUD. REV. 48 (2013) (empha-
sizing the importance of communications technologies).
8 TIMURKURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION 4–5 (1995). The literature on “informational cascades” is also relevant, but revolu-
tions go well beyond those. See generally Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion,
Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Susanne
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when they despise it. They might silence themselves. Their friends and
neighbors might have no idea what they actually think. To that extent,
people live in a world of pluralistic ignorance, in which they do not know
about the preferences of others.9 Under regimes that are oppressive (in
one or another respect), preference falsification is common. Because of
oppression, it is difficult to learn what people actually think.10
For those who want to predict revolution or revolt, the problem is
that the law, or social norms, can draw a wedge between private pref-
erences and public preferences.11 The law matters if citizens lack free-
dom of speech and if dissent is punished. Social norms matter if people
will be ostracized, in some sense, if they reveal their distress, anger,
indignation, or dissatisfaction. Perhaps they will be shunned; perhaps
powerful people will punish them in one or another way; perhaps their
employment prospects will be compromised. In any of these cases, peo-
ple might not merely silence themselves; they might say that they are
happy with the status quo when they are not. Consider some chilling
words from a computer programmer from Syria:
When you meet somebody coming out of Syria for the first time,
you start to hear the same sentences. That everything is okay
inside Syria, Syria is a great country, the economy is doing
great . . . It’ll take him like six months, up to one year, to become
a normal human being, to say what he thinks, what he feels.
Then they might start . . . whispering. They won’t speak loudly.
That is too scary. After all that time, even outside Syria you feel
that someone is listening, someone is recording.12
2. Diverse thresholds
Different people will require different levels of social support before
they will rebel or say what they actually think.13 Some people might
require no support at all; they are rebels by nature. They might be cou-
rageous, committed, or foolhardy. Call them the “zeroes.” They might
Lohmann, I Know You Know He or She Knows We Know You Know They Know: Common Knowled-
ge and the Unpredictability of Informational Cascades, in POLITICALCOMPLEXITY: NONLINEARMO-
DELS OF POLITICS (Diana Richards ed., 2000).
9 See, e.g., Kuran, supra note 8, for an especially good account see also D. Garth Taylor, Plu-
ralistic Ignorance and the Spiral of Silence: A Formal Analysis, 46 PUB. OPINION Q. 311 (1982);
For a valuable account with special reference to law, see RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE
POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS, 136–62 (2015).
10 See generally WENDY PEARLMAN, WE CROSSED A BRIDGE AND IT TREMBLED: VOICES FROM
SYRIA (2017), for first-hand reports.
11 See Kuran, supra note 8, at 84–102.
12 Pearlman, supra note 10, at 4.
13 See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420
(1978), for the classic account; Kuran, supra note 8, at 60–83.
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well turn out to be isolated; no one may join them, in which case they
might look radical, foolhardy, or even crazy. Other people might require
a little support; they will not move unless someone else does, but if
someone does, they are prepared to rebel as well. Call them the “ones.”
Others might require more than a little; they are the “twos.” The twos
will do nothing unless they see the zeroes and the ones, but if they do,
they will rebel as well. The twos are followed by the threes, and the
fours, and the tens, and the hundreds, and the thousands, all the way
up to the infinites (defined as people who will not oppose the regime, no
matter what).14
Outside of science fiction, it is not possible to see people’s thresh-
olds. People may not quite know whether they themselves are threes,
fours, or tens. They might turn out to be surprised. Consider the rele-
vant words of John Adams, writing with evident amazement about the
American Revolution: “Idolatry to Monarchs, and servility to Aristocrat-
ical Pride . . . was never so totally eradicated from so many Minds in so
short a Time.”15
3. Interdependencies
Interdependencies point to the fact that the behavior of the ones,
the twos, the threes, and so forth will depend crucially on who, if any-
one, is seen to have done what. Suppose that the various citizens are in
a kind of temporal queue. The zeroes go first, then the ones, then the
twos, then the threes, and so forth. (Or perhaps vice-versa. Or perhaps
it is all random.) Under imaginable assumptions, a rebellion will occur,
but only given the right distribution of thresholds and the right kind of
visibility.16 If the ones see the zeroes, they will rebel, and if the twos see
the ones, they, too, will rebel, and if the threes see the twos, they will
join them.17 If the conditions are just right, almost everyone will rebel.18
But it is important to see that the conditions have to be just right.
Suppose that there are no zeroes, or that no one sees any zeroes. If so,
no rebellion will occur. If there are few ones, the regime is likely to be
safe. If most people are tens or hundreds or thousands, the same is true,
even if there are some ones, twos, three, fours, and so forth.
14 The infinites deserve some attention. Their motivations are undoubtedly varied; they may
involve identity, habit, fear, loyalty, or something else.
15 GORDONWOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 169 (1993).
16 See generally Granovetter, supra note 13, for the clearest explanation.
17 Id. at 1424–25.
18 See id. at 1431. See also Heng Chen & Wing Suen, Falling Dominoes: A Theory of Rare
Events and Crisis Contagion, 8 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECON. 228, 239 (2016), for an emphasis on the
importance of beliefs and on their fragility.
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4. Unpredictability
We should now be able to see three reasons why revolutions may
be impossible to predict. First, we do not know what people’s prefer-
ences are. By hypothesis, they cannot be observed. Second, we do not
know what people’s thresholds are. They too are unobservable. Third,
we cannot anticipate social interactions—who will say or do what and
exactly when. It is important to emphasize the third point.19 Even if we
could identify people’s preferences and specify their thresholds, we
would not be able to know, in advance, the nature of social interactions.
The point bears on revolutions in general and on #MeToo in particular.
In the case of oppressive societies, it may be possible to know that peo-
ple are widely miserable or dissatisfied. In the context of sexual assault
and sexual harassment, it is reasonable to assume that dissatisfaction
is widespread. But that is not enough.
These points suggest that even if new technologies make it increas-
ingly possible to identify private preferences—for example, by exploring
people’s online behavior—we will still not be able to predict revolu-
tions.20 To be sure, we would know something important: a revolution
is more likely if people secretly hate the regime. We could certainly
learn from that fact. Secret opposition may be necessary for revolution,
but it is not sufficient. To know what will happen, we would need to
know about people’s thresholds as well. As I have noted, obtaining that
knowledge will inevitably be difficult; it might be impossible. And even
if we overcome that challenge, we would need to know who interacts
with whom, and who sees whom, and when. No one has that kind of
prescience. But the answers to those questions may well determine out-
comes.21
These points help explain not only why revolutions are unpredict-
able but also why they are often a product of seemingly small, random,
or serendipitous factors—of who did what when, or who heard what
when, or whether some kind of butterfly flapped its wings at the right
moment.22 We might think that Regime “A” was bound to fall, but it
19 See generally Matthew Salganik, Peter Sheridan Dodds & Duncan J. Watts, Experimental
Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCI. 854, 854–56
(2006), emphasizing the unpredictability of social exchange.
20 See generally SETH STEPHENS-DAVIDOWITZ, EVERYBODY LIES: BIG DATA, NEW DATA, AND
WHAT THE INTERNET CAN TELLUS ABOUTWHOWE REALLY ARE (2017).
21 See Salganik, supra note 19, at 854–56, for relevant findings. See alsoMatthew Salganik &
Duncan Watts, Leading the Herd Astray: An Experimental Study of Self-fulfilling Prophecies in an
Artificial Cultural Market, 71 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 338, 338–55 (2008); Matthew Salganik & Duncan
Watts,Web-Based Experiments for the Study of Collective Social Dynamics in Cultural Markets, 1
TOPICS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 439, 439–68 (2009).
22 See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, BUTTERFLY POLITICS (2017); PAUL ORMEROD,
BUTTERFLY ECONOMICS: A NEW GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1998).
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really was not. It happened to fall. The same is true if it does not fall. It
happened not to fall.23 Counterfactual histories can be illuminating in-
sofar as they illustrate this point.24
B. Complications
This is a very simple account, of course, and it needs to be compli-
cated in multiple ways. For present purposes, consider these points.
First, people’s preferences may be adaptive to the status quo.25 Peo-
ple might not have to work hard to shut themselves up. They might not
even think that the status quo is bad. Consider these words from a
woman in North Korea: “It never occurred to me that I could or would
want to do anything about it. It was just how things are.”26 The most
important word here is “want.” To be sure, fully adaptive preferences
are an extreme case, even under conditions of real fear.27 It might be
better to speak of partially adaptive preferences, in which people are
aware that something is wrong, or bad, or horrific, but the awareness
takes the form of a small voice in the head, to which people do not pay
a great deal of attention. But the idea of preference falsification is too
simple when people’s preferences are an artifact of the status quo.
Whether we are dealing with preference falsification, adaptive prefer-
ences, or partially adaptive preferences cannot be answered in the ab-
stract.
Second, the very word “preferences” is under-descriptive or perhaps
misleading. It might be better to speak of people’s beliefs, experiences,
or values. Under an oppressive regime, people might believe that terri-
ble injustices are committed or that their values are being violated. To
be sure, they are also concealing or falsifying what they prefer, but that
is hardly an adequate account of what is happening. They are conceal-
ing or falsifying their deepest convictions. They are concealing or falsi-
fying what actually happened to them. (Talk about fake news).
Third, and crucially, rebels are not doing a full analysis of the costs
and benefits of rebellion. They rely on mental shortcuts, or heuristics,
in deciding what to do and when.28 For that reason, available incidents
23 To be sure, the factors that underlie any fall, or failure to fall, deserve close attention.
24 See generally Cass R. Sunstein,Historical Explanations Always Involve Counterfactual His-
tory, 10 J. PHIL. HIST. 433 (Issue 3, 2016).
25 See JON ELSTER, SOURGRAPES: STUDIES IN SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY, 25 (1983).
26 Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea #MeToo Voices: ‘They Consider Us Toys,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/31/world/asia/north-korea-women-metoo.html [https://pe
rma.cc/VLP5-CES3].
27 Cf. SERENE KHADER, ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT (STUDIES IN
FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY) (2011) (discussing the complexity of the idea of adaptive preferences in the
face of personal agency).
28 SeeWeyland, supra note 5, at 35–38.
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or outcomes might affect probability judgments.29 If a town suddenly
falls to rebels, or if a government collapses, other rebels might believe
that the probability of success is high.30 The availability heuristic, as it
is called, works with emphatically social forces, producing availability
cascades, as specific incidents or results move rapidly from one person
to another, altering judgments about what is likely to happen.31 A rev-
olutionary movement might be fueled or halted by an availability cas-
cade.
Fourth, fate is not only in the hands of revolutionaries. There is
also the regime, and there are also counterrevolutionaries, and there
may well be counterrevolution. As a revolutionary cascade starts to de-
velop, the regime is likely to do something. For example, it might try to
entrench pluralistic ignorance by hiding or preventing visible rebellion
or mass demonstrations.32 It might allow dissent and disagreement—
until they become too visible.33 It might make concessions, hoping to
retain power. It might try to dissuade the hundreds and the thousands.
It might bring out its guns. It might kill people.34 If the goal of the re-
gime is to maintain power, the choice among these options can be very
difficult. For example, violence might be effective in quelling revolution,
but it might also foment more of it.35
II. #METOO
Turn to #MeToo in this light. All three conditions are met. The
qualifications are relevant as well.
First, with respect to sexual assault and sexual harassment, pref-
erence falsification has run rampant.36 Victims have silenced them-
selves.37 In some cases, they have said that all is or was well, when it is
29 Kurt Weyland, The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary
Wave of 1848?, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 917, 921 (2012).
30 See id.
31 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683, 685 (1999).
32 Gary King, Jennifer Pan & Margaret E. Roberts, How the Chinese Government Fabricates
Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument, 11 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 484,
496 (2017).
33 Id.
34 See generally Pearlman, supra note 10.
35 See Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, A Theory of Civil Disobedience, NAT’L BUREAU
OF ECON., 2–3, 13–17 (2015), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21338 [https://perma.cc/8N4R-339M].
36 But see Catharine MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html [https://
perma.cc/NQ78-LWD7] (“Women have been saying these things forever. It is the response to them
that has changed.”). MacKinnon is surely right on this point. It is also true that some women said
these things privately rather than publicly—and some spoke to no one at all.
37 Timur Kuran, who introduced the concept of preference falsification, has used the concept
to explain the pre-#MeToo silence around sexual harassment and assault, drawing comparisons to
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or was anything but that.38 These points are true and important, but
they are inadequate and under-descriptive. What many women (and
many, but fewer, men) did not reveal—what they kept private—was a
set of experiences, alongside evaluative judgments about those experi-
ences. We might want to speak, in the case of #MeToo, of experience
falsification. Self-silencing has been important, of course, but actual fal-
sification of experience—with an employer, for example—might be
more searing.39
Experience falsification or self-silencing can be a product of many
different factors. With respect to sexual violence or sexual harassment,
it may be a product of a rational calculation of likely costs and benefits,
given the risks of disclosure. Some women who did come forward with
accusations of assault and harassment pre-#MeToo have been ridiculed
or disparaged, or worse, providing a signal to other victims about what
might happen if they spoke out and thus tilting the cost-benefit analysis
in favor of staying silent.40 If cases of this kind were highly visible and
thus cognitively “available,” the availability heuristic would lead people
to think that probability of damage or harm from disclosure could be
quite high. But we need not invoke the availability heuristic. A 2003
study, cited by the EEOC in 2016, indicated that 75% of employees who
spoke out against workplace mistreatment faced some form of retalia-
tion.41 To the extent that victims of sexual harassment were aware of
the risk of retaliation, that awareness provided a reason to falsify their
experiences or at least not to speak about them.
Second, different women had and have different thresholds for dis-
closing their experiences and their judgments. Some women are ones,
others are twos, others are tens, and others are hundreds or thousands.
the fear-induced preference falsification that preserved communist rule for decades. Shankar Ve-
dantam, The Psychological Forces Behind a Cultural Reckoning: Understanding #MeToo, (NPR:
Hidden Brain Radio Broadcast Feb. 5, 2018) (in conversation with Princeton psychologist Betsy
Paluck), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=582698111 [https://per
ma.cc/933R-WW23] (“KURAN: For decades, communism survived by making the populations it
ruled afraid to express opposition to the principles of communism and express opposition to the
dictatorships that were running the Soviet bloc countries. VEDANTAM: The silence around Har-
vey Weinstein’s sexual misconduct operated in the same way. KURAN: It was an open secret for
decades, we’ve learned, in Hollywood and in circles that Harvey Weinstein traveled in, that he was
a predator of young women, but also, that if anybody called him out on this, he would ruin their
careers.”)
38 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Unleashed, 85 SOC. RES.: AN INT’LQ. 73, 73–92 (2018).
39 A vivid treatment of experience falsification is THE TALE (Gamechanger Films et al. 2018),
https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B07D8MCN2B/ref=atv_feed_catalog [https://perma.cc/MPR5
-C8DZ].
40 Vedantam, supra note 37.
41 U.S. EQUALEMP. OPPORTUNITYCOMM’N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OFHARASSME-
NT IN THEWORKPLACE: REPORT OFCO-CHAIRSCHAIR. FELDBLUM&VICTORIAA. LIPNIC, 16 (2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ8B-TE3
G].
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For one reason or another, some may be infinites.42 (They might be
frightened; they might have some kind of loyalty to the perpetrator;
they might not want their lives to be disrupted; they might cherish their
privacy.) Some might not have clarity on what their thresholds are.
They, and we, learn about that only ex post. Consider the following
words from Beverly Young Nelson, who accused Republican Senate can-
didate Roy Moore of having sexually assaulted her in 1977:
I thought that I was Mr. Moore’s only victim. I would probably
have taken what Mr. Moore did to me to my grave, had it not
been for the courage of four other women that were willing to
speak out about their experiences withMr. Moore. Their courage
has inspired me to overcome my fear.43
Third, social interactions are, and continue to be, crucial to #Me-
Too. Under certain conditions, the threes and the fours would silence
themselves, because the ones and the twos were silent too. But #MeToo
has benefited from the visibility of those who spoke out and the multiple
interactions made possible by social media. Within 24 hours of Alyssa
Milano’s initial tweet, 45% of all U.S. Facebook users had friends in
their networks who had posted with #MeToo.44 Once the ones and the
twos spoke out, the threes and the fours felt safer or emboldened.
It is important to say that this account is barebones and highly
stylized, and that it misses a great deal. I emphasize five points here.
First, the #MeToo movement is not opposing a regime, at least not in
the usual sense.45 Rather than rebelling against a government, the
women (and men) of #MeToo are uniting around a similar or common
experience and rebelling against a practice and also against institutions
(some of which may be in government). While cascading accusations
against individual perpetrators have been crucial—for example, more
42 See Lisa Bonos, Not Everyone with a #MeToo is Posting Their Story. Here’s Why Some Are
Refraining, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soloish/wp/2017/1
0/19/not-everyone-with-a-metoo-is-posting-their-story-heres-why-some-are-refraining/?noredirect
=on&utm_term=.502bb45e04b7 [https://perma.cc/23KN-RBSA], for insights from the “infinites.”
43 See Text of Beverly Young Nelson’s Accusation against Roy Moore, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 13, 20-
17), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/us/politics/text-beverly-young-nelson-statement.html [h
ttps://perma.cc/6X4F-FZAD] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
44 See More than 12M “Me Too” Facebook Posts, Comments, Reactions in 24 Hours, CBSNEWS
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-more-than-12-million-facebook-posts-com-
ments-reactions-24-hours [https://perma.cc/P33G-HKUZ]. Note also that it might be easier to use
Twitter, to reveal an experience or to state agreement, than to speak offline, or to attempt to show
support or to attract attention that way.
45 But see Ella Nilsen, More than 100 Members of Congress Want the Oversight Committee to
Investigate Trump, VOX (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/12/16766
800/democratic-congress-members-trump-investigation-women [https://perma.cc/3VYD-GCSR] (s-
uggesting that, for some, #MeToo may be viewed as a tool to oust President Trump, who has been
accused of sexual assault by multiple women).
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than two dozen women spoke out against Roger Ailes before he was
ousted at Fox News—the larger movement might be understood as a
challenge to a system of sex discrimination and to institutions that en-
gage in or perpetuate it.46 To the extent that we are speaking of insti-
tutions, it is not so much of a stretch to say that regime change, at least
of a sort, is involved.
Second, there is the question of granularity—of exactly what hap-
pened, and when, and why. Answering that question would reveal not
only informative detail but also conceptual surprises.
Third, there is the crucial role of salience in the #MeToo move-
ment.47 Some twos are different from other twos, and the same is true
for threes and fours, for one reason: their own statements and actions
are especially salient. In the context of #MeToo, Ashley Judd might
have made all the difference.48 Catharine MacKinnon has suggested
that Judd’s celebrity and salience were not the only thing that made her
an ideal first-mover; she was also, importantly, “somebody whose cred-
ibility is not readily attackable and who wasn’t suing at the time.”49 In
revolutionary movements in general, what is salient, and what is cog-
nitively available, greatly matters. As I have suggested, rebels do not
make elaborate cost-benefit analyses. They use mental short-cuts, and
availability is especially important.50
Fourth, descriptive social norms, which capture what people actu-
ally do, greatly matter. Other things being equal, people are more likely
to change their behavior to comply with a norm if they believe that most
other people are compliant, and less likely to do so if they believe that
most other people are noncompliant. A prominent study found that vis-
itors to a national park who saw signs informing them that many past
visitors had stolen petrified wood from the park became more likely to
steal petrified wood—and that visitors who saw signs informing them
that the vast majority of visitors had left the wood in the park became
less likely to steal petrified wood.51 The #MeToo movement appears to
46 See Gabriel Sherman, The Revenge of Roger’s Angels, N.Y.MAG. (Sept. 5, 2016), http://nyma
g.com/intelligencer/2016/09/how-fox-news-women-took-down-roger-ailes.html [https://perma.cc/4
FP4-RLLS].
47 See generallyWeyland, supra note 29 (emphasizing availability); see alsoMargaret E. Tank-
ard & Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Norm Perception as a Vehicle for Social Change, 10 SOC. ISSUES &
POL.’Y REV. 181, 185 (2016).
48 See, e.g., Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, Time Per-
son of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the
-year-2017-silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/7PWN-6AY4] (noting Judd’s importance).
49 Brock Colyar, The Ms. Q&A: Catharine MacKinnon Weighs in on the #MeToo Movement,
MS. MAG. BLOG (July 30, 2018), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2018/07/30/ms-qa-catharine-mackin-
non-weighs-metoo-movement/ [https://perma.cc/53QS-PSKN].
50 SeeWeyland, supra note 29, at 35–38.
51 See Robert B. Cialdini et al.,Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Impact, 1 SOC. INFLUE-
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have benefited from a shift in descriptive norms, suggesting that speak-
ing out or objecting is not inconsistent with usual behavior.
While it seems highly unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility
that attention to widespread harassment will serve to inform (some)
male perpetrators that they are simply behaving like many other men,
thus reducing their incentive to behave differently.52 But it is also true
that, to the extent #MeToo succeeds in changing norms, a new (and ben-
eficial) wave of preference falsification may lead potential harassers to
condemn the behavior rather than to support it.53 There is much to be
learned about this topic.54
Finally, #MeToo is not simply about the revelation of preferences,
experiences, beliefs, and values. It is also about the transformation of
preferences, beliefs, and values—most obviously on the part of perpe-
trators, but equally relevantly on the part of victims. Any social move-
ment helps to alter preferences, beliefs, and values. It casts a new light
on past experiences. It does not merely elicit preexisting judgments. It
produces fresh ones.55 Part of the point of #MeToo, and one of its
achievements, is to turn a sense of embarrassment and shame into a
sense of dignity.
Recall the statement from a computer programmer from Syria:
When you meet somebody coming out of Syria for the first time,
you start to hear the same sentences. That everything is
okay . . . It’ll take like six months, up to one year, to become a
normal human being, to say what he thinks, what he feels. Then
they might start . . . whispering. They won’t speak loudly.56
But eventually they might.
NCE 3, 7–8 (2006).
52 See Siri Uotila, Could the #MeToo Movement Inadvertently Lead to More Sexual Harass-




54 It is important to note that populations are heterogeneous. Some people will be very glad to
deviate from a new or emerging norm; they are defiant. Robert Kagan & Jerome Skolnick,Banning
Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in SMOKING POL’Y: LAW, POL., & CULTURE 78, 78–81
(Robert Rabin & Stephen Sugarman eds., 1993), for relevant discussion.
55 On the difference between the two, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, HOW CHANGEHAPPENS (2019).
56 Pearlman, supra note 10, at 4.
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Unofficial Reporting in the #MeToo Era
Deborah Tuerkheimer†
ABSTRACT
In the age of #MeToo, victims of sexual misconduct are coming forward en masse
to allege abuse, finding strength in numbers and a growing cultural responsive-
ness to their claims. Facilitated by innovative technologies,#MeToo is sparking the
creation of new channels for reporting abuse—channels intended to bypass the
laws and rules that prohibit sexual misconduct. Tomake sense of this unexamined
development, a proposed taxonomy classifies informal avenues of complaint into
four distinct categories: the Traditional Whisper Network, the Double Secret Whis-
per Network, the Shadow Court of Public Opinion, and the New Court of Public
Opinion. While unofficial reporting can advance important ends, the rise of infor-
mal accusation also raises concerns that bear directly on the need to enhance for-
malized accountability for sexual assault and harassment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The contemporary movement known as #MeToo emerged in early
October 2017 when allegations of sexual assault and harassment
against Harvey Weinstein were reported by the New York Times and
theNew Yorker.1 As the Weinstein story developed in the coming weeks
and months, the number of allegations publicly leveled against him
† Class of 1940 Research Professor, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. I am
grateful to Ian Ayres, Danielle Citron Keats, Sarah Lawsky, Melissa Murray, and Janice Nadler
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts, and to participants at the Legal Forum’s Law in
the Era of #MeToo symposium for engaged conversation. TomGaylord, Faculty Services and Schol-
arly Communications Librarian, contributed outstanding research assistance, and the Northwest-
ern University Pritzker School of Law Faculty Research Program furnished generous support.
1 Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers
Tell Their Stories, NEWYORKER (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from
-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [https://per
ma.cc/HHY8-4Q59]; Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassm-
ent Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harve
y-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/5LSZ-3SUC]. The first “Me Too” camp-
aign originated in 2007, when activist Tarana Burke began a nonprofit to assist victims of sexual
harassment and assault. See, e.g., Sandra E. Garcia, TheWomanWho Created #MeToo Long Before
Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-
tarana-burke.html [https://perma.cc/GD7A-UC99].
274 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
multiplied.2 The media quickly intensified reporting on a range of sex-
ual misconduct3 by other high profile men.4 Soon the coverage grew to
encompass sexual harassment and assault across disparate industries
and institutions, including publishing, fashion, music, sports, enter-
tainment, architecture, advertising, comedy, philanthropy, hospitality,
retail, farm, factory, academia, technology, media, church, and politics.5
2 See Sara M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein Scandal: A Complete List of the 87
Accusers, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2017/10/27/wein
stein-scandal-complete-list-accusers/804663001/ [https://perma.cc/8HG7-KRTR].
3 “Sexual misconduct” encompasses sexual assault, sexual harassment, and non-actionable
sexual abuse. See Kathryn Casteel & Andrea Jones-Rooy,We Need a Better Way to Talk about ‘Se-
xual Misconduct,’ FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 17, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/we-need-
a-better-way-to-talk-about-sexual-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/MN25-JUZ] (explaining the imp-
ortance of distinguishing between types of sexual misconduct). Although the existence of different
subordinate categories complicates use of the umbrella term, “sexual misconduct” highlights con-
nections between the various behaviors that fall under the rubric.
4 See Swetha Kannan & Priya Krishnakumar, A Powerful Person Has Been Accused of Mis-
conduct at a Rate of Nearly Once Every 20 Hours Since Weinstein, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-sexual-harassment-fallout/ [https://perma.cc/A26H-C9B
K]. Over the course of several years preceding the Weinstein story, clusters of high-profile sexual
misconduct accusations surfaced against Bill Cosby, Roger Ailes, and Donald Trump, among oth-
ers, likely seeding the ground for #MeToo. For one pre-Weinstein perspective, see Lani Seelinger,
Trump, Cosby, and Why Being a Woman in 2017 Feels Harder than Ever, BUSTLE (June 17, 2017),
https://www.bustle.com/p/trump-cosby-why-being-a-woman-in-2017-feels-harder-than-ever-6506
6 [https://perma.cc/F5CQ-H9CA].
5 See, e.g., Nick Anderson, Academia’s #MeToo Moment: Women Accuse Professors of Sexual
Misconduct, WASH. POST (May 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/acade
mias-metoo-moment-women-accuse-professors-of-sexual-misconduct/2018/05/10/474102de-2631-
11e8-874b-d517e912f125_story.html?utm_term=.d76b3ad5d2f9 [https://perma.cc/W3AQ-A58G];
Harry Bruinius, Churches Struggle with Their #MeToo Moment, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr.
20, 2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2018/0420/Churches-struggle-with-their-MeT
oo-moment [https://perma.cc/XMZ6-D7L2]; Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It to
Change a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/FJ4
W-RUT6]; Patricia Cohen & Tiffany Hsu, Children’s Book Industry Has Its #MeToo Moment, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/business/childrens-publishing-sexual-
harassment.html [https://perma.cc/WJ6L-E4N9]; Dan Corey, Here’s a List of Political Figures Ac-
cused of Sexual Misconduct, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sex-
ual-misconduct/here-s-list-political-figures-accused-sexual-misconduct-n827821 [https://perma.cc
/JP85-FBDD]; Jill Disis, The MediaMenWho Have Been Accused of Sexual Misconduct, CNN (Nov.
30, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/29/media/media-men-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/PSV4-5TS5]; Stassa Edwards, Women in Architecture Have Their Own
Shitty Men List, JEZEBEL (Mar. 16, 2018), https://jezebel.com/women-in-architecture-have-their-
own-shitty-men-list-1823844222 [https://perma.cc/6A3R-5HU9]; Amelia Harnish, Advertising’s
#MeToo Movement Picks up Speed, REFINERY29 (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.refinery29.com/en-
us/2018/03/193440/times-up-advertising-female-advertising-executives-sexual-harassment [https
://perma.cc/CG5G-TL9K]; Maura Judkis & Emily Heil, Rape in the Storage Room. Groping at the
Bar. Why is the Restaurant Industry So Terrible For Women?, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/rape-in-the-storage-room-groping-at-the-bar-why-is-the-
restaurant-industry-so-terrible-for-women/2017/11/17/54a1d0f2-c993-11e7-b0cf-7689a9f2d84e_st
ory.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fd2c12410c67 [https://perma.cc/LQ9B-NHB6]; Juliet Macur,
The “Me Too” Movement Inevitably Spills into Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2017/10/19/sports/olympics/mckayla-maroney-me-too.html [https://perma.cc/W6WB-UM
BS]; #MeToo Hits the Nonprofit World, CHRON. OFPHILANTHROPY (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.phil
anthropy.com/specialreport/metoo-hits-the-nonprofit-worl/167 [https://perma.cc/F542-ATFK]; Aly-
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By the close of the year, #MeToo had touched off a widespread reckon-
ing with a vast continuum of sexual abuse.6
To much of the general public, the realities of sexual violation—
mostly experienced by women7—was news. It was hardly news, how-
ever, to members of the impacted communities. Rather, survivors and
those vulnerable to abuse were sharing information all along. Harvey
Weinstein’s decades of predation were an “open secret” in Hollywood
well before the New York Times broke the story,8 and the same can be
said for many, even most, of the scandals that have erupted since.9 It
turns out that women were indeed reporting their abuse; they were
ssa Newcomb, #MeToo: Sexual Harassment Rallying Cry Hits Silicon Valley, NBC NEWS (Oct. 23,
2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/metoo-sexual-harassment-rallying-cry-hits-silico
n-valley-n813271 [https://perma.cc/UAB5-8UQK]; Yuki Noguchi, Low-Wage Workers Say #MeToo
Movement is Chance for Change, NPR (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/06/583428098/lo
w-wage-workers-say-metoo-movement-is-a-chance-for-change [https://perma.cc/V98X-WTUQ];
Emilia Petrarca, Fashion’s #MeToo Movement is Loudest on Instagram, CUT (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.thecut.com/2018/04/fashions-me-too-movement-instagram-sexual-harassment.html
[https://perma.cc/G4EM-S424]; David Sims, Louis C.K. and Abuse of Power in the Comedy World,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/11/louis-ck-sex
ual-misconduct-allegations/545489/ [https://perma.cc/L8GS-VKDL]; Marlow Stern, “Russell Sim-
mons Is Just the Beginning”: Music Industry Braces for #MeToo Impact, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 15,
2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/russell-simmons-is-just-the-beginning-music-industry-brac
es-for-metoo-impact [https://perma.cc/X3CG-AREW]; THR Staff, Notable Entertainment Figures
Accused of Sexual Misconduct in Wake of Harvey Weinstein, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Nov. 30,
2017), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/lists/hollywood-media-men-accused-of-sexual-miscond
uct-and-harassment-post-weinstein-1057193 [https://perma.cc/8CPU-XUMA].
6 See Edward Felsenthal, The Choice, TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-
the-year-2017-silence-breakers-choice/ [https://perma.cc/4SM4-P5VG] (explaining why the maga-
zine selected for its “Person of the Year” the women who catapulted the #MeToo movement).
7 At the most extreme end of the sexual abuse spectrum, nationwide survey data suggest that
nearly one in five women have been raped at some point in their lives. MICHELLE C. BLACK ET AL.,
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R8E-CTC
H]. For men, the number is one in seventy-one. Id. Transgender people experience sexual violence
at rates of nearly one in two. SANDYE. JAMES ET AL., THEREPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER
SURVEY 5 (2016), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.
.PDF [https://perma.cc/M9XF-F8FT] (in the largest survey of transgender people in the United
States, forty-seven percent of respondents reported having been sexually assaulted). Data on sex-
ual harassment, while sparse, also shows a steep gender disparity. See Rhitu Chatterjee, A New
Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced Sexual Harassment, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-perce
nt-of-women-have-experienced-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/6BL2-B22Y].
8 See Kantor and Twohey, supra note 1.
9 See, e.g., Reah Bravo, The Open Secret of Charlie Rose, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (May 4, 2018),
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/05/04/the-open-secret-of-charlie-rose/ [https://perma.cc/TB6Z
-55CV]; Food Writer Allison Robicelli Calls Mario Batali Allegations an ‘Open Secret,’ BALTIMORE
SUN (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.baltimoresun.com/features/baltimore-insider-blog/bs-fe-robicelli-
responds-20171212-story.html [https://perma.cc/6AM9-ZYW6]. See generally Sarah Hanson-
Young, The ‘Open Secret’ of Sexual Harassment in the Media is Staggering. There’s Plenty Yet to
Come, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2017/dec/04/t
he-open-secret-of-sexual-harassment-in-the-media-is-staggering-theres-plenty-yet-to-come [https:
//perma.cc/N3G2-SZY9]; Amanda Hess, Hollywood Harassment Was an Open Secret. But TV Com-
edies Took It On, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/arts/sexual-
harassment-tv-bystander-aziz-ansari-lena-dunham-tig-notaro.html [https://perma.cc/978Y-RBQ].
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simply doing so in uncharted ways. #MeToo has exposed a large decen-
tralized network of information exchange.
At the same time, facilitated by expanding technologies,10 #MeToo
has catalyzed the creation of new channels for reporting sexual miscon-
duct without directly invoking the legal system or law-adjacent institu-
tional structures.11 I will call these mechanisms for reporting sexual
misconduct12 that bypass formalized mechanisms of accountability “un-
official reporting channels” or “informal reporting channels.”13
After mapping the unofficial pathways for complaints that have
emerged in the #MeToo era, I consider the normative implications of
the new sexual misconduct reporting. My focus here is not on the woeful
inadequacies of formal mechanisms for addressing sexual assault and
harassment—inadequacies that prompt women to relay their abuse
through back channels.14 Instead, without minimizing the importance
of functions served by informal reporting,15 I argue that its proliferation
should raise concerns for those committed to improving our societal re-
sponse to allegations of sexual assault and harassment. By crystallizing
these concerns, my hope is to advance a conversation about how best to
facilitate lasting change.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I proposes a taxonomy that
classifies informal avenues of complaint into four distinct categories:
the Traditional Whisper Network, the Double Secret Whisper Network,
the Shadow Court of Public Opinion, and the New Court of Public Opin-
ion. Part II identifies a trio of dangers that surround the emergence of
an informal complaint system. These hazards include a lack of account-
ability for those who perpetrate abuse, the absence of process and the
strategic deployment of that absence by defenders of the status quo, and
the weaponization of defamation law in service of silencing would-be
accusers. By surfacing significant limitations of an unofficial reporting
regime, this discussion underscores the need for reform to activate a
largely forsaken law of sexual misconduct.
10 Technology is powering the evolution of whisper networks as it is simultaneously facilitat-
ing the #MeToo movement. For purposes of my argument, it is unnecessary to disentangle the
impact of technological innovation from the cultural causes and effects of #MeToo.
11 Sexual misconduct may be regulated by criminal law, by tort law, by Title IX, and by Title
VII, depending on where the misconduct occurs and what it comprises.
12 Unless otherwise specified, my use of “reporting” throughout this discussion includes not
just formal complaints, but informal or unofficial disclosures of misconduct as well.
13 Informal and unofficial reporting channels (used interchangeably throughout the discus-
sion) are pathways for complaint other than those established by an institution with authority to
process an allegation of misconduct under the applicable legal or administrative framework. See
supra note 11. At times, I will also refer to these channels as informal avenues of complaint.
14 For a discussion of the inadequacies of formal systems, see generally Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (2019).
15 I identify and explore these various functions in separate work. Id.
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II. A TAXONOMY OF INFORMAL REPORTING CHANNELS
Women have long chosen to share their accounts of sexual abuse
with one another rather than report through formal channels.16 Over
time, “whisper networks” have operated in a largely clandestine man-
ner; the communications shared within them, in addition to the net-
works themselves,17 have been hidden from the view of all except in-
tended recipients. But the secrecy of a network’s very existence, and
even the content of information exchanged, is not an inevitable feature
of unofficial reporting channels. One significant feature of the #MeToo
era is that whisper networks have exposed themselves to outsiders for
the first time.18
As important, #MeToo has spawned the creation of new kinds of
informal reporting channels that are conceptually distinct from whisper
networks. These channels amplify accusations of abuse by reaching
wider communities and aiming for more ambitious ends—a develop-
ment that has been greatly facilitated by technology.19 As new reporting
pathways emerge, it is clear that innovation along these lines will con-
tinue in the #MeToo era.
Now is an opportune moment to consider how informal reporting
channels operate.
A. Variables
On close inspection, unofficial conduits for reporting sexual miscon-
duct vary along three key dimensions. First, can the accuser report
16 See infra note 23. Informal reporting of sexual misconduct can be a form of consciousness-
raising. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 863–64 (1990)
(explaining that “[c]onsciousness-raising is an interactive and collaborative process of articulating
one’s experiences and making meaning of them with others who also articulate their experiences”).
On the centrality of consciousness-raising practices to feminism, see Catherine A. MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 519 (1982). For
historical context, see CAROLHYMOWITZ&MICHAELEWEISSMAN, A HISTORY OFWOMEN IN AMERI-
CA 351–55 (1978).
17 I am using “network” to describe a group of interconnected people who disseminate infor-
mation, receive information, or both.
18 See Summer Meza, What Is a Whisper Network? How Women Are Taking Down Bad Men
in the #MeToo Age, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/what-whisper-net-
work-sexual-misconduct-allegations-719009 [https://perma.cc/8ZQD-3BF3] (“This is the year the
whisper network went viral, with women sharing their allegations and experiences in forums,
spreadsheets, private groups and all over social media.”).
19 See generally Elizabeth Dwoskin & Jena McGregor, Sexual Harassment Inc: How the #Me-
Too Movement Is Sparking a Wave of Start-ups, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2018/01/05/sexual-harassment-inc-how-the-metoo-movement
-is-sparking-a-wave-of-startups/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3c7ec0e49aad [https://perma.cc/YJ7
D-ZRE6]; see also supra note 10.
278 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
anonymously or must the accuser identify herself?20 Second, is the ac-
cused named or does the accused remain unidentified?21 Third, is access
to the channel restricted or is it open to all?22 After discussing each var-
iable in turn, I introduce a taxonomy of informal reporting that uncov-
ers several instructive patterns. This analysis suggests that whisper
networks are evolving in ways that are significant, especially from the
vantage of law.
1. Accuser anonymity
The oldest and most familiar form of a whisper network features
face-to-face information exchange.23Women share their accounts of sex-
ual violation with one another in person (and did so well before there
was an internet); these reports of abuse can then be further dissemi-
nated to other members of the networked group.24
Until the #MeToo era, group outsiders were generally not privy to
the existence of whisper networks. This may be changing, however, as
victims begin to perceive a greater societal willingness to believe alle-
gations of sexual misconduct and to condemn it. Increasingly, members
of traditional whisper networks—some of which have been in operation
for decades—are revealing how and why they channeled accounts of
abuse.
The Glass Ceiling Club, for instance, was a group of female invest-
ment bankers who began convening in the 1990s to talk about “how to
make the workplace more female friendly.”25 As one participant re-
cently explained, “our conversations would revert to sharing facts we
knew about the men we worked with, [and] yes, it was mostly the same
men who preyed on young women.”26 Among the reasons for Glass Ceil-
ing Club members to divulge their experiences with sexual harassment
20 See infra notes 23–47 and accompanying text. Given that sexual misconduct is experienced
disproportionately by women, I will at times use female pronouns to describe victims and accusers
while recognizing that men are also victims and accusers. See supra note 7.
21 See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 53–62 and accompanying text.
23 See Julie Creswell & Tiffany Hsu, Women’s Whisper Network Raises Its Voice, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/business/sexual-harassment-whisper-networ
k.html [https://perma.cc/E898-AJFT] (“For as long as women have been in the labor force,” they
have gathered to “clue each other into a spectrum of behavior that was often unseen or ignored by
their employers,” including sexual misconduct.).
24 See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (discussing open and restricted networks).
25 Creswell & Hsu, supra note 23.
26 Id.
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was to help protect other women. “Survival hints”—strategies like stay-
ing on the public trading floor when engaging with a known harasser—
“were shared pretty freely.”27
Another decades-old, person-to-person whisper network centered
on Richard Meier, who stands among the world’s most prominent archi-
tects.28 In April 2018, multiple allegations of sexual misconduct against
Meier were publicly reported, along with details about a decades old
whisper network that enabled women to share information about his
abuse.29 Beginning in the 1990s, female employees created “‘a kind of
underground in the office that functioned to warn people about what
they could expect,’”30 as well as to offer safety in numbers.31 When one
woman alleged that Meier sexually assaulted her, she disclosed this to
other women at the firm; “‘it turned out that everybody had a story.’”32
Yet most victims of Meier’s abuse did not report the abuse through for-
mal channels.33
The classic version of the whisper network exists across a wide
swath of workplaces and other contained settings.34 But alongside it, a
different model—one that features an anonymous accuser—is becoming
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Robin Pogrebin,Women Say Richard Meier’s Conduct Was Widely Known Yet Went
Unchecked, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/arts/design/richard-m
eier-sexual-misconduct-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/WL4B-VCFJ].
29 Id.
30 Id. (quoting Adam Eli Clem, an assistant archivist in Meier’s firm in the mid-1990s). To
further protect one another, women “knew to wait for one another at the end of the day to avoid
leaving a female colleague alone [with Meier].” Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. (quoting Karin Bruckner, who started at Meier’s architecture firm in 1989 and was
groped by him against a copy machine.).
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Emily Alford, Former NBC News Anchor Linda Vestor on Matt Lauer Allegations:
‘Every-body Knew,’ JEZEBEL (Oct. 17, 2019), https://jezebel.com/former-nbc-news-anchor-linda-
vester-on-matt-lauer-alleg-1839150737 [https://perma.cc/6L3G-7M2P] (reporting that Vestor had
been warned by her co-workers to stay away from Lauer because he was “dangerous”); Catherine
Crump, Clerkships Are Invaluable to Young Lawyers. They Can Also Be a Setup for Abuse, WASH.
POST (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/12/15/when-
women-law-clerks-are-harassed-they-often-have-nowhere-to-turn/?utm_term=.38012bd5914a [htt
ps://perma.cc/S34L-CWBP] (describing ways in which female clerks were warned to “stay away”
from then-Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski); Wendy Lu,What #MeToo Means to Teenagers, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/well/family/metoo-me-too-teenagers-t
eens-adolescents-high-school.html [https://perma.cc/VFK4-D8ML] (According to one high school
senior, “‘[a] lot of female friend groups have a list of—or know about—high school boys who they
know have been treating women in a gross way, and make sure their friends stay away from
them.’”). Anecdotal evidence suggests that similar networks exist in many law schools and law
firms. See also An Phung & Chloe Melas,Women Accuse Morgan Freeman of Inappropriate Behav-
ior, Harassment, CNN (May 28, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/24/entertainment/morgan-
freeman-accusations/index.html [https://perma.cc/9FZJ-B83Q] (explaining that, because staffers
at Freeman’s production company “did not feel comfortable talking to senior personnel about their
workplace grievances,” some women formed a “‘survivors club’ where they gathered to vent about
their experiences . . . ”).
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more commonplace. To be sure, the anonymous accuser model is not
entirely without precedent.35 In 1990, for example, female students at
Brown University generated a list on several bathroom walls of men
who allegedly raped them;36 the same tactic has been used on college
campuses periodically since then (including at Brown in April 2017).37
But technology has enabled the anonymous accuser version of the whis-
per network to spread well beyond the confines of universities, making
it more ubiquitous than ever before.38
A recent example to have publicly materialized, albeit not by de-
sign,39 is the Media Men List (or “Shitty Media Men List,” as it was
originally conceived).40 According to its creator, former New Republic
editor Moira Donegan, the “anonymous, crowdsourced document was a
first attempt at solving what has seemed like an intractable problem:
how women can protect [them]selves from sexual harassment and as-
sault.”41 Donegan used a Google spreadsheet to collect “a range of ru-
mors and allegations of sexual misconduct, much of it violent, by men
in magazines and publishing.”42 Although the document was meant to
35 “‘People have been writing rape lists since the ‘80s and ‘90s, passing out fliers, writing
names on doors.’” Jenny Kutner, Sexual Assault Survivors Are Outing Their Rapists on the Anon-
ymous Corners of the Internet, MIC (Apr. 13, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/140607/sexual-assault-
survivors-are-outing-their-rapists-on-the-anonymous-corners-of-the-internet#.J2yzTJB9i [https://
perma.cc/2UZQ-LRPX] (quoting Annie Clark, executive director and co-founder of End Rape on
Campus).
36 See, e.g., William Celis,Date Rape and a List at Brown, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 1990), https://w
ww.nytimes.com/1990/11/18/us/date-rape-and-a-list-at-brown.html [https://perma.cc/R9HA-MW8
R].
37 See, e.g., Gwen Everett, List Alleging Names of Sexual Assaulters Appears on Campus Bath-
rooms, BROWN DAILY HERALD (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.browndailyherald.com/2017/04/27/list-
alleging-names-sexual-assaulters-appears-campus-bathrooms/ [https://perma.cc/FCN2-R2PH]. As
one former student explained, “students then and now would not write the names of their alleged
sexual assailants on bathroom walls if they felt they had a more legitimate avenue to adjudicate
campus assault . . . .” Id. See also George Joseph & Jon Swaine, Behind Columbia’s ‘Rape Lists’:
‘When Existing Systems Fail, What Then?,’ GUARDIAN (June 26, 2014), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/education/2014/jun/26/columbia-university-students-rape-list-mishandle-sexual-assault
[https://perma.cc/8TWD-P7X6].
38 See infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text (describing widened dissemination of miscon-
duct allegations).
39 See infra note 43.
40 See, e.g., Moira Donegan, I Started the MediaMen List, CUT (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.the
cut.com/2018/01/moira-donegan-i-started-the-media-men-list.html [https://perma.cc/QD5S-U5D
G]. The Media Men List was controversial and covered widely by the mainstream press. See, e.g.,
Jaclyn Peiser, How a Crowdsourced List Set Off Months of #MeToo Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/business/media/media-men-list.html [https://perma.c
c/ED4L-VXMT]. See infra notes 134–138 and accompanying text (describing the defamation com-
plaint recently filed against Donegan by an individual accused on the list).
41 Donegan, supra note 40.
42 Id.
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be private in the sense that intended recipients were women in the in-
dustry43—that is, women in a position to warn or be warned about their
predatory colleagues—it quickly went viral and was then made public.44
Before Donegan removed the document from the web, more than sev-
enty men had been anonymously named as perpetrators of sexual mis-
conduct, ranging from inappropriate behavior to criminal acts.45
In sum, networks featuring anonymous accusers are proliferating
in the age of #MeToo.46With the help of technology, women are increas-
ingly able to share accounts of sexual violation without divulging their
identities.47
2. Identification of accused
Unofficial reporting channels are meant to create safe spaces for
women to relate their experiences of sexual misconduct. For the most
part, these channels allow participants to identify the accused by name;
indeed, the need for a safe space is intricately connected to this very
function.
The notable exception is a publicly available spreadsheet that col-
lects accounts of sexual misconduct in academia while expressly prohib-
iting the naming of an accused.48 The creator of the spreadsheet, Karen
Kelsky, is a former professor who decided in the wake of the Harvey
Weinstein scandal, “somebody needs to do this in the academy.”49 Alt-
hough the spreadsheet does not allow identification of either alleged
victims or alleged perpetrators,50 it was designed to include the names
43 Id. See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (discussing open and restricted networks).
44 Id. See also Doree Shafrir,What to Do with “Shitty Media Men”?, BUZZFEED (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/doree/what-to-do-with-shitty-media-men [https://perma.cc/
ZUP3-38CD].
45 Donegan, supra note 40. The spreadsheet contained a disclaimer noting, “This document is
only a collection of misconduct allegations and rumors. Take everything with a grain of salt.” Id.
Donegan highlighted in red the names of men who were accused of physical sexual assault by more
than one woman. Id.
46 See, e.g., Sapna Maheshwari, Ad Agencies’ Reckoning on Sexual Harassment Comes on In-
stagram, Anonymously, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/business/
media/diet-madison-avenue-instagram.html [https://perma.cc/UH4R-A9UH]; Kutner, supra note
35; Petrarca, supra note 5.
47 In the course of litigation, it is possible for a court to require the unmasking of an anony-
mous accuser’s identity. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. Doxxing is also a threat to
anonymity. (Other encryption related concerns lie beyond the scope of this discussion.)
48 Karen Kelsky, When Will We Stop Elevating Predators, CHRON. HIGHER ED. (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Professor-Is-In-When-Will/242110 [https://perma.cc/4TE2-
MGZ2]. As the author, who is also the spreadsheet’s creator, explained, she “intentionally left the
definition of ‘sexual harassment’ open; contributors may share anything that they feel merits in-
clusion.” Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. Although some people identified the accused despite instructions to the contrary, Kelsky
explained that, “[f]or legal reasons, I removed the names from the Google doc as quickly as I saw
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of universities and departments, along with other pertinent infor-
mation.51
The spreadsheet was published in December 2017; it quickly went
viral and now contains nearly 2500 entries.52
3. Channel access
As whisper networks evolve from the “face-to-face” sharing model,53
important questions of access are arising. In their traditional incarna-
tion, whisper networks are only open to a select group of insiders,54 re-
sulting in the exclusion of those who might have equal or greater need
for the intelligence, including members of marginalized groups.55
This dynamic is beginning to change as technology facilitates the
wider dissemination of victims’ accounts.56 Information can now be
readily shared with a larger group of recipients who satisfy delineated
criteria.57 Informal reporting has moved beyond the in-person para-
digm, granting access to a range of intended recipients, including com-
pany co-workers,58 industry employees,59 and sorority sisters.60
them.” Id. Kelsky added that some of the men named privately are “still receiving promotions,
accolades, chairs, and deanships.” Id.
51 The crowdsourced survey asks participants “what happened and when, what the harasser’s
gender and position relative to the victim were at the time (professor, etc.), institution type and
field, institutional responses and career consequences for the harasser (if any), and the impact of
harassment on the career and health of the person who experienced it.” Colleen Flaherty, ‘Holding
Space’ for Victims of Harassment, INSIDEHIGHERED. (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.c
om/news/2017/12/08/what-can-crowdsourced-survey-sexual-harassment-academia-tell-us-about-p
roblem [https://perma.cc/6AZ5-FEQD].
52 Karen Kelsky, Sexual Harassment in the Academy: A Crowdsource Survey, https://docs.goog
le.com/spreadsheets/d/1S9KShDLvU7C-KkgEevYTHXr3F6InTenrBsS9yk-8C5M/htmlview?sle=tr
ue#gid=1530077352l [https://perma.cc/H6SC-3PFQ].
53 See supra notes 25–34 and accompanying text.
54 The size of the “insider” group may vary considerably, from small face-to-face gatherings to
large technology-facilitated workplace or industry wide chats. See infra notes 57–59 and accompa-
nying text.
55 Whisper networks are generally “based on trust, and any social hierarchy is rife with the
privilege of deciding who gets access to information.” Jenna Wortham, We Were Left Out, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Dec. 2017, at 42.
56 After the Media Men list circulated, Jenna Wortham, a woman of color, wrote: “Despite my
working in New York media for [ten] years, [the Media Men List] was my first ‘whisper’ of any
kind, a realization that felt almost as hurtful as reading the acts described on the list itself.” Id.
Wortham posited that women of color working in media may have been “perceived as outsiders, or
maybe [they] weren’t seen as vulnerable. [They] hadn’t been invited to the happy hours or chats
or email threads where such information is presumably shared.” Id.
57 For instance, closed and secret Facebook groups provide private spaces for sharing allega-
tions of misconduct. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
58 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
59 Id.
60 See infra note 74.
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Accusations are even being disclosed to the public writ large—in
other words, informal complaint channels can allow unrestricted ac-
cess.61 As the #MeToo movement reshapes societal responses to allega-
tions of sexual misconduct,62 channels for informal reporting are becom-
ing almost unrecognizable from the whisper networks of old. These new
channels are entirely open and increasingly commonplace.
B. Whisper Networks and Courts of Public Opinion
Unofficial channels for reporting sexual misconduct can best be cat-
egorized along two key dimensions: one is whether the accuser is anon-
ymous; the other is whether access to the channel is restricted (or open
to the public).


















To understand the unofficial reporting regime that has taken
shape in the #MeToo era, it is useful to begin with the Traditional Whis-
per Network. We then turn to the remaining matrixes, which I call the
Double Secret Whisper Network;63 the Shadow Court of Public Opin-
ion;64 and the New Court of Public Opinion.65
61 See infra notes 80–96 and accompanying text. Unrestricted access (open) channels will be
referred to as courts of public opinion; restricted access (closed) channels will be deemed variations
of whisper networks. See infra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (depicting and explaining two-
by-two matrix).
62 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 80–90 and accompanying text.
65 See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
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1. Traditional Whisper Network
Whisper networks enable women to share their accounts of sexual
violation with select insiders.66 The content of the information (and of-
ten, the existence of the network itself) remains secret—at least to the
extent outsiders are not privy to it, as is generally the intent of those
within the network.67 But, in contrast to the Double Secret Whisper
Network, which allows for anonymous reports, networks in this cate-
gory feature a known source of the accusation.68
The classic version of the Traditional Whisper Network entails
face-to-face information exchange.69 This in-person sharing of allega-
tions is hardly obsolete; anecdotal evidence suggests that whisper net-
works continue to thrive in many, perhaps even most, workplaces and
educational settings.70
But because technology has enabled a more robust dissemination
of information, no longer must the Traditional Whisper Network rely
on face-to-face encounters. Where large or dispersed populations wish
to report sexual misconduct within a select community—a particular
challenge given changes in workplaces and on college campuses—tech-
nology can serve an important function in enhancing the adequacy of
distribution channels. Updated formulations of the Traditional Whisper
66 See supra note 54.
67 In their classic formulation, whisper networks allow women to “share secret warnings via
word of mouth . . . .” Wortham, supra note 55. Whisper networks can, of course, be leaky.
68 Especially in larger groups of insiders, information may be passed along a chain of network
members—in effect, generating hearsay. At some point, if an accusation becomes sufficiently at-
tenuated from the original source, it might be considered “rumor” or “gossip.” Nevertheless, insid-
ers tend to perceive whisper networks as sources of useful information. See Jia Tolentino, The
Whisper Network after Harvey Weinstein and “Shitty Media Men,” NEW YORKER (Oct. 14, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-whisper-network-after-harvey-weinstein-and-sh
itty-media-men [https://perma.cc/RH8U-TKV3] (“Over time, in my experience, the whisper net-
work always proves reasonably accurate: firings and settlements and investigations accrue to the
names you’ve been hearing in different anecdotes for years. Gossip distorts details, but there are
ways to test the information. Women ask for and examine sourcing; you know whether the story
is firsthand or thirdhand. ‘I’ve heard he gets grabby’ is one type of information, and ‘this guy phys-
ically hurt one of my best friends’ is another.”).
69 One commentator provided this description: “‘Hey, just so you know, don’t be alone with X.’
‘I know you’re new here. In case nobody has mentioned it, Y has raped women. That’s a fact.’ ‘I’d
call Z a creep, but I don’t think he’s dangerous in the way W is. I don’t know, I could be wrong.’
These are the kinds of warnings whispered in private among women in work spaces.” Alex Press,
It’s Time to Weaponize the “Whisper Network”, VOX (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.vox.com/first-per-
son/2017/10/16/16482800/harvey-weinstein-sexual-harassment-workplace
[https://perma.cc/8M2F-DED9].
70 See Tolentino, supra note 68 (“Three years ago, shortly after I moved to the city, I was
introduced to the whisper network—the unofficial channel that women use to warn each other
about men whose sexual behavior falls on the spectrum from creepy to criminal—for New York
media. I had encountered these networks before, in college and grad school and in the Peace
Corps.”). See, e.g., Crump, supra note 34.
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network (for instance, invitation-only Facebook groups)71 enable women
identified by name to share their accounts across geographic distance
but still within the confines of a private space.
2. Double Secret Whisper Network
The Double Secret Whisper Network relies on technological inno-
vation to anonymize the accuser.72 Not only is the content of the infor-
mation kept secret from network outsiders; the identity of the reporter
is also kept secret from network insiders.
This type of network is becoming more commonplace. The Media
Men List, which was intended only for women in media,73 is just one
example of how Google Docs is being used to facilitate the spread of
anonymous allegations within a closed network.74
Sparked by the #MeToo movement, a wave of startups is creating
apps to assist with anonymous information distribution on campus and
in the workplace.75 This next generation of the Double Secret Whisper
Network allows users to share their accounts of abuse with select audi-
ences but in more technologically sophisticated ways. For instance,
Blind enables employees at more than one hundred companies, includ-
ing Amazon, Microsoft, and Google, to chat anonymously about work-
place issues, including, often, sexual harassment and assault.76
71 See Creswell & Hsu, supra note 23 (noting that through invitation-only Facebook groups,
among other technologies, “women—and some men—are seeking catharsis and validation by shar-
ing their stories”); Press, supra note 69 (mentioning email and Twitter Direct Messages as conduits
for allegations). See also Tyler Kingkade,Why Female Comedians Have a Secret World of Facebook
Groups, HUFFPOST (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/women-in-comedy-face-
book-groups_us_57c5e82be4b078581f0fe6ba [https://perma.cc/5A4N-5Y3B] (discussing female co-
medians’ use of private Facebook groups to exchange information about sexual harassment and
assault, among other topics).
72 The bathroom list is a non-technological analogue. See supra notes 36–37 and accompany-
ing text.
73 See supra note 43.
74 See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. Sorority women at Yale University have
used Google Docs in similar fashion. See, e.g., Abby Jackson, Women at Yale Say They Developed
a Secret Way to Protect Themselves from Dangerous Men Because the School Keeps Failing Them,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/yale-sexual-assault-allega-
tions-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/5N27-ZWYJ] (describing a system that uses “anonymous Google
forms to compile the names of men who women say are dangerous, and then prohibit them from
attending certain social events”).
75 See Dwoskin & McGregor, supra note 19 (discussing “a wave of businesses emerging in the
wake of widespread revelations of sexual misconduct in workplaces,” and observing that “[t]he
startups, many of which have female founders or co-founders, want to disrupt a costly and persis-
tent problem”); Kari Paul, New Apps Help Victims of Sexual Assault and Harassment File Anony-
mous Reports, MARKETWATCH (June 5, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/post-wein-
stein-new-apps-aim-to-out-predators-before-they-become-serial-abusers-2018-01-24 [https://perm
a.cc/VZ2K-AYS4] (“Against the #MeToo movement backdrop, a new crop of apps and secure social
networks are emerging to help victims report and address sexual harassment and assault. They
aim to put the power in women’s hands—and on their phones.”).
76 See Sarah Buhr, Uber Employees Are Chatting with Each Other about Uber’s Leadership on
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A somewhat different iteration of the Double Secret Whisper Net-
work—one designed as an information escrow77—narrows the intended
audience of an anonymous report to victims of the same perpetrator.
Rather than share their accounts with would-be targets (that is, desig-
nated group members), users disseminate their information even more
selectively.78
3. Shadow Court of Public Opinion
Open access channels for reporting abuse are an alternative to the
network model. As with restricted access channels, publicly available
channels can allow allegations to be made anonymously,79 which places
them in the rather cloaked domain of the Shadow Court of Public Opin-
ion. Although anyone can access these forums—indeed, far-flung distri-
bution is intended—the accuser remains unidentified, making the in-
formation more nebulous.80
Anonymous Workplace App Blind, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 25, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/2
5/ubersecret/ [https://perma.cc/RSC7-YU87] (“[Blind] works by only allowing those within the same
company to chat anonymously with each other.”).
77 Emerging platforms like Callisto facilitate the “matching” of accusations in order to connect
victims of the same perpetrator. See Anjana Rajan et al., Callisto: A Cryptographic Approach to
Detect Serial Predators of Sexual Misconduct, PROJECTCALLISTO (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.pro-
jectcallisto.org/callisto-cryptographic-approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/A23U-Q6UP]. See generally
Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV. 145 (2012) (arguing that in-
formation escrows can be deployed as an alternative method for both deterring and punishing
repeat sexual violations).
78 Id.
79 Accusers may wish to remain anonymous to avoid the common repercussions of identifying
themselves with a sexual misconduct allegation. See Itay Hod & Sharon Waxman, After #MeToo:
12 Accusers Share What Happened Next, From Firing to More Trauma, WRAP (Oct. 16, 2018), https
://www.thewrap.com/aftermetoo-12-accusers-what-happened-next-firing-more-trauma-harvey-we
instein/ [https://perma.cc/39EZ-VYPE]; see also infra note 81 and accompanying text.
80 See Kutner, supra note 35 (“These apps and sites are typically viewed as backwaters of the
internet, defined by seedy rumors and anonymous backbiting. However, many survivors of sexual
assault use them to expose their attackers, allowing victims to take control of their experiences.
This shift has led to questions about the degree to which school administrations should be paying
attention to what’s said on these platforms, and what they can—and should—do about it.”).
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Such avenues for sharing accounts of sexual misconduct are seem-
ingly widespread.81 Of late, with #MeToo’s focus on workplace harass-
ment,82 allegations often cluster around particular industries.83 In com-
ment threads84 and Instagram posts,85 both of which allow public access
to anonymous accusations, unnamed women have recently exposed al-
leged predators in children’s literature,86 advertising,87 and fashion.88
Notwithstanding the controversial nature of these platforms89 and
questions of legal liability that surround them,90 for accusers intent on
publicly exposing their abuser without identifying themselves, the
Shadow Court of Public Opinion beckons.
4. New Court of Public Opinion
In the past two years, the #MeToo movement has made significant
inroads in attacking longstanding societal dismissal of sexual miscon-
duct claims.91 One way to understand this dynamic is that it is at once
fueled by, and fueling, public allegations of sexual violation. What cat-
apulted #MeToo was blockbuster reporting on the Harvey Weinstein
story.92 The women in those accounts, many of whom were willing to
speak on the record, came forward after years, even decades, to report
81 See id. (“Due to the stigma associated with sexual assault and the fear of being victim-
blamed by the police or their university’s administration, many survivors feel uncomfortable com-
ing forward with their stories. That’s given rise to reports of rape on anonymous online forums like
Yik Yak, Whisper, College Confessions and campus-specific confessional Facebook groups.”).
82 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
83 For a campus-based Shadow Court of Public Opinion, see Chris Quintana, Anonymous Web-
site Aims to Out Sexual Assaulters at U. of Washington, CHRON. HIGHERED. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://
www.chronicle.com/article/Anonymous-Website-Aims-to-Out/244755 [https://perma.cc/68A7-TKL
7] (describing “Make Them Scared” as a “wiki dedicated to exposing the names of sexual harassers
/attackers created in the University of Washington Seattle area”).
84 See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
85 See Maheshwari, supra note 46 (describing allegations in the advertising industry); Pet-
rarca, supra note 5 (describing allegations in the fashion industry).
86 See Cohen & Hsu, supra note 5.
87 SeeMaheshwari, supra note 46.
88 See Petrarca, supra note 5.
89 See, e.g., Patrick Coffee, ‘Diet Madison Avenue’ Goes Dark on Instagram as Female Agency
Veterans Publish Oppositional Letter, ADWEEK (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.adweek.com/agencies/d
iet-madison-avenue-goes-dark-on-instagram-as-female-agency-veterans-publish-oppositional-lett
er/ [https://perma.cc/VNS6-7NUR]; Petrarca, supra note5; Kutner, supra note 35.
90 See infra notes 128–147 and accompanying text (discussing accusers’ vulnerability to defa-
mation claims).
91 SeeDeborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20–41 (2017) (identifying and documenting the phenomenon of “credibility
discounting” in sexual violence cases).
92 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. For thorough accountings of these extraordinary
reporting feats, see JODI KANTOR & MEGAN TWOHEY, SHE SAID: BREAKING THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT STORY THATHELPED IGNITE AMOVEMENT (2019); RONAN FARROW, CATCH ANDKILL:
LIES, SPIES, AND A CONSPIRACY TO PROTECT PREDATORS (2019).
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their abuse unofficially. Since then, many women with allegations
against high-profile men—women who, for myriad reasons, chose not to
report through formal legal channels93—have done the very same, for-
saking anonymity (unlike those who make public accusations in the
Shadow Court of Public Opinion) in the New Court of Public Opinion.94
Twitter—with its use of a hashtag that gave the #MeToo movement
its name—is also emerging as a repository for sexual misconduct accu-
sations.95 As the movement advances, we can expect that survivors will
93 SeeHod &Waxman, supra note 79. After reporting unofficially, several accusers then opted
to cooperate with official investigations. See, e.g., Ronan Farrow, Behind the Scenes of Harvey
Weinstein’s Arrest, NEW YORKER (May 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/be-
hind-the-scenes-of-harvey-weinsteins-impending-arrest [https://perma.cc/6WDU-VDWB] (explai-
ning that, the day after her allegations of sexual assault by Harvey Weinstein were publicly re-
ported in the New Yorker, one accuser was contacted by New York Police Department detectives
and agreed to cooperate with Weinstein’s prosecution); Associated Press, Special Prosecutor Inter-
viewing Women who Accused Eric Schneiderman of Abuse, N.Y. L. J. (May 23, 2018), https://www.l
aw.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/05/23/special-prosecutor-interviewing-women-who-accused-eric-
schneiderman-of-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/SZT5-4KUS] (describing prosecutor’s ongoing interview-
s with women who first disclosed allegations of abuse by Attorney General Eric Schneiderman in
the New Yorker).
94 See supra note 5. See also Anderson Cooper, Mario Batali and the Spotted Pig, CBS 60
MINS. (May 20, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mario-batali-and-the-spotted-pig-nyc/ [http:
//perma.cc/D6JN-4EYA]; Jim DeRogatis & Marisa Carroll, “He’s A Predator”: Two More Women S-
peak Out About R. Kelly’s Alleged Sexual Abuse, BUZZFEED (May 4, 2018), https://www.buzzfeedne
ws.com/article/jimderogatis/r-kelly-sexual-abuse-allegations-lizzette-martinez-times-up [https://p
erma.cc/298D-SQPU]; JaneMayer & Ronan Farrow, FourWomen Accuse New York’s Attorney Gen-
eral of Physical Abuse, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/
four-women-accuse-new-yorks-attorney-general-of-physical-abuse [https://perma.cc/5258-P2F8].
Given the professional training of, and constraints on, reporters, stories of sexual misconduct that
appear in the mainstream media are typically well corroborated. See, e.g., Irin Carmon & Amy
Brittain, Eight Women Say Charlie Rose Sexually Harassed Them—with Nudity, Groping and Le-
wd Calls, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/eight-wom
en-say-charlie-rose-sexually-harassed-them--with-nudity-groping-and-lewd-calls/2017/11/20/9b16
8de8-caec-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_story.html?utm_term=.201fe12ef99a [https://perma.cc/G2BM
-J5ZB]; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1; Mayer & Farrow, supra note 94. Although the term “cred-
ibly accused” has become a staple of secondary reporting on #MeToo allegations, not all reporting
on sexual misconduct allegations is immune from criticism. For one #MeToo era story that was
widely perceived as falling short of journalistic standards, see Katie Way, I Went on a Date with
Aziz Ansari. It Turned Into the Worst Night of My Life, BABE (Jan. 13, 2018), https://babe.net/2018/
01/13/aziz-ansari-28355 [https://perma.cc/X8SS-M5Z3].
95 See, e.g., Alison Flood, Three Women Go Public with Sherman Alexie Sexual Harassment
Allegations, GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/mar/07/three-wo
men-go-public-with-sherman-alexie-sexual-harassment-allegations [https://perma.cc/X3XJ-FEH
U] (describing accusations that first surfaced on Twitter); Molly Olmstead, A Woman Accused a
Prominent State Senator of Raping Her. She Says She Was Inspired by Christine Blasey Ford’s
Testimony, SLATE, Sept. 28 2018, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/09/joe-fain-washington-
state-senator-rape-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/PF6Z-5LL5]; Kristine Phillips, Pulitzer
Prize-Winning Author Junot Diaz Accused of Sexual Misconduct, Misogynistic Behavior, WASH.
POST (May 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2018/05/0
5/pulitzer-prize-winning-author-junot-diaz-accused-of-sexual-misconduct-misogynistic-behavior/?
utm_term=.45b050865128 [https://perma.cc/NM4X-R65Z].
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more routinely bring their allegations to the New Court of Public Opin-
ion.96
III. INFORMAL REPORTINGDANGERS
The sudden ascendance of an unofficial reporting regime is, in
many ways, a mark of progress. Newfound willingness on the part of
countless women and men to complain about sexual misconduct indi-
cates that the benefits of informally reporting abuse—anonymously or
not—are increasingly perceived as outweighing the costs. Nothing that
follows is meant to deny the functionality of unofficial reporting chan-
nels in a world where official systems for redressing sexual misconduct
are largely ineffectual.97 But there are risks associated with the rise of
informal accusation, particularly if official mechanisms for processing
allegations of abuse do not simultaneously evolve so as to become,
sooner or later, the primary repositories for these allegations.
The dominance of unofficial reporting is best understood as a prob-
lem of transition.98 Rather than remain a dominant feature of our soci-
etal approach to sexual assault and harassment, the proliferation of in-
formal complaints should underscore the need to invigorate our systems
of formalized redress.99 The alternative scenario—perpetual lopsided-
ness in the official/unofficial response ratio100—raises several sets of
concerns.
A. Limited Accountability
Whisper networks sacrifice the pursuit of offender accountability
in the interest of achieving other benefits. For women who report
through restricted access channels, regardless of whether they did so
anonymously, this tradeoff is generally accepted as an inherent feature
96 See Kate Thayer, Sexual Assault Survivors Are Publicly Accusing Attackers on Social Me-
dia. But at What Cost?, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-
life-facebook-sex-assault-allegations-20181212-story.html [https://perma.cc/8WCU-ZYL5] (“A Chi-
cago woman took to Facebook last week to describe, in graphic detail, how a man she knows tried
to rape her, naming him and including his photo in a post that was shared more than [a thousand]
times in a matter of days.”).
97 For a thorough analysis, see Tuerkheimer, supra note 14.
98 See LesleyWexler, Jennifer Robbennolt & ColleenMurphy, #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theori-
es of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 90–107 (2019) (applying theories and practices of transitional
justice to the #MeToo movement).
99 See Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sex-
ual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 880 (2019) (noting that the current “colonization” of the
state’s regulatory space by the #MeToo movement appears to be temporary).
100 To be clear, I am not arguing that informal reporting should entirely disappear as an option
but rather that the frequency of formal reporting should increase in both relative and absolute
terms.
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of the network model.101 Since the recipients of the report are members
of the vulnerable community, rather than those in positions of power
over the abuser, it is highly unlikely that any mechanisms of accounta-
bility will be triggered by a victim’s unofficial complaint.
The growing use of open access channels complicates this account.
When named women come forward in the New Court of Public Opinion,
consequences may result.102 Relatedly, when anonymous women make
accusations in the Shadow Court of Public Opinion, these accusations
can launch formal processes that may also lead to consequences.103 In
the age of #MeToo, men initially accused of misconduct in the Courts of
Public Opinion (which include both the Shadow Court of Public Opin-
ion104 and the New Court of Public Opinion)105 have faced job loss,106
suspension,107 revocation of honors,108 and economic penalties imposed
by businesses and consumers alike.109 They have also been disgraced in
101 Indeed, for some women, the lack of accountability is a chief benefit. See Donegan, supra
note 40 (“[T]he value of the spreadsheet was that it had no enforcement mechanisms: Without
legal or professional power, it offered an impartial, rather than adversarial, tool to those who used
it. It was intended specifically not to inflict consequences, not to be a weapon . . . .”).
102 For a discussion of the process concerns raised, see infra notes 116–127 and accompanying
text.
103 As a general proposition, formal processes move forward only if an accuser is identified and
willing to cooperate with investigators. While the contours of these processes are varied and often
opaque, sanctioning bodies are unlikely to impose a penalty based only on an anonymous accusa-
tion. The scenario change may change, of course, where an anonymous accusation triggers an in-
vestigation that generates corroboration of the account—for instance, a third-party witness, elec-
tronic evidence, or an admission by the accused.
104 See supra notes 71–90 and accompanying text.
105 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
106 See Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual Misconduct and
Their Fall From Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/1
0/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html [https://perma.cc/JVX9-DUKD] (listing men
“fired or forced to resign after accusations of sexual misconduct that ranged from inappropriate
comments to rape”).
107 See id. (listing men who have faced “suspensions and other fallout”).
108 See Susan Adams, Steve Wynn Loses Naming Rights at U Penn after Sexual Misconduct
Allegations, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2018/02/01/the-uni-
versity-of-pennsylvania-is-stripping-steve-wynns-name-from-a-campus-plaza/#2addd4767df5 [htt
ps://perma.cc/EL7G-TZ2K]; Louis Lucero II, Charlie Rose Has Honors from Two Journalism
Schools Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/us/charlie-
rose-awards.html [https://perma.cc/CZ7Z-SPUA]; Jane C. Hu, In the Aftermath of #MeToo, Which
Names in Science Should be Replaced? QUARTZY (Sept. 19, 2018), https://qz.com/quartzy/1394785/
replacing-names-in-science-after-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/JFJ9-AXK9].
109 See, e.g., DeRogatis & Carroll, supra note 94 (describing post-#MeToo responses to longtime
sexual misconduct allegations against R. Kelly). In the wake of the #MuteRKelly campaign and
the release of Surviving R. Kelly, a documentary series first aired in early 2019, Kelly was indicted
on a range of sex offenses by multiple prosecutor’s offices. See Jason Meisner, Madeline Buckley,
& Megan Crepeau, R. Kelly Hit with Federal Indictments in New York, Chicago; Faces New Rack-
eteering, Sex Crime Charges, Allegations He Paid to Recover Sex Tapes and Cover Up Conduct,
CHI. TRIB. (Jul. 12, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-r-kelly-arreste
d-federal-charges-20190712-6ghntysw3zf3lpncn4owcfzyje-story.html [https://perma.cc/VU2J-ZAQ
P] (summarizing the criminal charges pending against Kelly).
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the eyes of family, friends, and the general public, although the sus-
tained effects of sexual abuse-based stigma remain to be seen.110
Momentarily bracketing concerns related to process,111 it is useful
to observe that the consequences stemming from the Court of Public
Opinion may qualify as only partial accountability. One precondition
for full accountability might be a degree of proportionality between the
infraction and the attendant repercussion. Another might entail a level
of transparency that enables those harmed by the misconduct to feel
vested in the abuser’s penance. Perhaps accountability requires a mech-
anism for conveying collective condemnation of the transgression. And
so on.
My aim here is not to elaborate a thick meaning of accountability
but to gesture at the kinds of considerations that might come into play
when we assess what is missing even when unofficial reporting yields
consequences.112 Further to this concern, many commentators have pre-
supposed that individual accountability can be analyzed without regard
to the relevant legal framework. In my view, it cannot. Although not all
sexual misconduct is regulated by law, much of the misconduct being
disclosed in the #MeToo era is prohibited by criminal law, tort law, Title
IX, Title VII, or some combination. When this conduct results in only
extra-legal consequences, there is a troubling gap between the available
formal remedy and the outcome imposed instead. In other words, the
measure of accountability cannot be abstracted from what is dictated
by our system of laws.
In the Courts of Public Opinion, the limits of accountability are
compounded by the problem of inequity. Access to channels that hold
the greatest promise of generating some consequence, however inade-
quate, is markedly unequal. Most victims of sexual assault and harass-
ment do not have connections to mainstream media reporters. Moreo-
ver, for women whose abusers are not the subject of intense public
110 See Amanda Arnold, The Men Who Are Plotting Their Post-#MeToo Comebacks, CUT (Apr.
19, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/04/comeback-men-sexual-harassment-me-too.html [https:
//perma.cc/KBA6-G274] (describing comeback efforts on the part of Charlie Rose, Mario Batali,
Matt Lauer, Lorin Stein, Garrison Keiller, Louis C.K., and Al Franken); Stassa Edwards, Redemp-
tion Is Inevitable for Powerful Men, JEZEBEL (Apr. 20, 2018), https://jezebel.com/redemption-is-
inevitable-for-powerful-men-1825364533 [https://perma.cc/A3T3-ZKHV]; Rebecca Traister, TooM-
uch, Too Soon, CUT (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/08/louis-c-k-and-matt-lauer-wha
t-do-their-comebacks-mean.html [https://perma.cc/L5Y4-UDFC].
111 See infra notes 116–127 and accompanying text.
112 For a discussion of the tenets of accountability in the restorative justice context, seeWexler
et al., supra note 98, at 68–81 (discussing the importance of responsibility taking, harm repair,
redemption and reintegration).
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interest,113 resort to traditional media outlets is typically not an op-
tion.114 In short, those especially vulnerable to workplace sexual mis-
conduct—women of color and women in low-wage jobs—are cut off from
mechanisms of informal reporting that, among the unofficial options,
may offer the greatest hope of prompting offender accountability, how-
ever meager.115
B. Process Void (and Its Strategic Deployment)
Alongside the resurgence of the #MeToo movement, unmistakable
signs of resistance or “backlash” have emerged.116 Among the primary
drivers of this opposition is a concern for innocent men tarnished with-
out the benefit of a fair process. This fear of false allegations has become
113 #MeToo’s attention to allegations of sexual misconduct by prominent men has unleashed
a torrent of disclosures that never generate public attention. About a month after allegations
against Harvey Weinstein were reported in the New York Times, Rebecca Traister wrote:
Since the reports of Weinstein’s malevolence began to gush, I’ve received somewhere
between five and [twenty] emails every day from women wanting to tell me their ex-
periences: of being groped or leered at or rubbed up against in their workplaces. They
tell me about all kinds of men—actors and publishers; judges and philanthropists;
store managers and social-justice advocates; my own colleagues, past and present—
who’ve hurt them or someone they know. It happened yesterday or two years ago or
[twenty]. Few can speak on the record, but they all want to recount how the events
changed their lives, shaped their careers; some wish to confess their guilt for not re-
porting the behavior and thus endangering those who came after them. There are also
women who do want to go on the record, women who’ve summoned armies of brave
colleagues ready to finally out their repellent bosses. To many of them I must say that
their guy isn’t well known enough, that the stories are now so plentiful that offenders
must meet a certain bar of notoriety, or power, or villainy, before they’re considered
newsworthy.
Rebecca Traister, Your Reckoning. AndMine., CUT (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/1
1/rebecca-traister-on-the-post-weinstein-reckoning.html [https://perma.cc/P6SU-B7TF].
114 See id. To be sure, even if were an option, not all women would want their allegations of
misconduct publicly reported. SeeMichelle Toglia,Why Did Some Women Choose Not to Post a “Me
Too” Story? Women Share Why They Didn’t Participate in the Movement, BUSTLE (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.bustle.com/p/why-did-some-women-choose-not-to-post-a-me-too-story-women-share-
why-they-didnt-participate-in-the-movement-2961946 [https://perma.cc/S9EY-JVKE]. See also
Laura Gianino, I Went Public with My Sexual Assault. and Then the Trolls Came for Me., WASH.
POST (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/10/18/i-went
-public-with-my-sexual-assault-and-then-the-trolls-came-for-me/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.195
86c035348 [https://perma.cc/P7QR-SP6V].
115 Even social media, which is more accessible than mainstream media to victims of sexual
misconduct, may be effectively off-limits to many members of marginalized communities. See gen-
erally Jamillah Bowman Williams, Big Data Insights: #MeToo, Law, and Social Change, 2019 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 371 (2019). As California Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez put it, “The MeToo
movement . . . can’t just be for women who have a Twitter account.’’ Charisse Jones, When Will
MeToo Become WeToo? Some Say Voices of Black Women, Working Class Left Out, USA TODAY
(Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/10/05/metoo-movement-lacks-diversit
y-blacks-working-class-sexual-harassment/1443105002/ [https://perma.cc/9VLX-DMHY].
116 See, e.g., Jia Tolentino, The Rising Pressure of the #MeToo Backlash, NEWYORKER (Jan. 24,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-rising-pressure-of-the-metoo-backlas
h [https://perma.cc/S9HW-68SV].
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more widespread in the time of #MeToo;117 increasingly, it is deployed
to discredit the movement as a whole.118
It is not only politicians and commentators on the right who have
expressed a concern for the lack of process that attends informal report-
ing.119Many progressives worry about a world in which established pro-
cedures for investigating and adjudicating allegations of abuse are sup-
planted by pervasive public shaming and vigilantism.120
In evaluating the strength of process related arguments, it is im-
portant to carve out the category of cases where an informal report ini-
tiates a formal investigative process, which then results in a meaning-
ful sanction. Even when official procedures are triggered in this
arguably unorthodox manner—that is, through unofficial complaint—
process norms have been vindicated.121
Those who decry the absence of process in the Courts of Public
Opinion might remain concerned about cases that bypass entirely
mechanisms of formal investigation. As I have discussed, these cases
tend to yield a limited set of consequences for the accused abuser.122
117 According to a survey of 1500 Americans after one year of the #MeToo movement, 18% of
respondents believe that “false accusations of sexual assault are a bigger problem than attacks
that go unreported or unpunished,” as compared to 13% in November 2017.Measuring the #MeToo
Backlash, ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/10/20/measu
ring-the-metoo-backlash [https://perma.cc/KZV5-432S]. The proportion of respondents who think
that “women who complain about sexual harassment cause more problems than they solve” grew
slightly from 29 to 31%. Id. A separate survey of more than a thousand Americans reported that
more than 40% of respondents believe that the #MeToo movement has “gone too far.” Tovia Smith,
On #MeToo, Americans More Divided by Party than Gender, NPR (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.npr.
org/2018/10/31/662178315/on-metoo-americans-more-divided-by-party-than-gender [https://perm
a.cc/TM85-NLV8]. The problem of false allegations is perceived to be widespread by members of
both parties, although the effects of party affiliation are pronounced (more so than the effects of
gender): 77% of Republicans characterize false allegations of sexual assault as common while 37%
of Democrats do so. Id.
118 Around the time of then-Judge Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing, President Trump cap-
tured and advanced this line of thinking as follows: “[I]t’s a very scary time for young men in
America when you can be guilty of something you might not be guilty of. This is a very difficult
time . . . somebody could accuse you of something and you’re automatically guilty.” Dara Lind,
Trump: “It’s a Very Scary Time for Men in America,” VOX (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018
/10/2/17928800/trump-women-doing-great-kavanaugh [https://perma.cc/M3NY-N8AH]. Trump th-
en added, “Women are doing great.” Id. For a contextual analysis, see generallyMary Anne Franks,
Witch Hunts: Free Speech, the First Amendment, and the Fear of Women’s Words, 2019 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 123, 123–46 (2019).
119 See, e.g., Masha Gessen, When Does a Watershed Become a Sex Panic?, NEW YORKER (Nov.
17, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/when-does-a-watershed-become-a-sex
-panic [https://perma.cc/9488-WA97]; Shira Sheindlin & Joel Cohen, After #MeToo, We Can’t Ditch
Due Process, GUARDIAN (May 8, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/08/
metoo-due-process-televictions [https://perma.cc/6QTW-QZ9T].
120 See Caitlin Flanagan, The Conversation #MeToo Needs to Have, ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/the-right-conversation-for-metoo/551732/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/88A4-BRQB]. See, e.g., Gessen, supra note 119.
121 There is considerable variation in the process that is required, if any, before an adverse
action can be taken in the employment and educational contexts.
122 See supra notes 101–115 and accompanying text.
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And many, if not most, of these consequences have followed some
acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the man accused. Yet
when it comes to men who do profess their innocence, the shaming func-
tion potentially served by informal reporting in the Courts of Public
Opinion is itself a source of considerable angst.123
As a normative matter, the extent to which men should be shielded
from public accusations of sexual misconduct (and the stigma that may
result) is subject to debate.124 Unless the status quo changes, recogni-
tion of this entitlement would exist in deep tension with not only free
speech norms but also the reality that formal complaint processes are
often stacked against the accuser.125
At the same time, the procedural void that characterizes unofficial
reporting matters. It matters strategically insofar as it powers opposi-
tion to #MeToo. It also matters substantively, since neutral investiga-
tive procedures are of independent value. 126 Moving forward, efforts
should increase official reporting in relation to unofficial complaint, an-
swering legitimate process concerns.127 So too might this blunt the #Me-
Too backlash that is driven by incipient panic over mobs of angry, lying
women eviscerating innocent men.
C. Weaponization of Defamation Law
When a personmakes an unofficial allegation of sexual misconduct,
she or he becomes the potential target of a defamation claim by the in-
dividual accused.128 With the ascendance of complaint in the Courts of
123 For those whose livelihood depends on consumer popularity, the stigma associated with
sexual misconduct can have market related implications. See, e.g., Gabrielle Bluestone, Louis CK
Cancelled by Everyone, VICENEWS (Nov. 10, 2017), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/pazz9g/loui
s-ck-cancelled-by-everyone [https://perma.cc/N28P-E2F7]. But seeMarina Fang, Louis C. K. Jokes
About Sexual Harassment In New Set, Appears To Have Learned Nothing Again, HUFFPOST (Jan.
17, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/louis-ck-comeback_n_5c4096bbe4b041e98ffb7333 [http
s://perma.cc/D6WC-WQ6T] (describing sold-out shows in the comedian’s “comeback tour”).
124 There is no legal entitlement to such a shield. Indeed, the First Amendment generally pro-
tects the right of an accuser to level truthful accusations in the Courts of Public Opinion. For a
discussion of the law of defamation, which regulates the publication of false statements, see infra
notes 128–148 and accompanying text.
125 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 14.
126 A vast literature describes the virtues of procedural justice. See ALLAN LIND & TOM R.
TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 10, 30–34 (1988).
127 In a separate project, I propose ways of redesigning formal complaint channels to more
effectively incentivize official reporting. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 14.
128 Accusers may also be sued for statements made in the course of campus disciplinary pro-
ceedings. See Tyler Kingkade, As More College Students Say “Me Too,” Accused Men Are Suing for
Defamation, BUZZFEED (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tylerkingkade/as-
more-college-students-say-me-too-accused-men-are-suing [https://perma.cc/D2W3-EAPN]. While
most states grant speakers a privilege (a defense to defamation liability) for statements made to
law enforcement officials, application of the privilege to Title IX proceedings remains a more open
question. See infra note 145.
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Public Opinion, this threat has grown far more significant. To be sure,
if an allegation of abuse is truthful,129 a defamation defendant should
ultimately prevail.130 Even so, the prospect of being sued for libel is—or
should be—a meaningful deterrent to publicly accusing one’s abuser.
Most sexual misconduct victims cannot afford the financial cost of de-
fending a lawsuit, even apart from the psychic toll this effort exacts.
Moreover, the confused state of defamation law means that litigation
costs in this area are relatively uncertain.131
In the face of this uncertainty, the fact that so many women are
using social media to name their alleged abuser is, on first glance, puz-
zling.132 One simple explanation for the ubiquity of informal reporting
is that its benefits133 are perceived as sufficient to outweigh the prospect
of litigation and its attendant costs. It is not clear, however, that the
risk of legal liability is typically included in accusers’ calculus.
This may change with the filing of the first high-profile defamation
suit in the #MeToo era.134 In October 2018, Stephen Elliott, a writer
accused of sexual assault and harassment in multiple entries on the
Media Men List, sued Moira Donegan, creator of the list, and thirty
129 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 91 (analyzing the available research on false sexual assault
reporting to police). I am aware of no studies specifically examining the veracity of extra-legal
accusations (including anonymous accusations) of sexual misconduct.
130 Defamation is a common law tort consisting of a false statement of fact that injures the
subject’s reputation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
131 See infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text.
132 Perhaps in part because the early high-profile #MeToo accusations did not generate law-
suits, the legal risks associated with Courts of Public Opinion reports are just beginning to enter
the public discourse. See, e.g., Andreas Redd et al., Student-Created Website Allowing for Anony-
mous Sexual Assault Allegations Vulnerable to Defamation Charges, DAILYU. WASH. (Oct. 1, 201
8), http://www.dailyuw.com/news/article_dd14bf34-c5f6-11e8-a705-cf14683d53a3.html [https://per
ma.cc/5T2W-YAL7]; Thayer, supra note 96.
133 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 14 (cataloguing multiple functions served by informal report-
ing channels).
134 Stephen Elliott’s not the only high-profile defamation suit filed since October 2017. See, e.g.,
Ben Paviour, Virginia Lt. Gov. Justin Fairfax Files $400 Million Lawsuit Against CBS, NPR (Sept.
12, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/12/760291624/virginia-lt-gov-justin-fairfax-files-400-mil-
lion-lawsuit-against-cbs [https://perma.cc/XN5S-LAM3]; Megan Graham, Anonymous Instagram
Account Diet Madison Avenue Sued for Defamation, ADAGE (May 24, 2018), https://adage.com/ar-
ticle/agency-news/anonymous-instagram-account-diet-madison-avenue-sued-defamation/313645/
[https://perma.cc/32QG-C9TL]; Randall Roberts, Electronic Producer and DJ William “the Gas-
lamp Killer” Bensussen Files Defamation Lawsuit against Accusers, LATIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), http
s://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-entertainment-news-updates-electronic-producer-and-d
j-william-the-1510687064-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/88A6-UDFV]; Claudia Rosenbaum,
Crystal Castles Singer Ethan Kath Sues Alice Glass over Rape and Abuse Claims, BUZZFEED (Nov.
3, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/claudiarosenbaum/crystal-castles-singer-ethan-k
ath-sues-alice-glass-over [https://perma.cc/M5T8-MTD4]; But see Nardine Saad & Amy Kaufman,
Brett Ratner Drops Defamation Lawsuit against Rape Accuser Melanie Kohler, LA TIMES (Oct. 2,
2018), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-entertainment-news-updates-2018-brett-rat-
ner-drops-defamation-lawsuit-1538511141-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/T2QL-BWP3].
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Jane Does for $1.5 million.135 Elliott’s complaint alleges that he was de-
famed by the knowing and malicious publication and circulation of false
allegations.136 The lawsuit immediately garnered national media atten-
tion.137
Whether Elliott ultimately prevails—or even survives a motion to
dismiss138—his complaint spotlights the jeopardy that attends unoffi-
cial reporting. With the ascendance of the Shadow Court of Public Opin-
ion and the New Court of Public Opinion, allegations that once were
confined within restricted access channels (the Traditional Whisper
Network and the Double Secret Whisper Network) can be disseminated
in ways that make accusers especially ripe targets for libel actions. El-
liott’s lawsuit not only impacts Donegan,139 but also the Jane Does who
may now be “unmasked.”140 Importantly, the suit has the potential to
deter accusers around the country who may be contemplating a public
accusation of sexual misconduct.141 In essence, the defamation claim
targets the very engine of #MeToo—unofficial reporting channels.
Compounding the chilling effects of being named as a defamation
defendant142 is an unsettled doctrinal landscape that complicates efforts
to predict a legal outcome or even whether litigation will reach the ex-
pensive and often grueling discovery stage.143 Apart from ambiguities
surrounding the law of defamation,144 a suit like Elliott’s—that is, one
135 Complaint at iv, Elliott v. Donegan, 2018 WL 4940326 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2018) (No. 18 Civ.
5680). See also supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text (discussing Media Men List).
136 Although Elliott asserts that he is a “private citizen who is neither a politician nor a celeb-
rity,” he also alleges that the defendants acted with malice. Id. at 3. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
137 See, e.g., Jonah Engel Bromwich, Writer Who Appeared on ‘Media Men’ List Sues Its Crea-
tors, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/style/stephen-elliott-moira-
donegan-media-men-list.html [https://perma.cc/RM9D-WEGG].
138 See Ruth Spencer, Robbie Kaplan Sees Right through Stephen Elliott’s Lawsuit, CUT (Oct.
19, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/10/robbie-kaplan-moira-donegan-stephen-elliott-lawsuit.
html [https://perma.cc/29Q9-3XSF].
139 See infra note 147 and accompanying text. Even scholars who argue that courts have inter-
preted § 230 too broadly would likely view the creator of a spreadsheet (like Donegan) as immune
from liability for its content. See, e.g., Danielle Citron Keats & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will
Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017).
140 See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
141 As Donegan’s attorney Robbie Kaplan has suggested, “the point of the case is not actually
to succeed against [Donegan], or maybe not even to go forward with the case at all, but to file it to
send a strong message to other women that if [they] do this [they] will be sued.” Spencer, supra
note 138.
142 See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text (observing that the costs of defending
against a defamation claim may itself serve as a powerful deterrent to speech).
143 See Christina Cauterucci, Does Stephen Elliott’s Lawsuit against Moira Donegan Have a
Chance to Succeed?, SLATE (Oct. 12, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/stephen-el-
liott-moira-donegan-lawsuit-analysis.html [https://perma.cc/QF3X-82CG] (discussing a divergenc-
e of practitioners’ views).
144 See, e.g., supra note 136.
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that involves anonymous allegations, or allegations aggregated online
by a third party, or both—raises at least two questions that continue to
vex courts.145 First, when can a defendant claim immunity under Sec-
tion 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which generally protects
an entity from liability for third-party content, provided the entity does
not at least, in part, develop or create the allegedly defamatory con-
tent?146 And, second, when can anonymous speakers who are sued pre-
vent their identities from disclosure, thereby protecting accusers’ inde-
pendent interests in preserving anonymity and foreclosing legal
liability?147
For the anonymous sexual abuse complainant148 whose identity is
revealed in the course of defending a defamation claim—as well as for
the accuser named from the outset—the defense of truth may allow for
ultimate vindication. Even so, the promise of a defamation verdict for
the defendant hardly seems satisfying. In an ironic twist, a survivor
who eschewed formal reporting channels may ultimately find herself in
a courtroom, telling her story under the most formal conditions possible,
having expended enormous resources along the way in exclusive service
of beating back a claim that she lied about her abuse. With defamation
law looming in the background, no survivor could be faulted for deciding
to forsake unofficial reporting altogether and simply keep silent about
her abuse.
IV. CONCLUSION
The costs and benefits of divulging abuse have begun to shift in ap-
preciable ways. Assuming this trajectory continues, we will surely see
greater activity in the matrixes that extend beyond the confines of the
Traditional Whisper Network: the Double Secret Whisper Network, the
Shadow Court of Public Opinion, and the New Court of Public Opinion.
The proliferation of unofficial reporting in the #MeToo era reflects and
portends progress. Yet the continued rise of informal reporting against
145 More than half the states have passed some form of Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation) legislation, which further complicates this terrain.
146 For a summary of competing judicial approaches to the interpretation of Section 230, see
Yaffa A. Meeran, As Justice So Requires: Making the Case for a Limited Reading of § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 257, 267–74 (2018).
147 For an overview of judicial unmasking standards, see Matthew Mazzotta, Balancing Act:
Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV.
833, 847–60 (2010); Ethan B. Siler, Yelping the Way to a National Statutory Standard for Unmask-
ing Internet Anonymity, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 189, 194–202 (2016). For a litigator’s guide to
unmasking, see Paul Alan Levy, Litigating Civil Subpoenas to Identify Anonymous Internet Speak-
ers, 37 LITIG. 27 (2011).
148 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (describing the rise of the Shadow Court of
Public Opinion and explaining why accusers may wish to remain anonymous).
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the backdrop of a mostly dormant law of sexual misconduct is of con-
cern. A meaningful societal response to sexual misconduct must entail
a commitment to activating formal mechanisms of accountability.
299
Sexual Harms without Misogyny
Deborah M. Weiss†
Claims of sexual injury are always viewed through the twin lenses
of sexual morality and sexual politics. Central to each is a narrative of
what constitutes a sexual harm.
Traditional society assigned to women the unenviable role of polic-
ing sexuality. To this end, its legal system assessed sexual harm from
the perspective of the double standard, which admired men and stigma-
tized women for engaging readily in sex. Sexual harm was thus a wrong
against a woman’s chastity and rape was the only recognized sexual
injury. A rape conviction required showing not that a man’s motives
were blameworthy but that a woman’s virtue was beyond reproach, her
lack of consent demonstrated by her sexual history and by a display of
the “utmost” resistance.1
First-wave feminists of the Victorian and Progressive eras rejected
the double standard and its inevitable division of women into two clas-
ses, “the protected and refined ladies . . . and those poor outcast daugh-
ters of the people whom [men] purchase with money.”2 While accepting
the notion of sexual harm as an injury to chastity, they advocated a sex-
neutral standard of sexual restraint grounded in Christian doctrine.
The next wave of sex law reform began during the 1950s and was
grounded in a sex-neutral standard of sexual autonomy that freed
women from the constraints of the double standard but failed to provide
a compelling secular narrative of sexual harm to replace religious doc-
trines justifying sexual restraint.3
† Director, Workforce Science Project, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic
Growth, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Megan Smith Richardson provided truly outstand-
ing research and input for this paper.
1 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF LAW 17–47 (1988). See also Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the
Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 Yale L. J. 1372, 1391–92 (2013).
2 Josephine Butler, Social Purity, in THE SEXUALITYDEBATES 170 (Sheila Jeffreys ed., 1987).
3 Martin S. Weinberg, Rochelle Ganz Swensson & Sue Kiefer Hammersmith, Sexual Auton-
omy and the Status of Women: Models of Female Sexuality in U.S. Sex Manuals from 1950 to 1980,
30 SOC. PROBLEMS. 312, 312–13 (1983).
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First-wave feminism and sexual autonomy theory achieved some
important sex law reforms, notably the raising of the age of consent
from its appalling historical norm of ten or twelve. Still, the law of rape,
with its focus on the victim’s behavior, proved hard to change. Courts
began in theory to recognize civil actions for sexual harassment, but so
grudgingly that recovery was virtually impossible.
In response to these failures, feminists in the seventies argued that
sex-neutral theories of sexual autonomy failed to identify the critical
role of sexuality in the subjugation of women. Male sexual advances,
they argued, were often or even always motivated not by sexual passion
but by a desire to humiliate and subordinate women. This dominance
framework supplied a secular theory of sexual harm, an element criti-
cally missing from early discussions of sexual autonomy. The source of
sexual harm, from this perspective,was located in the intent of the male
actor, shifting inquiry from female to male motives.
The prevailing public narrative of sexual harm became an odd syn-
thesis of themes from dominance theory and sexual autonomy theory.
That narrative accepted one key principle from the most radical domi-
nance model, the strong misogyny narrative: all sexual harm resulted
from men’s generalized desire to degrade and exert power over all
women. However, public opinion rejected the idea that such motives
pervaded heterosexual interaction. Thus, men were divided into two
groups: good actors conformed to the norms of the sexual autonomy
model, while bad actors fit the model of strong misogyny theory and
were driven by an all-encompassing animus towards women as a group.
By providing a model of sexual harm, this hybrid misogyny model
succeeded where autonomy theories had failed and produced a seismic
shift in both public and judicial attitudes. Under its influence, the law
of rape finally began to undergo a period of significant reform, with
changes such as rape shield laws that shifted legal inquiry away from
the character of the victim. Perhaps most dramatically, courts began to
increase substantially the scope of liability for sexual harassment, au-
thorizing recovery for non-economic harm through hostile environment
theory.
However compelling, I argue, the hybrid misogyny narrative is in-
complete. By locating the problem of sexual harm solely in the actions
of deviant misogynists, it impeded recognition of the damage that can
be done by flawed but not evil men, especially in situations of power
created by the workplace. When applied to workplace settings,4 the hy-
brid misogyny narrative paved the way to judicial expansion of sexual
harassment liability, but also to some deeply misguided doctrines.
4 In this Article, I focus on the limits of the misogyny paradigm in sexual harassment law.
Katharine Baker has similarly argued that even rape law has been distorted by overstating the
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In this article I will discuss three of these distortions. First, the
focus on misogynistic motive led courts to overlook the importance of
objective power differentials and thus failed to distinguish adequately
between supervisor and coworker cases. Early sexual harassment cases
imposed liability only in cases of quid pro quo, where benefits or detri-
ments of the job were explicitly conditioned on submission to sexual de-
mands. In extending this doctrine, the Supreme Court might well have
preserved a distinction between the acts of supervisors and those of
coworkers, but it did not, instead providing a single doctrine, hostile
environment theory, that was applicable to both supervisors and
coworkers.5 Judicial deprecation of the importance of implied coercion
worsened when the Court handed down rules governing agency liability
that made recovery for supervisory conduct only slightly easier than for
coworker conduct.
Second, the notion that all harm results from misogynistic animus
has prevented recovery in cases in which the defendant’s actions, how-
ever harmful, were motivated not by animus but by a genuine romantic
interest in the plaintiff that was ultimately rejected, sometimes after a
consensual affair. At that point, the defendant began to engage in work-
place behavior that was harmful to the plaintiff, but that was not,
viewed in isolation from the sexual rejection, hostile or misogynistic.
Courts typically reject liability in these cases, reasoning that thwarted
affection rather than generalized animus towards womenmotivated the
defendant. Yet Title VII does not itself contain any requirement that
the plaintiff prove animus but rests liability on a showing that a de-
fendant acted “because of” sex.6 The strong misogyny narrative in effect
adds to the plaintiff’s burden by requiring her to prove an element that
is not to be found in Title VII or Supreme Court opinions.
Finally, the picture of a unitary sexualized misogyny, directed
against all women, has obstructed efforts to develop defensible doc-
trines governing admission of “me-too” evidence from women other than
the plaintiff, which exponentially improve the chances of success by a
harassment plaintiff. The law disfavors but does not wholly disallow
evidence of prior bad acts, and such evidence has been increasingly al-
lowed in the past ten years under a variety of theories. In response,
defendants have recently begun to produce rebuttal witnesses who tes-
tify to the defendant’s respectful treatment of women. A strong misog-
yny theory that treats sexual harassment merely as a specific manifes-
tation of more generalized misogyny cannot justify the exclusion of
malignancy of rapists’ motives. Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and
Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 Harvard Law Review 563 (1997).
5 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
6 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
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defendant me-too evidence, since it has tremendous difficulty explain-
ing why aman would single out some women while leaving others alone.
As a purely legal matter, these issues might be handled by carefully
targeted doctrinal arguments. Even judges, however, are influenced by
narratives. Moreover, public reaction to the #MeToo movement sug-
gests that the misogyny model may be engendering a worrisome back-
lash. Some of this may be dismissed as the inevitable opposition that
reform movements always encounter, but some concerns seem legiti-
mate. The double standard and traditional legal doctrine focused al-
most entirely on the blameworthiness of the victim’s conduct. Misogyny
theory turns the tables too completely, assimilating all sexual harm to
the paradigm of rape, a crime of the most profound blameworthiness.
Though it effectively blocks attacks on victims, it encourages a moraliz-
ing stance towards the conduct of even those defendants whose behav-
ior, though an appropriate basis for legal liability, falls far short of rape.
And moral opprobrium in excess of what is warranted erodes public
support and invites resistance.
The history of the law of sexual harm suggests that narratives mat-
ter, and new narratives are needed. In highly charged areas of law,
judges will have difficulty applying doctrines without support from a
moral framework that makes sense to them and fits the facts of the case
before them. If #MeToo is to usher in a new phase of sex law reform, it
must construct new and more nuanced narratives of sexual harm that
go beyond misogyny and sexual autonomy.
One central priority is the development of a narrative about what
situations are sufficiently coercive to require state supervision through
legal intervention. Past waves of legal reform have had great success in
passing laws that single out statuses and contexts that are unaccepta-
bly coercive. Liberal theorists have labored mightily to provide a more
cohesive account of coercion without complete success.7 If the ball can-
not be moved on theory, perhaps at least more compelling stories can
be constructed.
A second priority is to resurrect what the Victorians knew: most
misogynists construct two kinds of girls, the pure and the sullied. Mi-
sogyny is not simply about hating women, it is about dividing them.
7 See, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent and Coercion, 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 951, 951–92
(2018) (proposing a “normative impairment” definition of coercion that focuses on both the “blame-
worthiness of the coercer” and the “involuntariness of the consenter’s choice”); Rubenfeld, supra
note 1, at 1412 (pointing out the incomplete definition of coercion and suggesting supplementing
it with consideration of whether sexual activity involved “deception”); Michal Buchhandler-Raph-
ael, Criminalizing Coerced Submission in the Workplace and in the Academy, 19 Colum. J. Gender
& L. 409, 437–38, 442 (2010) (advocating for a model of sexual coercion that considers a variety of
factors, i.e., economic inequality).
299] SEXUALHARMS WITHOUTMISOGYNY 303
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the hybrid misogyny nar-
rative does not advance the extraordinarily challenging cause of provid-
ing a secular morality that acknowledges the emotional dangerousness
of sex not only when it is casual but even more so when it is not. Sex
has consequences, both for men and for women, and a society that fails
to provide a moral framework for sexual behavior does so at its peril.
I. NARRATIVESMATTER
Title VII prohibits employers from adversely affecting the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of sex.8 A sexual har-
assment complainant must allege and prove behavior that caused harm
to the terms or conditions of employment; was attributable to the em-
ployer; and had a causal nexus to her sex. In practice, the theory of
harm has proven to be the most important of these elements and exerts
a kind of halo effect on the theoretically distinct elements of causation,
agency, and proof. Courts that find harm seem willing to stretch to find
other elements satisfied. Courts that find no harm seem to set impossi-
bly high standards for other elements.
Sexual harm is unavoidably viewed against the background of
views about sexuality and relationships between men and women. Over
the last two centuries a series of legal efforts have attempted to control
sexual harms,9 each responding to the dominant moral framework of its
time with a narrative on the nature and causes of these harms.
The overwhelming majority of human societies have imposed a
double standard on the sexual behavior of males and females, with
males invariably the beneficiary of the more permissive norm.10 None-
theless, the degree of inequity as well as numerous other details of the
double standard has varied widely among societies. For present pur-
poses, the relevant double standard is that of the Anglo-American world
prior to the mid-twentieth century, to which I refer as traditional, alt-
hough it is not in all respects a universal tradition.
Traditional Anglo-American sexual mores reflect a tension between
two perspectives, the Christian and that of popular mores. Both were
united in assigning importance to the regulation of sexual behavior but
they differed in their demands on men’s self-control and in turn in the
8 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e–2(a) (1964).
9 I speak in this article primarily of sexual harms to women. This focus is not to minimize
the importance of protections against sexual harms to others, including men and gender noncon-
formists. However, the relation of these to harms to women is complex and beyond the scope of
this article.
10 Gwen J. Broude, Extramarital Sex Norms in Cross-Cultural Perspective, 3 BEHAVIOR
SCIENCE RESEARCH 181, 182 (1980).
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burdens they placed on women. Christianity rejected the double stand-
ard, preaching chastity, in the sense of abstinence from non-marital sex,
for both men and women. Social norms likewise restricted female sexu-
ality to marriage but leant strongly towards the double standard. Men
were expected, permitted, and encouraged to pursue with vigor every
opportunity for sexual activity, while women were correspondingly ex-
pected to resist these efforts.11 In the public’s mind, this double stand-
ard was simply an entitlement of masculinity,12 while intellectual and
religious perspectives generally saw sexual restraint as a requisite of
family stability.13
The balance between Christianity and the double standard vacil-
lated over the years, but before the Victorian era the double standard
dominated both public opinion and the law. Males were assigned virtu-
ally no responsibility for controlling their own sexuality, and social
norms accepted the existence of a class of vilified prostitutes14 to satisfy
male lust in order to protect the virtue of good women. The burden was
placed on individual women to demonstrate that they belonged to the
protected class of ladies rather than among the fallen.
Sex law reflected the tensions between these frameworks. Under
the influence of Christianity, traditional Anglo-American law nomi-
nally placed stringent limits on sexual activity by both sexes, prohibit-
ing fornication, adultery, bigamy, and contraception. However, these
laws operated more harshly against women than men both by their
terms and by custom.15 Other laws forthrightly buttressed the double
standard and protected the right of males, especially wealthy ones, to
wide sexual access to females. Laws against prostitution fell far more
harshly on sex workers than on their clients.16 For hundreds of years,
the Anglo-American age of consent was ten or twelve.17
11 See generally Keith Thomas, The Double Standard, 20 J. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS 195 (Apr.
1959) (examining the evolution of the double standard).
12 Id.
13 At a minimum, female chastity was needed to ensure certainty of paternity, a condition of
inducing men to care for their children. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF ON HUMAN NATURE 331–32
(T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., Longmans, Green & Co. 1874) (1738). Hume, who is sometimes
regarded as a protofeminist, seems to have regarded the double standard as necessary but unfair.
14 The choice between the terms “prostitute” and “sex worker” is a difficult one. The former
carries strong and undesirable connotations of disgrace and moral blame, and to avoid these some
Victorian reformers substituted the term Magdalenism. However, the generally preferable “sex
worker” is anachronistic in contexts that describe the attitudes of earlier periods. My choice of
terminology reflects this tradeoff.
15 Adultery, for example, was typically grounds for divorce for the wronged husband but not
the wronged wife, and in some circles the failure of a married man to keep a mistress was regarded
as unmanly. Thomas, supra note 11, at 195, 199.
16 Id. at 198.
17 MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING ADOLESCENT
FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THEUNITED STATES, 1885–1920 (University of North Carolina Press, 2d ed.
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The law of rape reflected the wholly male concerns that women
were inclined to make false charges of rape that were hard to rebut.18
The core definition of rape was sexual intercourse that was both forcible
and without consent.19 Victims were, as is well known, required to resist
strenuously, often to the utmost, a condition not always met even in
instances of submission to credible threats of deadly force.20 Many ju-
risdictions imposed further requirements unique to rape cases: imme-
diate complaints; eyewitnesses or physical evidence; and cautionary in-
structions to the jury.21 The victim’s prior behavior, both sexual and
otherwise, was open to virtually every possible type of prejudicial ques-
tioning at trial.22
The balance began to shift with the Victorians, who stressed the
critical role that women played in the social order. The image of the
angel in the house23 whose domestic virtues civilized men24 has been
much mocked by later feminists as a cult of domesticity that fetishized
female submissiveness. Compared with what came decades later, these
early forms of separate spheres ideology had elements that were
cramped and confining. Compared, however, with what came before, its
vision of women’s moral superiority was a radical step toward improv-
ing the status of women. Nineteenth century reformers such as Frances
Willard, Josephine Butler and Jane Addams broadened the notion of
woman’s sphere to include public reform efforts, to which Addams re-
ferred as “public housekeeping.”25 These reformers argued passionately
for a single standard of sexual behavior:
[N]umbers even of moral and religious people have permitted
themselves to accept and condone in man what is fiercely con-
demned in woman. And do you see the logical necessity in this?
It is that a large section of female society has to be told off—set
aside, so to speak, to minister to the irregularities of the excus-
able man. That section is doomed to death, hurled to despair;
while another section of womanhood is kept strictly and almost
forcibly guarded in domestic purity. . . . [P]ublic opinion [must],
1995).
18 SCHULHOFER, supra note 1, 1917 (1988).
19 Id. at 18.
20 Id. at 18–20.
21 Id. at at 18–19.
22 Vivian Berger,Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 13–18 (Jan. 1977).
23 COVENTRY PATMORE, THE ANGEL IN THEHOUSE (1854).
24 John Ruskin, Of Queens’ Gardens, in SESAME AND LILIES (H. Bloom ed. 1983) (1910).
25 JANE ADDAMS, WOMEN AND PUBLICHOUSEKEEPING (1910). In this view, virtually all of do-
mestic policy, in the sense of non-foreign policy, was in fact domestic, in the sense of women’s work.
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both in theory and practice, . . . shall recognize the fundamental
truth that the essence of right and wrong is in no way dependent
upon sex, and shall demand of men precisely the same chastity
as it demands of women. 26
These thinkers were the first to see the link between sexual and eco-
nomic oppression. Women’s rights activists condemned wealthy men
who regarded access to working women as a class privilege. The contin-
uum between the exploitation intrinsic to prostitution and the sexual
exploitation of women outside sex work was widely noted and under-
stood as the result of an economic system that denied women access to
economic opportunities.27
Amovement to reform sex law was an important part of the agenda
of the first-wave women’s movement. The durability of the traditional
doctrine of consent made the generally applicable law of rape impervi-
ous to these Victorian efforts: if consent could be contested at trial, pros-
ecution was seldom possible. Reformers therefore targeted a narrower
set of cases, combining their larger narrative attacking sexual exploita-
tion with carefully crafted legal arguments applicable to particular con-
texts in which consent could be said to be wanting as a matter of law.
A central achievement was the expansion of the law of statutory
rape.28 Between 1885 and 1920, all US states raised the age of consent
from between seven and twelve to between sixteen and eighteen.29
Though situating this campaign in the context of larger moral issues,
reformers repeatedly stressed a central inconsistency in the legal sys-
tem’s treatment of youth and incapacity. Boys and young men were pro-
tected until age twenty-one from an imprudent decision to enter even a
trivial contract, while a girl over the age of ten who had even coerced
26 Butler, supra note 2, at 172-74. Jane Larson observed that these reformers “saw sexuality
as a vehicle of power that in complex ways kept women subordinated in society. In response, they
created a vigorous sexual politics that challenged not just private, but also public power. Ulti-
mately, they questioned the state’s conferral of privilege in law of male sexual interests to the
detriment of women and girls; they thus exposed the state’s complicity in what otherwise appeared
to be wholly private acts of sexual oppression.” Jane E. Larson, “Even a Worm Will Turn at Last”:
Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE L.J. & HUMAN. 1, 4 (1997).
27 Id. at 27; Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUALHARASSMENT LAW 12–13 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2004); Emma Goldman, The Traffic in Women, in ANARCHISM ANDOTHER ESSAYS 177 (1910).
28 Suffrage is often seen as the first step in the emancipation of women when it was in fact as
much the culmination of a broad variety of reform efforts undertaken by a women’s movement
comprised of coalition of diverse views. Jane E. Larson, “Even a Worm Will Turn at Last”: Rape
Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & THEHUMAN. 1, 3 (1997) (“[F]eminism,
evangelism, maternalism, domesticity, and moral reform . . . energized the mainstream of the
woman movement.”). See also SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE SPINSTER ANDHER ENEMIES: FEMINISM AND
SEXUALITY 1880–1930 chs. 3–4 (London: Pandora, 1985).
29 ODEM, supra note 17, at 37.
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sex was forced to bear life-altering consequences, such as pregnancy
and unmarriagability, without legal protection.30
A second and more complex set of legal protections consisted of civil
and criminal actions for seduction. The early civil actions were compro-
mised by patriarchal attitudes, since only the victim’s male guardian
had standing to sue, but over time both the defensibility and the efficacy
of these laws increased as women obtained the right to represent them-
selves.31 Seduction theories were somewhat varied in their require-
ments, but many were dependent on the existence of misrepresentation.
Thus, like statutory rape law, they could be defended as consistent with
the rules governing non-sexual offenses. Relatively few doctrines spe-
cifically addressed the coercive nature of the workplace, but most in
practice developed into a tool that protected young working women, and
one interesting Missouri statute criminalized sexual relations between
employers and young women employed in domestic service.32 Women’s
rights groups pressed for the passage of criminal seduction laws,33
which were widespread by the late nineteenth century, though later re-
pealed for supposedly exposing men to female exploitation.34
The last cohort of first-wave feminists in the early twentieth cen-
tury placed more emphasis than their predecessors on sexual freedom,
advocating a range of views from the mildly permissive35 to the radical
support of free love.36 After the passage in 1920 of the Nineteenth
Amendment, feminism entered a quiescent period, but public sexual
norms gradually relaxed, in part because of improvements in the qual-
ity and availability of reliable contraception.37 A wide variety of think-
ers including academics like Alfred Kinsey38 and Wilhelm Reich,39 the
30 Larson, supra note 26, at 1, 8–10.
31 Brian Donovan, Gender Inequality and Criminal Seduction: Prosecuting Sexual Coercion in
the Early-20th Century, 30 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 61, 66 (2005). See generally H. W. Humble,
Seduction as a Crime, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 144 (1921); Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand so Little,
They Call My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374
(1993); Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1996); Sara McLean,
Confided to His Care or Protection: The Late Nineteenth-Century Crime of Workplace Sexual Har-
assment, 9 COLUM. J. GENDER& L. 47 (1999).
32 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1260 (1879).
33 Siegel, supra note 27, at 11–12.
34 D. R. N. Blackburn, Criminal Seduction, 31 CENT. L.J. 44, 44–50 (1890).
35 See, e.g., MARGARET SANGER, WOMEN AND THENEW RACE 226, 229 (1920).
36 Emma Goldman, The Traffic in Women, in ANARCHISM AND OTHER ESSAYS (1910).
37 Latex was invented in 1916, greatly improving both the reliability and the experience of
using barrier methods such a condoms and diaphragms. See Hallie Lieberman, A Short History of
the Condom, JSTORDAILY (June 8, 2017), https://daily.jstor.org/short-history-of-the-condom/ [http
s://perma.cc/Q3CR-JJXP].
38 ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948); ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THEHUMAN FEMALE (1953).
39 WILHELM REICH, THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION (1936).
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writers of marriage manuals,40 and public figures like Hugh Hefner41
and Helen Gurley Brown42 advocated increasingly permissive norms of
sexual behavior. Like their Victorian-progressive predecessors, they en-
dorsed a sex-neutral standard. However, rather than extend the obliga-
tion of chastity to men, they hoped to provide women with the sexual
freedoms traditionally reserved to males. Their perspective, now re-
ferred to as the sexual autonomy model, made fundamental the right of
all individuals to decide for themselves with whom and under what cir-
cumstances to have sex.
In the late 1950s, a new wave of sex law reformers began their
work, this time based on the norm of sexual autonomy. The expansion
of autonomy-based rights began with reforms in the law of rape43 and
led to groundbreaking protections of women’s right to sexual pleasure,
notably in cases Constitutionally protecting access to contraception and
abortion.44 But the liberal alternative to religious sexual morality gave
primacy to freedom of choice and provided no alternative narrative of
sexual harm or voluntary restraint. In consequence, though women
gained much needed freedom to engage in desired sex, far less progress
was made in protecting them from undesired sex. Without such a nar-
rative, the scales were inevitably tipped against doctrines that could be
seen as restricting the freedom to have sex. Some progress was made in
the expansion of statutory status-based offenses that involved the
abuse of positions of power.45 But the law of rape, with its focus on the
victim’s behavior, proved hard to reform, and the sexual double stand-
ard continued to infect the application of even revised doctrine.
The first sexual harassment cases were brought in the early 1970s
and met a mixed reaction from courts. Virtually all involved the quid
pro quo conduct of a supervisor who conditioned the terms of employ-
ment on the toleration of sexual advances, often quite degrading in na-
ture. Cases rejecting liability typically expressed the same concern for
40 See, e.g., THEODOOR HENDRIK VAN DE VELDE & MARGARET SMYTH, IDEAL MARRIAGE, ITS
PHYSIOLOGY AND TECHNIQUE (1928).
41 See The Playboy Philosophy, Part I, Installments 1–7 (1962), https:// books.google.com/book
s?id=akprmQEACAAJ&dq=playboy+philosophy&hl=e n&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjsnsGhlsjhAhVD
XK0KHeoRARIQ6AEIKzAA [https://perma.cc/EZ5X-FYE4].
42 See HELENGURLEY BROWN, SEX AND THE SINGLEGIRL (1962).
43 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW
& PHIL. 35, 92–93 (1992).
44 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1342.
45 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 18.130.180(24) (1984) (prohibiting any licensed health profes-
sionals from engaging in “sexual contact with a client or patient”); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6106.9
(1993) (prohibiting sexual relationships between lawyers and clients under various circum-
stances); see also Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Mich. App. 1981) (sexual relationship
between psychiatrist and patient constitutes malpractice); McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363,
376 (1991) (describing a lawyer’s threat to withhold legal services if client did not comply with
sexual demand constitutes malpractice).
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preserving male sexual opportunities that animated the worst aspects
of rape law, and suggested that liability for even quite egregious behav-
ior would foreclose all sexual activity in the workplace.46 These courts
seem to have concluded that the defendant caused no harm to the plain-
tiff beyond the inconvenience that sometimes attended normal hetero-
sexual interaction. This skepticism about the gravity of injury spilled
over into unrelated elements of the cause of action: these cases found
that plaintiffs had failed to prove not only the elements of harm but
causation and agency liability.
Those early courts that accepted sexual harassment as a ground of
recovery appear to have done so from a different perspective on the cal-
culus of harm. They did not assess the sexual harm to women as more
serious but rather saw the problem of economic discrimination as of
greater importance. Their conception of injury evidently colored their
analysis of the superficially unrelated requirements of causation and
agency, which they were more likely to find satisfied.47 But even these
courts imposed a requirement of tangible economic harm or at least the
explicit threat of such harm. Abusive sexual behavior by supervisors
without explicit threat or actual retaliation was without remedy. Sexual
autonomy theory could, on a purely theoretical level and with some
struggle, justify legal recognition of highly limited claims of sexual har-
assment, but it could not help judges see cases through the eyes of vic-
tims. Its sex-neutral picture of equal sexual agency focused primary on
increasing freedom, leaving too many wondering why the work environ-
ment transformed sexual behavior that was acceptable in most spheres
into a legal harm.
46 Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d, 568 F.2d
1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (“If the plaintiff’s view were to prevail, no superior could, prudently, attempt
to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of either sex. An invitation to dinner could become
an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time.
And if an inebriated approach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office Christmas party could
form the basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a promotion or a raise is later denied
to the subordinate, we would need 4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400.”); Miller v. Bank
of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“It is conceivable, under plaintiff’s theory, that
flirtations of the smallest order would give rise to liability. The attraction of males to females and
females to males is a natural sex phenomenon and it is probable that this attraction plays at least
a subtle part in most personnel decisions. Such being the case, it would seem wise for the Courts
to refrain from delving into these matters short of specific factual allegations describing an em-
ployer policy which in its application imposes or permits a consistent, as distinguished from iso-
lated, sex-based discrimination on a definable employee group”); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (“[A]n outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable
under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or
sexually oriented advances toward another.”).
47 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (explaining that the Restatement
imposes a narrow test for vicarious liability—“The tort must be one accomplished by an instru-
mentality, or through conduct associated with the agency status”); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654, 656–61 (D.D.C. 1976).
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The watershed change in the law of sexual harm began in 1975. In
Against Our Will, Susan Brownmiller argued that men did not rape be-
cause they wanted sex, but rather used rape as a means to humiliate
and subordinate women.48 Indeed, much or even all of what passed for
consensual sex was in fact subtly disguised rape, a tool of oppression
rather than an expression of desire. The new paradigm in rape law laid
the ground work for Catherine MacKinnon to refocus the sexual har-
assment debate from formal equality to the power structures underly-
ing sex at work. Her 1979 landmark book, Sexual Harassment of Work-
ing Women, had been influential in draft form even before its
publication. Her theory had two distinct components. The first con-
cerned the victim’s experience: the existence of the workplace power re-
lationship could make otherwise non-problematic sexual behavior coer-
cive.49 At the same time she began to advance the thesis that
Brownmiller had developed in her work on criminal rape: Men did not
seek sex and incidentally dominate women. They sought sex in order to
dominate women.50 The inherently coercive nature of the workplace was
simply a useful tool to effectuate the underlying goal of dominance. In
her early work, MacKinnon focused more or less equally on the har-
asser’s impulse to subordinate and the role of the coercive environment
in the experience of the powerless. In her later work, her focus shifted
to the desire to dominate, and the institutional setting became unim-
portant:
The uncoerced context for sexual expression becomes as elusive
as the physical acts [of sexuality and violence] come to feel in-
distinguishable. . . . [R]ape is defined as distinct from inter-
course, while for women it is difficult to distinguish the two un-
der conditions of male dominance.51
From this perspective, the coercive nature of the workplace was al-
most irrelevant, since harm resulted from the fact that men’s motives
were so pernicious and their power so omnipresent.
Some feminist writers on sexual harassment accepted only ele-
ments of the dominance model, notably the view that sexual harm is
motivated by misogyny. However, the greatest influence on the public
narrative came from MacKinnon and her sometime co-author Andrea
48 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINSTOURWILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 377–78 (1975).
49 “Sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual re-
quirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power. Central to the concept is the use of
power derived from one sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another.” CATHERINE
MACKINNON, SEXUALHARASSMENTOFWORKINGWOMEN: ACASE OFSEXDISCRIMINATION 1 (1979).
50 BROWNMILLER, supra note 46.
51 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 174, 175 (1989).
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Dworkin. MacKinnon and Dworkin did not stop simply at the observa-
tion that sexual harm can be the result of a defendant’s urge to oppress,
but argued instead that it must be the source of all sexual harm. More-
over, the desire to subordinate was inevitably a generalized desire to
degrade and humiliate all women and such motives were pervasive in
heterosexual relationships.52 I will call the view that both of these hy-
potheses are true the strong misogyny narrative of sexual harm.
Dominance theories captured a fundamental truth: sexual harm
can result from sexual advances motivated not by erotic desire but by
dominance and misogyny. The dominance model received widespread
and generally respectful public attention. The idea that dominance ra-
ther than desire motivated sexual advances in the workplace was
quickly accepted by observers across the political spectrum.53 It thus
supplied the secular theory of harm that sexual autonomy models had
failed to provide. This new narrative provided public discussion with a
powerful way of rethinking sexual misconduct that was acceptable even
to those who did wholly abandon the double standard. The double
standard absolved men from any responsibility to control their sexual
impulses—that task was left to women, who were assigned the unap-
pealing role of sex police. But every society expects men as well as
women to control their violent impulses, and if rape was a crime of vio-
lence its perpetrator had breached the most central of societal norms.
Similarly, society expects its members to keep their nonviolent but ag-
gressive impulses in check, so that sexual behavior short of rape is more
easily seen as misconduct if motivated by hostility rather than erotic
passion.
The focus on motive also placed the issue of consent in a new light.
Men might argue that women desired (and consented to) sex more often
than they would admit, but few were willing to claim publicly that
women desired victimization. If sexual harms were the result of misog-
yny, the questions of consent and unwelcomeness receded in im-
portance, since the wrong inhered in the accused’s intent rather than
the victim’s failure to resist. By persuading the public that at least some
rape cases were motivated by hatred rather than lust, the dominance
thesis paved the way for crucial rape law reforms like victim shield stat-
utes. Similarly, a focus on animus in workplace harassment blunted the
impulse to ask whether the victim had encouraged the behavior at is-
sue.
52 MACKINNON, supra note 49, at 1; ANDREADWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987).
53 Louise Thistle, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Struggle for Dominance, SANDIEGO
UNION, Apr. 20, 1980, at 58; Karen Kirk, Fighting Abuse at Work, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 10,
1980, at 46.
312 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
The dominance theory in general and MacKinnon’s work in partic-
ular received widespread and generally supportive coverage in the pop-
ular press. At the same time, even sympathetic observers seldom ac-
cepted MacKinnon’s general view of relations between men and
women.54 In the words of one, “what McKinnon represents is the em-
battled, bleak, martyred side of feminism . . . [H]er view is so narrow
and her attitude so wound-licking that we tend to get awfully weary of
her version of “unmodified feminism” early on.”55 Her dark picture of
sex between men and women was often criticized as a step backwards
for women’s efforts to achieve sexual pleasure on the same terms as
men.56 Public opinion thus accepted a circumscribed version of domi-
nance theory, which was understood to describe the conduct and mo-
tives of a subset of men, and this picture was helicopter dropped into
the otherwise prevailing model of sexual autonomy. The next section
examines how this ambivalent acceptance of the misogynymodel played
out in the case law.
II. SUPERVISORS, COERCION ANDHOSTILITY: THEWRONG TURN
The idea that sexual misconduct is about power rather than sex is
compelling and easily understood, and it is now a commonplace of public
discussion. This simple thesis did nothing short of revolutionize sex law.
But its simplicity obscured several very real complexities, such as the
possibility of harm without misogyny and the relevance of coercion to
alternative conceptions of harm. To further complicate matters, few ac-
ademics, much less the courts and the public, accept the strong misog-
yny model in its entirety, and the sexual autonomy model remains im-
portant. Examining the evolution of the core doctrines of sexual
harassment reveals how the new narrative developed an awkward com-
bination of autonomy andmisogyny principles. The resulting hybrid mi-
sogyny model recognized sexual harassment in theory while providing
little relief in practice.
By the end of the 1970s, courts had come to accept as a form of sex
discrimination the explicit conditioning of job benefits on toleration of
sexual conduct. Title VII’s prohibition of this scenario was put on a
sound doctrinal footing by Barnes v. Costle,57 which stressed the critical
54 Patricia Holt, MacKinnon’s Feminist View: Embattled and Unmodified, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, July 2, 1987, at 70.
55 Id.
56 See, e.g., Jerry Barnett, Is Anti-Sex Feminism a Step Backwards for Women’s Rights?, FW-
SA BLOG (Dec. 6, 2013), http://fwsablog.org.uk/2013/12/06/is-anti-sex-feminism-a-step-backwards-
for-womens-rights/ [https://perma.cc/DSA9-MGYG].
57 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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role of but-for causation. Discrimination occurred because the plaintiff
would not have suffered the disadvantageous outcome but for her sex.58
After Barnes, the next critical question was the proper treatment
of cases without an explicit quid pro quo that caused tangible economic
injury. In Sexual Harassment of Working Women, MacKinnon had pro-
posed a model of non-quid pro quo cases59 which she later called envi-
ronmental harassment and described as “sexual insult and aggres-
sion.”60 MacKinnon did not entirely ignore the issue of coercion in
environmental discrimination, but she identified as the coercive ele-
ment not the supervisory relationship, but women’s generally poor la-
bor market prospects.61 In 1980,62 the EEOC issued Guidelines that fol-
lowed MacKinnon’s distinction, defining sexual harassment as
unwelcome sexual conduct that either contained a quid pro quo,
whether implicit or explicit,63 or that had “the purpose or effect of un-
reasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”64
A number of lower courts soon adopted hostile-environment theory,
and the Supreme Court endorsed it in the 1986 case Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson,65 in which the plaintiff’s legal team included MacKin-
non.66 The plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, testified that she had been intim-
idated into a sexual relationship with her supervisor, Sidney Taylor,
that had included rape. However, there had been no concrete retaliation
or explicit threat of such,67 and the defendant argued that lack of eco-
nomic injury precluded liability.
58 Id. at 990. The critical role of but-for causation has since been reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
59 MACKINNON, SEXUALHARASSMENT OFWORKINGWOMEN, supra note 49, at Ch. 3–4.
60 Brief of Respondent, at 30, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), 1986
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 102.
61 MACKINNON, supra note 49, at 40–41.
62 Intent to Conduct Public Scoping Meeting in Compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 74, 676 (1980).
63 “Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature con-
stitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implic-
itly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such con-
duct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual . . .
.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
64 Id.
65 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
66 Brief of Respondent, supra note 60, at 1.
67 In particular, Vinson claimed that shortly after she was hired, Taylor:
invited her out to dinner and, during the course of the meal, suggested that they go to a
motel to have sexual relations. At first she refused, but out of what she described as fear
of losing her job she eventually agreed. According to respondent, Taylor thereafter made
repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch, both during and
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The central holding of Meritor is that discrimination with respect
to the terms and privileges of employment includes not only “tangible
loss” of “economic character,” but also “psychological aspects of work-
place environment.” The Court’s opinion, however, goes further than
this by following the plaintiff’s brief, adopting the misogyny model’s em-
phasis on motive, and changing the narrative of workplace sex. Where
unsympathetic courts had seen sex, the Meritor Court saw sexual
abuse: “Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of
sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and
make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of
racial epithets.”68 If defendants were motivated by the desire to abuse
rather than the desire for sex, their needs no longer deserved weight in
the social calculus, and thus the scope of liability could be enlarged.
Meritor and subsequent cases reflected the emerging understand-
ing that sexual advances can be sex discrimination, but they did so by
a route that embodies several troublesome premises. First, they sug-
gested that an abusive motive is a key element of the cause of action, in
stark contrast to non-sexual Title VII doctrine, in which only but-for
causation rather than hostility is required. Second, the animus-based
theory of harm seriously deprecates the importance, from the em-
ployee’s perspective, of supervisory authority. Quid pro quo doctrine is
based on the significance of the power relationship, and the Meritor
Court might have chosen to expand existing quid pro quo doctrine, as
the EEOC Guidelines suggested, to acknowledge the implicitly coercive
nature of any supervisory relationship.69 Vinson testified that she re-
luctantly acquiesced to Taylor’s demands and did not report him for fear
of losing her job: had Taylor been a coworker instead of a supervisor,
Vinson would have been far more likely to resist. Instead the Court
chose to apply hostile environment doctrine, which focuses not on the
context but on “hostile” motivation of the harasser.
The Court solidified the doctrinal emphasis on the defendant’s mo-
tivation in Harris v. Forklift, which held that to be actionable under
after business hours; she estimated that over the next several years she had intercourse
with him some 40 or 50 times. In addition, respondent testified that Taylor fondled her
in front of other employees, followed her into the women’s restroom when she went there
alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions. These
activities ceased after 1977, respondent stated, when she started going with a steady
boyfriend.
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60.
68 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
69 For criticism of this approach see Lynn T. Dickinson, Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment: A
New Standard, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 107 (1995); Marlissa Vinciguerra, Note, The After-
math of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717,
1718–19 (1989).
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hostile environment theory, an environment must be one “that a rea-
sonable person would find hostile or abusive.”70 The court imposed a
totality of the circumstances test whose four factors made no reference,
direct or indirect, to the existence of supervisory authority.71 Hostile
work environment theory thus applied in an identical fashion to the be-
havior of coworker and supervisors, and the special role of the supervi-
sory relationship was limited to cases of explicit quid pro quo. This was
a striking shift, since even earlier courts that rejected liability were re-
markably candid in noting the coercive nature of the supervisory rela-
tionship.72
This sole focus on the motives of the harasser, to the exclusion of
circumstantial factors creating coercion, might have had done little
harm to future plaintiffs had the Court accepted the strong misogyny
model’s view that malign motives were pervasive. But the Court, like
most Americans, rejected this view and repeatedly indicated that it did
not intend to provide recovery for all sexualized behavior73 or even some
mildly offensive behavior.74 In effect the Court adopted a sexual auton-
omy model that permitted adults to engage in sexually tinged conduct
as long as that behavior was kept within an acceptable range.
This doctrinal narrative, which probably tracked public sentiment
as well, might thus be called a hybrid misogyny model. It took one key
principle from the strong misogyny narrative: all sexual harm resulted
from the desire to degrade and exert power over allwomen. At the same
time, it assumed that respect was the norm in sexual relations between
men and women. Thus, the judicial narrative distinguished two types
of men. Good men, the majority, conformed to the norms of the sexual
autonomymodel and its consent-based morality. Only a relatively small
70 Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993).
71 1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, 2) its severity, 3) whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and 4) whether it unreasonably inter-
feres with an employee’s work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
72 “The abuse of authority by supervisors of either sex for personal purposes is an unhappy
and recurrent feature of our social experience . . . . [P]laintiff’s theory rests on the proposition, with
which this Court concurs, that the power inherent in a position of authority is necessarily coer-
cive. . . . Any subordinate knows that the boss is the boss whether a file folder or a dinner is at
issue . . . . If the plaintiff’s view were to prevail . . . . An invitation to dinner could become an invi-
tation to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time.” Tom-
kins, 422 F. Supp. at 557.
73 Harassment does not include “ordinary socializing in the workplace—such as male-on-male
horseplay or intersexual flirtation.” Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
74 “This standard . . . takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is
merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. As we pointed
out in Meritor, “mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an em-
ployee,” ibid . . . does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond
Title VII’s purview.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
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group of bad men were motivated by animosity towards women, and it
was this group only with whom the law was concerned. The malign mo-
tives of these bad actors were the source of sexual harm, without regard
to contextual factors creating coercion.
The problems of the hybrid model can be seen when the current
standard is applied to specific facts. In Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l
Co.,75 the plaintiff, Valerie Baskerville, had been subjected to a constant
stream of sexual speech and indications of sexual interest by her super-
visor, Michael Hall.76 For example, at one point, he told her that “his
wife had told him he had ‘better clean up my act’ and ‘better think of
you as Ms. Anita Hill.’”77 On another occasion, the announcement “May
I have your attention, please” was broadcast over the public address
system. Hall stopped at Baskerville’s desk and said, “You know what
that means, don’t you? All pretty girls run around naked.”78
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, took the unu-
sual step of overturning a jury verdict for plaintiff.79 It reasoned that
the defendant was “not a sexual harasser” but merely “not a man of
refinement” and “a man whose sense of humor took final shape in ado-
lescence.”80 Moreover, Posner stated, “[t]he comment about Anita Hill
was the opposite of solicitation, the implication being that he would get
into trouble if he didn’t keep his distance.”81 Noting that context might
change the effect of the remarks, the opinion nonetheless concludes
“there is no suggestion of any other contextual feature of their conver-
sations that might make [the defendant] a harasser.”82 Commenting
that Hall “never said anything to her that could not be repeated on
primetime television,”83 Posner concluded, “only a woman of Victorian
delicacy—a woman mysteriously aloof from contemporary American
popular culture in all its sex-saturated vulgarity—would find [the de-
fendant’s] patter substantially . . . distressing.”84
In some sense, Posner was correct. The defendant was not clearly
a misogynist and quite possibly simply an immature and silly man. But
this fact does not deserve the importance he gives it unless existing hos-
tile environment doctrine adds to Title VII a requirement of animus
75 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995).
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that has been rejected in other contexts.85 What should have been crit-
ical was whether the conduct would not have been directed to her but-
for her sex (and it clearly would not have been) and whether she suf-
fered harm sufficient to trigger Title VII. The latter question can only
be answered the context of the fact that Hall was Baskerville’s supervi-
sor and that the comments were explicitly directed to her—she was not
watching a TV show. Most women, I will venture, find the behavior of
Michael Scott in The Office hilarious rather than offensive, in part be-
cause the show mocks rather than condones his behavior.86 The same
behavior by an actual supervisor would provoke a very different reac-
tion. Hall in effect told Baskerville that he might have propositioned
her had it not been for his wife’s warning, a comment that would have
been unsettling even in a social setting and was downright scary coming
from a supervisor. Posner argued that Hall’s implication that he would
not harass Baskerville eliminated any sexual threat from the situation.
How far would Posner take this reasoning: would he be similarly dis-
missive of the statement “I’ve fantasized about forcing myself on you,
but don’t worry, I won’t”? The opinion is all the more remarkable be-
cause Posner has elsewhere shown great insight into the humiliating
nature of similar interactions.87
Baskerville illustrates the pitfalls of emphasizing motive but might
be dismissed as a singular opinion. The next Section considers three
areas in which the problem of the strong misogyny theory have or are
threatening to create broader doctrinal problems.
III. THREEDOCTRINAL PROBLEMS
A. Agency Liability
The Supreme Court missed another opportunity to draw a bright
line between supervisor and coworker harassment when it considered
the rules governing employer liability. Greater liability for supervisor
than coworker conduct would not have erased the problems caused by
Meritor, but it would have focused employer attention on the main prob-
lem. Instead, the court chose blur further the boundaries between su-
pervisory and coworker conduct in the twin 1998 cases of Burlington
85 Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination
in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 501 (2001) (“For years, it has (or
should have) been clear that discriminatory intent or motive is not coextensive with hostile ani-
mus”).
86 My personal favorite is the Sexual Harassment episode. The Office US: Sexual Harassment
(NBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2005), part of which can be seen at,Michael Scott Fights Cor-
porate – The Office US, YOUTUBE (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX5G47mh
M28 [https://perma.cc/8RHA-HLGL].
87 See generally Baskerville, 50 F.3d 428.
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Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth88 (Kennedy) and Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton89 (Souter).
Justice Kennedy’s Burlington opinion began well, rejecting the use
of the categories quid pro quo and hostile work environment in deter-
mining vicarious liability, holding that courts should instead look to
agency law and the purpose of Title VII.90 Agency law, as summarized
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219, provides strict employer
liability for the acts of employees “committed while acting in the scope
of their employment.”91 Although the question was somewhat closer
than the opinion suggested,92 the Court was not clearly wrong in hold-
ing that sexual harassment by a supervisor was not conduct within the
scope of employment.
The opinion then examined the distinction between coworker and
supervisor conduct under the Restatement’s provision for liability when
the employee “was aided in accomplishing” the wrongdoing by the ex-
istence of agency relation, even where the acts were outside the scope
of employment.93 The opinion noted that a generous interpretation of
this rule would imply strict liability for all coworker harassment and
declined to adopt this view, noting that neither the EEOC nor other
courts had advocated this approach.94 The Court acknowledged that su-
pervisors who take tangible employment actions are more clearly aided
by the agency relationship than are coworkers: “a supervisor’s power
and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular
threatening character.”95 The Court declined, however, to find that all
harassing supervisors were “aided” by the supervisory relationship on
the grounds that “there are acts of harassment a supervisor might com-
mit which might be the same acts a coemployee would commit, and
there may be some circumstances where the supervisor’s status makes
little difference.”96
88 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
89 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
90 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 751–53.
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1).
92 The Restatement is not entirely consistent in its definition of scope of employment, at one
point appearing to require that action be motivated in part by a desire to serve the master (§ 228)
and at another simply that it be authorized or incidental to authorized conduct (§ 229). Id. §§ 228–
29. Some employers seemed to regard sexual access to subordinates as a perquisite of status. JULIE
BEREBITSKY, SEX AND THEOFFICE: AHISTORY OFGENDER, POWER, ANDDESIRE 144 (2012). At such
employers, harassment might be said to be authorized.
93 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 758–59.
94 Id. at 760.
95 Id. at 763.
96 Id.
299] SEXUALHARMS WITHOUTMISOGYNY 319
The Court concluded that agency law was insufficiently clear to
provide a rule governing the proper scope of employer liability, and in-
stead looked to the policies underlying Title VII.97 It stated that the
central such policy was conciliation and the avoidance of lawsuits,98 and
therefore imposed a kind of negligence standard in cases in which a su-
pervisor had not taken tangible job action.99 Employers would not be
liable if (i) they exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior and (ii) the plaintiff-em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive mecha-
nisms the employer provided.100
These agency rules have proven nothing short of catastrophic for
sexual harassment victims. Survey evidence shows that victims believe
that their reports will be at best ignored and will more likely subject
them to retaliation.101One study found that more than 75% of complain-
ants encountered retaliation.102 Victims are caught in a double bind.
Even short delays in reporting will be found unreasonable, providing
the employer with a complete defense.103However, employees forfeit Ti-
tle VII’s provisions against retaliation if they make complaints of sexual
97 Id. at 763–64.
98 “For example, Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment [sic] policies
and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer’s
effort to create such procedures, it would effect [sic] Congress’ intention to promote conciliation
rather than litigation in the Title VII context.” Id. at 764.
99 Id. at 765.
100 Id.
101 Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him?
The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC.
ISSUES 117, 127 (1995) (60% of non-reporters believed they would be blamed for the incident if
they made a formal complaint; 60% believed complaints would be ineffective because nothing
would be done); Chelsea R. Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, AMeta-Analysis of the Antecedents
and Consequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 127 (2007); David
Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800”
Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative
Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1290–92 (2001).
102 Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following
Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8:4 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 255
(2003).
103 See Jackson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Educ., Vocational & Technical Div., 272 F.3d 1020, 1026
(8th Cir. 2001) (finding nine-month delay in reporting sexual harassment to be unreasonable);
Shaba v. IntraAction Corp., No. 02 C 5173, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2004)
(finding two-month delay in reporting sexually harassing conduct of supervisor—during which
time employee recorded events in a log and talked to coworkers about the harassment—to be un-
reasonable); Dedner v. Oklahoma, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260 (E.D. Okla. 1999) (finding three-
month delay in reporting sexual harassment by supervisor, who had previously been fired for sex-
ually harassing behavior and then reinstated, to be unreasonable); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83
F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (holding that plaintiff’s delay in reporting for three months after
the first incident made her behavior unreasonable, even though she reported once behavior esca-
lated); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Tech., No. C98-0378, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5425, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 13, 1999) (finding that employees who do not report are almost always found to have acted
unreasonably).
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harassment before the conduct rises to a level at which it becomes ac-
tionable.104 Courts have insisted on prompt reporting of incidents even
when the employer has actual notice of egregious public conduct prior
to formal reporting.105 Although courts typically impose stringent time-
liness requirements on plaintiffs, they are tolerant of significant delays
in response by defendants.106 Courts generally reject employee claims
that they failed to report because of concerns about futility or retalia-
tion,107 even when these concerns can be substantiated108 or even when
a direct threat has been made. 109
The Burlington/Faragher rule thus places a burden on sexual har-
assment plaintiffs utterly unlike any other in Title VII jurisprudence.
Title VII’s policy of conciliation is, as a general matter, implemented by
requiring plaintiffs to file a complaint with the EEOC and to attempt to
reach an administrative settlement before going to court. Burling-
ton/Faragher inexplicably adds a new layer to this process, one which
is extremely prejudicial to victims. The employer-procedures defense
encourages employers to devise a reporting system that satisfies the
courts but discourages complaints.110 It is hard to think of any other
area of law in which potential plaintiffs are required to report their con-
cerns and lay out their entire case to a potentially adverse party without
the benefit of a neutral intermediary.
At the time of Burlington/Faragher, the Court was far from un-
sympathetic to sexual harassment complainants. How could it have cre-
ated such a mess? The misogyny narrative encouraged it to view har-
assment as an offense of moral turpitude, approaching rape in its
seriousness. Had the Court taken this further, adopting a strong misog-
yny perspective, it would have regarded harassment as part of a larger
104 Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001) (per curiam).
105 Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l. Bldg. Serv., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1264–71 (N.D. Okla. 2003)
(Plaintiff’s supervisor rubbed against the side of plaintiff’s chest on Sept. 28 and then placed her
head in a headlock between his knees on October 11 or 12. On October 15, the plaintiff made a
formal complaint under the employer’s sexual harassment policy. Even though the first incident
occurred in front of another supervisor, the district court held that the employer’s failure to take
any action until after the plaintiff made a formal complaint to be reasonable, because that single
incident did not give the employer notice of the existence of a hostile environment requiring cor-
rection. However, the district court concluded that plaintiff’s failure to make a formal report im-
mediately after that incident, despite a formal incident 3–4 days after the second incident, consti-
tuted an unreasonable failure to take advantage of preventative or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer).
106 Anderson v. Leigh, No. 98 C 50169, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1584, at *17–19 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
10, 2000).
107 Id. at *3–4, *22.
108 Childress v. PetsMart, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 705, 707–09 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
109 Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775–76 (W.D. Ky 1998).
110 See Sherwyn, supra note 101.
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system of pervasive oppression, and would never have entrusted em-
ployers and their agents with the job of protecting women from harass-
ment. But the Court, like the public, rejected the strong dominance the-
ory in favor of a dichotomized picture of a few bad apples in a barrel of
good actors. This hybrid view provided no way of thinking about the
complex problems that result not from misogyny but from the combina-
tion of power imbalance and economic self-interest. Sexual harassment
persists because of the misconduct of a few but just as much from the
inaction of others. Supervisors are almost by definition more valued by
an organization than those they supervise. An employer may fail to act
against a supervisor not because it condones his actions but simply be-
cause intervention is more costly than looking the other way.
B. Disappointed Affections
Genuine and lasting love can arise at work.111 Public opinion seems
solidly supportive of office romance: one survey found that only 4% be-
lieve that work relationships are wrong under all circumstances.112 In-
deed, between a third and a half of respondents report having had sex-
ual or romantic involvement at work.113 Yet surveys also suggest that
attraction and relationships between supervisor and subordinate can
111 Good data on sex and love at work is surprisingly hard to find. Most surveys that directly
examine the topic appear to be done by commercial vendors of human resource related services
such as Vault and CareerBuilder. The sample sizes are typically under 1000, which is problematic
for phenomena that might well vary widely among sectors and regions. Academic studies on larger
samples that consider adjacent topics, such as marital happiness, sometimes shed light on office
relationships. Taken together, this body of research, however incomplete, does seem to provide
relatively consistent results, at least as to the order of magnitude of various phenomenon. One
survey found that 31 percent of workers who started dating at work eventually married. This sur-
vey was conducted online by The Harris Poll from November 28 and December 20, 2017 and in-
cluded a representative sample of 809 full-time workers across industries and company sizes in
the U.S. private sector. Rachel Nauen,Office Romance Hits 10-Year Low, According to Career Buil-
der’s Annual Valentine’s Day Survey, CAREERBUILDER (Feb. 1, 2018), http://press.careerbuilder.co
m/2018-02-01-Office-Romance-Hits-10-Year-Low-According-to-CareerBuilders-Annual-Valentine
s-Day-Survey [https://perma.cc/7AK8-9R4P]. A representative sample of 19,131 individuals mar-
ried between 2005 and 2012 found that 65.05% of relationships began offline and of those 21.66%
began at work, implying that about 14% began at work. John T. Cacioppo et al., Marital Satisfac-
tion and Break-ups Differ across On-line and Off-line Meeting Venues, 110 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. U.S. (PNAS) 10135 (June 18, 2013). The marital satisfaction level of work relationships was
somewhat lower at a significant level, though to my eye the effect size does not seem particularly
large. Id. at 101373.
112 The 2018 Vault Office Romance Survey Results, VAULTCAREERS (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www
.vault.com/blog/workplace-issues/2018-vault-office-romance-survey-results/ [https://perma.cc/E44
D-Z42Q].
113 CareerBuilder surveys find over the years that between 36 and 41% of workers have ever
dated a co-worker. Nauen, supra note 103. The Vault 2018 survey found 52% had participated in
an office romance. Id.
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be problematic even when genuinely motivated by affection. These re-
lationships account for just under 10% of office relationships,114 are dis-
proportionately dangerous,115 probably account for most of the 6% of
workers who have left a job because a romantic relationship with some-
one at work went sour, and hurt women more than men.116 Public opin-
ion is less approving of relationships between co-workers and subordi-
nates, though only a minority (43%) feel that relationships between
supervisors and subordinates are never appropriate.117 These relation-
ships are not uncommon: 22% of workers have dated someone who was
their supervisor at the time.118
The perils of romance in the supervisory setting are attested by the
significant number of sexual harassment cases involving a defendant
whose feelings about the plaintiff seem, on any reasonable interpreta-
tion, to have been sincere and respectful romantic interest. In some
cases, the plaintiff had initially engaged in a consensual affair. In oth-
ers the defendant’s interest in the plaintiff was never reciprocated. In
either situation, the plaintiff eventually rejected the defendant. At that
point, the defendant began to engage in workplace behavior that was
harmful to the plaintiff. Sometimes the behavior in these cases is
merely wounded— such as avoidance of direct contact that led to less
favorable work assignments.119 In other cases the behavior was more
antagonistic but would not in itself have risen to the threshold needed
for a hostile environment claim.
The adverse consequences of romantic rejection are illustrated by
Novak v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor.120 The plaintiff, Shanti
Novak, was a detective with the Waterfront Commission of N.Y. Har-
bor.121 She became romantically involved with Scott Politano at a time
when both held the same rank, in different locations. Eventually the
114 Dana Wilkie, Forbidden Love: Workplace-Romance Policies Now Stricter, SHRM (Sept. 24,
2013), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/employee-relations/pages/forbidden-love
-workplace-romance-policies-stricter.aspx [https://perma.cc/4ACE-MFQC].
115 James Lardner, et al.,Cupid’s Cubicles: Office Romance Is Alive andWell, Despite a Barrage
of Corporate Countermeasures, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 14, 1998, at 44, 47.
116 9% of women have left work because of failed romance compared to 3% of men. The 2018
Vault Office Romance Survey Results, supra note 112.
117 Id.
118 Nauen, supra note 103 (finding that 27% of women reporting they have dated at work say
they have dated their supervisor compared with 16% of men. The survey suggests that an addi-
tional 8% have been higher ranking people not their supervisor. 30% total—35% of women and
25% of men—have dated someone at a higher level in the organization).
119 Novak v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 928 F. Supp. 2d 723, 731 (S.D.N.Y 2013).
120 Id. at 726.
121 Id.
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two became live-in partners,122 and during this time, Politano was pro-
moted to Lieutenant and was transferred to Novak’s office, conse-
quently becoming her supervisor.123 Novak terminated her relationship
with Politano shortly thereafter.124 After her breakup with Politano,
Novak was singled out for unfavorable treatment even after Politano
was replaced as Novak’s supervisor.125 Novak was given unfavorable
work and shift assignments; was subjected to heightened scrutiny with
respect to her work and her requests for overtime pay and sick leave;
was the only detective not to receive further formal detective training;
was excluded from an email regarding a shooting range schedule; and
was the only detective to whom newly hired detectives were not as-
signed, which was both humiliating and deprived her of the opportunity
to learn from the new assignees, who were seasoned detectives from
other agencies.126 The situation became worse after she complained to
the human resources department.127 Politano refused to communicate
with Novak and gave her orders only indirectly through detectives jun-
ior to her, and escalated minor work failings into formal written mem-
oranda of counseling.128 Without questioning that Novak was mis-
treated by Politano or that Politano’s attitude affected the way other
supervisors treated Novak, the court concluded that “such mistreat-
ment, while unfair and unfortunate, does not constitute Title VII sex
discrimination under existing law.”129
Faced with similar cases, other courts likewise typically reject lia-
bility in these cases, reasoning that thwarted affection rather than gen-
eralized animus towards women motivated the defendant.130 Yet Title
VII does not contain any requirement that plaintiff prove animus, but
rests liability on a showing that the defendants acted “because of





126 Id. at 726–27.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 727.
129 Id. at 731. The case seems somewhat confused about the elements of a hostile environment
claim: “At no point during the relevant period was Novak terminated or suspended, nor did she
suffer a loss of pay or other compensation, such as sick time or vacation time. Novak was never
demoted or denied an opportunity for promotion, and she was never formally disciplined during
her employment at the Commission.” Id. at 727.
130 Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High Sch. Dist., 715 F. Supp. 862, 871–72 (N.D. Ill. 1989);
see generally Huebschen v. Dep’t of Health and Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (Equal
Protection clause applied to public employer). To be fair, the Keppler court acknowledged that an
explicit quid pro quo (“resume sleeping with me or else”) could violate Title VII, but held that even
egregious retaliation based on hurt feelings could not. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 870 n.7.
131 Cary Franklin, Discriminatory Animus, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE
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sexual harassment doctrine: “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indi-
cates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
are not exposed.”132 A woman who is denied job opportunities because
she has rejected a supervisor romantically is close to the paradigm of
quid pro quo harassment. She cannot help but feel pressured to enter
or resume a sexual relationship, and such situations clearly pose a se-
rious threat to equal opportunity for women in the workplace. In prac-
tice, though, many courts have still viewed these cases through the lens
of dominance doctrine, denying recovery on the grounds that the de-
fendant’s conduct was motivated by “personal animosity” rather than
sexist animus133 and was thus outside of Title VII’s prohibition on al-
tering the terms and conditions of employment because of sex.134 The
misogyny narrative in effect adds to Title VII a requirement that is ab-
sent from the statute and Supreme Court opinions.
C. Me-Too Evidence
In the extrajudicial sphere, the #MeToo movement has strikingly
demonstrated the power of multiple charges against an individual to
succeed where a series of isolated complaints had previously failed. At
the same time, a chorus of charges invites a chorus of rebuttals. The
defenders of individuals accused of misconduct, such as Brett Ka-
vanaugh and Bill Clinton, often stress evidence that the accused has
treated other women well.135Unfortunately, the strongmisogyny theory
supports the admissibility of this not-me-too evidence, which is obvi-
ously relevant to a charge of generalized animus towards women
though less clearly germane to a specific charge of misconduct towards
one woman.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen Katz eds., 2014).
132 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
133 See, e.g., Succar v. Dade Cnty Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that
misconduct does not constitute sexual harassment if based on a “personal feud,” not gender).
134 The only exception occurs if the supervisor engages in behavior that would, standing alone
and without reference to the past rejection, constitute sexual harassment, such as explicitly con-
ditioning better treatment at work on future romantic or sexual involvement.
135 Kelsey Bolar,Why His Female Law Clerks Are among Brett Kavanaugh’s Biggest Advocates,
THEDAILY SIGNAL (July 11, 2018), https://www.dailysignal.com/2018/07/11/why-his-female-law-cl
erks-are-among-brett-kavanaughs-biggest-advocates/ [https://perma.cc/JYQ3-FUXP];/; Gloria Ste-
inem, Feminists and the Clinton Question, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1998); Callum Borchers, Bill Clin-
ton’s Very Trump-Like Response to Questions about Sexual Misconduct, WASHINGTON POST (June
4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/06/04/bill-clintons-very-trump-li
ke-response-to-questions-about-sexual-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/S9GU-RT29]; USA TODAY
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/2018/01/12/sexual-harassment-reckoning-201
8-more-backlash-and-pushback/880479001/ [https://perma.cc/Z76L-7L4A]. (“Three-dozen female
former Saturday Night Live employees publicly defended former SNL comic-turned Franken by
declaring he never did anything to them.”)
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This undesirable consequence of generalized misogyny theory has
played out in the courts as well. The expression “me-too” evidence pre-
dates the #MeToo movement, and refers to evidence of discriminatory
behavior, not necessarily sexual, towards an individual not a party to
the suit. Its admissibility follows the general rules of evidence: although
evidence of prior acts may not be introduced “for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith,”136 it may be offered for other purposes
such as proof of “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”137 The strongest
basis for the introduction of me-too evidence is generally thought to be
proof of intent or motive.138
In the 2008 Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn case, the Su-
preme Court held that the admissibility of me-too evidence “depends on
many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plain-
tiff’s circumstances and theory of the case”139 by virtue of factors such
as similarities in the treatment of other employees and the plaintiff.140
Lower courts have treated Sprint as creating a narrow exception to the
presumption that prior act evidence is inadmissible, and have some-
times excluded even me-too evidence that meets the Sprint criteria on
other grounds, finding that the probative value of such evidence is out-
weighed by unfair prejudice141 or where it poses a danger of creating a
“trial within a trial.” 142 One court stated that “more often than not, ‘me
too’ evidence is not admitted at trial . . . ”143
In response to me-too evidence, defendants have increasingly pro-
duced rebuttal witnesses to testify to the defendant’s respectful treat-
ment of women. In theory, the same principles guide the admissibility
of me-too and not-me-too evidence. In the non-sex harassment discrim-
ination cases, this equivalence might make sense, since me-too and not-
136 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
137 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
138 Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Found., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 213
(2009); Soza v. William Ziering, Inc., F035182, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6398, at *27–29 (July
11, 2002).
139 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008).
140 See, e.g., Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 809–10 (8th Cir. 2011); Elion v. Jackson,
544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008).
141 See, e.g., Johnson v. Interstate Brands Corp., 351 F. App’x, 36, 41 (6th Cir. 2009); Jones v.
St. Jude Med. S.C., 823 F. Supp. 2d 699, 734–35 (S.D. Ohio 2011); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 563 F.
Supp. 2d 905, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., LLC, 754 F.3d 1240, 1258 (11th Cir.
2014).
142 See, e.g., Lawson-Brewster v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 617 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595 (W.D. Mich.
2008); Hall v. Mid-State Mach. Prods., 895 F. Supp. 2d 243, 272 (D. Me. 2012); McClendon v.
Dougherty, No. 2:10-cv-1339, 2011 WL 4345901, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2011).
143 Andazola v. Logan’s Roadhouse, Inc., No. CV-10-S-316-NW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73775,
at *7 (N.D. Ala. May 24, 2013).
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me-too evidence could plausibly deserve equal weight. If a plaintiff pro-
duces examples of other women paid less than they deserve, a defend-
ant should surely be permitted to show that women on average are paid
as well as men. Pay discrimination might not be universal, but is gen-
erally directed towards a group. In contrast, a sex harasser might plau-
sibly treat women generally well but single out a small set of victims,
such as those who seem easier prey by virtue of circumstance or tem-
perament. To compound the problem, courts seem to apply the Sprint
rules more leniently to not-me-too evidence, virtually always holding it
admissible,144 while sometimes excluding me-too evidence.145
Judicial preference for not-me-too evidence poses a looming threat
to sex harassment plaintiffs, and it demands a strong narrative in re-
sponse. The strong misogyny theory cannot supply that narrative. A
theory of sexual harassment that treats sexual behavior as a specific
manifestation of generalized animus has tremendous difficulty explain-
ing why a man who treats women generally well should single out a
specific woman for misogynistic abuse in the form of sexual behavior.
What is needed is a new narrative that can treat sex harassment as a
gender-based wrong without characterizing it as a form of indiscrimi-
nate misogyny. The next Section outlines how such a new narrative
might be constructed.
IV. NEWNORMS OF SEXUALHARM
Propelled by dominance theory, the American law of sexual harass-
ment took the momentous step of recognizing nonviolent sexual harm
to adult women without invoking the norm of chastity. At the same
time, the hybrid misogyny narrative behind those legal rules views har-
assment as the conduct of a small group of toxic misogynists, a deeply
flawed picture that has produced deeply flawed doctrine.
Sexual misconduct is regarded by traditional sexual morality and
first-wave feminism as an offense against chastity; by sexual autonomy
theory as an offense against consent; and by dominance theory as an
offense against women’s equality. Better legal doctrines require new
144 See, e.g., Elion, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 8; Howard v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 561 F. Supp. 2d. 53, 5553
(D.D.C. 2008); Rodriguez v. Chertoff, No. CIV 05-546-TUC-CKJ, 2008 WL 5087209, at *1 (D. Ariz.
Nov. 26, 2008); Pantoja v. Anton, 198 Cal. App. 4th 87, 87 (2011); United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic
Children’s Found., 173 Cal. App. 4th at 759; Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 381, 386–
87 (E.D. La. 2008); Soza, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6398.
145 See, e.g., Elion, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 8; Howard v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 561 F. Supp. 2d. 53, 55
(D.D.C. 2008); Rodriguez v. Chertoff, No. CIV 05-546-TUC-CKJ, 2008 WL 5087209, at *1 (D. Ariz.
Nov. 26, 2008); Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 381, 386–87 (E.D. La. 2008). See gen-
erally Emma Pelkey, The “Not Me Too” Evidence Doctrine in Employment Law: Courts’ Disparate
Treatment of “Me Too” Versus “Not Me Too” Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 92 OR.
L. REV. 545 (2013).
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narratives that build on the strengths of each of these models while
learning from their limitations.
A. Consent and Its Limits
American society places tremendous value on individual auton-
omy and freedom of choice. A central premise of our moral thinking
is the harm principle: only harm to third parties justifies interfer-
ence with individual decisions and interactions between consenting
adults. The traditional law of sex deviated from these core principles
by scrutinizing consent far less in sexual settings than in other set-
tings and by placing little value on women’s sexual autonomy. But
in the past half century, sex law has become more consistent with
these other broadly-held values.
Consent has thus become the touchstone of the American ap-
proach to the legal regulation of sex. By the later twentieth century,
the resulting laws and norms had improved women’s sexual and eco-
nomic freedom but left many women feeling unprotected from sexual
predation. Many felt abandoned not only by the society against
whose unequal institutions they struggled but also by liberal femi-
nism, which sometimes viewed complaints about sexual harm as a
step backwards from hard-won sexual freedom and towards a new
neediness, suffused with a neo-Victorian rejection of female sexual
pleasure.
Into this vacuum came dominance theory, which allowed women
to protest sexual imposition without appearing querulous and
wounded. Its rapid success in driving reform, however, had costs. It
did to some extent revive stereotypes of female sexual coldness. It
painted far too bleak a picture of male psychology and of a society
that was rapidly improving its treatment of women. It is now a half
century later, and a new theory of harm is needed, one that extends
earlier autonomy models without the drawbacks of dominance the-
ory.
The legal system’s notion of autonomy is primarily “thin.” Thin au-
tonomy requires only that agents be free from wrongful interference
with choice, without consideration of their actual capacity to act on this
freedom.146 Autonomy theory becomes “thicker” as it builds in more re-
quirements that consent be meaningful, and these extensions are an
inherently value-laden exercise in defining new entitlements.147 Corre-
spondingly, the concept of coercion (a violation of autonomy) expands as
146 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1422 n.199 (citing ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM:
KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (2009)).
147 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 1, at ch. 4.
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entitlements increase—coercion cannot be understood except against
the background of entitlements.
The two major reform movements before dominance theory relied
in part on autonomy arguments, wholly in the case of rape law reform
and partly in the case of age of consent reform. In both instances, they
required an autonomy theory that, if not maximally thin, was at least
no thicker than that embodied in other areas of law. Age of consent re-
formers placed great weight on the comparison between sex law and the
law of contracts and property. If minors could not enter into a valid sale
of personal property, it seemed only reasonable to limit their capacity
to consent to sexual relations. More recently, autonomy theorists have
made a compelling case that sex law provides less protection than anal-
ogous law governing theft or professional conduct.148 For present pur-
poses I will equate thin sexual autonomy with sexual autonomy based
on entitlements found in non-sex areas of the legal system, although
that is not entirely accurate, since those areas may already embody
some thickness.
Thin sexual autonomy does not support extending the law of sexual
harassment, because the American legal system simply does not pro-
vide enough legal protection to employees upon which to build. Employ-
ers are relatively free to mistreat employees, whose main redress is to
leave, an option facilitated by the relative mobility of the American la-
bor market. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
available to employees only in the most extreme cases. The supervisor-
employee relationship is not subject to even remotely the level of scru-
tiny applied to relationships such as therapists and patients or adults
and minors. Any new narrative of sexual harm must capture how sex
differs from property, contracts, and other areas in which the law su-
pervises exchange relations.
To see how the model of thin autonomy plays out, consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical. A male supervisor, J, conducts the onboarding pro-
cess for each new employee. After filling out paperwork, J provides an
overview of company procedures. At the end, he tells many of the female
new hires that he enjoys a quick hook-up after work, and that if she
ever feels so inclined she should come to his office at the end of the day
and they can repair to his place for the evening. He adds that this is
completely voluntary and won’t affect her job. He does not ask for a re-
sponse, never mentions the subject again unless the employee does, and
neither rewards those who accept his offer nor sanctions those who do
not.
148 Id. at ch. 6.
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Not everyone will characterize this scenario, by itself, as sexual
harassment, though I would, but it surely at least provides evidence
that could be part of a hostile environment case. But the thin autonomy
model cannot easily even support its use as evidence. From its perspec-
tive, all that matters is that consent has been requested and any refusal
honored. J has wholly met these requirements—his acts are not even a
step in a troublesome direction. Professor Stephen Schulhofer, the au-
thor of a fascinating and important application of the autonomy para-
digm to sexual harm,149 suggests that autonomy theory can be modified
to acknowledge the problematic nature of J’s behavior.150 He proposes
extending the unwelcomeness requirement of current hostile environ-
ment doctrine to allow for more consideration of circumstances, noting
that that in “many of the reported cases, a supervisor confronted his
female subordinate with a crude, impersonal sexual proposal. It seldom
seems plausible to think that the woman was delighted by the idea or
that only reticence prevented her from suggesting such an encounter
herself.”151 In such circumstances, courts should presume unwelcome-
ness. In other words, unless the subordinate’s actions had somehow re-
butted the presumption, the conduct would be evidence of harassment.
In contrast, courteous advances of a personal or romantic character
should not be presumed unwelcome, although a single gentle refusal
should be sufficient to indicate that any future advances are unwel-
come.152
The distinction between crude impersonal advances and romantic
personal ones is onto something critically important that is not part of
current doctrine and that goes a long way to describing why most people
would consider J’s behavior disturbing. Precisely why this distinction is
important demands further explanation. Autonomy theory typically
honors the freedom to make offers. Schulhofer constructs an important
new category in autonomy theory: lack of consent even to receive an of-
fer.153 To this point his account is consistent with autonomy theory,
which would typically honor an individual’s explicit refusal to entertain
offers. But his next move is more complex: he suggests that the nature
of a crude impersonal offer constitutes a proxy for lack of consent. Au-
tonomy models generally disallow offers only if the counterparty is not
legally competent to accept because, for example, she is a minor.
Schulhofer does not advocate the complete legal incapacitation of sub-
149 See generally id.
150 The example of J is not Schulhofer’s but is designed to explore his theory.
151 SCHULHOFER, supra note 1, at 186–87.
152 Id. at 187.
153 Id. at ch. 9.
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ordinates, suggesting that a complete ban on relationships between su-
pervisors and subordinates would intrude too much on the freedom of
mature adults, who not infrequently choose to enter such relation-
ships.154 And the special status that Schulhofer rightly accords to per-
sonal and romantic offers is not a pure proxy for welcomeness, as au-
tonomy theory would require. An indication of interest from a physically
attractive supervisor is more likely to be welcome than one from a less
fortunate colleague, but neither Schulhofer nor anyone else would sug-
gest that that should be legally relevant.
Not only the nature of the offer but the existence of a supervisory
relationship clearly affects our view of J, but again thin autonomy the-
ory cannot clearly explain why. Much of sex law reform has focused on
instances in which victims of sexual harms received less protection than
victims of harms to other interests such as property. But treating J’s
proposal as presumptively unwelcome would extend the protection of
sexual autonomy past the protection of property or other rights. Sup-
pose J had told new employees that he was an Amway distributor and
they should consider him for their wellness and cleaning product needs.
This would be distasteful, and a corporate employer might well prohibit
such behavior in the event that it became common. Yet no court would
invalidate such a purchase by a subordinate on grounds of duress. By
regarding J’s behavior as legally suspect, Schulhofer (and I and others)
are proposing to extend the protection of sex law beyond that provided
by the law governing other areas.155
Sex is different. Something about sex makes the supervisory set-
ting more problematic for a request for sexual interaction than for a
request for a financial transaction or for non-sexual social engagement.
Something about sex gives special valence to the respectful or crude
quality of the request, making even certain offers presumptively objec-
tionable. But what is different?
B. Beyond Thin Autonomy
Autonomy theory is the dominant American approach to moral
questions, but thin autonomy does not protect women from second-gen-
eration sexual harassment. What thicker model of autonomy, enriched
by appeal to other values and entitlements, can do better? The first-
wave feminist attack on the double standard ultimately rested too di-
rectly on Christian ideals of chastity to be straightforwardly imported
into today’s secular legal system. Dominance theory’s powerful narra-
tive was too dark to have broad public appeal, and from a theoretical
154 Id. at ch. 8.
155 Id. at 164–67.
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point of view it contained no explanation of why men would seek to dom-
inate women or why they might choose sex as their means to this end.
The harm principle upon which autonomy theory rests is ulti-
mately empirical in implementation. Whether given actions cause
harm, and of what kind, is a question on which evidence can be brought
to bear, and I will now sketch out some possible approaches to develop-
ing an empirically grounded theory of sexual harm that might augment
autonomy theory.
1. Sex is dangerous: a sex-neutral norm
Sex and the activities that surround it have consequences that ex-
tend far beyond erotic desire and satisfaction. To start the journey to
thicker autonomy with this observation is to acknowledge that sexual
harm is not always about misogynistic abuse, though it may be, and
that fact is important. But sexual harm may also be about sex, or even
about love, and is no less dangerous in these instances.
The sexual autonomymodel seldom acknowledges the power of sex-
ual emotions, and does so almost always outside the context of legal
harms. Advocates of stronger norms against casual sex often note that
sex can lead to strong feelings of emotional attachment. These feelings
of attachment could be relevant in a number of ways to the law of sexual
harassment,156 but I will focus on the three fact patterns identified ear-
lier, which seemmost likely to command a consensus in favor of extend-
ing the law. All three raise issues that touch on the many emotions be-
sides desire that can arise in sexual settings.
When sexual advances are rejected or relationships are ended, the
rejected party may experience pain, shame, anger, resentment, or feel-
ings of inadequacy. A rejected supervisor may thus have difficulty treat-
ing a subordinate fairly. Fearing this, a subordinate who wishes to re-
ject or end sexual contact may suffer great anxiety and or feel
intimidated into sex even where there is no direct threat of harm. Re-
jected parties may feel this full range of emotions regardless of their
initial intent: rejection is not fun whether advances were motivated by
love, lust, or animus. Essentially the same emotions may be triggered
when the problematic behavior is not a sexual advance but more indi-
rect behavior of the kind described in Baskerville.
156 For example, a number of cases address the issue of preferential treatment of sexual ro-
mantic partners. See generally, e.g., Miller v. Dept. of Corrections, 36 Cal. 4th 446 (Cal. 2005);
Sherk v. Adesa Atlanta, LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Stewart v. SBE Entertainment
Group, LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1235 (D. Nev. 2017). At some point, the law might well want to
concern itself with these, but this extension would be more controversial than those proposed in
this article.
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Equally serious though less obvious problems can arise when the
supervisor is the rejecting party. The rejector may wish to avoid the
emotions of the rejected; fear awkward situations; have a jealous
spouse; or simply want a clean break. For any of these reasons, a super-
visor who terminates a relationship may feel unable to return to a nor-
mal supervisory relationship, with detrimental effects to the subordi-
nate’s career.
That love sometimes hurts is hardly a new insight—it’s hard to im-
agine popular music without it—but it has been curiously absent from
discussions of sexual harassment. Perhaps the focus on misogynistic
animus has been so single-minded that other types of danger have been
ignored. Or perhaps the ethos of sexual freedom has made any allusion
to the emotional dimension of sex seem vaguely old fashioned and puri-
tanical. Over fifty years have passed since the advent of the sexual rev-
olution, and it is now time to discuss these issues more honestly, with
assistance from the growing body of empirical research on the emo-
tional consequences of sex.
The strength of sexual emotions implies that truly free sexual
choice requires more safeguards than truly free economic choice, espe-
cially in situations of unequal power such as the workplace. This obser-
vation, which I will call the dangerous-sex model, leads to a thicker au-
tonomy model, which, unlike the misogyny model, supports protection
even from harms not motivated by animus.
The dangerous-sex approach addresses some of the problem cases
discussed earlier. Certainly it suggests that supervisory status be given
much greater significance than it receives at present, in turn suggesting
a different result in the jilted lover cases. Indeed, it identifies the prob-
lems in those cases as central to the understanding of the harm in sex-
ual harassment: any of the formidable emotions surrounding sex, not
just the malign ones, render the supervisory relationship dangerous. It
refocuses the issue in the me-too evidence cases. The plaintiff is not try-
ing to prove a general disposition to misogynistic behavior but to show
a pattern of sexual behavior that is not necessarily manifested towards
all women. The agency liability cases are more of a puzzle, since they
make little sense even on their own terms. Of all three anomalies, they
are most open to the complaint that they protect plaintiffs less from
sexual harm than from other harms. In no other situation, including
racial harassment, has Title VII’s policy of reconciliation been used to
require internal reporting. Still, the misogyny narrative may have con-
tributed to this wrong turn by creating an image of sex harassers as so
anomalously malevolent, so outside the normal range of behavior, that
their peers could be relied on to recognize and respond appropriately to
their offenses. The dangerous-sex model instead emphasizes that essen-
tially ordinary feelings and behavior becomemenacing when introduced
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into an environment of power. From this perspective it is unrealistic to
expect self-policing by employers. Supervisors are, almost by definition,
worth more to employers than those they supervise, since they are paid
more, and employers have an incentive to favor supervisors over their
subordinates in disputes between the two. This favoritism may be rein-
forced by the stronger social and collegial ties that exist between people
at the same hierarchical level. The current agency liability rules seem
to assume that harassers are so seriously pathological that their col-
leagues can overcome the strong forces that make people reluctant to
find against valued colleagues and friends. But if sexual harm can re-
sult from normal behavior at the wrong time and place, the insistence
on internal dispute resolution seems wholly misguided.
2. Developing new feminist norms
The dangerous-sex model is sex-neutral not only in terms of the
legal rules it suggests, which do not differentiate between men and
women, but in its assumptions about male and female sexuality. In
American law and society, neutral legal rules are the preferred ap-
proach to promoting sex equality, and American feminists have at-
tempted to avoid building assumptions about sex differences into their
policy analysis.
At some point, however, it may be worthwhile to consider differ-
ences between men and women in the consequences of sexual activity,
and even to entertain the possibility that these differences are not en-
tirely environmental in origin. Neither the autonomy nor dangerous-
sex models make it easy to claim sexual misconduct as inherently a
feminist concern, since both take fundamentally sex-neutral perspec-
tives on sexuality. Only the historically contingent fact of male eco-
nomic power, itself unexplained, makes harassment of more importance
to women than men. Both the autonomy and dangerous-sex models
avoid the excessive pessimism of the dominance model but both have
the opposite flaw. They do not explain why women are more likely to be
disturbed than men by sexual harassment, and they answer the ques-
tion of why sexual harassment is sex discrimination with only the
wholly formal answer that the plaintiff would not have been treated as
she was were it not for her sex.
A number of theories might provide an account of difference. I dis-
cuss only one that has recently not received the attention it deserves.
This approach focuses on differences in male and female reproductive
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roles, and is not new to feminist theory. It can be found as early as Frie-
drich Engels157 and in several important second-wave feminists includ-
ing Simone de Beauvoir,158 Gerda Lerner,159 and Shulamith Fire-
stone.160 It is an approach that, though value-laden, is based on
empirical observations about human behavior, as I believe future theo-
ries should be. This approach might be called the means of reproduction
model, an allusion to the idea that patriarchies oppress women in order
to give men control of the means of reproduction.
Women get pregnant and men do not. The shadow of forced preg-
nancy falls across all potentially coercive heterosexual interaction even
in a post-contraceptive era. Such fears explain in part why rape is trau-
matic in a way that other assaults are not. Perhaps it is less obvious
why such intense fears can be triggered by situations in which the pos-
sibly of coerced intercourse is not imminent. Consider the case of Va-
lerie Baskerville, discussed earlier, whose supervisor told her, inter
alia, that an announcement over the work PA system meant “all pretty
girls run around naked,” and who indicated that his wife told him that
his sexual interest in Baskerville was becoming too serious.161 The
threat of sexual coercion was in the air, but surely it was not an imme-
diate possibility. Why was her situation more deserving of legal protec-
tion that that of an employee who suffers non-sexual abuse?
To say that the threat of forced pregnancy drives women’s sexual
fear does not require that that fear result from careful calculation of the
likelihood of pregnancy. Evolutionary psychologists suggest that we
have two distinct mental tracks.162 Domain-general mechanisms give
humans some capacity to respond to novel situations. These work along-
side domain-specific mechanisms that have evolved by natural selection
to respond to recurring adaptive problems of the environment inhabited
by early humans. These domain-specific mechanisms operate not
simply by telling us what to do, but by filling us with powerful emo-
tions.163 Though we are capable of fearing things for which no domain-
specific mechanism exists, our most primal reactions are ancient and
157 FRIEDRICHENGELS, THEORIGIN OF THEFAMILY, PRIVATEPROPERTY, AND THE STATE (1884).
158 SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley trans. 1968) (1949).
159 GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986).
160 SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION
(1970).
161 Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430.
162 John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (David M. Buss ed., John Wiley & Sons 2005). Some
evolutionary psychologists regard the emphasis on domain specific mechanisms to be the field’s
single most revolutionary contribution to psychology.
163 Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions, inHANDBOOK OF
EMOTIONS (M. Lewis & J.M. Haviland Jones, eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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domain-specific. Children instinctively fear snakes but not cars, alt-
hough in modern life cars pose an incomparably greater risk to their
safety. Domain-specific mechanisms are not finely calibrated to actual
risk, and once triggered they are strong. Snakes in a glass cage or even
in a photograph can inspire visceral fear, while cars do not. Similarly,
the threat of sexual coercion is frightening even when victims know that
the chances of actual coerced sex are small and the chances of resulting
pregnancy are smaller.
Feminists become understandably nervous at this point. The sug-
gestion that evolved dispositions play a role in sexual behavior conjures
up the views of an early school of evolutionary psychology that might
be called traditionalist, because it scientizes the traditionalist view of
sex roles and it takes a restrictive view of female sexuality, grounded in
part on empirical claims about women’s lower interest in sex.164 Later
researchers such as Sarah Blaffer Hrdy,165 Jane Lancaster,166 and Bar-
bara Smuts167 have presented a very different picture of human sexual
predispositions that allows for far more variation between societies and
a much more expansive and complex view of female sexuality. This so-
phisticated theory is consistent with, and even helpful to, a feminist
perspective on sexual harassment.
All evolutionary psychologists agree on one foundational principle
of sexual behavior, the theory of parental investment. Through preg-
nancy and its corollaries such a breastfeeding, human females have a
much higher level of obligatory investment in each offspring. Women
should be more discriminating in selecting sex partners, since the pos-
sibility of pregnancy make each copulation a greater potential commit-
ment of resources for a female than for a male.168 Early evolutionary
psychologists took this to mean that women were interested only in
long-term relationships in which they traded sexual fidelity for male
provisioning.169 Later researchers pointed out the errors in this last
leap. The possibility of pregnancy means only that females should be
more sexually selective than males and prefer partners of high genetic
quality. It does not imply a female taste for monogamy or long-term
164 See generally DONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OFHUM. SEXUALITY (1981).
165 Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Raising Darwin’s Consciousness: Female Sexuality and the Prehominid
Origins of Patriarchy, 8 HUM. NATURE 1 (March 1997).
166 Jane Lancaster, A Feminist and Evolutionary Biologist Looks and Women, 34 Y.B. OF
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1 (1991).
167 Barbara Smuts, The Evolutionary Origins Of Patriarchy, 6 HUMAN NATURE 1 (1995); Bar-
bara Smuts, Feminism, the Naturalistic Fallacy, and Evolutionary Biology, 11 POL. AND THE LIFE
SCI. 174–76 (1992).
168 Robert L. Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELECTION AND
THEDESCENT OFMAN 136–179 (Bernard Campbell ed. 1972).
169 Symons, supra note 162.
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relationships. Few mammal species are monogamous or have signifi-
cant paternal provisioning, yet in all females are more sexually selec-
tive. High status males tend to pursue numerous partners, while high
status females tend to seek better partners, though sometimes quite a
few of them.170 Sharon Stone once remarked that one advantage of be-
ing famous was that “I find I get to torture a higher class of men.”171
The selectivity principle helps explain why coercive sex is more
frightening to women than to men. Any act of coerced sex is potentially
an act of coerced reproduction that could create an indestructible link
between the victim and the coercer. Because sexual choice is of over-
whelming importance to females, powerful fear can be triggered by non-
copulatory sexual coercion, unexecuted threats of sexual coercion, in-
tercourse without risk of pregnancy because of age or contraception,
and situations in which the threat of coercion is not immediate.172 Just
as in any other aspect of human behavior and physiology, there is a
wide range of individual difference, but for the average woman, the pos-
sibility of sex is more fraught than for the average man not because of
lack of sexual desire but because the potential consequences of sex are
far more significant. The reproductive component of sex can provide an
explanation for why sex is different and why we might protect sexual
autonomy more than other autonomy interests. At the deepest emo-
tional level, unwanted sex can never be just sex or just violence but is
an act of reproductive coercion that simply has no analogue in any non-
sexual behavior. Pressure to buy Amway products from a supervisor is
uncomfortable, but pressure to have sex is terrifying.
Traditionalist evolutionary psychologists were wrong to leap from
parental investment theory to the view that women seek only monoga-
mous long-term relationships, but their account of male psychology pro-
vides a new perspective that can bridge traditionalist and feminist ac-
counts of male domination. All evolutionary psychologists note that the
long dependency of human infants means that paternal provisioning
increases the likelihood of a child’s survival; that men are reluctant to
support their children unless they can be certain about paternity; and
that men highly value chastity in long term mates.173 Traditionalists
170 Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, “7 Empathy, Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female,” Conceptual
Issues in Evolutionary Biology, n.d., 131.
171 Lois Romano, The Reliable Source, WASHINGTON POST (May 13. 1993), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1993/05/13/the-reliable-source/30d0cb6b-9ca9-4f73-bb56-de21115
92bbb/?utm_term=.4940de1ebb66 [https://perma.cc/Y2W4-AH8M].
172 Gerd Bohner & Norbert Schwarz, The Threat of Rape: Its Psychological Consequences on
Non-Victimized Women, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSP. 162–75
(D. Buss and N, Malamuth, eds. 1996).
173 This observation, as noted earlier, has a long and distinguished lineage. See, e.g., HUME,
supra note 13, at 331–32. More recently it has been made by both the early evolutionary psycholo-
gists and their feminist critics. For the early evolutionary psychology perspective, see Symons,
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and others mistakenly assumed that extensive male provisioning was a
universal—in fact, the relative economic contribution of men and
women varies greatly between societies. They were correct, however,
that the sexual division of labor leaves most reproductive tasks to
women; that on average men make a higher contribution to subsistence;
and that societies in which men make a large contribution to subsist-
ence are often organized to restrain female sexuality to ensure pater-
nity certainty through a sexual double standard.174 Societies with a dou-
ble standard vary in their requirements of female virtue, running the
range from strict chastity requirements, often brutally enforced, to a
looser expectation that women require men to display respect and seri-
ousness before becoming sexually intimate. But even in relatively per-
missive societies, women are strongly stigmatized for crossing the elu-
sive line between desirable hotness and repellent sluttiness, and the
pain of this stigma is keenly felt.175
The consequences of being labelled a slut are serious. Women cate-
gorized as sluts occupy an exceedingly low rung on the social scale.
Many men regard them as outside the class of women eligible for long-
term serious relationships, and they are at much greater risk of sexual
imposition—recall that until recently evidence of a women’s prior sex-
ual experience was considered compelling evidence against a rape
charge. Often the suggestion of sexual experience in a woman is under-
stood to imply other negative personal traits. Thus, a supervisor who
engages in a “crude, impersonal” sexual conduct towards an employee
is indicating that she is a low status person who can be taken advantage
of sexually and in other ways as well.176
supra note164. For their feminist critics, see Lancaster, supra note 166.
174 In some societies, women contribute more than men to economic subsistence, and in some
the kin of the mother rather than the father play the dominant role in supporting child-rearing.
Societies in which paternal support is not important are typically not monogamous, the sexual
double standard is relatively relaxed, and women find a diversified portfolio of genetically high-
quality partners at least as good as just one. Hrdy, supra note 163; Lancaster, supra note 164. F.
W. Marlowe, “The Mating System of Foragers in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample,” Cross-
Cultural Research 37, no. 3 (2003): 282; Marlowe.; Alice Schlegel and H.B. Barry III, “The Cultural
Consequences of Female Contribution to Subsistence,” American Anthropologist 88, no. 1 (1986):
142–50.
175 Leora Tanenbaum, The Truth about Slut Shaming, HUFFINGTONPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https:
//www.huffingtonpost.com/leora-tanenbaum/the-truth-about-slut-shaming_b_7054162.html [http
s://perma.cc/BF5P-JTMQ].
176 Judge Posner, a complex thinker who on the whole adopts the early sociobiology approach,
observed in an article that “solicitations by a supervisor . . . may be resented as signaling the offe-
ror’s unwillingness to recognize that the woman is of high rather than low status.” Richard A.
Posner, Employment Discrimination: Age Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, 19 INTERNATI-
ONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 421, 437 (1999). This insight seems wholly lost in the Bas-
kerville opinion. Thought the reasons for this are not clear, Posner is generally unsympathetic to
the regulation of sexual harassment, and one commentator has suggested that he operates from
the assumption that male sexuality is essentially ungovernable, and that women must bear the
burden of regulating sex. Id. See also Jane E. Larson, The New Home Economics: A Review of Sex
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The means-of-reproduction framework therefore provides a view of
sexual harassment not just as a wrong but as a discriminatory wrong.
It fills a key gap in the autonomy model by providing a reason for ex-
tending protection to sexual harms past the level provided to property
wrongs. Like dominance feminism and first-wave feminism, means-of-
reproduction feminism stresses role of sex in the social and economic
control of women. Unlike these alternatives, it does so without resorting
to norms of female chastity or assumptions about female sexual cold-
ness. Women are more sexually vulnerable not because of their fragility
or lack of desire but because the possibility of pregnancy makes coercive
sex frightening and makes the suggestion of sexual promiscuity degrad-
ing in ways it would not be to a man. The means-of-reproduction ap-
proach provides an account of why men might wish to subordinate
women that is both more empirically satisfying than prior theories and
less gloomy, acknowledging the variation among societies and individ-
uals and the possibility of movement towards more just social arrange-
ments.
In the context of sexual harms, the means-of-reproduction model
enlarges the perspective of the dangerous-sex model to clarify the spe-
cial emotional consequences of sex for women. Women are more sex-
ually vulnerable not because they are prudish or coy, but because sex
has potentially far more significant consequences for them than it does
for men. Society may help reduce that differential by expanding
women’s reproductive rights, but human emotional responses are to
some extent those of our ancestors in the environment of evolutionary
adaptation. American law and norms favor formal equality, and the
mean of reproduction perspective probably does not change the policy
prescriptions of the dangerous-sex model. From a purely formal point
of view, sex harassment is probably best thought of as a sex-neutral
offense, a wrong because it would not have occurred but for the plain-
tiff’s sex. Sex differences are relevant because they inform the applica-
tion of the Harris factors: whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
positionwould have found the behavior sufficiently severe, threatening,
or humiliating to constitute a hostile environment.177
But narratives matter. Sexual neutral models perform important
functions, but a complete picture requires something more. In practice,
adopting a neutral perspective means amale perspective will determine
the governing legal structures, and that has historically failed to protect
women. Judge Posner could not imagine that he would have been upset
by Hall’s behavior, and no doubt few men would have been. Narratives
and Reason, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 443, 467 (1993).
177 The only place that sex harassment doctrine has even fitfully considered sex differences is
the reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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are needed not so much to provide doctrinal arguments as to enhance
our ability to understand experiences beyond our own.
V. CONCLUSION
Subordination theory transformed the public and judicial view of
sexual misconduct. Because its dark picture of pervasive misogyny was
never broadly accepted, it metamorphosed into a meme of a small class
of misogynists, driven by the need to dominate and control women, and
deserving of both ostracism and legal sanctions.
This powerful image of harassers enabled the law to expand liabil-
ity for sexual harassment past the narrow confines of explicit quid pro
quo, but at the price of distorting the doctrinal elaboration that fol-
lowed. Sexual harassment came to be seen as essentially a form of rape.
Sometimes, as in Meritor, it was. But serious sexual harm can also re-
sult from motives and behavior much closer to normal sexual conduct,
a possibility obscured by the conflation of harassment and rape. If har-
assers were rapists, the coercive nature of the supervisory relationship
needed no special recognition; most organizations could be counted on
to self-police; defendants should be able to defend their character; and
retaliation motivated by hurt feelings should be not actionable. All sex-
ual harm was rape, committed by rapists.
Of course, not all sexual harm is the equivalent of rape, and not all
men who cause sexual harm are the moral equivalent of rapists. The
challenge now facing public policy is the regulation, whether by law or
norms, of a vast gray area of motive and behavior. What kinds of harm
short of that suffered in a violent assault should the law remedy? What
is the relevance of motive? Some sexual harms will be unavoidably out-
side the law, but some intermediate harms are deserving of legal relief,
especially those that occur in environments of unequal power. A female
employee may be seriously injured by the behavior of a supervisor who
is immature or wounded but not malicious. As long as the misogyny
narrative prevails, nuanced discussion of intermediate sexual harm is
impossible. New narratives, such as those that stress the emotional
dangerousness of sex, and perhaps even its special risks for women, are
needed.
New norms, however, require a shift in the rhetoric of culpability.
If women are to be protected from sexual harm that is significantly
short of rape, they cannot claim that that harm is equivalent to that of
rape, or that it is inflicted by men who are essentially rapists. In a path-
breaking article twenty-five years ago, Professor Linda Krieger argued
that discrimination, in the most general sense, was frequently moti-
vated not by animus but by a variety of unconscious biases. The result-
ing discrimination, she noted, was “unintended and, for many people,
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earnestly undesired.”178While arguing that the law should provide rem-
edies for unconscious discrimination, she cautioned against applying
the same level of moral condemnation to those who committed uncon-
scious discrimination as to those who engaged in the paradigmatic de-
liberate variety. Inappropriate levels of censure, she predicted, would
backfire, heightening tension and creating resistance.179
New narratives of sexual harm require similar modulation in the
rhetoric of blame. The dangers of overstating culpability can be seen all
too clearly in the #MeToo moment. Astonishingly to many (or at least
to many men), the #MeToo moment showed the ineffectiveness of the
current legal system. At the same time, the dangers of a dichotomized
view of male behavior were far more evident in the Twittersphere than
they had been in the courtroom. In court, narratives of sexual harm are
a subtle influence on the logic of the law, always present but not easily
detected. In social media and on the Internet more generally, moral nar-
ratives are always front and center. The initial wave of allegations
against individuals such as Harvey Weinstein involved behavior that
was either rape or an extreme abuse of power whose immorality few
questioned. The narrative of misogyny was rightly used in this setting.
As the #MeToo movement progressed, new charges continued to raise
issues central to the protection of women’s equality, but the conduct
described became less extreme and fit less readily into the models of
rape and misogyny. The behavior in question often involved suggestive
language or touching. Some of the accused, like Garrison Keillor, may
have been impelled, as Judge Posner said of Michael Hall, by immatu-
rity rather than by animus. The discussion shifted from professional
settings, where the element of power transformed the creepy into the
coercive, to the purely social, culminating in the claims made against
Aziz Ansari involving callous but lawful conduct during a date. Yet
these men received the same heavy artillery accusations of misogyny as
did Weinstein.180
Some commentators, including some feminists, noted that #MeToo
disregarded crucial distinctions between widely differing behavior.
Some critics went further, suggesting that concerns about anything
178 Linda Hamilton Krieger, Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrim-
ination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1244 (1995).
179 Krieger and others have gone further, suggesting that the remedies appropriate for uncon-
scious bias are more limited that those appropriate for conscious bias. While I support this posi-
tion, the analogy between non-misogynistic harassment and unconscious bias do not seem perfect.
Full compensatory damages in harassment or any other sex discrimination case should not require
proof of misogyny, but there may be some point at which culpability is low enough to justify limi-
tations on damages.
180 Alicia Eler, No, Garrison Keillor, Women Who Take Selfies Aren’t “Asking For It”, HARPER’S
BAZAAR (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/politics/a14030260/garrison-keillo
r-women-who-take-selfies/ [https://perma.cc/N9TZ-XKMP].
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short of the most egregious conduct would rob women of their agency
and even “strip sex of eros.”181 The view that the line must be drawn
narrowly, to encompass only the most egregious behavior, was explicitly
tied to the misogyny theory: “Shouldn’t sexual harassment . . . imply a
degree of hostility?”182
#MeToo supporters responded that no-one was actually equating
leering sexual advances with rape. In some sense this response was cor-
rect. If pressed, most #MeToo advocates would no doubt agree that not
all charges were equally serious. Yet there has been no sustained dis-
cussion of the many gradations of undesirable sexual conduct. And as
Krieger predicted, condemnation in excess of what is warranted has
contributed to backlash. Some contend that #MeToo is an effort to cre-
ate division between men and women, 183 while others insist that if they
must worry about being accused they will simply avoid women profes-
sionally.184 Not all of these reactions deserve sympathy, but some seem
to me the result of genuine confusion and resentment of a world in
which the rules seem unclear and the penalties for transgression arbi-
trary.
I have done little here to provide a practical guide for the perplexed
on the specific categories of intermediate sexual harm. My more modest
goals have been to make the case for moving away from the strong mi-
sogyny model and to suggest some paths that journey might take. With-
out new and less morally charged narratives of harm, there can be no
discussion of how the law and social norms can make modulated assess-
ments of the culpability of those who cause sexual harm, and provide
protection against significant sexual harms that are not motivated by
misogyny.
181 Daphne Merkin, Publicly, We Say #MeToo. Privately, We Have Misgivings., N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/golden-globes-metoo.html [https://per
ma.cc/JK9L-FVVW].
182 Id.
183 David Walsh, Ronan Farrow’s Latest #MeToo “Bombshell,” Directed Against Leslie Moonves
of CBS, WORLD SOCIALISTWEBSITE (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2018/08/01/m
oon-a01.html [https://perma.cc/AY2T-2RW5].
184 Katrin Bennhold, Another Side of #MeToo: Male Managers Fearful of Mentoring Women,




#MeToo and Law Talk
Lesley Wexler†
How Americans talk when they talk about #MeToo is often deeply
rooted in the law—even in non-legal settings, participants in the #Me-
Too conversation often deploy legal definitions of victims and perpetra-
tors, reference legal standards of proof and the role of legal forums,
draw explicit or implicit comparisons to legal punishments, and derive
meaning from legal metaphors and legal myths. In this essay, I identify
and assess the deployment of such law talk to help understand both
how legal rhetoric may facilitate the national #MeToo conversation and
related legal reforms, but may also simultaneously limit and obscure
some of the #MeToo’s more transformative possibilities. Such critical
engagement seeks to open space for selective pushback, including initial
thoughts on the possibilities of reclaiming colloquial law talk to better
match the interests at stake in non-legal settings as well as bringing to
the forefront the therapeutic, informative, and structural issues law
talk might crowd out.
In Part I, I briefly discuss the emergence of two distinct MeToo
movements to understand both the non-legal and legal origins of the
#MeToo conversation. I begin with Alyssa Milano’s informative, hand-
raising oriented #MeToo hashtag and its intersection with Tarana
Burke’s victim-centered, empathy-generating, and restorative-justice
focused Me Too. Even as these two approaches joined to form the origi-
nal basis of the #MeToo conversation, I note how law talk was implicitly
embedded in #MeToo from the very beginning. I then highlight four
ways in which law talk is now shaping much of the public discourse in
regards to: (1) who may claim #MeToo status; (2) how commentators
use the existence of legal forums to serve a gatekeeping function to #Me-
Too conversation; (3) what process is demanded in non-legal settings for
† Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Illinois College of
Law. Thank you to Dan Shalmon, Jessica Clarke, Eric Johnson, Shelly Layser, Jeremy McClane,
Colleen Murphy, Ellen Oberwetter, Jennifer Robbennolt, Arden Rowell, Jamelle Sharpe, and the
panelists at the University of Chicago Legal Forum #MeToo Colloquium for comments and to Jacob
Ferguson for excellent assistance with the article.
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assessment and response to #MeToo claimants; and (4) what conse-
quences are appropriate for #MeToo perpetrators based on legal analo-
gies.
In Part II, I identify some possible benefits to the increasingly dom-
inant law talk. Because America is a highly legalistic country, law may
provide an accessible language for a diverse group of people to learn
about, think through, and discuss #MeToo related issues. Relatedly, law
talk facilitates the borrowing of well-considered legal rules and pro-
cesses for non-legal settings, rather than forcing participants to con-
struct a wholly new approach. In addition, law talk might help generate
or maintain a floor for potential #MeToo claimants, precluding roll-
backs of who may persuasively claim to be a victim and what events
and perpetrators might be viewed as inherently problematic. Lastly,
when individuals approach #MeToo as a fundamentally legal conversa-
tion, it might provide a natural feedback loop for legal reform. #MeToo
conversations steeped in the law can lay bare the need for procedural
reforms on issues such as statutes of limitations or evidentiary stand-
ards or substantive reforms regarding definitions of rape, sexual as-
sault, consent, or sexual harassment, so as to change the approach in
both legal and non-legal settings. The prevalence of law talk might also
provide an obvious entrée into conversations regarding law’s creation
and enforcement of barriers to transparency and thus facilitate fuller
debates about the potential hazards of such barriers as exemplified by
non-disclosure agreements or mandatory arbitration.
In Part III, I discuss my increasing concern with law talk’s expand-
ing role in the #MeToo conversation. While law might sometimes be an
appropriate starting point, as for those claimants who seek formal, legal
accountability, the dominance of law talk may sometimes act as a sticky
baseline limiting meaningful engagement with those #MeToo claims
and claimants whose facts do not easily fit within the bounds of legal
impermissibility or whose interests are not served by a legal approach.
This stickiness can occur when #MeToo conversation participants: hold
mistaken beliefs that specific law governs a situation when in fact it
does not; maintain an understanding that the same concerns that in-
form and create law are coextensive with the concerns implicated by
situations not governed by the law’s baseline; or use unjustifiably high
thresholds to overcome law’s baseline as a strong default even in set-
tings where other approaches might better serve welfare or other aims.
I also suggest that the dominance of law talk may obscure or crowd out
non-legal conversations and concerns. These include attention to struc-
tures that create the underlying conditions ripe for abuse; emphasis on
victim support rather than perpetrator punishment; and pathways for
amends, redemption, and reintegration.
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I conclude with three preliminary suggestions in Part III to push
back against some perils of law talk in the #MeToo setting. The first is
to take up the work of exposing and contesting the inappropriate appli-
cation of legal baselines in #MeToo conversations. The second is to re-
claim colloquial law talk to include victim concerns. Lastly, I urge a re-
framing of the national conversation to center therapeutic, informative,
and structural concerns.
I. BACKGROUND
#MeToo is often characterized as a bottom-up moral reckoning with
the pervasiveness of sexual harassment and sexual assault in modern
society. But even if its origins were therapeutic, restorative, and educa-
tional in origin, I suggest in this section that the American #MeToo con-
versation has always been steeped in the law. Legal definitions, legal
rules, legal processes, and legal metaphors pervade the everyday con-
versations taking place at office coolers,1 on social media,2 and in news
commentary.3 In this section, after identifying the presence of law talk,
I offer a brief taxonomy of the ways in which law talk is currently shap-
ing the #MeToo conversation to more easily facilitate observation of its
beneficial and pernicious effects.
A. MeToo’s Educational, Therapeutic, and Structural Roots
In 2017, New York Times and NewYorker reporters broke the story
of Harvey Weinstein’s pervasive and horrifying sexual assaults against
Hollywood actresses.4 A few days later, Alyssa Milano posted the tweet
heard around the world:
Me too.
1 Lynda Tran, Addressing this #MeToo Moment, CBSNEWS (July 31, 2018), https://www.cbsn
ews.com/news/commentary-addressing-this-metoo-moment/ [https://perma.cc/LS85-ZNCR].
2 See generally Jamillah BowmanWilliams, #MeToo as Catalyst: A Glimpse into 21st Century
Activism, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 373 (2019).
3 Eliza Ennis & Lauren Wolfe, #MeToo: The Women’s Media Center Report, THEWOMEN’SM-
EDIA CENTER (2018), http://www.womensmediacenter.com/reports/media-and-metoo-how-a-move
ent-affected-press-coverage-of-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/429D-TSBJ].
4 Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for
Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-har-
assment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/T5SY-3SCL]; Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Over-
tures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-
harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [https://perma.cc/9VMZ-GAJ5].
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Suggested by a friend: “If all the women who have been sexually
harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as a status, we might give
people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.”
If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted, write ‘metoo’ as a
reply to this tweet.5
The #MeToo hashtag quickly went global with over 2 million #Me-
Too tweets spanning 85 countries in less than a month.6 When asked
about the tweet and the ensuing response, Milano commented that
“[t]he most important thing that it did was to shift the conversation
away from the predator [Harvey Weinstein] and to the victim.”7 It was
not styled as a legal reform effort and “[wa]sn’t a call to action or the
beginning of a campaign, culminating in a series of protests and
speeches and events. It [wa]s simply an attempt to get people to under-
stand the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault in society. To
get women, and men, to raise their hands.”8 In other words, #MeToo
was intended to dismantle the preexisting belief that harassment and
assault is exceptional.
#MeToo quickly collided with Tarana Burke’s “Me Too,” a ten-year
effort to “help survivors of sexual violence, particularly. . . young
women of color from low wealth communities, find pathways to heal-
ing.”9 Burke’s Me Too focuses on victims’ needs for empathy, to be un-
derstood by normalizing speaking out, taking the focus off the accuser,
providing community, and dispelling isolation.10 At the heart of Burke’s
Me Too is the idea of solidarity: “Survivors reaching out to those who
don’t understand they are survivors – and helping them to feel whole
again.”11
5 Alyssa Milano @Alyssa_Milano, TWITTER (Oct.15, 2017, 1:21PM), https://twitter.com/Alyssa
_Milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/7WF5-RRLL].
6 Kara Fox & Jan Diehm, #MeToo’s Global Moment: The Anatomy of a Viral Campaign, CNN
(Nov. 9, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/09/world/metoo-hashtag-global-movement/index.html
[https://perma.cc/HQ7B-77NH].
7 Joyce Chen, Alyssa Milano Wants Her ‘Me Too’ Campaign to Elevate Harvey Weinstein Dis-
cussion, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/movies/movie-news/alyssa-
milano-wants-her-me-too-campaign-to-elevate-harvey-weinstein-discussion-123610/ [https://perm
a.cc/7P5D-7QAB].
8 Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/ [https://perma.cc/YV83-B
T7U].
9 ME TOO, History and Vision, https://metoomvmt.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/W5PX-DMR5]
(last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
10 Daisy Murray, ‘Empowerment Through Empathy’ - We Spoke to Tarana Burke, the Woman
Who Really Started the ‘Me Too’ Movement, ELLE (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.elle.com/uk/life-and-
culture/culture/news/a39429/empowerment-through-empathy-tarana-burke-me-too/ [https://perm
a.cc/8VX9-UKZC].
11 JUST BE INC., The Movement, http://justbeinc.wixsite.com/justbeinc/the-me-too-movement-
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Such solidarity facilitates12 the way in which Burke’s Me Too also
takes on larger structural considerations of how “collectively, to start
dismantling these systems that uphold and make space for sexual vio-
lence.”13 For Burke, the conversation should not focus on individual per-
petrators, but instead on “power and privilege.”14 As part of this trans-
formative vision, she deemphasizes individual guilt, and her version of
restorative justice facilitates the healing of both victims and perpetra-
tors.15
#MeToo and Tarana Burke’s “Me Too” were quickly tied together,
with Burke tweeting, “It’s beyond a hashtag. It’s the start of a larger
conversation and a movement for radical community healing. Join us.
#metoo.”16 The two efforts seemed to merge, if a bit uneasily,17 and have
prompted extensive dialogue online and off about specific incidents as
well as about sexual assault and harassment more generally.
B. Law as Emerging Background
Despite this initial seemingly non-legal focus of #MeToo founders,
the conversation about #MeToo has and is being deeply shaped by law
and legal discourse.18 In this subsection, I briefly introduce four differ-
ent ways in which law and law talk is now embedded in the #MeToo
conversation: (a) scope of #MeToo claims and claimants; (b) forum ar-
guments demanding prior or exclusive engagement with a legal forum
in order to participate as a claimant in the #MeToo conversation; (c)
process arguments for resolution of #MeToo claims; and (d) concern
about proportionate punishment for #MeToo perpetrators.
c7cf [https://perma.cc/RXQ6-22RM] (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
12 Kaitlynn Mendes et al., #MeToo and the Promise and Pitfalls of Challenging Rape Culture
through Digital Feminist Activism, 25 EURO. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 236, 238 (2018).
13 Murray, supra note 10.
14 Tarana Burke (@TaranaBurke), TWITTER (Aug. 20, 2018, 4:08AM), https://twitter.com/Tara
naBurke/status/1031498206260150272 [https://perma.cc/B4QP-F89N].
15 Michelle Rodino-Colocino,Me Too, #MeToo: Countering Cruelty with Empathy, 15 COMM. &
CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 96, 98 (2018).
16 Abby Ohlheiser, The Woman behind ‘Me Too’ Knew the Power of the Phrase When She Cre-
ated It 10 Years Ago, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-in-
tersect/wp/2017/10/19/the-woman-behind-me-too-knew-the-power-of-the-phrase-when-she-create
d-it-10-years-ago/?utm_term=.a6673cec1967 [https://perma.cc/JB7M-RXS9].
17 Burke has been vocal about her dissatisfaction with the focus on high profile predators
against white women and suggested changing the narrative. Elizabeth Wagmeister, How Me Too
Founder Tarana Burke Wants to Shift the Movement’s Narrative, VARIETY (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://variety.com/2018/biz/news/tarana-burke-me-too-founder-sexual-violence-1202748012/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/A34C-548R].
18 Alison Gash & Ryan Harding, #MeToo? Legal Discourse and Everyday Responses to Sexual
Violence, 7 LAWS (SPECIAL ISSUE), May 21, 2018, art. 21 at 22.
348 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
1. Scope
The first use of law talk relates to what actions or events, and re-
latedly which participants, might have engaged in or been subject to
behavior properly considered within the purview of #MeToo.19 In the-
ory, the question of whomay or who should feel entitled to say “#MeToo”
need not bear any particular relation to law. But law has informed #Me-
Too membership from the very beginning. The initial #MeToo hashtag
includes two legal terms of art: “sexual harassment” and “[sexual] as-
sault.”20 While it is unclear whether Alyssa Milano intended to refer-
ence the formal legal definition of such concepts or instead gave voice
to a more colloquial understanding, she used legally freighted terms. As
lawyers and legal scholars, this might seem hard to avoid or inevitable,
but one can imagine other ways of expressing the initial call and its
scope, such as “survivors of sexual violence or sexist behavior.”21
This initial rhetorical grounding of #MeToo in legal terminology
and its massive replication through all those that answered and re-
peated the call matters because law formally defines sexual harassment
and assault. As part of the enterprise of determining criminal and civil
offenses, the law also creates a dividing line between criminal and tor-
tious behavior on one side and legally permissible on the other. While
the law does not explicitly endorse or authorize behavior that might still
be morally objectionable, it also does not speak to the non-legal scope of
and sanctions for what might be considered lawful, but awful behav-
ior.22 In other words, the law provides a forum, a set of rules, and a
range of consequences for unlawful behavior, but it is largely silent as
to lawful behavior. So, for example, if we look to the law for answers, it
tells us that, if the alleged facts are true, actress Gabrielle Union or
actor Anthony Rapp can lay claim to #MeToo, but probably not Aziz
Ansari’s unnamed date;23 Chloe Dykstra, who detailed being subject to
sexist sexual and emotional behavior that many people believe falls
19 Such exclusion need not happen via law talk—as arguments that men and marginalized
groups had been explicitly excluded or voices were not heard.
20 SeeMilano, supra note 5.
21 For instance, she could have posted “If all the women who have been subject to sexist be-
havior or physically violated in a sexual way wrote ‘Me too’ as a status, we might give people a
sense of the magnitude of the problem.”
22 See, e.g., Vicki Shultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L. J. F. 22
(2018) (discussing how much inappropriate workplace behavior is not deemed “because of sex”).
23 Katie Way, I Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari. It Turned into the Worst Night of My Life,
BABE (Jan. 13, 2018), https://babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari-28355 [https://perma.cc/UZW6-TW6
C].
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short of criminality;24 or women and men made deeply uncomfortable
by Joe Biden’s non-sexual but overly intimate touching.25
2. Forum
The second use of law talk relates to how individuals reference the
role of legal forums in defining entrance to or participation in the #Me-
Too conversation. This form of law talk builds upon the scope argument,
that only those meeting legal definitions of assault or harassment can
participate, by adding another condition, that only those who were will-
ing to engage legal mechanisms may now share their accounts or seek
justice. A stronger version of this argument suggests not only that vic-
tims must have engaged legal mechanisms to participate, but that the
only appropriate forums in which to discuss their claims are in sites of
formal accountability such as courtrooms or an employer’s dispute res-
olution mechanisms.
One might view this forum policing as a variant of Mary Ann Glen-
don’s Rights Talk, which documented Americans’ tendencies to frame
political preferences as instead inviolable individual rights.26 It empha-
sizes the rights of perpetrators as holders of due process and such due
process as absolute and only vindicated in legal settings. Take, for ex-
ample, the position of this National Review piece:
If a person is the victim of a crime, that crime should be reported
and the accused should have a right to face his or her accuser.
This to avoid a trial-by-mob, and to keep people from losing their
jobs and having their reputations ruined by a hashtag rather
than proof and due process. . . . If sexual harassment is a crime,
it should be fought not with hashtags but with the full force of
the law. . . . We should criticize the justice system when it fails,
but we must follow due process when it comes to crimes, because
if we don’t, everyone will suffer.27
24 Chloe Dykstra, Rose-Colored Glasses: A Confession, MEDIUM (June 14, 2018), https://me-
dium.com/@skydart/rose-colored-glasses-6be0594970ca [https://perma.cc/W5JB-3KP8].
25 David Oskar Marcus, #MeToo Has Lost Its Way: In Defense of Joe Biden, THEHILL (Apr. 2,
2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/436862-metoo-has-lost-its-way-in-defense-of-joe-bide
n [https://perma.cc/HL74-ZAXS]; EJ Dickson, Joe Biden and the #MeToo Generation Gap, ROLLING
STONE (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/biden-metoo-genera-
tion-gap-817133/ [https://perma.cc/978Y-5F3G] (noting a generational divide in women’s response
to #MeToo allegations against Joe Biden).
26 MARYANNGLENDON, RIGHTSTALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENTOFPOLITICALDISCOURSE (1991).
For another modern-day example of this, see Joseph Blocher, Guns Rights Talk, 94 BOSTON U. L.
REV. 813 (2014).
27 Annika Hernroth-Rothstein, #MeToo and Trial byMob, NAT’LREV. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://w
ww.nationalreview.com/2017/10/metoo-meeting-trial-mob/ [https://perma.cc/973T-52FN].
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The exclusive legitimacy of legal forums is often implicitly or ex-
plicitly contrasted with the “court of public opinion,” in which non-legal
airings and/or resolutions of claims are derided as witch-hunts, or vigi-
lantism, mob justice,28 or lynch mobs.29 To take a few examples, one
reporter noted, “[#MeToo once] seemed refreshingly nonpartisan. . . . If
there was to be a witch hunt, better that it seek out all the witches, not
just those from a particular coven;”30 lawyer Wendy Kaminer wrote,
“Categorically believing accusers turns a mere accusation of wrongdo-
ing into proof that it occurred. Women who cheer this virtually irrebut-
table presumption of guilt, considering due process for alleged har-
assers a component of rape culture, are cheering a thoughtless,
treacherous form of vigilante feminism;”31 and commentator Adriana
Cohen exhorted, “Those in the #MeToo mob. . . insist we must believe
all women who make sexual assault allegations against men, regardless
of the facts involved or the evidence.”32
3. Process
The third form of law talk subjects #MeToo claimants to legal pro-
cess arguments regardless of whether the claimants have invoked or
are participating in a legal proceeding. By legal process, I mean those
rules that guide the adjudication of civil or criminal claims, rather than
those legal rules and definitions that determine the substantive scope
of offenses. So, for instance, many believe individual, non-legal judg-
ments or responses to a #MeToo account are or should be limited by
whether an alleged event occurred within a criminal or civil statute of
limitations. Those who come forward in present with accounts of events
that could no longer be litigated ought to be barred not just from a legal
finding of fault or crime but also any such supportive social judgment
or collateral consequences for the alleged perpetrator.
28 See generallyMary Anne Franks,Witch Hunts: Free Speech, #MeToo, and the Fear of Wom-
en’s Words, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 123, 123–147 (2019).
29 David Hendershot & Janet Weaver, Opinion, #MeToo is Mob Justice, Not Social Justice,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/readersreact/la-ol-le-metoo-mob-jus-
tice-20180926-story.html [https://perma.cc/R6HQ-NLHD].
30 Grayson Quay, #MeToo Falls to Tribalism, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www
.theamericanconservative.com/articles/metoo-falls-to-tribalism-kavanaugh-ellison-trump/ [https:/
/perma.cc/22YY-FXG4].
31 Interestingly, unlike many, Kaminer is careful to distinguish the settings or goals of ther-
apy and justice. Wendy Kaminer, Opinion, Beware Vigilante Feminism, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 27,
2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/10/27/beware-vigilante-feminism/ Qix5RT3jJjo
VIAzh9Zt9aM/story.html [https://perma.cc/47NS-8QKU].
32 Adriana Cohen, The #MeTooMob and Our Judicial System, REALCLEARPOL. (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/10/05/the_metoo_mob_and_our_judicial_system_1
38258.html [https://perma.cc/L2SJ-GC2Z].
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Relatedly, when assessing the validity of a #MeToo narrative or ac-
count, many turn to legal processes to guide their decision-making.
Take for instance the public commentary surrounding questions re-
garding Justice Kavanaugh’s fitness for the Supreme Court. Legal
questions dominated the public conversations: such as whether Dr.
Ford and other alleged victims such as Deborah Ramirez and Julie
Swetnik offered up corroborating witnesses or legally admissible evi-
dence; whether Justice Kavanaugh or others “tamper[ed]” with wit-
nesses;33 whether the evidence offered up satisfy a criminal or civil
standard of proof;34 and whether the presumption of innocence was
properly respected.35
4. Consequences
The final form of law talk I identify here relates to the conse-
quences for alleged #MeToo perpetrators. Legal analogies and meta-
phors often pervade the discussion of consequences, with the term
“death penalty” frequently used to voice the concern that those found or
even simply alleged to be involved in wrongdoing will become unem-
ployable or experience a social death. Take, for example, Gayle King’s
observation that “I think when a woman makes an accusation, the man
instantly gets the death penalty,”36 or Senator Dick Durbin’s comment
in the wake of Al Franken’s resignation, “there’s only one penalty, and
it’s the death penalty,”37 or this news commentary, “When the [#MeToo]
mob descends on a target of prominence, it’s as good as a death sen-
tence, socially and professionally.”38 Others have invoked the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”39
33 Alexandra Hutzler, Death Threats against Kavanaugh Accuser Christine Blasey Ford Are
‘Witness Tampering,’ Senator Says, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/senat
or-death-threats-kavanaugh-accuser-witness-tampering-1130571 [https://perma.cc/ZPQ5-G75X].
34 David A. Graham, Susan Collins Says She Believes Survivors—Just Not Ford, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/susan-collinss-kavanaugh-sex
ual-assault/572347/ [https://perma.cc/XWE2-HBV7?type=image] (discussing how most of the GOP
seemed to follow a criminal standard of proof and how Susan Collins followed the civil standard of
proof).
35 Thomas Jipping, Losing the Presumption of Innocence, NAT’LREV. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://w
ww.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/brett-kavanaugh-presumption-of-innocence/ [https://perma
.cc/VGK8-WSRR].
36 Audie Cornish, Gayle King Thinks #MeToo Needs Due Process Talk, N.Y. TIMES (June 12,
2018) (Magazine), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/magazine/gayle-king-thinks-metoo-needs-
due-process.html [https://perma.cc/KC27-BHCS].
37 #MeToo’s Penalty: Your Job, WTAXNEWS RADIO, https://wtax.com/news/101101-metoos-pe
nalty-your-job/ [https://perma.cc/499S-5TF6] (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
38 Claire Berlinski, The Warlock Hunt, AM. INT. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.the-american-in-
terest.com/2017/12/06/the-warlock-hunt/ [https://perma.cc/899N-JCAL].
39 Lionel Shriver, What’s Wrong with Hearing #MeToo Men’s Side of the Story?, SPECTATOR
(Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/09/whats-wrong-with-hearing-metoo-mens-side
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#MeToo conversations often include related concerns that any
sanctions be time bound and that #MeToo perpetrators be able to move
on with their lives just as other criminals completing state-ordered pun-
ishment.40 Think of Norm MacDonald’s comment that
[i]t’s weird that you can commit murder and go to prison and do
your time and then everybody goes, ‘He’s done his time, he de-
serves to work, how dare you treat him as less than you just be-
cause he murdered a guy,’ because he did his penance for it. And
yet the Twitter mob, there is no sentence for it. But I think we’re
going to return to reason and realize you shouldn’t ban a person
for life for doing something that you couldn’t even put him in
prison for.41
Or consider this online commentator referencing alleged #MeToo per-
petrators speaking out to defend themselves, “Yet even worse is the in-
creasing frequency and severity of punishment for anyone attempting
to commute this career death sentence by daring to give voice to the
possibility of innocence or mitigating circumstances.”42
II. BENEFITS
Given that so much of the #MeToo conversation is steeped in and
policed by law talk, I use Part II to discuss some potential benefits to
such rhetorical moves, before explaining in Part III why such benefits
might not materialize or be experienced by all or even most participants
in the conversation. I begin here by identifying here four possible posi-
tive features of law talk. First, law talk is familiar and pervasive in
American culture. Even those without law degrees or legal expertise are
generally comfortable engaging in conversations using the language of
the law to order their judgments and opinions. Second, law and related
law talk can provide off-the-rack defaults in non-legal settings, allowing
participants in #MeToo conversations to easily systematize their under-
standings of events rather than needing to reinvent the wheel for gov-
erning concepts. It offers a preexisting system to determine who is a
-of-the-story [https://perma.cc/6EY4-S9YT].
40 Opinion,What to Do with the ‘Bad Men’ of the #MeToo Movement, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/02/opinion/bad-men-metoo-movement.html [https://perma.cc//E
NC7-ABN2].
41 Scott King, Norm Macdonald on New Show, Burt Reynolds, Dirty Work 2? And Louis C.K,
FORBES (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottking/2018/09/10/norm-macdonald-on-
new-show-burt-reynolds-dirty-work-2-and-louis-c-k/#9af433c2ca9d [https://perma.cc/7HSD-HSA
Z].
42 E. Olson, Comment to #MeToo Casualty Ian BurumaWas the Editor We Needed, QUILLETTE
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://quillette.com/2018/09/26/metoo-casualty-ian-buruma-was-the-editor-we-n
eeded/ [https://perma.cc/U9UP-PMET].
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victim and what is an appropriate punishment. Relatedly, law talk and
the underlying law from which it emerges can establish a floor to guard
against participants in the #MeToo conversation who wish to exclude
potential victims or exonerate potential perpetrators who do satisfy le-
gal definitions. And lastly, the pervasiveness of law talk might help gen-
erate a natural feedback loop into legal reform. Since participants are
already contemplating and debating legal standards, they might push
for reform when those concepts fail them in non-legal settings.
A. Accessible to Americans
One ostensible benefit of rendering #MeToo a legal conversation is
that law talk and legal thinking are generally accessible to America’s
diverse population. While not everyone in the United States is well
versed in the law, commentators from de Tocqueville to Mary Ann Glen-
don have noted that “lawyers’ habits of mind, as well as their modes of
discourse, ‘infiltrate through society right down to the lowest ranks.’”43
Most people living in the United States discussing #MeToo have at least
a passing familiarity with concepts and terms embedded in law, such
as due process, presumptions of innocence, sexual harassment, and sex-
ual assault.44
B. Off-the-Rack Defaults
Second, law talk allows participants to borrow “off-the-rack” legal
terms to deploy in non-legal settings.45 Just as contract law can provide
“off-the-rack” terms and rules to deploy in private settings, the civil and
criminal law can supply terms and concepts “for free,”46 enabling par-
ticipants to concentrate on: the application of the law to facts, legal re-
forms, structural and cultural changes, or even expressions of empa-
thy.47 For instance, civil law both defines the term “sexual harassment”
43 GLENDON, supra note 26, at 1 (citing de Tocqueville and noting that such patterns continue
today).
44 This is not to say relevant therapeutic or scientific discourses are necessarily less accessible,
though they might be. Rather, the point is that a legally oriented discourse is a familiar one.
45 Using a preexisting body of law as an off-the-rack solution in another legal setting is a
common strategy. Scholars and legislators often experiment, taking the terms, rules, and/or base-
lines from one area and arguing for their application or consideration in other settings so as to
build upon existing understandings of the world with which people are already familiar. For an
intriguing example, see Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010) (using commercial partnership default
rules to contemplate default rules to govern polygamous relationships).
46 There’s no such thing as free. Nod to STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE
SPEECH: AND IT’S AGOOD THING TOO (1994).
47 FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 34 (1991) (“Corporate Law is a set of terms available off the rack so that participants in
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and has a body of case law to interpret what set of facts constitute sex-
ual harassment. Thus, for those in the #MeToo conversation who use
the term “sexual harassment” as a shorthand rather than describing all
of the events they experience, other individuals might already have a
basic understanding, informed by the law, as to what that experience
might be.48 Rather than needing to hash out the facts, they might be
able to move past a definition of terms and towards empathy and sup-
port. Or for those interested in enhancing civil remedies or reducing
barriers for claimants to come forward in non-legal settings, they need
not first have a conversation about what constitutes sexual harassment.
Similarly, for those concerned about fairness to those outed in a Face-
book post or a whisper network as a #MeToo perpetrator, they can use
due process protections as understood under the Fifth Amendment as a
default for protections to be applied in the workplace or in social set-
tings.
C. Baseline/Floor
Third, law talk can also impose an informal floor in non-legal set-
tings, ensuring that participants in the #MeToo conversation cannot
persuasively narrow #MeToo claims, procedures, or punishments be-
neath what the law would dictate. While many scholars have noted the
limitations of Title VII’s definition of harassment and its increasingly
narrow interpretation by courts,49 it might nevertheless provide a use-
ful floor against those who seek to narrow it even further. For in-
stance,50 while some might subjectively or normatively believe that sex-
ist, but not sexual, behavior cannot constitute sexual harassment, and
those subject to it ought not claim the mantle of #MeToo, law talk may
provide an important check. As Schultz and Soucek nicely illustrate,
the law’s understanding of sexual harassment is broad, including “the
corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting . . . Corporate codes and existing judicial deci-
sions supply these terms ‘for free’ to every corporation, enabling the venturers to concentrate on
matters that are specific to their undertaking.”).
48 Thanks to Jessica Clarke for pointing out that it is not just law, but the related conscious-
ness raising groups that enabled this possibility. And thanks for the hard work of feminists like
Catherine MacKinnon and Lin Farley that enabled such as shift. Reva B. Seigel, Introduction: A
Short History of Sexual Harassment, in CATHERINEA.MACKINNON&REVAB. SIEGEL, DIRECTIONS
IN SEXUALHARASSMENT LAW (2003).
49 SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE
DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017).
50 For another example, though many suggest that one cannot rape one’s wife, the law conclu-
sively states otherwise, and the law can inform social as well as legal understandings. Irin Cormon,
Why Are So Many Men Confused About What Sexual Consent Means, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/what-counts-as-improper-sexual-contact-its-becoming-
harder-to-tell/2017/10/13/b15506c6-af8e-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html? utm_term=.3ff46c7
142f5 [https://perma.cc/C36Q-J37B]; FED. BUREAUOF INVESTIGATION, FREQUENTLYASKEDQUEST-
IONS ABOUT THE CHANGE IN THEUCR DEFINITION OF RAPE (2014).
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endless ways employees are undermined, excluded, sabotaged, ridi-
culed, or assaulted because of their sex—even if not through words or
actions that are ‘sexual’ in nature. . . .”51 The Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation is broader than many others that have been offered, including
the one that the New York Times has employed and everyday linguistic
usage, which often focuses on touching.52
By creating a floor that includes some defined set of victims, it also
helps rhetorically guard against the discounting or minimization of al-
leged actions of alleged perpetrators. So, for instance, when people ob-
serve that Al Franken’s behavior is not the equivalent of Harvey Wein-
stein,53 it is helpful to counter that Al Franken’s alleged behavior was
at the very least tortious.54 One need not be a moral monster to be ap-
propriately considered within #MeToo’s ambit, and the law can help-
fully disentangle the confusion.
Law talk can also help protect against related minimization by vir-
tue of elapsed time or the youth of the perpetrator. So, when Harvey
Weinstein defends his actions as “com[ing] of age in the 60’s and 70’s,
when all the rules about behavior and workplaces were different,”55 one
can point to the laws against rape and assault that existed at the time.
Or for those who try to downplay the allegations against Justice Ka-
vanaugh as a simple example of “boys will be boys,” the law then and
51 Vicki Schultz & Brian Soucek, Sexual Harassment by Any Other Name, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 227, 227 (2019).
52 Id.
53 Chris Varias, Rob Schneider: In Showbiz . . . All You Get to Keep Is the Stories, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER (Jan. 02, 2018), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/entertainment/2018/01/02/rob-schnei
der-showbiz-all-you-get-keep-stories/996743001/ [https://perma.cc/U4BU-85V3].
54 For example, take this paragraph from cultural commentator Masha Gessen:
The case of Franken makes it all that much more clear that this conversation is, in fact,
about sex, not about power, violence, or illegal acts. The accusations against him, which
involve groping and forcible kissing, arguably fall into the emergent, undefined, and
most likely undefinable category of “sexual misconduct.” Put more simply, Franken
stands accused of acting repeatedly like a jerk, and he denies that he acted this way. The
entire sequence of events, from the initial accusations to Franken’s resignation, is based
on the premise that Americans, as a society, or at least half of a society, should be polic-
ing non-criminal behavior related to sex.
Masha Gessen, Al Franken’s Resignation and the Selective Force of #MeToo, NEWYORKER (Dec. 7,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/al-franken-resignation-and-the-selective-
force-of-metoo [https://perma.cc/F9NZ-LUWU]. Those well versed in the law and willing to engage
in law talk might remind Gessen and Gessen’s readers that the law includes civil wrongdoings,
like torts, in additional to criminal wrongdoings and that many of the allegations against Franken
raise colorable claims of tortious behavior.
55 Harvey Weinstein, Statement from Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://ww
w.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/us/statement-from-harvey-weinstein.html [https://perma.cc
/R9CB-2B8X].
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now defines such alleged actions as illegal even if engaged in by a 17-
year-old boy.56
Law talk and its provision of a protective floor need not and indeed
has not been limited to possible #MeToo claimants, but also includes
potential #MeToo perpetrators and enablers. Due process defines a min-
imum set of protections afforded to criminal defendants, and as ex-
plained above, many have argued that decision-makers or accusers
must provide this level of protections and cannot go below them. Simi-
larly, in assessing the role of enablers and participants, one might use
the criminal law to define a minimal level of contribution before one
ought to be sanctioned, even if such sanctions are not imposed by the
state. For instance, think of William Shatner’s comments, “I keep ask-
ing who is policing [the #MeToo movement] because there’s a lot using
it for their own personal vendettas that have nothing to do with the
points of the movement.”57
D. Legal Reform Feedback Loop
Lastly, structuring #MeToo as a legal conversation even in non-le-
gal settings might create a natural feedback loop into legal reforms. By
integrating the law into the conversation, the law’s limitations are un-
likely to be overlooked. To the extent that advocates find that particular
legal standards do not match their needs or expectations, they can press
for legislative reform. A brief list of possible reforms that are currently
being pursued include: altering federal or state definitions for concepts
like intent, discrimination, harassment for sex crimes and torts,58 ex-
panding workplaces covered by harassment policies;59 and using private
codes of conduct to offer more expansive definitions than those offered
56 Megan Garber, Brett Kavanaugh and the Revealing Logic of ‘Boys Will Be Boys’, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/09/brett-kavanaugh-an
d-the-revealing-logic-of-boys-will-be-boys/570415/ [https://perma.cc/9LM3-6Q47].
57 Ryan Parker, William Shatner Likens #MeToo Movement to French Revolution if Not Po-
liced, HOLLYWOODREP. (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/william-shatner
-likens-metoo-movement-french-revolution-not-policed-1171559 [https://perma.cc/7S55-EQVF?ty
pe=image]; Ryan Parry & Josh Boswell, William Shatner as He Defends Christmas Classic Baby
It’s Cold Outside from the Censors and Says He Now Has to Refrain from Complimenting Women
on Their ‘Great Legs’, DAILYMAIL (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-65044
45/William-Shatner-says-MeToo-hysterical-like-French-Revolution.html [https://perma.cc/68SA-
QXWS].
58 Ginia Bellafante, The #MeToo Movement Changed Everything. Can the Law Catch Up?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/nyregion/metoo-movement-schn
eiderman-prosecution.html [https://perma.cc/8C6B-J4Z4].
59 Rebecca Beitsch, #MeToo Has Changed Our Culture. Now It’s Changing Our Laws, PEW
TRUSTS (July 31, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/
07/31/metoo-has-changed-our-culture-now-its-changing-our-laws [https://perma.cc/9AXK-MN8F].
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in the law.60 Other reforms relating to forum access include: lengthen-
ing or abolishing statutes of limitations for #MeToo related crimes,61
pushing against the legality of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration,62
and limitations on nondisclosure agreements.63
III. CONCERNS ABOUT LAW TALK’S LEGAL BASELINE AND PRELIMINARY
SUGGESTIONS
While law talk might help order and set the floor for the national
#MeToo conversation as discussed above, I have deep concerns about
the ways in which this legal floor may also act as a ceiling. Those en-
gaged in colloquial law talk often use law as a sticky baseline from
which to assess the validity of #MeToo claims, claimants, processes, and
responses. This essay’s descriptive aim is to help clarify, as with other
baselines, how colloquial law talk’s legal baseline acts to foreclose some
options “not by the logic of the rules, but rather by the terms of the
discourse through which arguments are made. These baselines define
the normative starting points of . . . analysis,”64 and I argue, for too
many, the ending point as well. In this section, I identify two ways in
which this baseline worrisomely manifests in the #MeToo conversation.
As explained in Part I, colloquial law talk is being deployed in non-
legal settings to police the boundaries of #MeToo in numerous ways in-
cluding but not limited to:
constraining the conversation to workplace harassment
governed by Title VII and thus excluding other settings
60 Christine Herman, U of I Law Faculty & Staff Call for Overhaul of Campus Sexual Miscon-
duct Policies, WILL ILL. PUB. MEDIA (Oct. 23, 2018), https://will.illinois.edu/news/story/u-of-i-law-
faculty-staff-call-for-overhaul-of-campus-sexual-misconduct-poli [https://perma.cc/2RWY-NQ3Z].
61 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Opinion, Let’s Ease Statutes of Limitations in Rape Cases, WASH.
POST (May 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lets-ease-statutes-of-limitations-
in-rape-cases/2018/05/25/d21db6c0-6044-11e8-9ee3-49d6d4814c4c_story.html? utm_term=.4a128
9faba55 [https://perma.cc/W563-NGUY].
62 L. Camile Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a Legal Movement Too?, 22 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 321, 333–335 (2018); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act
of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2017).
63 Beitsch, supra note 59; Bowman Williams, supra note 2.
64 Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The
Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 916 (1989) (“Baselines embody important moral
and political choices, but because they are starting points for analysis, they tend to suppress dis-
cussion of these choices. They therefore have the effect of masking the political underpinnings of
legal rules.”).
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such as dating and domestic violence,65 and excluding
lawful, but awful66 sexual encounters from the debate67
opposing the inclusion of those who have violated (or are
perceived to have violated) the law, such as sex workers,68
those in prison,69 and those in detention based on their
immigration status70
65 David M. Engel, Law in the Domains of Everyday Life: The Construction of Community and
Difference, in LAW INEVERYDAY LIFE 123, 129–130 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
66 Lawful, but awful sex is also often coterminous with the terms bad sex Stassa Edwards, It’s
Time to Map the Wilderness of Bad Sex, JEZEBEL (Jan. 19, 2018), https://jezebel.com/its-time-to-
map-the-wilderness-of-bad-sex-1822171954 [https://perma.cc/HKT9-XLHW]; Lili Loofbourow, The
Female Price of Male Pleasure,WEEK (Jan. 25, 2018), https://theweek.com/articles/749978/female-
price-male-pleasure [https://perma.cc/UE5X-54A6]; Collier Meyerson, #MeToo Is Changing the
Definition of ‘Bad Sex’, NATION (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/metoo-is-chang-
ing-the-definition-of-bad-sex/ [https://perma.cc/V8Z7-S92R]; grey zone sex, Jessica Bennett, The
#MeToo Moment: Navigating Sex in the ‘Gray Zone’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/02/23/us/the-metoo-moment-navigating-sex-in-the-gray-zone.html [https://perma.
cc/B3NQ-PYMK]; unenthusiastic, Gaby Hinsliff, Opinion, Consent Is Not Enough: If You Want a
Sexual Partner, Look for Enthusiasm, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/co
mmentisfree/2015/jan/29/rape-consent-sexual-partner-enthusiasm [https://perma.cc/HZ7C-AYC
9]; or unwanted, Anonymous, We Need to Talk about Sexual Assault in Marriage, VOX (Mar. 8,
2018), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2018/3/8/17087628/sexual-assault-marriage-metoo [https
://perma.cc/BM2E-GXK5].
67 Justin Duyao, Aziz Ansari: He Is Not A Predator, BISON (Feb. 15 2018), https://thelink.har-
ding.edu/the-bison/2018/02/15/different-perspectives-aziz-ansari-he-is-not-a-predator/ [https://per
ma.cc/R3BC-NGTY]. Some have suggested that rather than limiting #MeToo to sexual violence
and misconduct or even to questions of legal permission, that MeToo is well positioned to open the
frontier on the societal need for mutual pleasure in sexual contact. Zosia Bielski, The Next Frontier
in Consent: Better Sex, GLOBE&MAIL (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/rela-
tionships/the-next-frontier-in-consent-better-sex/article37681221/ [https://perma.cc/WJ4Y-JN2U];
See, e.g., The Fine Line Between a Bad Date and Sexual Assault: 2 Views on Aziz Ansari, NPR ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/16/578422491/the-fine-line-bet
ween-a-bad-date-and-sexual-assault-two-views-on-aziz-ansari [https://perma.cc/UP2H-HP6Z]; W-
ay, supra note 23; Caitlin Flanagan, The Humiliation of Aziz Ansari, ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/01/the-humiliation-of-aziz-ansari/55054
1/ [https://perma.cc/G6XS-N45V]; Bari Weiss, Opinion, Aziz Ansari Is Guilty. Of Not Being a Mind
Reader, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/opinion/aziz-ansari-babe
-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/XUN6-L5SR].
68 Samantha Cooney, ‘They Don’t Want to Include Women Like Me.’ Sex Workers Say They’re
Being Left Out of the #MeToo Movement, TIME (Feb. 13, 2018), http://time.com/5104951/sex-work-
ers-me-too-movement/ [https://perma.cc/7VPU-WJ9B]; Kyli Rodriguez-Cayro, Sex Workers Can Be
Sexually Assaulted Too, And We Need To Talk About It, BUSTLE (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.bus-
tle.com/p/sex-workers-can-be-sexually-assaulted-too-we-need-to-talk-about-it-7551815 [https://pe
rma.cc/75AE-3VQF].
69 Natasha Lennard, Will the Prison Rape Epidemic Ever Have Its Weinstein Moment?,
INTERCEPT (Nov. 21, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/21/prison-rape-sexual-assault-violen
ce/ [https://perma.cc/K8UM-TZP9].
70 Alfonso Serrano, Immigration Advocates: Immigrant Detainees Must Be Included in the
#MeToo Conversation, COLORLINES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/immigra-
tion-advocates-immigrant-detainees-must-be-included-metoo-conversation [https://perma.cc/4AY
H-TNSF]. While those detained may not have violated the law, some are using their uncertain
legal status to try to exclude them from the conversation.
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discounting the accounts of those who failed to engage the
relevant criminal or civil machinery
demanding the application of constitutional due process
protections
using criminal law’s standards of evidence and proof
A. Good Faith Mistakes
One worrisome form of colloquial law talk simply reflects a category
error. Participants genuinely, but incorrectly, believe that specific sub-
stantive or procedural laws apply in settings in which they do not. They
apply legal standards because they believe such standards are binding
framework rules for assessing substance and providing appropriate pro-
cedure. For instance, some Americans might think a criminal statute of
limitations governs a confirmation hearing or an employment proceed-
ing. Or an employer might believe he is only entitled to fire someone
accused of harassment or assault who has been convicted of crime, en-
gaged in behavior that rises to the level of a crime, or at the very least
violated a civil statute. Some might think that the presumption of inno-
cence must apply to social determinations of wrongdoing. These beliefs
inform not only an individual’s own role when he or she is called upon
to make a decision, but might also inform what one thinks others must
do.
My suggestions for these types of baseline mistakes are profoundly
modest. As colloquial law talk can often inadvertently slip or intention-
ally move between descriptive claims about what the law demands and
normative claims that the law’s demands ought to dictate or strongly
inform situations that they do not govern, those seeking to unmask the
use of the law as a baseline must themselves not fall prey to their own
category errors. So, in those instances in which one is appropriately at-
tempting to counter the mistaken application of law as a baseline, one
must be humble about the potential of simple error correction, whether
in real life social conversations, on social media, via journalism, or other
parts of the conversation. While one might initially think legal scholars
and lawyers are in the best position to correct such mistakes, the debi-
asing literature suggests simple information correction, particularly in
settings where people’s beliefs are deeply held, partisan, or identity con-
stitutive, can sometimes trigger a backfire effect further entrenching
the mistaken belief.71 Much like with the work on vaccines, this is an
71 Sara Pluviano et al., Misinformation Lingers in Memory: Failure of Three Pro-Vaccination
Strategies, 12 PLOSONE (July 27, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181640 [https://per
ma.cc/4F9X-95YS].
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area that might benefit from further empirical work both to determine
whether the backfire effect is likely to be engaged,72 and if so, what the
most effective method of error correction is, including subsidiary issues
such as who ought to engage in error correction and under what condi-
tions.
B. Sticky Default
Law also emerges as a conversational baseline when individuals
understand the formal inapplicability of the law, but they use the law
as a sticky governing default. In such circumstances, individuals could,
at least in theory, be convinced to abandon the law as the appropriate
lens, but they would require the satisfaction of a high persuasive
threshold to do so. Such a default concerns me for several reasons.
In many #MeToo settings, law may not be an appropriate framing
for conversation or for resolution. For instance, if someone like Chloe
Dykstra or Aziz Ansari’s anonymous date wants to identify herself or
himself as a #MeToo survivor on social media, responding with criminal
standards to assess such a claim may be both inappropriate and coun-
terproductive. It unnecessarily forecloses an emerging cultural dia-
logue73 about the harms of coercive and unwanted sex; the uneven bur-
dens regarding the provision of sexual pleasure;74 the benefits of
seeking affirmative75 and enthusiastic consent;76 the costs to society
when we only account for the harms and benefits of unlawful behavior;
77 as well as the even larger conversations about gender, sex, power, and
equality. An unchallenged legal default in the #MeToo conversation im-
plicitly concludes that law is the only forum and the only language
through which we can understand and address such issues. But by def-
inition, such an approach will prevent a better understanding of the
true nature of harms for which the law has not accounted or the creation
72 Kathryn Haglin, The Limitations of the Backfire Effect, RESEARCH& POLITICS (July–Sept.,
2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168017716547 [https://perma.cc/5MXZ-3
MPF].
73 Constance Grady, The Uproar over the New Yorker Short Story “Cat Person,” Explained,
VOX (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/12/12/16762062/cat-person-explained-new-
yorker-kristen-roupenian-short-story [https://perma.cc/S4ZK-7JCP].
74 Breanne Fahs & Eric Swank, The Other Third Shift?: Women’s Emotion Work in Their Sex-
ual Relationships, 28 Feminist Formations 46 (2016).
75 Samantha Cooney, The Aziz Ansari Allegation Has People Talking About ‘Affirmative Con-
sent.’ What’s That?, TIME (Jan. 17, 2018), http://time.com/5104010/aziz-ansari-affirmative-consent/
[https://perma.cc/4N8R-CWRX].
76 Maggie Serota, Aziz Ansari Addresses Sexual Misconduct Allegations in Standup Set, SPIN
(Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.spin.com/2019/02/aziz-ansari-addresses-sexual-misconduct-standup-
nyc/ [https://perma.cc/V52L-KNA3].
77 Robin Kar & Lesley Wexler, #MeToo: Counting the Collective Harm of Missing Women’s
Work, JUSTIA (Mar. 5, 2019), https://verdict.justia.com/2019/03/05/metoo-counting-the-collective-
harm-of-missing-womens-work [https://perma.cc/JHV7-PLM5].
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of a new cultural consensus of a better approach.78 In addition, I echo
the worries of other scholars who have aptly noted that such policing of
#MeToo claims may “dampen [survivors’] ability to seek out or receive
support, acceptance and healing through consciousness-raising dis-
course.”79
In addition, law makes the best sense as an “off-the-rack” default
when it reflects the consensus that the relevant group would have
reached with sufficient time and resources. So, in the contract setting,
Fischel and Easterbrook assume off-the-rack rules make sense for con-
tract drafters because there are “lots of terms . . . that almost everyone
will want to adopt.”80 Of course, borrowing and transplantation can
sometimes work in unforeseen conditions and unanticipated domains,81
but I am concerned about their unthinking adoption in a time and place
of significant social contestation.
To be more concrete, much disagreement exists both among schol-
ars and society at large on both the substance and the procedure that
governs the law itself. A robust agreement does not exist as to what
constitutes or what should constitute rape, sexual harassment, and con-
sent in legal settings. For example, existing state rape laws vary on the
definition of the underlying offense as well as to a host of consent issues
including the requirement of affirmative consent, the relevant age for
consent, the importance of difference in age between the alleged victim
and alleged perpetrator, the role and determination of incapacity, and
the importance of marital status.82 Nor is there widespread agreement
among the public as to what ought to constitute sexual assault or sexual
harassment.83 Simply importing the legal standards sidesteps the deep
divisions related to these definitions and imports them into a new set-
ting. While I noted above that increased use of such definitions might
spur legal reform, the significant hurdles to new legislation and the
need for concomitant social shifts and structural change create a real
78 Julianne Escobedo Shephard, The Next Step for #MeToo Is Into the Gray Areas, JEZEBEL (S-
ept. 24, 2018), https://jezebel.com/the-next-step-for-metoo-is-into-the-gray-areas-1829269384 [http
s://perma.cc/GR9P-JAZV].
79 Gash & Harding, supra note 18.
80 EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 47.
81 Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postcript Assessment of the Iron Law of
Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 28–30 & nn.14–20 (2014).
82 Laws in Your State, RAINN (Last visited Aug. 9, 2019), https://apps.rainn.org/pol-
icy/?_ga=2.257230472.2042468811.1556473013-624410638.1543422985 [https://perma.cc/K7WR-
WMF3].
83 William Cummings, Americans Agree Sexual Harassment Is a Problem, They Just Don’t
Always Agree What It Is, USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/na-
tion/2017/11/17/americans-agree-sexual-harassment-problem-they-just-dont-always-agree-what/
864621001/ [https://perma.cc/7Y5Z-CQM9].
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burden on claimants in imposing contested legal standards in non-legal
settings.
In addition, even if one thinks the substance and procedure govern
legal settings fairly well, the same concerns that inform and create law
are rarely coextensive with the concerns implicated by situations not
governed by the law’s baseline. Colloquial law talk sometimes obscures
a real mismatch between law’s purposes in legal settings and its appli-
cation to non-legal settings, where different interests exist or ought to
be balanced differently. For instance, under criminal law, given the
state’s role in imposing a possible deprivation of liberty, it makes sense
that the Constitution would offer a fulsome promise of due process with
a neutral decision-maker, notice of accusations, and the right to con-
front an accuser. But even in many legal settings, one can often satisfy
due process without providing robust protections.84 While reasonable
disagreements about how to forge a path forward from #MeToo exist,
the unthinking application of strong due process norms to settings that
involve no deprivations of constitutionally protected interests is prob-
lematic.
Third, and somewhat relatedly, the use of law as a strong default
may make it more difficult to deploy other approaches that better serve
welfare or goals that are distinct from the law. American law, both crim-
inal and civil, focuses on the provision of justice. In so doing, it attends
to individual fault and individual wrongdoing, rather than directly ad-
dressing larger structural and cultural issues or even victim needs be-
yond compensation.85While such a limited approach might be appropri-
ate for the criminal and tort system, this is why societies and
particularly those going through moments of social upheaval contem-
plate using other mechanisms for social change as well. Of course, alt-
hough the limitations of the law do not per se preclude adopting a ther-
apeutic or structural approach to #MeToo issues, I have shown above
how the use of a sticky legal baseline makes that more difficult. Given
84 Thanks to Professors Jamelle Sharpe and Arden Rowell for suggestions. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (setting out the test for what process Due Process requires and con-
cluding that a pre-deprivation hearing was not required in social security disability contexts. See
also U.S. v. Reed, 41 M.J. 449 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (while due process applies to persons before court
martial, seventeen-month delay between identification of accused as a suspect and bringing
charges did not violate due process); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (concluding due
process does not require either notice or opportunity for hearing prior to certain forms of corporal
punishment) Schaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei (holding that an alien could be permanently ex-
cluded without a hearing), 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 139 (2019) (holding that
unauthorized immigrants may be detained indefinitely once taken into criminal custody). While I
believe more robust protection may be owed in many of these settings, the existing law finds oth-
erwise.
85 It is worth noting that the law does serve other functions aside from backward looking jus-
tice, such as providing restraining orders and injunctions.
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these concerns, I conclude with two preliminary thoughts on paths for-
ward.
1. Reforming colloquial law talk
Any participant in the #MeToo conversation who sees a mismatch
between the law as default and the interests at stake may attempt to
refashion or reform colloquial law talk.86 Some of that work is already
occurring. Given the bottom up nature of the #MeToo conversation and
its non-legal origins, the turn to the legal baseline has not been unno-
ticed and has been hotly contested at least by some.87 To take one highly
salient example, many demanding a discussion about presidential nom-
inee Joe Biden’s non-sexual, intimate touching strongly reject the idea
that Biden’s behavior need be unlawful or sexually motivated to be rel-
evant to the modern reckoning.88 But relatedly, the forms of accounta-
bility they call for also differ substantially from those requested for
criminal sexual assault or tortious sexual harassment.89
I suggest here that one mode of contestation would be to better
match people’s legal intuitions to the actual interests at stake on both
sides when the law is invoked in non-legal settings. On the one hand,
one might dig into various processes and procedural protections and ex-
plain why they ought to be considered satisfied even if the criminal law
protections were not applied. Again, to return to the due process exam-
ple, when invoked it seems to stem from the deeply held intuition in
America that people ought to be treated fairly. So, what should fairness
look like in non-legal settings? Professor Clarke’s piece does a nice job
explaining why many settings, such as journalistic reporting and work-
place investigations, do in fact comport with our intuitions of fairness.90
One might also mine the procedural fairness literature for thoughts on
what processes have shown to be acceptable, but, equally important,
one also needs to search it for evidence and explanations of processes
86 Of course, legal baselines are not always sticky and sometimes people are able to argue
persuasively that the wrong baseline is being used in a given setting. For example, Professor Sun-
stein has compellingly argued that the Supreme Court used the wrong baseline in Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
87 Tarana Burke, @TaranaBurke, TWITTER, (Aug. 20, 2018, 4:14AM), https://twitter.com/Ta-
ranaBurke/status/1031499602623643650 [https://perma.cc/UQC8-VNWA].
88 Lucy Flores, Joe Biden and the Apologies that Weren’t, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/opinion/joe-biden-lucy-flores-apology.html?searchResultPo-
sition=3 [https://perma.cc/5JCR-W9AJ]; Marle Solis, Reckoning with the Joe Bidens of the #MeToo
Movement, BROADLY (Apr. 11, 2019), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/8xz4nb/joe-biden-alle-
gations-inappropriate-touching-me-too [https://perma.cc/3AN3-2S98].
89 Jill Filipovic, Joe Biden Still Has to Answer for Decades of Bad Choices, VANITY FAIR (Apr.
4, 2019) https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2019/04/joe-biden-apology-advice [https://perma.cc/ZWN
N2-FGBE].
90 See generally Jessica Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 37 (2019).
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that have been considered unfair across various settings. If the #MeToo
movement is perceived as deeply unfair, much of society is unlikely to
willingly participate in its call for a social reckoning.91
Second and equally important, colloquial law talk might provide an
opening for the salience of the violations of victims’ colloquial due pro-
cess. If we are to account for interests of and burdens on accusers in
order to provide fairness, we ought to balance the ledger by also ac-
counting for potential MeToo claimants’ interests and burdens.92 In the
#MeToo era, what does it mean to be fair to accusers? As Professors
Gash and Harding have noted, invocations of due process include an
“assumption and an expectation that normal legal pathways are clear
of obstacles for victims of sexual violence, when in fact these pathways
are ridden with obstacles and peril.”93 At the very least, I think such
due process for all should include: allowing victims to remain a focus of
the #MeToo narrative,94 dismantling bias against believing them,95 re-
jecting numerosity to take complaints seriously,96 taking complaints se-
riously by initiating investigations, maintaining investigations even if
the alleged harasser leaves the workplace,97 and providing sanctions
proportionate to any findings made. Relatedly, society ought to engage
the need for reintegration of victims who were retaliated against for
coming forward or for being harassed in the first instance just as seri-
ously as it engages the question of reintegration of the profoundly un-
deserving.98
91 Tammi Walker, Fixing What’s Wrong with How Universities Adjudicate Sexual Misconduct
Claims: How Procedural Change Can Encourage Cooperation, 2018WISC. L. REV 111 (2018).
92 While the victims’ rights movement has focused generally on the ways in which the criminal
justice might be unfair to victims and their families, I want to emphasize instead the way in which
unfairness seems to particularly plague those contesting sexual assault, sexual harassment, and
related behavior like domestic violence and emotional abuse.
93 Gash & Harding, supra note 18, at 22. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on
Law in the Everyday Life of Women, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 109 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1993) (suggesting “Either the law does not apply (to women’s experiences), is applied
to women’s detriment, or is not applied at all.”).
94 Ijeoma Oluo, Due Process Is Needed For Sexual Harassment Accusations—But for Whom?,
ESTABLISHMENT (Nov. 13, 2017), https://medium.com/the-establishment/due-process-is-needed-f
or-sexual-harassment-accusations-but-for-whom-968e7c81e6d6 [https://perma.cc/KY7G-89E5].
95 Lenora Lapidus & Sandra Park, The Real Meaning of Due Process in the #MeToo Era,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/due-process-meto
o/553427/ [https://perma.cc/2RGM-VXN6].
96 See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Unofficial Reporting in the #MeToo Era, 2019 U. CHI.
LEGAL. F. 273 (2019).
97 Leah Litman et al., Opinion, A Comeback but No Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES (Aug 2. 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/opinion/sunday/alex-kozinski-harassment-allegations-come-
back.html [https://perma.cc/2ETV-DWVE].
98 Megan Garber, The Leaked Louis. C.K. Set Is Tragedy Masked as Comedy, ATLANTIC (Dec.
31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/12/louis-ck-leaked-tape/57922
0/ [https://perma.cc/S9X4-JV5Q]; Joe Berkowitz, The Bad Men of 2017 Have Somehow Gotten Wor-
se, FAST COMPANY (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90286891/the-bad-men-of-2017-
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To take a different example, one might push back on the law as
providing a floor or a ceiling to #MeToo claiming. Many have celebrated
the inclusion of lawful, but awful sex99 and the need for affirmative,
enthusiastic consent as part of the #MeToo public discourse.100 Scholars
and journalists are now spending intellectual capital to map the terrain
of lawful, but awful encounters101 and the unequal burdens they often
place on women.102 A robust defense of the benefits of self-identification
and self-definition ought to be offered and defended, particularly when
#MeToo claimants are not making a legal claim or seeking legal justice.
Contrast Professor MacKinnon’s 1993 observation about rape, “Many
women, no matter how violated they were, do not call what happened
to them rape if they do not think a court would agree with them. In this
ultimate triumph of law over life, law tells women what happened to
them and many of us believe it,”103 with Tarana Burke’s embrace of a
bottom up approach to #MeToo, noting “It’s your movement. It’s our
movement. It is a survivors’ movement. You are in it if you say you’re
in it.”104
It is important to note that reform of colloquial law talk need not
be unidirectional. Given #MeToo’s focus on consent and coercion, it
should be noted that not all legal violations need give rise to #MeToo
claims. For instance, sometimes the state may have an interest in crim-
have-somehow-gotten-worse [https://perma.cc/HH5J-RBF6].
99 Lexy Perez, Amy Schumer Talks Friend Aziz Ansari’s Sexual Misconduct Claim,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/amy-schumer-talks-fri
end-aziz-ansaris-sexual-misconduct-claim-1080874 [https://perma.cc/8RWD-SAEW] (Schumer de-
scribes Aziz’s behavior: “It’s not a crime, but it’s not cool.”).
100 Lindy West, Opinion, Aziz, We Tried To Warn You, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/opinion/aziz-ansari-metoo-sex.html [https://perma.cc/2TKL-A5GE?type=
image]; Mariel Cariker, Sexual Assault Allegations Against Aziz Ansari Spark Twitter Debate,
METIZA (Jan. 14, 2018), https://metiza.com/need-to-know/sexual-assault-allegations-aziz-ansari-s
park-twitter-debate/ [https://perma.cc/WH5B-6QMG], citing Jessica Valenti, TWITTER (Jan. 14,
2018), https://twitter.com/JessicaValenti?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5 Eserp%7Ctwgr
%5Eauthor [https://perma.cc/43PY-Y78K]; Brittany Wong, What Therapists Want Us to Know
about Aziz Ansari, ‘Bad Sex’ and #MeToo, HUFFPOST (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/en-
try/therapists-on-aziz-ansari-me-too_n_5a6f6ed3e4b01fbbefb4b934 [https://perma.cc/425V-JSJ5];
Fiona Chen, Opinion, Why the Aziz Ansari Story and Discussions of Grey Areas Are Central to the
#MeToo Movement, TECH (Jan. 25, 2019), https://thetech.com/2018/01/25/me-too-aziz-ansari [https
://perma.cc/5Z7T-TPU9].
101 See Mendes et al., supra note 12; see also Robin West, Manufacturing Consent, BAFFLER
(2018), https://the baffler.com/salvos/manufacturing-consent-west [https://perma.cc/ZD5Q-URW
6]; KATEMANNE, DOWNGIRL: THE LOGIC OFMISOGYNY (2017).
102 Sara L. Maurer, The #MeToo Movement Isn’t about Women’s Frailty. It’s about Women’s
Labor, CHRON. OFHIGHERED. (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-MeToo-Move-
ment-Isn-t/242179 [https://perma.cc/9YTF-82XQ].
103 MacKinnon, supra note 933.
104 Shia Diefotze, #MeToo Founder Addresses the Movement, UAF SUN STAR (Apr. 23, 2018),
http://uafsunstar.com/metoo-founder-addresses-the-movement/ [https://perma.cc/ZT6Z-KG3Y].
366 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
inalizing behavior such as incest or statutory rape or sex between a per-
son in power such as a therapist or clergyperson and a person in their
trust or a state university professor and a student, but it seems at least
theoretically possible in some small subset of those cases all parties are
truly willing and voluntary participants. The State may legitimately
choose to outlaw such behavior, but the statutorily protected person
ought not be labelled a #MeToo victim or survivor if she or he does not
choose to view her or himself that way.
2. Reframe
In a more radical move, participants in the #MeToo conversation
might instead more aggressively challenge legal framing. Many options
for reframing exist–I suggest three possibilities here. First, to return to
the justification for the original #MeToo tweet, the #MeToo conversa-
tion might be recentered on victims and their needs beyond accounta-
bility for their perpetrators. Second, to the extent that the conversation
is about perpetrators and accountability, society needs to think seri-
ously and creatively about the concept of earned redemption instead of
emphasizing carceral analogies of death penalties and time served. In
theory, and perhaps in practice, these conversations can occur simulta-
neously, but both America’s historical experience with carceral femi-
nism and my anecdotal observation of the last two years of #MeToo law
talk conversations suggests they are far too often mutually exclusive.
To begin, law talk is not a particularly useful vehicle for addressing
victim needs such as immediate trauma care, opportunities for long-
term healing, and workplace reintegration. A focus on dissecting indi-
vidual stories for their truth or falsity and subsequent consequences for
perpetrators ignores and may even tradeoff with the need for greater
awareness of and resources for healing.105 In my opinion, law talk has
helped Times Up raise millions of dollars for litigation so that victims
could move from non-legal sites to legal sites to resolve their claims and
defend themselves from retaliation and defamation,106 but where is the
parallel financial outpouring to help victims afford therapy, to assist
community provision of healing resources, and to get victims fully rein-
tegrated back into the working world?107 While legal determinations
105 Aisha Harris, She Founded Me Too, Now She Wants to Move Past the Trauma, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/arts/tarana-burke-metoo-anniversary.html
[https://perma.cc/K54T-XD6S].
106 Constance Grady, Time’s Up Was at the Center of the 2018 Golden Globes. One Year Later,
What Has Come of It?, VOX (Jan. 6, 2019) https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/1/4/18165557/golden-
globes-times-up-legal-defense-fund-sharyn-tejani [https://perma.cc/R8TP-2C9E].
107 Diana Falzone, You Will Lose Everything”: Inside the Media’s #MeToo Blacklist, VANITY
FAIR (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/04/the-metoo-blacklist [https://perma.c
c/P7TE-DS75]; Robin Kar & Lesley Wexler, #MeToo: Counting the Collective Harm of Missing
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can serve important functions, as Professor Aya Gruber notes, carceral
feminism with its emphasis on “equaliz[ing] and civiliz[ing] the crimi-
nal justice system’s treatment of female victims” has in the past traded
off with or made more difficult efforts to “provid[e] access and resources
to [female] victims, and creat[e] programs to address the economic and
social realities that kept women in abusive relationships or led them to
remain silent about rape.”108 Without a conscious reframing, a law talk
centered #MeToo may facilitate these same tradeoffs and unaddressed
harms that plagued victims of domestic violence in the 1980s and 1990s.
In other words, while victims of unlawful #MeToo behavior should have
equal opportunities for criminal and tort justice as victims of other
crimes, a single minded focus on such may ignore or even displace what
many victims would find most helpful particularly in non-legal settings.
In addition, law talk’s approach also fails to grapple seriously with
a meaningful path for perpetrators. As noted above, law talk often
frames any mode of accountability as punishment and then assesses its
perceived proportionateness in specific cases. Take, for instance, former
radio host and #MeToo perpetrator John Hockenberry’s plea for abso-
lution,109 “Is a life sentence of unemployment without possibility of fur-
lough, the suffering of my children, and financial ruin an appropriate
consequence?”110 While I am skeptical that the vast majority of #MeToo
perpetrators will serve anything that approaches a non-legal life sen-
tence,111 I also worry about the poverty of conceptions of perpetrator
accountability and reintegration. In much of the law talk #MeToo con-
versation, there seems to be no ground other than silent reacceptance
after a brief period of social sanction as evidenced by law talk’s “time
served” sentiment or banishment reflected in law talk’s “death penalty”
analogy. Law, and criminal law in particular, may have little to tell us
about imagining a meaningful path back to full participation in society
Women’s Work, JUSTIA (Mar. 5, 2019), https://verdict.justia.com/2019/03/05/metoo-counting-the-c
ollective-harm-of-missing-womens-work [https://perma.cc/5UQZ-UVJ7].
108 Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 748–49 (2007). See also id.
at 801 (“Although there were salient reasons for feminists to reform the criminal justice system,
once they engaged state power, it became the primary if not singular focus of the movement.”).
109 For an excellent piece discussing why absolution is inappropriate in the #MeToo setting, see
Michelle Goldberg, The Shame of the MeToo Men, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/09/14/opinion/columnists/metoo-movement-franken-hockenberry-macdonald.htm
l [https://perma.cc/36WT-56UT].
110 John Hockenberry, Exile, HARPER’S (Oct. 2018), https://harpers.org/archive/2018/10/exile-4/
[https://perma.cc/G5ZE-EAPZ].
111 For a partial list of high profile individuals accused of #MeToo wrongdoing along with the
latest developments, see Sexual Harassment and Assault Allegations, VOX (last updated Jan. 9,
2019), https://www.vox.com/a/sexual-harassment-assault-allegations-list/paul-haggis [https://per
ma.cc/7S8J-7AZM].
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besides simply a passage of time.112 In addition to pressing for legal re-
forms or expansion of law talk, advocates might highlight the dangers
of importing the worst punitive impulses of criminal law and carceral
feminism into non-legal settings113 and instead point participants to-
ward the concept of restorative justice. While some of the most im-
portant acts of restorative justice such as apologies, promises of non-
repetition, and efforts to prevent others from engaging in #MeToo re-
lated acts are not required by the law, they would help serve the inter-
ests of the victims and society,114 as well as provide perpetrators a
roadmap towards earned redemption and fuller societal reintegration.
CONCLUSION
As we enter the third year of the #MeToo landscape, Americans are
properly struggling with this great societal reckoning. While such a
transformation will necessarily involve both law and law talk, this es-
say suggests a deeper understanding of how law talk functions can help
participants to push back against its misuses, excesses, and oversights.
As lawyers and legal scholars, we are uniquely positioned to point out
the ways in which law talk might distort our understandings of victims
and perpetrators outside the legal setting. I suggest here that instead
of only zooming in on the crime and punishment of individual perpetra-
tors, we ought to consider refocusing on victims’ needs as well as on the
possibilities for earned redemption of perpetrators. Many have already
112 Moreover, in practice, for many criminals, time served does not reflect a path back to full
integration. Between felon disenfranchisement, background checks for employment, housing lim-
itations, and the difficulty of compliance with probation and parole requirement, many criminals
never experience something that resembles full participation in society. Brentin Mock, Released
Inmates Will Need More Than a ‘Ban the Box’ Measure to Rejoin Society, CITY LAB (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/11/obama-ban-the-box-released-inmates-hurdles/413470/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/3T9Z-X4FM].
113 For examples of others worried about the importation of carceral feminism into the #MeToo
debate, see Judith Levine, Will Feminism’s Past Mistakes Haunt #MeToo?, BOSTON REV. (Dec. 8,
2017), http://bostonreview.net/gender-sexuality/368udith-levine-will-feminisms-past-mistakes-ha
unt-metoo [https://perma.cc/6H69-N8CF]; Alex Press, #MeToo Must Avoid ‘Carceral Feminism’,
VOX (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/2/1/16952744/me-too-larry-nassar-judg
e-aquilina-feminism [https://perma.cc/MK86-WVFJ]; OPEN SOC’YFOUND., Righting Carceral Fem-
inism’s Wrongs in a #MeToo Era, (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/events/r
ighting-carceral-feminism-s-wrongs-metoo-era [https://perma.cc/C4XQ-RYQV]. For a sample of
those discussing the historical harms of carceral feminism, see, e.g., Victoria Law, Against Carceral
Feminism, JACOBIN (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/10/against-carceral-feminis
m/ [https://perma.cc/275V-WQHK]; Lise Gotell, Reassessing the Place of Criminal Law Reform in
the Struggle against Sexual Violence, in RAPE JUSTICE 53, 53–71 (Anastasia Powell ed., 2015); Erin
Collins, The Criminalization of Title IX, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 365 (2016).
114 Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45; Lesley Wexler
& Jennifer Robbennolt, #MeToo and Restorative Justice: Realizing Restoration for Victims and
Offenders, ABA DISPUTE RESOLUTIONMAG. (Win. 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dis-
pute_resolution/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/2019/winter-2019-me-too/metoo-and-r
estorative-justice/ [https://perma.cc/WNR9-L44Y].
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taken up this call and I am hopeful that scholars, commentators, and
members of the public will be more mindful when engaging in law talk
in the #MeToo landscape.

371
#MeToo as Catalyst: A Glimpse into 21st Century
Activism




The Twitter hashtag #MeToo has provided an accessible medium
for users to share their personal experiences and make public the prev-
alence of sexual harassment, assault, and violence against women.1
This online phenomenon, which has largely involved posting on Twitter
and “retweeting” to share other’s posts has revealed crucial information
about the scope and nature of sexual harassment and misconduct. More
specifically, social media has served as a central forum for this unprec-
edented global conversation, where previously silenced voices have been
amplified, supporters around the world have been united, and re-
sistance has gained steam.2
This Essay discusses the #MeToo movement within the broader
context of social media activism, explaining how this unique form of col-
lective action is rapidly evolving.3 We offer empirical insights into the
† Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Thank you to the participants at
the University of Chicago Legal Forum symposium on Law in the Era of #MeToo for a lively dis-
cussion. Thank you to my coauthors for the research collaboration between the Massive Data In-
stitute (MDI) and the Gender Justice Initiative (G+JI) for inspiring this project. Thank you to Guy
Uriel Charles and Paul Butler for insights and to Austin Donohue for your invaluable research
assistance.
†† Professor of Computer Science & Research Professor in MDI, Georgetown University.
Thank you to the MDI for infrastructure and student researcher support.
††† Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. With many thanks to my coauthors, the
MDI/G+JI research collaboration, and my research assistant Rachel Farkas.
1 Although women are the focus of this essay, men, trans, and gender non-binary people are
also participants. For example, actor Terry Crews is a male victim who has been vocal in the #Me-
Too movement.
2 See Kara Fox & Jan Diehm, #MeToo’s Global Moment: The Anatomy of a Viral Campaign,
CNN (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/09/world/metoo-hashtag-global-movement/inde
x.html [https://perma.cc/M85F-XMTM].
3 See Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and
Political Change, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 28, 28–29 (2011).
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types of conversations taking place under the hashtag4 and the extent
to which the movement is leading to broader social change. While it is
unclear which changes are sustainable over time, it is clear that the
hashtag #MeToo has converted an online phenomenon into tangible
change, sparking legal, political, and social changes in the short run.
This Essay provides data to illustrate some of these changes, which
demonstrate how posting online can serve as an impetus, momentum,
and legitimacy for broader movement activity and changes offline more
characteristic of traditional movement strategies.
II. WHY AMOVEMENT?
The problem is pervasive—in a recent nationwide survey, 81% of
women report experiencing some form of sexual harassment in their
lifetime.5More than one in four have survived sexual assault.6 The sim-
ple hashtag #MeToo has added names, faces, and stories to the statis-
tics in what is arguably the most powerful activism in the women’s
movement in recent history. The sheer number of women experiencing
harassment and assault make these issues ripe for social movements
and collective action.7 This behavior goes beyond workplace misconduct,
with statistics showing that harassment is ubiquitous and difficult to
avoid. According to a large scale nationally representative survey, har-
assment is not something that only happens behind closed doors, with
66% of women reporting that they have experienced harassment in pub-
lic places.8 Many are also vulnerable within their own households, with
35% of women experiencing sexual harassment at home. Workplace
harassment is also a common issue, with 38 percent of women experi-
encing harassment in their workplace.
Harassment has become a part of our culture and everyday norms
and takes many forms.9 Verbal sexual harassment is the most common
4 This Essay does not focus on the computer science or data analytic methods used to extract
this information. For a more detailed discussion of that see: Lisa Singh, Linda Li, Laila Wahedi,
Yifang, Wei, Jamillah Williams, & Naomi Mezey. #metoo—An Analytic Framework for Character-
izing an Evolving Social Media Movement (in prep).
5 STOP STREET HARASSMENT, THE FACTS BEHIND THE #METOO MOVEMENT: A NATIONAL




7 See generally, STOP STREET HARASSMENT, supra note 5; Banu Ozkazanc-Pan, On Agency
and Empowerment in a #MeToo World, GENDER, WORK&ORG., 1–9 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1111
/gwao.12311 [https://perma.cc/CWD8-ZHY7]; PAOLOGERBAUDO, TWEETS AND THESTREETS: SOCIA-
LMEDIA AND CONTEMPORARY ACTIVISM (2012); Alexandra Segerberg & W. Lance Bennett, Social
Media and the Organization of Collective Action: Using Twitter to Explore the Ecologies of Two
Climate Change Protests, 14 COMMC’N REV. 197 (2011).
8 STOP STREETHARASSMENT, supra note 5, at 8.
9 Id.
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form, experienced by 77% of women. An alarming 62% of women report
being subjected to physically aggressive forms of sexual harassment,
such as indecent exposure, being physically followed, and being groped
or touched in a sexual way without consent. The internet, text messages
and phone calls are also commonly used to harass, with 41% of women
experiencing cyber sexual harassment. Twenty-seven percent of women
have survived sexual assault, being forced into sex acts against their
will.
Despite the pervasiveness of the problem, sexual harassment and
assault commonly go unreported.10 In fact, sexual assault is the most
underreported violent crime in America, with 70% of crimes never re-
ported to police.11 Even after the rise of #MeToo, among survey respond-
ents who said they had experienced workplace harassment in the past
year, 76% did not officially report it.12 Many victims do not report be-
cause they fear retaliation, or think that reporting will lead to little or
no consequences for the perpetrator.13 These concerns may be height-
ened when the perpetrator holds a position of power.14 In a sense, the
common failure to report is confirmation that harassment is not only a
part of the culture, but that the underlying gender inequality is still so
accepted that reporting remains either ineffective or entails costs that
are too high for victims. The Kavanaugh hearings were a paradigmatic
example of both the inequality and the costs.15 Given the other changes
we identify, the obstacles to reporting are a sobering reminder that
some aspects of culture are stickier than others.
10 LYNN LANGTON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATIONSURVEY, 2006–2010 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vnrp0610.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/X3D3-RJVJ].
11 The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE& INCESTNAT’LNETWORK (2017), htt
ps://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/5B26-CGFN].
12 Harassment-Free Workplace Series: A Focus on Sexual Harassment, SOC’Y FORHUMANRES-
OURCEMGMT (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and
-surveys/Pages/A-Focus-on-Sexual-Harassment.aspx [https://perma.cc/2XY6-97LR] (last visited J-
an. 21, 2019).
13 See Anne Lawton, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Perils of Reporting Sexual Harass-
ment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 603, 632 (2007).
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., Rebecca Solnit, The Kavanaugh Case Shows We Still Blame Women for the Sins of
Men, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/21/brett-
-kavanaugh-blame-women-anita-hill-cosby-weinstein (last visited Feb. 25, 2019).
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III. ORIGINS OF THE #METOOHASHTAG
“Me Too” was first coined by Tarana Burke16 in 2006 to support
women and girls, particularly women and girls of color, who had sur-
vived sexual violence.17 The term was popularized on October 15, 2017
when Alyssa Milano18 invited the Twitter world to use the hashtag to
capture experiences of sexual misconduct by tweeting, “If you’ve been
sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet . . .
we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.”19 Her
tweet followed aNew York Times report published 10 days prior, detail-
ing Harvey Weinstein’s sexual assaults and harassment of numerous
women; the hashtag #MeToo gained momentum shortly after.20 In issu-
ing the tweet, Milano was acknowledging that despite the pervasive-
ness of harassment and assault, many victims have been silenced.21 In
the next twenty-four hours, there were over 1 million tweets and re-
tweets using the hashtag #MeToo.22
The hashtag #MeToo has served as a sign of empowerment for vic-
tims who may have feared they were alone, who thought they would not
16 Tarana Burke is currently Senior Director at Girls for Gender Equity, a nonprofit that helps
schools, workplaces, and other groups improve policies concerning sexual violence at. In 2003
Burke founded “Just Be,” an all-girls program for young black women that provided assistance to
survivors of sexual violence. See Ania Alberski, Former Phila. Activist Tarana Burke among the
‘Silence Breakers’ Honored by Time Magazine, THEDAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Dec. 10, 2017), https://
www.thedp.com/article/2017/12/philly-woman-silence-breakers-metoo-penn-upenn-sexual-assault
[https://perma.cc/K56A-4KSU]; Staff, GIRLS FORGENDEREQUITY, https://www.ggenyc.org/about/st
aff/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
17 See Abby Ohlheiser, The Woman Behind ‘MeToo’ Knew the Power of the Phrase When She
Created It—10 Years Ago,WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2017/10/19/the-woman-behind-me-too-knew-the-power-of-the-phrase-when-she-cre-
ated-it-10-years-ago/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4067dc89d58d [https://perma.cc/H5NH-EELJ]
(last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
18 Alyssa Milano is an American actress and activist. See Elizabeth Chuck, Before #MeToo,
Before Doug Jones, AlyssaMilano’s Activism Started with a Kiss on TV, NBCNEWS (Dec. 16, 2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/metoo-doug-jones-alyssa-milano-s-activism-started-kiss-
tv-n829466 [https://perma.cc/AKU7-YWLX].
19 Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), https://twitter.com/alys
sa_milano/status/919659438700670976?lang=en [https://perma.cc/72N3-TJ6W].
20 Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid off Sexual Harassment Accusers for
Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-har-
assment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/5C89-5DTK].
21 Fox & Diehm, supra note 2.
22 The #MeToo Research Collaboration, MASSIVE DATA INST. & GENDER + JUST. INITIATIVE,
http://metoo.georgetown.domains/ [https://perma.cc/J6T8-F69V]; MICHAEL COHEN, THE #METOO
MOVEMENT: FINDINGS FROM THE PEORIA PROJECT, GEO. WASH. U. (2018), https://gspm.gwu.edu/s
ites/g/files/zaxdzs2286/f/downloads/2018%20RD18%20MeToo%20Presentation.pdf [https://perma.
cc/UNH5-5LGR]; Abby Ohlheiser, How #MeToo Really Was Different, According to Data, WASH.
POST (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2018/01/22/how-me-
too-really-was-different-according-to-data/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.225aacf76ae2 [https://per
ma.cc/8X36-JY3K].
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be believed, or who simply did not think justice was a possibility. Post-
ing on social media has provided a simple and subtle way to speak out
and share their experience. Within the first year, the hashtag #MeToo
was used 19 million times on Twitter.23 Tweets in over 46 different lan-
guages have used the hashtag, and many new hashtags related to har-
assment and assault continue to emerge in these different languages.24
The magnitude of the social media response makes it clear that these
are not just rare cases of bad behavior, but an all-too-common part of
women’s experiences in the world. The response also provides a glimpse
into the everyday attacks and shaming faced by victims of sexual abuse,
and the persistent social acceptance of victim blaming, and its connec-
tion to larger, systemic forms of inequality.25
IV. SOCIALMEDIA ACTIVISM: A NEW PARADIGM
The #MeToo phenomenon represents an example of a new type of
collective action that has galvanized rights-based movements in the
twenty-first century.26 Social media activism describes the effectiveness
and viability of using social media platforms for political engagement
in furtherance of social movements.27 Social media activism gained in-
creased attention from scholars after the 2011 Arab Spring, where ac-
tivists used Twitter to initiate conversations that helped fuel social and
political change.28 For example, the hashtag #Egypt was instrumental
in disseminating information during this revolutionary social move-
ment.29 Online networks used the Twitter hashtag to help activists or-
ganize and share information, push for freer expression, and propel po-
litical change in neighboring countries.30
23 Monica Anderson & Skye Toor, How Social Media Users Have Discussed Sexual Harass-
ment Since #MeToo Went Viral, PEWRES. CTR. (October 11, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fac
t-tank/2018/10/11/how-social-media-users-have-discussed-sexual-harassment-since-metoo-went-v
iral/ [https://perma.cc/ZX7J-B5HB].
24 MDI Research Collaborative finding using tweets collected through the Twitter API.
25 After a Year of #MeToo, American Opinion Has Shifted against Victims, THE ECONOMIST
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/10/15/after-a-year-of-metoo-amer-
ican-opinion-has-shifted-against-victims [https://perma.cc/S63X-5YGW].
26 Shirky, supra note 3; Gerbaudo, supra note 7; Dhiraj Murthy, Introduction to Social Media,
Activism, and Organizations, SOC. MEDIA + SOC’Y, 1 (2018). See generally CLAY SHIRKY, HERE
COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OFORGANIZINGWITHOUTORGANIZATIONS (2008).
27 Gerbaudo, supra note 7; see also SHIRKY, supra note 3.
28 Gerbaudo, supra note 7; Mary Butler,Clicktivism, Slacktivism, or “Real” Activism? Cultural
Codes of American Activism in the Internet Era, 20 (graduate thesis, University of Colorado) (on
file with University of Colorado, Boulder) (2011) [https://perma.cc/Y3GX-ZBRP]; Sam Gustin, So-
cial Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2011), https://www.
com/2011/02/egypts-revolutionary-fire/ [https://perma.cc/9LYZ-HQRD].
29 Gustin, supra note 28.
30 Gerbaudo, supra note 7.
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The current literature on social media activism primarily explores
1) how social media enables connectivity and organizing opportunities
for existing political and social movements, and 2) whether social media
has led to a new type of collective action, upending the need for orga-
nized groups supporting change, and enabling individuals to act.31 Clas-
sic theories on collective action and the public sphere have been contex-
tualized to account for the new ways in which individuals can
communicate via technology.32 For example, incorporating social media
into resource mobilization theory, many scholars have argued that so-
cial media is an effective tool to recruit participants and organize cam-
paigns, which are the social capital needed to promote the motives of
any one movement.33 Social media helps connect individuals with simi-
lar grievances, linking them to groups and organizations that are work-
ing to combat parallel grievances.34
In other words, social media provides a crucial consolidating func-
tion by giving a common name to a set of concerns and thereby creating
a one-issue community. If the community is big enough and the griev-
ance sufficiently widespread, it also creates vital social visibility for in-
juries that were previously invisible. As Alyssa Milano rightly pointed
out, it gives people “a sense of the magnitude of the problem.” 35
Since the Arab Spring, a few other highly visible Twitter move-
ments have been successful at propelling social, legal, and political
change because they have tapped into injustices of sufficient magni-
tude.36 For example, #LoveWins began in September 2014 as part of a
broad campaign of support for the LGBT community and its efforts to
win the right to marry.37 The hashtag went viral on June 26, 2015 after
31 Compare Jonathan Obar et al., Advocacy 2.0: An Analysis of How Advocacy Groups in the
United States Perceive and Use Social Media as Tools for Facilitating Civic Engagement and Col-
lective Action, 2 J. INFO. POL’Y 1 (2012); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW
SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2007); and MANUEL CASTELLS, THE
RISE OF THENETWORKSOCIETY (THE INFORMATIONAGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY ANDCULTURE) (1996);
with BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY IN THE EVOLUTION
OF POLITICAL POWER (2003). See alsoW. Lance Bennett, Communicating Global Activism, 6 INFO.,
COMM’N & SOC’Y 143 (2003); Paolo Gerbaudo & Emiliano Trere, In Search of the “We” of Social
Media Activism: Introduction to the Special Issue on Social Media and Protest Identities, 18 INFO.,
COMM’N& SOC’Y 865 (2015); Shirky, supra note 3.
32 Obar et al., supra note 31; Benkler, supra note 31.
33 Jose Ortiz & Arvind Tripathi,Resource Mobilization in Social Media: The Role of Influential
Actors, 25TH EUR. CONF. ON INFO. SYS., 3049–59 (2017).
34 Gerbaudo, supra note 7; Shirky, supra note 3; Bijan Stephen, Social Media Helps Black
Lives Matter Fight the Power, WIRED (Nov. 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-
matter-uses-social-media-to-fight-the-power/ [https://perma.cc/RZ3M-58V5].
35 Ohlheiser, supra note 19.
36 Deen Freelon et al., Beyond the Hashtags: #Ferguson, #Blacklivesmatter, and the Online
Struggle for Offline Justice, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT, 36–70 (2016), http://archive.cmsim-
pact.org/sites/default/files/beyond_the_hashtags_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A8X-PH6K].
37 Yasmin Aslam, #LoveWins on the Internet, MSNBC (June 27, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com
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the Supreme Court’s decision to legalize same sex marriage, with over
10 million tweets.38 To date, the largest social justice movement to be
ignited on Twitter is #BlackLivesMatter.39 The hashtag first appeared
in July 2013 after George Zimmerman was acquitted in the killing of
an unarmed black teenager, Trayvon Martin.40 Since that time, the
hashtag has been used in over 30 million Twitter posts.41 The hashtag
continues to thrive in a steady stream of daily tweets, increasing in vol-
ume when relevant real world events occur.42 The hashtag has also
helped to galvanize research and activism about racial bias, law en-
forcement reform, and the criminal justice system.43
V. HASHTAGSUNITED: #METOO AND THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE
Following in the footsteps of #BlackLivesMatter, #MeToo has
helped increase awareness and visibility of a pervasive societal prob-
lem, while amplifying the voices of those who have been injured. Opti-
mists have argued that social media has been, essentially, a power
equalizer that broadens access to political activism.44 Although Twitter
is not a representative sample of the U.S. population, some have argued
that social media activism has fewer divides along the lines of race,
class, and gender than the activism of traditional social movements, due
to the Internet’s accessibility.45 Moreover, social media networks, in-
cluding Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and others, have become key
parts of global and domestic civil society.46 On the one hand, it seems
easier to “belong” on social media than it does in physical space. In a
/msnbc/love-wins-the-internet [https://perma.cc/G9ND-QYRX].
38 Id.
39 MONICA ANDERSON ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., ACTIVISM IN THE SOCIALMEDIA AGE 5 (July 11,
2018).
40 Id. at 13.
41 Id.
42 These surges have occurred, for example, when black men, women, and children have been
killed by the police and when officers are not indicted or acquitted of charges.
43 See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE, FEDERALREPORTSONPOLICEKILLINGS: FERGUSON,
CLEVELAND, BALTIMORE, AND CHICAGO (2017); Trymaine Lee, Black Lives Matter Releases Policy
Agenda, NBCNEWS (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/black-lives-matter-re-
leases-policy-agenda-n620966 [https://perma.cc/9ZQY-RYA9]; German Lopez, This Moment at the
DNC Shows Democrats Have Embraced Black Lives Matter, VOX (July 26, 2016), https://www.vox.
com/2016/7/26/12291274/democratic-convention-police-violence-mothers-of-the-movement [https:/
/perma.cc/XB95-S4RH].
44 SHAKED SPIER, COLLECTIVE ACTION 2.0: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON COLLECTIVE
ACTION 140 (2017); Stephen, supra note 34.
45 See generally Yarimar Bonilla & Jonathan Rosa, #Ferguson: Digital Protect, Hashtag Eth-
nography, and the Racial Politics of Social Media in the United States, 42 J. AM. ETHNOLOGICAL
SOC. 4, 8 (2015); Gerbaudo & Trere, supra note 31; Stephen, supra note 34. Although a digital
divide remains along race and socioeconomic lines, the Internet and social media networks are
now easy to access across a broad swath of socio-economic and geographic regions.
46 Shirky, supra note 3.
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more practical sense, there are fewer barriers to participation, such as
geographic restrictions, scarcity of leisure time, and cost. For example,
people may be more willing and able to read 140 character tweets than
travel to attend a live political speech. More individuals also get to take
the stage, providing a sense of empowerment that everyone has a voice.
Given this broader access, knowledge and information is no longer mo-
nopolized by political and economic elites and is communicated faster
to the public. This allows for rapid mobilization of groups and gives
greater opportunities to engage in public speech.47 Thus, social media
represents a low-cost method through which people are able to organize,
connect, and coordinate massive responses to injuries, events, and so-
cial change.48
However, some skeptics have argued that, rather than enable
greater mobilization opportunities or connectivity among like-minded
individuals, social media has created the “slacktivist.”49 Slacktivist is a
pejorative term for an individual who participates in a social movement
by liking or sharing social media posts promoting a particular cause.50
These individuals participate in a movement in ways that require min-
imal costs to participants; in a click or retweet, “the slacktivist can feel
that he or she has helped to support the cause.”51 Critics of social media
activism argue that, rather than playing a central role in social change,
“slacktivists” do very little to produce social change and their participa-
tion is a poor substitute for in-person activism.52 In fact, they suggest
that “slacktivists” may inhibit further engagement by giving “superfi-
cial” satisfaction to those sharing a post.53
Advocates for social media activism have argued that liking or
sharing a post, even if a small contribution to a particular movement,
represents the initial step toward greater engagement by those individ-
uals.54 Moreover, this early participation acts to spread knowledge
47 Spier, supra note 44.
48 Shirky, supra note 3; Obar et al., supra note 31.
49 N. L. Cabrera et al., Activism or Slacktivism? The Potential and Pitfalls of Social Media in
Contemporary Student Activism, J. DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUC., 4 (Apr. 2017). See also Malcolm
Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW YORKER (Oct. 4, 2010),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell [https://perma.
cc/Y6V7-PRYP].
50 Noah Berlatsky,Hashtag Activism Isn’t a Cop-Out, ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.th
eatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/01/not-just-hashtag-activism-why-social-media-matters-to-pro
testors/384215/ [https://perma.cc/X38Y-XKHS].





54 Berlatsky, supra note 50; Henrik Serup Christensen, Political Activities on the Internet:
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about a cause or issue that, if widespread, can motivate those with
greater power and resources to seek cultural and institutional reform.
#MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter provide examples of how initial, rapid
fire communication led to consolidation and mobilization, both by orga-
nized groups as well as individuals. While the initial contribution costs
were minimal (involving shares or retweets), enough participation led
to more tangible benefits for the movement, such as organized protests,
funding for legal groups, and public awareness of discrete social prob-
lems. Eventually, this forced public officials to speak out and address
those issues. It is also important to note that while there are no direct
monetary costs to tweeting, there can be heavy emotional and reputa-
tional costs to participating. This is particularly true for working-class
women, breadwinners, and immigrants, who may risk not only losing a
job or being shunned, but also may risk deportation and separation from
their community for speaking out.55
VI. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: CONVERTING CONVERSATIONS TO
CHANGE
In Part A, we discuss our collection and analysis of over 13 million
tweets to provide a brief overview of what people are talking about
online under the #MeToo hashtag. In Part B, we examine the social,
legal, and political changes occurring offline that have been inspired by
the online activity.
A. The Conversations Happening Online56
First, it is ongoing social and political events that continue to keep
the #MeToo hashtag relevant.57 An analysis of over 13 million tweets
collected by the Massive Data Institute (MDI) at Georgetown Univer-
sity offers insights into the types of conversations taking place under
the hashtag.58 Data reveal that the volume of tweets using the #MeToo
hashtag is heavily correlated with social and political events, reaching
Slacktivism or Political Participation by Other Means?, FIRSTMONDAY (Feb. 2011), https://uncom-
monculture.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3336 [https://perma.cc/8HHR-Y47W]; Monica Ander-
son et al., supra note 39; Kirk Kristofferson et al., The Nature of Slacktivism: How the Social Ob-
servability of an Initial Act of Token Support Affects Subsequent Prosocial Action, 40 J. CONSUMER
RES. 1149, 1149 (2014).
55 Megha Mohan, Secret World: The Women in the UK Who Cannot Report Sexual Abuse, BBC
NEWS (March 27, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/in-pictures-43499374 [https://perma.cc/KWF8-
JE6H].
56 The #MeToo Research Collaboration supra note 22.
57 The #MeToo Research Collaboration supra note 22; Anderson & Toor, supra note 23.
58 The #MeToo Research Collaboration supra note 22; (we use the Twitter streaming Applica-
tion Programming Interface (API) to collect tweets; this is an analysis of tweets collected between
October 2017 and October 2018).
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a high point in September 2018 during the Brett Kavanaugh hearings.59
This is evidence of increased discussion and sustained momentum,
demonstrating that the activism was not simply a fleeting trend from
October 2017. The types of events and the volume of #MeToo activity
surrounding those events are telling. First, the range of the events––
from activism such as International Women’s Day and the Golden
Globes, to announcements about perpetrators such as Moonves and
Cosby, to achievements of women, such as Time Person of the Year––is
a strong indication of the emergence of an online community sharing
and commenting on a wide range of activities.
The MDI Research Collaborative also analyzed the content of the
conversations. The first content analysis looks only at hashtags that co-
occur frequently in the same tweet with #MeToo. Co-occurring hashtags
are important because they highlight topics that online users are con-
versing about. The hashtag that co-occurs most frequently is #TimesUp,
which pops up an impressive 310,000 times. #TimesUp, a next-step of
#MeToo, was created by women in the entertainment industry on Jan-
uary 1, 2018 to raise money for a legal defense fund.60 Other hashtags
that co-occur frequently with #MeToo include #withyou, #goldenglobes,
#oscars, #rape, #sexualassault, #trump, #kavanaugh, and #resist. Fig-
ure 1 groups the most frequently co-occurring hashtags into topic areas.
Each bubble in Figure 1 represents a frequent hashtag. The size of the
bubble represents the relative frequency of the different co-occurring
hashtags. Different colors of bubbles represent different topics. This fig-
ure highlights the variation in the types of topics that feature promi-
nently in the conversation. Even with this variation, a large majority of
hashtags are about activism (50 out of the top 180), including
#TimesUp. This suggests an on-going interest in linking the Twitter
conversation to action and social change. The co-occurrence of hashtags
used in other countries for their #MeToo tweets–for example, #rice-
bunnies in China, #metooindia in India, #balancetonporc in France–is
a reminder that both the underlying problem and recent discussion of
sexual misconduct are global phenomena.
59 We do not remove bots because they are engaging in conversation, but we do remove SPAM,
i.e. ads and dead hyperlinks. SPAM makes up approximately 7% of the stream.
60 Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-Harassment Action Plan, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-up-hollywood-women-sex
ual-harassment.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module
=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/T3EJ-L3YL].
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FIGURE 1. HASHTAGS THAT FREQUENTLY CO-OCCUR WITH #METOO
The next content analysis identifies words, excluding hashtags,
which are most frequently used in the English tweets with #MeToo. The
highest frequency words are shown in Figure 2. The larger words in
Figure 2 occur in over 1 million tweets, while the small words occur in
over 150,000 tweets. What is telling about these high-use words is the
prevalence of misconduct words like harassment, sexual, and assault
and activism words like movement and believe. These words represent
further evidence of the personal nature of some of this online discussion
and the openness with which people are sharing their stories, discuss-
ing them, and showing support for others.
FIGURE 2. COMMONWORDSMENTIONED IN #METOODISCUSSIONS
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While the volume, hashtag topics, and frequently occurring words
give us a macro-level view of the Twitter conversation, we are also in-
terested in the more focused legal discussions taking place. As an initial
step, we compiled a list of legal terms and determined how frequently
they were used in #MeToo tweets. Figure 3 shows the legal terms that
occur in at least 15,000 tweets. The most prevalent terms are those that
have a root of “harass,” e.g. harassing, harassment, harassed, etc. Other
legal terms include law, court, case, claim, report, and hearing. The use
of such words suggests that legal action is a clear theme in the #MeToo
discussion.
FIGURE 3. FREQUENTLY OCCURRING LEGAL TERMS
B. Social-political and Legal Change Offline Post #MeToo
Popularization of the #MeToo hashtag in October 2017 ignited so-
cial media and shook the power structures of media, television, and pol-
itics. Questions about the viability of #MeToo have loomed large, in part
because of skepticism that the digital activism would translate into off-
line action,61 as well as the limitations of the current legal landscape in
providing relief for victims of sexual assault and harassment.62 How-
ever, as the movement continues to be culturally salient, we appear to
be entering into a period of change, in the legal landscape as well as in
society and politics more broadly. Dissatisfaction with the current sta-
tus quo, and the strong desire for social and institutional changes in
how we deal with sexual assault and harassment, is already leading to
change.
61 Gladwell, supra note 49.
62 Ginia Bellafante, The #MeToo Movement Changed Everything. Can the Law Catch Up?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/nyregion/metoo-movement-
schneiderman-prosecution.html [https://perma.cc/NP3G-2WPR]; 2018 Brings #MeToo Laws Na-
tionwide, WNYC (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/2018-brings-metoo-laws-na-
tionwide [https://perma.cc/M9Z2-QHYL].
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1. Strikes and protests
The high volume of #MeToo tweets does not mean that traditional
social movement tactics such as strikes, marches, and legal action are
obsolete. The online activity not only serves as a catalyst for action, but
also provides greater legitimacy and visibility to the action occurring
offline, in some cases leading to rapid change. For example, in the pri-
vate sector, activists have organized to address policies connected to
sexual harassment and workplace safety, garnering media attention
and public scrutiny for issues normally dealt with in closed-door con-
versations. In September 2018, for example, after 10 employees filed
sexual harassment complaints with the U.S. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC), McDonald’s employees organized the first
ever multi-state strike against the company’s existing sexual harass-
ment policies.63 The workers carried signs that said “#MeToo McDon-
alds” and wore tape over their mouths that said “#MeToo.”64 Unite
Here, a labor union that works primarily with the hospitality industry,
worked in conjunction with union leaders in cities such as Chicago, Se-
attle, and Washington DC to organize massive campaigns advocating
for hotels to provide panic buttons to hotel workers.65 Major hotel
chains, including Marriott, Hilton, and Hyatt, subsequently introduced
policies to provide panic buttons at all their properties by 2020.66 In
October 2018, 20,000 Google employees walked out of corporate offices
in 50 cities after demanding an overhaul of Google’s sexual harassment
policies, particularly their policy of forced arbitration.67 In response,
Google CEO Sundar Pichai announced changes to the policies, includ-
ing optional arbitration. The decision followed in the footsteps of similar
63 Daniella Silva,McDonald’s Workers Go on Strike over Sexual Harassment,NBCNEWS (Sep.
18, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mcdonald-s-workers-go-strike-over-sexual-har
assment-n910656 [https://perma.cc/9QZ8-KFKW].
64 Rachel Abrams, McDonald’s Workers Across the U.S. Stage #MeToo Protests, N.Y. TIMES
(Sep. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/business/mcdonalds-strike-metoo.html [http
s://perma.cc/GK64-N7UM]; Sarah Whitten, McDonald’s Employees Stage First #MeToo Strike in
Chicago, Alleging Sexual Harassment, USA TODAY (Sep. 18, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/sto
ry/money/food/2018/09/18/mcdonalds-employees-metoo-strike-sexual-harassment/1349981002/ [h
ttps://perma.cc/29KK-PUYP].
65 SeemaMody,Hotels are Arming Workers with Panic Buttons to Combat Harassment, CNBC
(Sep. 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/major-hotels-arm-workers-with-panic-buttons-to-
fight-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/FHX9-ZJG6].
66 Id.
67 Daisuke Wakabayashi et al., Google Walkout: Employees Stage Protest Over Handling of
Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/technology/g
oogle-walkout-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/UFM5-C27B].
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policy changes made by other tech giants, including Microsoft and
Uber.68 Facebook followed suit soon thereafter.69
2. TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund
As discussed above, the hashtag #TimesUp is a solution-oriented
branch of the #MeToo movement that seeks solutions to the problems
#MeToo has helped identity. It refers to the TIME’S UP Legal Defense
Fund (TULDF), created to support lower income women and women of
color who have been sexually assaulted or harassed in the workplace.70
TULDF was created by 300 actresses, female agents, writers, directors,
producers, and entertainment executives seeking solutions for the sys-
temic sexual harassment revealed by #MeToo.71 Consistent with re-
source mobilization theory, this is a clear example of how social media
activism both outraged and inspired individuals, motivating them to
organize, connect, and coordinate efforts to lead to tangible outcomes.
The group’s mission, in part, is a response to early critiques that lower
income women and women of color were being left out of the #MeToo
conversation.72 This organization offline has helped provide the social
and financial capital necessary to advance the cause. As of February 8,
2019, TULDF has fielded more than 4,000 requests for assistance from
all 50 states and has raised $24 million.73 The funding is used to connect
women experiencing workplace harassment and retaliation with attor-
neys, and in some cases, to media specialists. Legal defense funds like
TULDF help victims to get justice. They also have the potential to en-
hance existing efforts to help working class women claim their rights in
ways that generally carry steep financial burdens.
68 Jilian D’Onfro, Google CEO, in Internal Memo, Supports Employee Walkout in the Wake of
Report on Sexual Misconduct, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/30/google-ceo-
sundar-pichai-supports-employee-walk-out-in-memo.html [https://perma.cc/L2E8-4XLR].
69 Daisuke Wakabayashi & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Facebook to Drop Forced Arbitration in
Harassment Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/technology/fa-
cebook-arbitration-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/B98Y-Z5M9].
70 Buckley, supra note 60.
71 Id.
72 The #MeToo Research Collaboration, supra note 22 (Our analysis shows that <1% of those
posting #MeToo are black.). See Charisse Jones, When Will MeToo Become WeToo? Some Say
Voices of Black Women, Working Class Left Out, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/money/2018/10/05/metoo-movement-lacks-diversity-blacks-working-class-sexual-
harassment/1443105002/ [https://perma.cc/2KT6-2BRA]. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo Movement, 128 YALE L. J. 105 (2018).
73 See TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund—Stats & Numbers, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR.,
https://nwlc.org/resources/times-up-legal-defense-fund-stats-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/BT8Z-FG
JP] (last visited February 17, 2019).
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3. EEOC sexual harassment charges
The frequency of legal words emerging in #MeToo conversations
online is consistent with recent reports that more individuals are re-
porting sexual harassment through legal channels since the start of the
movement.74 According to the EEOC, the government agency responsi-
ble for enforcing workplace discrimination law, sexual harassment
charges are up nationwide, the first increase observed this decade. The
number of hits to the EEOC website for people searching for infor-
mation on sexual harassment has also doubled.75 The agency has capi-
talized on #MeToo momentum by increasing lawsuits to enforce sexual
harassment law and hold employers accountable.76 The EEOC has filed
50% more of these lawsuits than it did during the previous year, and
has recovered $70 million for sexual harassment victims in FY 2018,
compared to the $47 million it recovered during FY 2017.77 In terms of
outcomes, the EEOC reported an increase in cause findings from 970 in
FY 2017, to 1,199 in FY 2018. The agency also facilitated more success-
ful conciliations, with nearly 500 in FY 2018, compared to 350 in 2017.78
4. State/Federal legislation
While this increased legal activity may be promising in showing
that victims are seeking justice and accountability, long-term results
will be limited if the movement does not lead to legal reform in order to
enhance and broaden protection under sexual harassment law. Our cur-
rent laws leave many individuals unprotected. For example, many
workers are not protected by federal law, including: domestic workers,
temporary workers, independent contractors, farm workers, interns,
and those working for small employers.79 The statute of limitations to
74 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC RELEASES PRELIMINARY FY
2018 SEXUALHARASSMENTDATA (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-4-
18.cfm [https://perma.cc/WZ8S-6N8G].
75 Julia Horowitz, Workplace Sexual Harassment Claims Have Spiked in the #MeToo Era,
CNN (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/04/business/eeoc-sexual-harassment-reports/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/92RS-JFMG].
76 Eric Bachman, In Response To #MeToo, EEOC Is Filing More Sexual Harassment Lawsuits
and Winning, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbachman/2018/10/05/how-
has-the-eeoc-responded-to-the-metoo-movement/#33a7edf87475 [https://perma.cc/U5RC-MDCE];
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW: EEOC LEADS
THEWAY IN PREVENTINGWORKPLACEHARASSMENT, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/pr
eventing-workplace-harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/832W-CFVR] (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
77 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 2018 PERFORMANCE REPORT 14
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2018par.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX3R-3PR
U].
78 Id. at 32.
79 42 U.S.C. § 2000b. Small employers refer to employers with less than 15 employees. See
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers
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file sexual harassment claims under federal law is only 180 or 300 days,
which is not enough time for many victims to process, reflect, and decide
how to move forward.80Non-disclosure agreements too often silence vic-
tims.81 And crucially, mandatory arbitration agreements increasingly
prevent claimants from even accessing a court of law.82
To examine the actual and potential policy changes following #Me-
Too, we reviewed all passed, proposed, and pending state and federal
legislation that explicitly addresses sexual harassment and gender eq-
uity from October 2016 to December 2018.83 Legislators in several
states have cited the #MeToo movement in discussing passed legislation
and California has even coined some of the new laws the “#MeToo
Bills.”84 In the U.S. Congress, from October 2016 to December 2018, 52
bills were introduced relating to sexual harassment, sexual assault, and
gender equity in employment.85 This total includes a steep increase af-
ter the #MeToo movement took off in October 2017.86 While only two
federal bills were introduced in 2016, 26 were introduced in 2017, 22 of
which were following #MeToo, and 24 bills were introduced in 2018.87
Three of these bills have passed.88 See Figure 4. Of the three bills passed
by Congress, one mandates anti-harassment training for Senators and
without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 251,
263 (2006).
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Joanna Grossman,Moving Forward Looking Back: A Retrospec-
tive on Sexual Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1043 (2015) (explaining that the statute of
limitation is “180 or 300 days, depending on the level of coordination between the federal and state
anti-discrimination agencies”); NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, SELECTED TITLE IX PRACTICE
ISSUES: BREAKINGDOWNBARRIERS 91 (2017), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/BDB07
_Ch6.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5AF-7JML].
81 Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the Culture of Silence
around Sexual Abuse through Regulating Non-disclosure Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59
B.C. L. Rev. 2507, 2507 (2018).
82 Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in Employ-
ment Law: Where To, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2019).
83 Methodology: using Legiscan, we performed a legislative search for each state for the legis-
lative sessions incorporating bills introduced from October 2016-present (2017 & 2018). Our initial
search was: “sexual harassment” OR “equal pay” OR “sexual misconduct” OR “gender equity” OR
“gender equality.” From there, we searched each individual bill to see if there were any parts of
the bill that applied generally to harassment, equal pay, gender equity, whether it was through
increased awareness, mandatory training, or some other expansion or limitation on current law.
84 Governor Signs Jackson’s #MeToo Bills to Combat Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,
(Oct. 01, 2008), https://sd19.senate.ca.gov/news/2018-10-01-governor-signs-jacksons-metoo-bills-c
ombat-sexual-harassment-workplace [https://perma.cc/DLX2-NCRA]; Rebecca Beitsch, #MeToo







371] #METOO AS CATALYST 387
Senate employees,89 another makes lawmakers financially liable for
harassment settlements,90 and the third creates additional reporting
requirements for sexual harassment in the military.91 Although a direct
causal link cannot be drawn, this timeline suggests a strong correlation.
FIGURE 4. FEDERAL LEGISLATION:
SEX-BASEDHARASSMENT AND EQUITY
Even greater legal activity is occurring within the state legisla-
tures. From October 2016 to December 2018, 384 bills were introduced
across nearly all 50 states, plus the District of Columbia.92 The amount
and timing of state legislation also suggests a very close tie with the
#MeToo movement. While only 12 bills were introduced in 2016, 91
were proposed in 2017 (19 were introduced following #MeToo), and 281
were proposed in 2018.93 Ninety of these state bills have passed to
strengthen the rights and protections of women in a number of states.94
Three were passed in 2016, 21 were passed in 2017, and 66 were passed
in 2018.95 See Figure 5. The states with the highest number of bills in-
troduced in 2018 include California (25), Illinois (17), New York (24),
Pennsylvania (20), Tennessee (15), Virginia (12), Minnesota (14), and
Connecticut (16). States with the highest number of Bills passed in 2018
include Illinois (8), California (7), Maryland (5) New Jersey (4), New
89 S. Res. 330, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
90 132 Stat 5297 (2018).
91 131 Stat. 1283 (2017).
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York (3), Washington D.C. (4), Washington State (4), Virginia (3), and
Tennessee (3).96
FIGURE 5. STATE LEGISLATION: SEX-BASEDHARASSMENT AND EQUITY
At both the federal and state level, the legislation proposed repre-
sented direct remedies to several institutional and cultural issues at the
heart of the #MeToo movement. Almost all states and the federal gov-
ernment introduced legislation addressing pay equity and salary dis-
crimination between male and female government employees.97 A ma-
jority of states introduced legislation mandating sexual harassment
training programs for government employees or introduced legislation
improving existing training.98 Several states also introduced legislation
requiring government contractors or companies that receive federal
funds to have harassment-training programs in place.99 Numerous
states also introduced legislation to end mandatory arbitration in sex-
ual harassment cases, or to extend the statute of limitations for filing
sexual harassment claims.100 Figure 6 outlines these most frequently
occurring topics in the state legislatures; pay equity was the most fre-
quently introduced legislation, followed by sexual harassment training,
with gender discrimination, statute of limitations, and arbitration also
occurring frequently in several states.101
96 Id.
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FIGURE 6. FREQUENTLY OCCURRING TOPICS
OF STATE LEGISLATION, 2016-2018
5. Tort claims
Some scholars also suggest that #MeToo will have an impact on
tort law and will lead to more legal actions by victims of gender-related
and sexualized injuries such as domestic violence, rape, sexual assault,
sexual harassment, and reproductive injuries, particularly against
third-party actors and when there are statutory gaps.102 Torts may
sometimes be a better legal avenue than Title VII and Title IX because
tort laws often have less strict deadlines for filing a claim. Additionally,
plaintiffs who are not official employees of the defendant employer, or
who are not students attending a defendant’s educational institution,
currently have no civil rights claim under these statutes.103 In some
cases, common law tort claims may provide the only avenue under
which they could seek redress. Tort claims also provide recovery or the
right to seek damages from the offending individual, whereas Title VII
and IX claims can only be directed against the employer or the educa-
tional entity itself.104 The most commonly brought tort actions related
to sexual harassment, sexual assault, and rape are intentional or neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, invasion of
privacy, intrusion, as well as employment-related common law torts,
102 Martha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #MeToo Moment?, 11 J. TORT L. 39, 46–47
(2018); Rebecca Hanner White, Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L. J. ONLINE 1014,
1016 (2018). See generally Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from
Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2007).
103 SeeWhite, supra note 102, at 1022.
104 Rebecca Hanner White, Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L. J. ONLINE 1014,
1024 (2018).
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such as failure to maintain a safe workplace and negligent hiring and
retention.105
Spikes in defamation lawsuits against the alleged wrongdoer, as
well as retaliatory defamation lawsuits against the victim, have also
been reported following #MeToo.106 These claims are particularly com-
mon when the statute of limitations for sexual assault or sexual harass-
ment claims has passed.107 In addition to extending the ability of vic-
tims to bring a claim, defamation lawsuits also provide one of the few
ways to address the additional reputational injuries that women often
sustain when they accuse a high-profile harasser.108 For example, high
profile defamation lawsuits have been brought against Bill Cosby, Don-
ald Trump, Roy Moore, and Bill O’Reilly.109 In this sense they might
also be thought of as a mechanism for fighting the underlying gender
inequality that allows men to take advantage of being more readily be-
lieved than women.110
6. Government officials
Our comprehensive analysis of the public record reveals that #Me-
Too also spurred a series of public accusations of government officials,
many of whom are responsible for passing laws on this very issue.111
105 Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts:
Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55 (2006); White, supra note
102, at 1016.
106 Mark Mulholland & Elizabeth Sy, Victim Defamation Claims in the Era of #MeToo, N.Y. L.
J. (Aug. 1, 2018).
107 White, supra note 102, at 1022.
108 See Anna North, The Summer Zervos Sexual Assault Allegations and Lawsuit against Don-
ald Trump, Explained, VOX (March 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/26/
17151766/summer-zervos-case-trump-lawsuit-sexual-assault-allegations (last visited February
27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XB74-2Z3F].
109 Daniel Jackson, Sex-Assault Accusers Turn to Defamation Lawsuits in #MeToo Era, COURT-
HOUSENEWS SERV. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/sex-assault-accusers-turn-t
o-defamation-lawsuits-in-metoo-era/ [https://perma.cc/ZVX3-JTBG].
110 Defamation lawsuits are also a new obstacle for people with fewer resources filing sexual
misconduct complaints under Title IX. Tyler Kingkade, As More College Students Say “MeToo,”
Accused Men are Suing for Defamation, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Dec. 5, 2017), https:// www.buzzfeednew
s.com/article/tylerkingkade/as-more-college-students-say-me-too-accused-men-are-suing [https://p
erma.cc/2JHR-N2LZ]. Even the threat of a lawsuit can chill an alleged victim’s plans to speak out.
Jackson, supra note 109.
111 Jamillah Bowman-Williams, #MeToo and Public Officials: A post-election snapshot of alle-
gations and consequences, GEO. U. L. CTR. (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2018/11/MeToo-and-Public-Officials.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDQ2-DN6Q]. Methodol-
ogy: using LexisNexis, GoogleNews and NewspaperArchive, we performed a series of searches
based on a series of key word phrases and indexed subject terms. These included, but were not
limited to, words denoting general types of allegations, such as “sexual harassment,” “sexual mis-
conduct,” “sexual assault,” “inappropriate touching,” and “abuse,” which were searched in associ-
ation with positions such as “government official,” “state senator,” “legislative bodies,” “local gov-
ernment,” “Congress,” “assemblymen,” “governor,” “congressman,” and “state representative.” The
search was limited to online and print newspapers and publications from the United States, and
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Those accused include state legislators, members of the U.S. Congress,
and other elected and appointed officials.112 All but three of the 138 peo-
ple accused in our data set are men. Some have been accused by more
than a dozen women.113 Most of the allegations pertain to behavior
within the workplace, including unwanted kissing and groping, mastur-
bating in front of others, sending sexually explicit photos, and discuss-
ing sexual fantasies.114 Some of the reported misconduct has also oc-
curred outside of official government responsibilities, including
domestic violence, sexual misconduct with minors, and sex traffick-
ing.115
Many of these claims have been settled by officials, who pay victims
large settlements using taxpayer dollars.116 Other claims have
prompted internal investigations into the toxic workplace cultures that
feed this type of behavior.117 Republicans and Democrats shared a rela-
tively even distribution of the allegations, constituting about 48.5 per-
cent and 43.5 percent of accusations, respectively.118 Reports are also
spread fairly evenly across the country.119 Alleged misconduct was no-
tably high compared to the overall population in Ohio, Kentucky,
Alaska, and Washington, D.C.120
Most of the accused officials in our findings have since fallen from
power.121 Of the 25 appointed officials, 23 have been fired or resigned.122
Of the 111 elected officials, 76 are no longer in office.123 Moreover, some
of these officials also face legal action, including at least 7 civil lawsuits
and 12 criminal charges. This type of accountability is historically un-
precedented.124 Nonetheless, of the 27 government officials accused of
looked at reporting conducted from November 2016 to October 2018. Individual behavior is iden-
tified, and others accused of enabling or hiding another individual’s harassment or misconduct are
also accounted for. In some circumstances the incident takes place in earlier years, but the accu-





116 Peter Henning, Taxpayers Are Subsidizing Hush Money for Sexual Harassment and As-
sault, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 5, 2017), https://theconversation.com/taxpayers-are-subsidizing-
hush-money-for-sexual-harassment-and-assault-86451 [https://perma.cc/QF57-AZ59].







124 Nathanial Rakich,We’ve Never Seen Congressional Resignations Like This Before, FIVETHI-
RTYEIGHT (Jan. 29, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/more-people-are-resigning-from-con
gress-than-at-any-time-in-recent-history/ [https://perma.cc/LLT3-KVYT].
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sexual misconduct who ran for office in the 2018 midterm elections, 23
were re-elected or elected to a new government position.125 These sta-
tistics are consistent with typical election trends, considering that an
average of 92 percent of state legislators are re-elected in any given
election year.126 So, for those who did not step down and instead, sought
reelection, sexual misconduct allegations appeared to have little influ-
ence on the outcome.
VII. CONCLUSION
As important as individual stories are for achieving empowerment
and justice at the personal level, the magnitude of the social media re-
sponse reveals something significant about the pervasiveness of, and
tolerance for, harassment and abuse in our society. By encouraging
women and men to speak out and supporters around the world to act,
our analysis suggests that #MeToo is changing our society’s collective
understanding of sexual harassment and assault, and reducing our col-
lective tolerance for it. Not only are people talking about issues online,
but by using a simple, shared phrase they have named and consolidated
the conversation and made the injury more visible. There is also evi-
dence that the conversations are sparking broader offline organizing ef-
forts and prompting victims to claim their legal rights, seek protection
of the law, and demand better laws when the protection is inade-
quate.127
In this new paradigm of collective action, at least in the context of
#MeToo, tweeting has not eclipsed traditional social movement activity,
but rather has been a catalyst and communications tool for action of-
fline. While social media allows individuals to disseminate information,
organize, and act without dependence on traditional movement institu-
tions, organizations like Time’s Up Legal Defense continue to play a
central role in pushing for remedies and reform. Legal reform also has
not been abandoned within the new paradigm as indicated by the in-
crease in legislative activity around harassment and gender equity fol-
lowing the #MeToo surge online.
Social media activism is powerful when it effectively names a per-
vasive injury and the inequality that sustains it, when it consolidates
communication about the injury, and when it inspires action and re-
form. Like #BlackLivesMatter, #MeToo has done just this. But both
movements seek to address the stickiest kinds of cultural norms, the
125 See Bowman-Williams, supra note 111.
126 Ciara O’Neill, Money and Incumbency in State Legislative Races, 2015 and 2016, FOLLOW
THEMONEY (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/money-inc
umbency-in-2015-and-2016-state-legislative-races [https://perma.cc/6H2U-WEBH].
127 Beitsch, supra, note 84.
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ones that are so ingrained that we often do not recognize them; they are
the implicit default ideas about race and gender. For this reason,
change can be uneven, uncertain, and subject to backlash. What we do
not yet know is whether the #MeToo movement will maintain its mo-
mentum and whether these changes in the short run will translate to




Sexual Harassment Litigation with a Dose of
Reality
Diane P. Wood†
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 which prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”2 has
been around for 55 years. One might think that this was long enough to
work out the kinks and ensure that its protections are readily available
to any covered person who needs them. But at least parts of the statute
are still works-in-progress. Prominent among the latter group is the
prohibition against “discriminat[ion] against any individual with re-
spect to his [sic] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”3 There is much one
could say about this, starting with the question “what does the word
‘sex’ mean here?”4 But that topic, important though it is, deserves its
own Symposium.5 The focus of today’s discussion is the #MeToo Move-
ment. If there is any message to be taken from the explosive growth of
that hashtag, it is that there is still a great deal of work to be done if
the goal is to eliminate sexual harassment and related abusive behav-
iors.
Why is that? As I just said, statutory protections against sex dis-
crimination in the workplace have existed for more than half a century,
† Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in Law, The
University of Chicago. I wish to thank Adam Davidson, Andrew Miller, and Elizabeth Reese for
their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
3 Id.
4 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. College of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 340 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(construing the word “sex” to encompass classifications based on sexual orientation); Whitaker v.
Kenosha Unified Schl. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1038 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying Title
IX protections to transgender high school student on sex-stereotyping theory).
6See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 121 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (agreeing with
Hively); Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2019) (disagreeing with Hively).
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and there are comparable protections in other specialized settings, in-
cluding housing,6 educational institutions,7 and public benefits.8 The
flood of stories that has emerged in the wake of the #MeToo Movement,
however, strongly indicates that those legal rules are not doing the job.
The question is why not? And in particular, why have the laws address-
ing #MeToo in the workplace not been a match for the problem? This
inquiry sheds light both on changes that may be especially useful, and
on the competing interests that will have to be addressed.
Let’s start with the basics: what does discrimination on the basis
of sex mean? Does it mean classifying one’s employees by biological gen-
der and paying the males more money? Certainly yes, but that isn’t all
it means. Does it mean excluding one sex on the basis of characteristics
unique to it—pregnancy for women, susceptibility to prostate cancer for
men, and so on? This is a more difficult question in some instances, but
Congress has answered it in others. For example, the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 19789 clarifies that the terms “because of sex” or “on
the basis of sex” include actions taken on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions.10 For issues covered by that stat-
ute, at least, the answer to the second question is also yes. But what
about sexual harassment?
For more than two decades after Title VII was enacted, it seems
fair to say that very few people imagined that the statute addressed
sexual harassment. Some, however, realized that few things affect a
person’s “terms and conditions of employment” more than sexual har-
assment. In 1979, Catharine MacKinnon published her groundbreaking
book entitled simply “Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case
of Sex Discrimination.”11 The book revolutionized thinking in this area.
In what must be record time for a legal scholar, MacKinnon’s concept
made its way up to the Supreme Court in 1986, in a case calledMeritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.12 There, in an opinion by then-Associate
6 Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et
seq.).
7 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.).
8 See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (finding that gender-based discrim-
ination in the criteria for awarding social security survivor benefits violated the Constitution’s due
process and equal protection guarantees); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642–44 (1975)
(striking down as unlawful sex discrimination in violation of equal protection a provision basing
social security benefits based only on the earnings of a deceased husband, and not on earnings of
a deceased wife).
9 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-(k)).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
11 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979).
12 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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Justice William Rehnquist, the Court recognized that sexual harass-
ment is covered by Title VII. In so doing, it settled several important
questions:
When a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because
of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor discriminates on
the basis of sex.13
The language of Title VII is not limited to economic or tan-
gible discrimination. The phrase “terms, conditions, or priv-
ileges of employment” evinces a congressional intent to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women in employment.14
Sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited sexual harass-
ment, whether or not it is directly linked to the grant or de-
nial of an economic quid pro quo, where such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an in-
dividual’s work performance or creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive working environment.15
A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving
that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment.16
For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the vic-
tim’s employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.17
The fact that sex-related conduct is “voluntary,” in the sense
that the complainant has not been forced to participate
against her will, is not a defense to a sexual-harassment suit
brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any sexual har-
assment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were “un-
welcome.”18
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed these rulings over the years. In
1993, in the case of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,19 it held that har-
13 Id. at 64.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 65.
16 Id. at 66.
17 Id. at 67.
18 Id. at 68.
19 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (former employee brought suit against her employer, arguing the com-
pany president’s gender-based insults and innuendos created an abusive work environment. While
the lower court held that the comments were not so severe as to affect her psychological well-being
nor to cause her injury, the Supreme Court ultimately held “when the workplace is permeated
with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to
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assment need not reach the level of tangible psychological injury in or-
der to be actionable.20 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,21
it recognized that harassment at the hands of a person of the same sex
as the victim falls within the statute.22 In the twin cases of Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth23 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,24 it set
forth the rules for linking a supervisor or other actor’s conduct to the
employer; those rules in turn establish when the employer will be vicar-
iously liable for misconduct. It is worth stressing in this connection that
the link to the ultimate employer is critical—indeed, it is outcome-de-
terminative for purposes of a Title VII action. Courts have held that
Title VII creates a remedy only against the “employer.”25 From that,
they infer that the offender, whether a supervisor, a fellow employee, a
customer, or another workplace participant, is not individually liable
under the statute.26 Unless, therefore, a state-law theory exists, or an-
other federal statute is available (often true in racial discrimination and
harassment cases),27 the plaintiff can proceed only indirectly against
the offending party, by pursuing an action against the employer.
The need to link the offending behavior to the employer is thus one
of the hurdles that a victim of sexual harassment must surmount. But
it is far from the only one. Most cases do not make it all the way up to
the Supreme Court, and the Court chooses only those in which a broader
point needs to be made. It is the district courts and the courts of appeals
that have the responsibility of sifting through the filed cases and decid-
ing at retail who wins and who loses. At that level, it becomes apparent
that even blatant cases of sexual harassment frequently fail.
alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,’ Title
VII is violated”).
20 Id. at 21–22.
21 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (the male plaintiff quit and brought a sexual harassment claim against
his employer after male crewmen on the oil rig where he worked subjected him to sexual humilia-
tion, sexual assault, and threats of rape).
22 Id. at 81–82.
23 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that an employer is vicariously liable for harassment per-
petrated by an employee with higher authority over the victim, and noting that this liability is
strict if there are tangible job consequences, but if there are no tangible job consequences, the
employer may avail itself of an affirmative defense, which requires a showing that the employer
exercised reasonable care to “prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and
that the employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportu-
nities provided”).
24 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (holding that, in cases not involving a tangible employment action,
an employer may raise an affirmative defense that “looks to the reasonableness of employer’s con-
duct in seeking to prevent and correct harassing conduct and to the reasonableness of employee’s
conduct in seeking to avoid harm”).
25 See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995); Fantini v. Salem State Coll.,
557 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2009).
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
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This paper looks at those cases and asks what went wrong and
whether changes in the law are necessary, or if on the other hand the
plaintiffs’ failures occur as a result of competing policies. Importantly,
because more than 98% of all civil litigation is resolved short of a trial,
the facts in the cases discussed here are generally not contested: at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, the court accepts the facts and inferences in
favor of the opponent of the motion;28 at the summary judgment stage,
the court reviews the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff (or more accurately, the non-moving party, as plaintiff nor-
mally is in an employment-discrimination case).29 Yet even with this
thumb on the scale, plaintiffs lose an impressive percentage of cases.
Sometimes they lose because the court concludes that the described con-
duct is not severe enough, or not pervasive enough, to affect the terms
and conditions of employment.30 Sometimes, based on the same notion,
courts actually overturn jury verdicts for plaintiffs.31 In other instances,
plaintiffs lose because they do not adequately inform the employer of
the abuse that is going on.32 In another line of cases, the court does not
see the connection between the harassing acts and the plaintiff’s sex.33
Plaintiffs lose notwithstanding facts that strongly suggest harassment,
if they make a mistake and choose the wrong legal theory—for example,
if they complain to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
about sex discrimination, but the facts are later judged to be a better fit
for unlawful retaliation.34 In one egregious instance described below,
the EEOC took over a complaint and secured a victory on liability, but
the battle then shifted to punitive damages. A jury thought that these
damages were appropriate, but the court of appeals overturned the
28 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief.”); Acosta v. Jani-King of Okla., Inc., 905 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir.
2018); Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2018).
29 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1986); Hutchison v. Fitzgerald Equip. Co., 910 F.3d 1016, 1021–22
(7th Cir. 2018).
30 See, e.g., Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993) (upper thigh rub-
bing, unwanted kissing, leaping out from behind bush); Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d
456, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2002) (leering, touching); Bilal v. Rotec Indus., 326 Fed. App’x 949, 952–53
(7th Cir. 2009) (inviting sex, sticking chocolate into plaintiff’s mouth). But see Hostetler v. Quality
Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000) (overturning a district court that dismissed a case
on the ground that the conduct was not sufficiently severe).
31 See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432–33 (7th Cir. 1995) (overturning
a district court ruling in favor of the plaintiff on the grounds that the plaintiff’s alleged harasser
neither touch her nor asked her to go on a date or have sex with him).
32 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 96 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1996); Perry
v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1014–15 (7th Cir. 1997); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 782–83 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 748–49 (1998).
33 See Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 810–11 (7th Cir. 2001).
34 See, e.g., id. at 809–10.
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jury’s verdict because it found that the instructions did not give the jury
enough latitude to take into account the relevant collective bargaining
agreement.
Other problems lie behind these observable results. As the law has
developed, in all but a small number of cases nothing can or will happen
unless the victim reports the abuse or harassment in a timely and com-
plete manner. But reporting is often difficult, both psychologically and
practically. Reporting mechanisms and confidentiality measures are
notoriously leaky. Victims fear either ineffectual responses or retalia-
tion. Victims also fear, with some warrant, that they will not be believed
or that the seriousness of the problem will not be appreciated. In those
instances, the victim might wind up as the party paying a price for the
offensive conduct, through a transfer to a less desirable location, a move
to a different job, or in the most extreme cases, even dismissal. Investi-
gations of complaints may be cursory, and their results may rest on
credibility determinations that are themselves questionable.
To address these and related problems, changes in the law may be
necessary. One area ripe for re-examination is the distinction the Su-
preme Court has recognized between supervisory harassment and fel-
low-employee or customer harassment. Another area where greater
scrutiny would help is that of preventive measures and remedies. It is,
or at least should be, shocking that 80% of women report that they have
experienced sexual harassment, and many men have also been victim-
ized. That must stop.
A closer look at some cases in this area will drive these points home.
The specific examples presented here come from the Seventh Circuit; in
addition, I discuss the preliminary results of a broader survey of the
cases that have reached the federal courts of appeals since Meritor.35
One might view the Seventh Circuit examples as the legal version of
the popular TV show “Mythbusters.” In the spirit of that show, these
cases debunk the idea that companies and individuals are routinely
found liable for sexual harassment based on innocuous or misunder-
stood behavior (e.g., “you look nice today,” or “let me hold the door for
you”). The reality is otherwise: the innocuous actions never get liti-
gated, or if they do, they are quickly thrown out of court, while even
truly awful actions frequently fall outside the scope of the law as a re-
sult of one or more of the doctrines mentioned earlier. It is worth con-
sidering whether those doctrines are performing a valuable function, or
if they need to be modified or jettisoned altogether.
The Seventh Circuit cases almost all involve behavior described by
the victim of harassment—and accepted by the court because the appeal
35 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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is from a motion to dismiss or the grant of summary judgment—that
was not enough to allow the victim to go forward with her case. For
want of a better organizational mechanism, they are presented in
chronological order.
The first example is the case of Saxton v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co.36 Plaintiff Saxton began working for AT&T’s Design En-
gineering Staff in 1986.37 Shortly after she joined the company, she en-
countered a supervisor in the International Division named Jerome
Richardson.38 The two struck up a casual acquaintance and discussed
the question whether Saxton might transfer to Richardson’s group.39
Richardson boasted that he could bring Saxton into his group with a job
classification (called MTS) that typically required a bachelor of science
degree in engineering or a related field from a reputable university,
even though Saxton had only a bachelor of arts degree in computer sci-
ence from a lesser-known college.40 Saxton’s supervisor told her that the
supervisor doubted that Saxton could be transferred into the MTS job.41
Saxton, however, decided to give the transfer a try; she accepted Rich-
ardson’s offer and joined his group in January 1988.42 The former su-
pervisor’s qualms were vindicated when, in February or March, Rich-
ardson informed Saxton that she actually did not have the MTS job, but
instead had a lower classification.43 Richardson assured her that the
opportunity for the promotion was still available, if she performed sat-
isfactorily. As far as the record shows, however, “she never received the
MTS promotion.”44
Then matters took a disturbing turn. In April 1988, Richardson
suggested that Saxton and he should meet for drinks after work.45 Sax-
ton accepted, hoping to discuss her dissatisfaction with her initial lab
assignment.46 The two spent a couple of hours at a suburban nightclub
and then drove to a jazz club in Chicago.47 As the court’s opinion re-
counts, “[w]hile they were at the jazz club, Richardson placed his hand
on Saxton’s leg above the knee several times and once he rubbed his
36 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
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hand along her upper thigh.”48 Saxton rebuffed his advances and asked
him to stop. She warned him that this behavior could lead to trouble.49
Richardson, however, was not deterred: on the way out of the club, he
pulled Saxton aside and kissed her. She pushed him away after two or
three seconds.50 Once again, Saxton asked him not to repeat his ad-
vances, and he seemingly acquiesced.51 The next morning at work, Sax-
ton reiterated her request that he cease the sexual advances. At the
time, Richardson apologized and assured her that he would respect her
wishes.52
Richardson did not keep his word, as one can see from the court’s
account of the case:
Approximately three weeks later, Richardson invited Saxton to
lunch with the stated purpose of discussing work-related mat-
ters. Afterwards, Richardson was driving Saxton back to her car
when he took a detour to an arboretum, stopped the car, and got
out to take a walk. Saxton decided to follow suit and walk off on
her own. As she did so, Richardson suddenly “lurched” at her
from behind some bushes, as if to grab her. Saxton ran several
feet in order to avoid Richardson’s sudden motion. She again re-
minded Richardson that his conduct was inappropriate, causing
him to become sullen. They then resumed the drive back to Sax-
ton’s car without further incident.53
After the arboretum incident, Richardson ceased any sexual ad-
vances toward Saxton.54 Saxton then sued for sexual harassment, but
her case was dismissed. Here is the court’s explanation for its result:
“Although Richardson’s conduct was undoubtedly inappropriate, it was
not so severe or pervasive as to create an objectively hostile working
environment.”55 In addition, the court said, AT&T took adequate reme-
dial steps.56
Example number two is Baskerville v. Culligan International Co.57
This result was, if possible, even less favorable to the claimant, in whose






54 Id. at 529.
55 Id. at 534.
56 Id. at 535–36.
57 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 916
F.3d 631, 640 (7th Cir. 2019).
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favor a jury had ruled at the trial level, but who lost in the court of
appeals.58 Baskerville was hired as a secretary in the marketing depart-
ment of Culligan, a manufacturer of water-treatment products.59
Shortly after she joined the company, she was assigned to work for Mi-
chael Hall, who had recently been hired to be the Western Regional
Manager.60 Here are the acts of sexual harassment about which Bas-
kerville was complaining, some of which may seem trivial, others more
serious:
He would call her “pretty girl.”
When she was wearing a leather skirt, he made an obnox-
ious sound as she was leaving his office.
In response to her comment about how hot his office was, he
raised his eyebrows and said, “Not until you stepped your
foot in here.”
When the company was broadcasting an announcement
over the public address system, Hall said to Baskerville,
“You know what that means, don’t you? All pretty girls run
around naked.”61
He once called Baskerville a “tilly,” a term that he admitted
using for all women.
He told her that his wife had said that he had “better clean
up [his] act” and “better think of [Baskerville] as Ms. Anita
Hill.”
He told Baskerville that he left a Christmas party early be-
cause he thought he might “lose control” with “so many
pretty girls there.”62
When she complained about cigarette smoke in Hall’s office,
he replied “Oh really? Were we dancing, like in a night-
club?”63
When Baskerville checked to see if Hall had sent his wife a
Valentine’s Day card, he responded that he had not. He con-
tinued by saying that it was lonely in his hotel room, where
he lived alone while awaiting his wife’s move to Chicago,
and he had nothing but his pillow for company. At that
point, he made a gesture intended to suggest masturba-
tion.64
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Using a standard that the courts have since rejected, under which
actionable harassment occurs only if the workplace becomes “hellish”
for the victim,65 the court of appeals found as a matter of law that no
jury could conclude that these incidents added up to harassment.66 In
addition, as in Saxton, the court was impressed that the company took
some steps to protect the victim.67 Although one might think that the
later disapproval of the “hellish” standard is a step forward, we will see
that later cases confirm that it is still necessary to show both subjective
and objective offensiveness, and that the latter must be enough to affect
terms and conditions of employment.
The facts of the next example, Zimmerman v. Cook County Sheriff’s
Department,68 are more graphic. Michelle Zimmerman was employed as
a correctional officer by the Cook County Sheriff’s Department.69 In Au-
gust of 1992 a fellow officer, Salvatore Terranova, launched a campaign
of inappropriate sexual remarks and behavior.70 For example, he re-
peatedly referred to his “big dick.”71 His worst act, however, took place
on August 14, “when he placed a zucchini between his legs and thrust
it against [Zimmerman]’s buttocks.”72 Three days later, she asked her
supervisor for a change in work assignment. She did not tie her request
directly to Terranova’s offensive sexual conduct; she complained only of
“a severe personality conflict at my present job.”73 Her supervisor
turned her down the next day without conducting any investigation.74
After a brief time during which the Sheriff’s Office separated the two,
Zimmerman was reassigned to Terranova’s area.75 He picked up where
he had left off.76 This time, his behavior was even more offensive: the
opinion reports that on one occasion, “he grabbed one of her breasts,
65 For instance, in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme Court con-
firmed that “Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.”
Id. at 22. It continued, “[a] discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not
seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing their
careers.” Id. See also Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2018) (“While ‘hellish’
was once the standard, it is no longer. The Supreme Court standard dictates that the discrimina-
tion just be only so severe or pervasive so as to affect the terms and conditions of employment. . . .
This is a far cry from hellish.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
66 Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995).
67 Id.
68 96 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 1996).
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grabbed and rubbed her buttocks, and grabbed her by her wrists and
yanked her arms down, injuring one of her arms.”77 The next day, she
submitted detailed memoranda concerning these incidents to her supe-
riors.78 During their investigation, which exonerated Terranova, they
separated the two.79 Shortly afterward she went on disability leave and
did not return to her job for a year.80 The one-year hiatus apparently
resolved her remaining workplace problems with Terranova, with
whom she had no further contact on the job.81 She did not, however,
acquiesce in his behavior. To the contrary, she filed criminal charges
against Terranova. Interestingly, even though he had been exonerated
by the Sheriff’s Department, he was convicted of sexual assault.82 Nev-
ertheless, Zimmerman lost her civil sexual harassment action.83 The
problem this time? Insufficient notice to the employer of the nature of
the problem she had with Terranova.84
The case of Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc.,85 also failed for lack of
adequate notice to the employer.86 This was an example of less intru-
sive, but persistent, inappropriate remarks. For instance, about six
months into plaintiff Perry’s employment, Jackson commented to her,
“You know you want me, don’t you?”87 It did not take long for Jackson
to escalate his advances. He called Perry to his office a couple of months
later on the pretext of discussing her performance.88 And that is how
the conversation began: Jackson commented on Perry’s absenteeism.
But he then said, “By the way, [in] your interview, I saw your breasts.
I saw your nipples . . . . You wore a low-cut blouse, and I could see your
breasts, and I knew your nipples were hard.”89 On another occasion,
Jackson told Perry that he would “beat [her] with the stick [her] hus-
band used.”90 She understood him to be referring to his penis and his
desire to have sex with her.91 Other inappropriate remarks followed,
including comments about her waking up next to him in bed, about








84 Id. at 1019.
85 126 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997).
92 Id. at 1011.
87 Id. at 1011–12.
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clothes well.”92 Perry’s effort to sue was blocked by two facts: she never
reported any of these comments to anyone at Chernin’s; and Chernin’s
had published policies against sexual harassment in the workplace.93
Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc.,94 the next example, shows that
plaintiffs occasionally win. Although the district court had granted
summary judgment for the employer, the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded to allow the case to go forward.95 A quick glimpse of those
facts explains that ruling. The plaintiff, Hostetler, worked at a Burger
King.96 She alleged that a fellow supervisory employee at her restau-
rant grabbed her face one day at work and stuck his tongue down her
throat.97 He repeated his effort to kiss her the next day.98 When she
struggled to evade him, he began to unfasten her brassiere, managing
to get four out of five snaps undone and threatening to “undo it all the
way.”99 On another occasion while Hostetler was working, Payton an-
nounced that “he could perform oral sex on her so effectively that ‘[she]
would do cartwheels.’”100 When Hostetler reported these incidents to
her superiors, her district manager remarked that he dealt with his
problems by getting rid of them.101 Days later, Hostetler—not Payton—
was transferred to a distant Burger King location.102 The district court
thought that these incidents were not severe enough to amount to har-
assment and that Burger King had done enough, but the Seventh Cir-
cuit saw matters otherwise.103 It held that “the type of conduct at issue
here falls on the actionable side of the line dividing abusive conduct
from behavior that is merely vulgar or mildly offensive.”104 Although
the court found it more difficult to say whether Payton’s behavior was
so serious that it would allow a finder of fact to label Hostetler’s work
environment hostile, since the number of incidents was not high, the
court resolved that issue in Hostetler’s favor because the two principal
acts were physical, rather than merely verbal.105 It is hard to say why
Hostetler received a more favorable reception by the court, but perhaps
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 218 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2000).
95 Id. at 812.
96 Id. at 802.
97 Id. at 801.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 801–02.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 804.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 806–07.
104 Id. at 807.
105 Id. at 808.
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the physical dimension of the abuse she experienced made a difference.
In any event, the court of appeals remanded the case to a district court
for trial.106
In Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,107 plaintiff Berry complained to her
regional manager about incessant harassment from Causevic, her su-
pervisor at Delta Airline’s cargo facilities at Chicago’s O’Hare Air-
port.108 She asserted that Causevic had taken a substantial number of
improper and harassing actions: he slid his hand up her shorts to her
panty line and told her that he loved her smooth legs; he pulled her
blouse away from her chest and tried to look down her shirt at her
breasts; he repeatedly asked her if she would take him up on his “prop-
osition” (for sex) and if she would go with him on a “very, very long ride
home”; he referred to her as his “girlfriend” in front of others; he asked
her on a date; he told her that he thought her “butt” and legs were
“sexy”; and he tried to touch or embrace her inappropriately on various
occasions.109 Almost every time Berry sought help from Causevic at
work, he would say things such as “give me a kiss first,” “what will you
do for me,” or “only if you go on a long ride with me.”110 The district court
granted summary judgment for Delta, and the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed.111 It is worth quoting the holding:
”[I]t is clear that the incidents of workplace “harassment” which
occurred after Berry complained to [the regional manager] on
June 7, 1999, while unfortunate, are not actionable as sexual
harassment under Title VII (either collectively or individually)
because Berry has presented no evidence suggesting that any of
these incidents were motivated by her gender. Even taken in the
light most favorable to Berry, the evidence presented suggests
that all of the claimed instances of post-complaint harassment
were meant as retaliation for Berry’s having complained about
Causevic’s prior sexual harassment, and were not motivated by
any anti-female animus.”112
The court added that, insofar as the claimed harassment was mo-
tivated by Berry’s sex, Delta could not be liable because it did not know
what was going on.113
106 Id. at 812.
107 260 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2001).
108 Id. at 805.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 804, 814.
112 Id. at 808–09.
113 Id. at 811.
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The next example is a good-news, bad-news story: the case for lia-
bility went to a jury, which ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, but the case for
punitive damages failed in the court of appeals. It is Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co.114 The legal
question, which went all the way to the en banc court of appeals, related
to whether evidence about a company’s obligations under its collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) was admissible to show the reasonable-
ness of its response to known (indeed, very well known) harassment.115
The majority held that the company might be able to escape punitive
damages based on its obligations under the CBA, and so it vacated the
jury’s award of punitive damages and remanded for further proceed-
ings.116
The underlying behavior was appalling. Gary Amos was a long-
time employee of Ameritech; he worked in its coin center and its small
business unit.117 Most of his fellow employees were women.118 Unfortu-
nately for everyone, he could not seem to resist exposing himself at the
workplace. The first glimpse of this behavior dated back to 1975 (and
this was a 2002 decision!), when Barbara Huckeba complained to her
supervisor that Amos had exposed himself to her three
times.119 Ameritech’s response—shocking to modern eyes—was to fire
Huckeba, not to discipline Amos. It justified that action by saying that
Huckeba was more likely than Amos to find a good job elsewhere.120 And
Huckeba was not alone in her complaints. Two other employees also
complained in 1975 about sexually offensive conduct; they were luckier
than Huckeba only insofar as they did not lose their jobs.121 But neither
did Amos, who both kept his position and avoided discipline.122 The rec-
ord established other misconduct on Amos’s part in 1988, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. The list of misdeeds is a long one: “telling
female co–workers that he was in love with them, flashing them, send-
ing notes with sexual messages or propositions, grabbing them and rub-
bing their hair or buttocks (sometimes with his hands, sometimes with
his erect penis), and allowing himself to be seen masturbating at his
desk.”123
114 256 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
115 Id. at 526.
116 Id. at 528–29.
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Amos flashed someone in 1989 but was reprimanded only with a
warning.124 The discipline escalated slightly in 1990, when five women
informed Ameritech that Amos had pressed his erect penis against
them.125 The company suspended Amos for two weeks. It did not choose
a more severe sanction, it appears, because the responsible supervisor
did not bother to read Amos’s personnel file and thus was unaware of
his inglorious history.126 More complaints followed in 1991 and 1992,
but they did not result in discipline.127 Other than admonitions to stop
the offensive behavior,128 Amos ignored the advice. At long last, the
company appeared to be on the brink of firing Amos: on December 18,
1992, the equal employment opportunity coordinator recommended this
action.129 But the coordinator had no power unilaterally to implement
that recommendation.130 And the responsible person—the labor rela-
tions manager—was on vacation on December 18.131 He did not return
and review the file until after the Christmas break. Critically more than
30 days had elapsed since Amos’s most recent documented miscon-
duct.132 This was important because the CBA said that disciplinary
measures had to be taken within 30 days of the misconduct.133 That
meant, Ameritech said (and the en banc court accepted) that Ameritech
had to wait for yet another incident before firing Amos.134 Not surpris-
ingly, more misconduct occurred in 1993 and early 1994, but Ameritech
still did nothing. As the majority put it, “Another public-masturbation
incident in March 1994 at last produced Amos’s removal.”135 This was
enough in the unanimous view of the en banc court to support the jury’s
verdict on liability for the EEOC; on that point, the court rejected
Ameritech’s efforts to show why it should not be vicariously liable for
Amos’s actions.136 The court split only on the question of punitive dam-
ages.137
The majority held that even though the terms of the CBA could not





128 Id. at 519–20.







136 Id. at 523.
137 See generally id.
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damages.138 In order to win such damages, the court noted, the com-
plaining party (in this case, the EEOC) had to demonstrate that the
respondent “engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or
with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an ag-
grieved individual.”139 Ameritech, the court held, was entitled to try to
persuade the district court that its decision to comply with the letter of
the CBA did not “evince ‘malice’ or ‘reckless indifference’ to the federally
protected rights of female employees.”140 The case was remanded for
further proceedings on this point, though the court did note that a jury
that was fully aware of the CBA and Ameritech’s explanation for its
actions might still return the same $650,000 punitive damages
award.141 Whether this case is a “good news” or a “bad news” story de-
pends on one’s viewpoint. From the negative perspective, it shows a
company that repeatedly fails to follow through on the promise of its
workplace conduct policies, to the great harm of its employees. And it
seizes on the technicality of the CBA’s 30-day rule to take away the
EEOC’s punitive damages verdict, despite the overwhelming evidence
supporting that remedy. From the positive perspective, the EEOC won
the case on liability and, to the extent that victory sent a message to
companies not to tolerate this kind of egregious behavior, it may have
helped victims of harassment well beyond the Ameritech employees in-
volved.
Bilal v. Rotec Industries, Inc.142 provides the last example. Once
again, a defense verdict on summary judgment was upheld by the court
of appeals.143 The key holding was that the following incidents of har-
assment, spread over 14 months, were not sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to create an abusive work environment.144 Admittedly, the first few
do not seem too bad in isolation. They include a statement from Chief
Executive Officer Oury that plaintiff Bilal (a receptionist for the com-
pany) was a “fox,” and Oury’s invitation to Bilal to join him while watch-
ing the Chicago marathon.145 The remaining three are more trouble-
some. For example, Bilal alleged that Oury told her pointblank “that
her job would be easier if she had sex with him.”146 On another occasion
138 Id. at 527–28.
139 Id. at 527 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)).
140 Id. at 528.
141 Id. at 528–29.
142 326 Fed. App’x. 949 (7th Cir. 2009).
143 Id. at 951.
144 Id. at 956–57.
145 Id. at 957.
146 Id.
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he “walked behind her desk and rubbed his genitalia through his cloth-
ing against her arm.”147 In a third incident, Oury “took a piece of choc-
olate from his mouth and placed it in Bilal’s mouth while she was speak-
ing.”148 The court of appeals conceded that at least the chocolate
incident deserved comment, but it said that “while bizarre and disgust-
ing, [this behavior] was ‘middle-of-the-continuum’ physical contact
which, because it occurred in relative isolation, cannot be regarded as
severe under the existing case law.”149 But perhaps the court’s most tell-
ing comment came earlier in the opinion, when it had this to say:
[I]t is lamentable that what appears to have been a robust claim
for hostile work environment was so significantly weakened by
the inadequate response to the summary judgment motion of the
defendants. However, we find no error in the district court’s lim-
itation of the analysis and thus proceed to review this claim in
light of only the incidents plaintiff presented to the district
court.150
Bilal’s lawyer had failed to support her allegations with evidence
admissible at the summary judgment stage, and her complaint failed to
alert the company to the precise legal theories she was pursuing.151 She
was left with nothing—not even a job, as the company fired her for al-
leged insubordination before she brought her Title VII case.152 Bilal
thus shows that people can lose cases because of bad lawyering, just as
they can lose them because of unfavorable legal rules. It can be hard,
however, for a lawyer to know exactly what the court will demand at
the summary judgment stage to show a genuine issue of material fact,
especially in any case such as employment cases in which motivation or
intent plays a major role.
This anecdotal evidence (for that is all it is) from the Seventh Cir-
cuit is nonetheless enough to raise serious concerns about the effective-
ness of the legal system in addressing claims of sexual harassment in
the workplace. There is a great problem of under-reporting, which leads
to the problem that many cases never cross the threshold of a court-
house. For those that do, only some go to the federal courts, while others
show up in state court as batteries, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, violations of state equal employment laws, and similar theo-
ries. And in the federal district courts, sexual harassment cases are,
147 Id. at 952
148 Id. at 957.
149 Id. at 958.
150 Id. at 956.
151 Id. at 954.
152 Id. at 952.
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like almost all other cases, frequently settled. The latter group leave
very little in the way of footprints. Finally, even cases that are judicially
resolved in the district courts often are not appealed. For the year end-
ing June 30, 2018, 277,000 civil cases were commenced in the district
courts, but less than 28,000 civil appeals were commenced over the
same period.153 On the other hand, it is interesting to see the cases that
are appealed because they usually reach the court of appeals on an
agreed factual record, and so they allow one to see which kinds of situ-
ations pass muster and which do not.
That is why it is interesting (and manageable) to study the cases
that reach the courts of appeals. Plaintiffs lose these cases for a variety
of reasons, some of which are entirely legitimate. Those reasons include:
Failure to allege a violation of the law
Insufficient evidence to support allegations
Another non-merits factor, such as lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, failure to prosecute, etc., dooms the case
The employer should not be held liable because it responded
appropriately or took appropriate preventive or remedial
measures
The employer did not know about the bad behavior
The employer’s reasons for its action were not pretextual
The employee failed to take advantage of the employer’s
workplace conduct policy
The employee did not complain in a timely way
Studying the reasons why plaintiffs lose sheds some light on possi-
ble reforms, if the evidence of the widespread incidence of #MeToo prob-
lems points to systematic under-enforcement of the laws forbidding sex-
ual harassment, or if it reveals that those laws are too narrow or
technical in their scope. A number of avenues are worth studying. First,
the mechanisms for reporting harassment still need improvement. Vic-
tims fear that they will be seen as whiners, or worse, and that they may
wind up with no job at all if they complain about a co-worker, or worse,
a supervisor. Anti-retaliation policies can help in this respect, but they
have not been as strong as they should be. Second, the inability to sue
the offending person under federal law—or put differently, the need to
tie all harassment directly to the employer—has hampered enforce-
ment. Particularly if one is concerned with fellow-employee harass-
ment, or harassment from a line supervisor who does not have the
power to hire and fire, it may be both undesirable and difficult to tar
the ultimate employer with misbehavior that very likely violates the
153 See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, UNITED STATESCOURTS (2018), https://www.
uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 [https://perma.cc/KAL8-R
5UL].
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company’s written policies. Informal methods of dispute resolution that
are available on a voluntary basis (i.e., not compulsory arbitration) have
also proven to be trustworthy and helpful. Finally, a broader re-exami-
nation of what ought to be regarded as severe enough to constitute har-
assment, or pervasive enough, might reveal that even if courts no longer
require literal hellishness, the bar may still be too high.
This re-examination will succeed only if it takes all relevant per-
spectives into account. The courts must be fair arbiters attentive to the
positions of all concerned—the victim, the alleged harasser, and the em-
ployer. There is much work to be done. But it is important to start from
a realistic appraisal of the status quo. We can begin by jettisoning the
myth that benign behavior is routinely condemned and getting to work
on the serious issues.

415
Consent behind Bars: Should It Be a Defense
against Inmates’ Claims of Sexual Assault?
Nika Arzoumanian†
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding what constitutes “consent” sits at the heart of the
#MeToo Movement, but consent can take on a variety of meanings de-
pending on the context in which parties give and receive it.1 The #Me-
Too Movement gained initial traction when women spoke out against
harassment in the workplace and Hollywood, but the questions #MeToo
raises apply far beyond those boundaries. Specifically, prison inmates
are largely left out of the #MeToo discussion, particularly women and
gender minorities.2
Exploring #MeToo in the prison context is critical for two reasons.
First, considering whether consent is possible when bodily autonomy is
severely restricted will expand our understanding of consent’s outer-
most bounds. Second, almost 2.2 million American adults were in prison
or jail at the end of 2016; the impact of prison on issues relevant to the
#MeToo Movement applies to a significant proportion of Americans.3
Startling statistics reflect high and rising numbers of sexual as-
sault allegations in correctional facilities.4 In 2011, prisoners made
† B.A. 2016, New York University; J.D. Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law
School. Many thanks to Professor John Rappaport for his thoughtful feedback throughout the
Comment writing process, as well to Professor Daniel Hemel for his insightful advice on this piece.
I would also like to thank the members of the 2018–2019 Board of The University of Chicago Legal
Forum for their constant guidance and commitment to excellence in legal scholarship.
1 See Lee Tunstall, #MeToo Ushers in the Age of Consent, THE SEATTLE TIMES (June 7, 2018),
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/metoo-ushers-in-the-age-of-consent/ [https://perma.cc/5XZZ
-YTH9].
2 SeeMarisa Endicott, ‘No Longer Human’: Women’s Prisons Are a Breeding Ground for Sex-
ual Harassment, Abuse, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 29, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/sexual-harass-
ment-abuse-womens-prisons-me-too-5231b62c1785/ [https://perma.cc/4GD3-3VVT].
3 Drew Kann, 5 Facts Behind America’s High Incarceration Rate, CNN (July 10, 2018), https:/
/www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarceration-five-key-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2U
U-3K5G].
4 See Alysia Santo, Prison Rape Allegations Are on the Rise, THEMARSHALL PROJECT (July
25, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/07/25/prison-rape-allegations-are-on-the-rise
[https://perma.cc/FV2G-4FNV].
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8,768 allegations of sexual assault and harassment across the United
States, whereas by the end of 2015, prisoners made 24,661 allegations
of sexual assault and harassment.5 Yet, the possibility of consensual
sexual contact in prison—particularly between inmates and guards—is
less often a topic of discussion.
Much of the time, sexual contact between inmates and correctional
officers in prison is identified at the time as “consensual” or “ap-
pear[ing] to be willing.”6 That being said, many scholars and prisoners’
rights advocates argue that a significant proportion, if not all, of seem-
ingly consensual sexual contact between guards and inmates is non-
consensual, the product of either physical force or non-physical coer-
cion.7 Prisoners are bringing claims of excessive force under the Eighth
Amendment on these same grounds. Often characterized by gift-giving
and special treatment, the relationships they describe may seem con-
sensual in the outside world. However, the fact that they develop in
prison raises a series of unique concerns: specifically, can consent even
exist in prison, particularly between guards and inmates?
Uncertainty regarding the definition of consent has given rise to a
dispute both within the judiciary and among scholars as to whether con-
sent is or should be a defense to an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim based on sexual acts between inmates and correctional officers.
In order to resolve this issue, I will argue in favor of the mixed approach
taken by the Ninth Circuit: prisoners are “entitled to a presumption
that any relationship with a correctional officer is not consensual,” but
the defendant can “rebut this presumption by showing that the rela-
tionship ‘involved no coercive factors’” beyond the background coercion
that prison already imposes.8
This Comment champions a prisoner-centered approach using the-
ories of bodily autonomy and also explores why a per se rule is inappro-
priate in the inmate-guard context, despite being accepted in regulating
other forms of sexual contact. I will review the current status of legisla-
tion pertaining to prison sexual assault, as well as the general structure
under which a prisoner may bring an Eighth Amendment sexual as-
sault claim. I will also explain the various perspectives circuit courts
5 Id.
6 Margaret Penland, A Constitutional Paradox: Prisoner “Consent” to Sexual Abuse in Prison
Under the Eighth Amendment, 33 LAW& INEQ. 507, 508–09 (2015).
7 Merideth J. Hogan, If Orange is the New Black, is Coercion the New Consent? An Analysis
of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision to Allow Guards to Use an Inmate’s Alleged Consent as a Defense to
a Sexual Abuse Allegation, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 425, 425 (2015).
8 M. Jackson Jones, Power, Control, Cigarettes, and Gum: Whether an Inmate’s Consent to
Engage in a Relationship with a Correctional Officer Can Be a Defense to the Inmate’s Allegation
of a Civil Rights Violation Under the Eighth Amendment, 19 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 275,
278 (2014) (citing Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012)).
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and scholars have put forth to determine whether inmate consent
should be a defense to prison sexual assault claims and explore the fac-
tors that differentiate consent in prison from consent in the outside
world. I will then advocate for the Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach, fo-
cusing on the harms of limiting bodily autonomy in prison, how the
mixed approach operates to ensure prisoner safety, and how prisoner-
guard relationships differ from other contexts where per se rules
against sexual contact are enforced.
II. ANOVERVIEW OF CONSENT IN PRISON
A. Federal and State Legislation
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)9 and the Prison Rape
Elimination Act (PREA)10 are the two most relevant pieces of federal
legislation passed in recent history on the issue of prisoner sexual as-
sault. The PLRA places restrictions on inmates seeking to bring suit in
federal court. Most notably, the PLRA requires that inmates must ex-
haust all available administrative remedies, including internal griev-
ance systems within their prisons before bringing any claim in federal
court.11 The Supreme Court has interpreted exhaustion as “proper ex-
haustion,” requiring that “prisoners must follow all of the procedural
rules that detention agencies have developed for internal grievances be-
fore suing.”12 This process often involves very short timelines for filing
grievances, a particularly dangerous roadblock in the context of sexual
assault where inmates may struggle emotionally to bring claims in a
timely manner.13
9 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012).
10 28 C.F.R. § 115 (2012).
11 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“[N]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administra-
tive remedies as are available are exhausted.”).
12 Gabriel Arkles, Prison Rape Elimination Act Litigation and the Perpetuation of Sexual
Harm, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 809–10 (2014) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
94 (2006)).
13 Id. at 810. Furthermore, since the passage of an amendment to the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) in February 2013, a “prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual
act” is necessary for recovery under the PLRA for mental or emotional injury. The PLRA defines a
“sexual act” as:
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for purposes
of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however
slight;
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth
and the anus;
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand
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The conversation regarding sexual assault in prison would be in-
complete without at least a brief discussion of the PREA, which estab-
lished a “zero tolerance” policy for rape and sexual assault perpetrated
by both prisoners and prison staff across various forms of detention.14
The PREA calls for wide-sweeping data collection about rape in prison,
as well as increased surveillance, policing, and criminalization of prison
rape.15 However, the PREA does not create a private right of action or
an affirmative defense.16 For this reason, courts often do not explicitly
consider the PREAwhen adjudicating Eighth Amendment prisoner sex-
ual assault claims.17 Instead, the penalty is targeted towards state de-
tention agencies: if they fail to comply with the PREA, they will receive
a reduction in federal funds.18
Most states have passed legislation that prohibits sexual relation-
ships between inmates and correctional officers regardless of consent,
and many states have passed legislation that prohibits sexual activity
between inmates as well.19 A few states’ statutes even explicitly stipu-
late that inmates are “incapable of consent to sexual relations with a
[correctional employee].”20 In contrast, Arizona, Nevada, and Delaware
not only acknowledge inmate consent but also allow for the prosecution
of inmates who “willingly” engage in sexual contact with prison staff.21
B. Sexual Assault in Prison and the Eighth Amendment
Inmates typically bring claims of sexual abuse in prison through 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on Eighth Amendment grounds, which requires that the
or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person
who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(a)–(d) (2012). Prior to 2013, “the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required
physical injury before a claim for emotional or mental violation could be heard. This created a
loophole for some sexual assault cases in which the victim could not prove physical injury, since
the court defined injury not to include penetration, thereby blocking a claim even for emotional or
mental damages. An amendment to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), however, eventu-
ally closed this loophole, barring courts from defining sexual violence as less than physical injury
by explicitly listing sexual acts as injury.” Hannah Belitz,ARight Without a Remedy: Sexual Abuse
in Prison and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291, 295 n.29 (2018).
14 Gabriel Arkles, supra note 12, at 804–05 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2012)).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 802.
17 Id. at 811.
18 Id. at 806.
19 Jones, supra note 8, at 293.
20 Id. (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 21A (2013)) (emphasis added).
21 Hannah Brenner, Bars to Justice: The Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 GEO.
J. GENDER& L. 521, 546 n.151 (2016).
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inmate meet two prongs.22 First, the abuse must be “objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation” under “societal standards
of decency.”23 Second, the alleged assaulter must have had “actual
knowledge of danger to the prisoner and [chose] not to prevent it.”24
However, the test is simplified in the excessive force context. InHudson
v. McMillian,25 the Supreme Court decided that if the alleged assaulter
had actual knowledge of danger to the prisoner and chose not to prevent
it, the court should assume the abuse was objectively harmful enough
to establish a constitutional violation under societal standards of de-
cency.26 Essentially, if the second prong is met, the first prong is also
met.
In Hudson, the Court held in favor of an inmate who brought an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after
he sustained minor injuries from being beaten by guards while hand-
cuffed.27 The Court held that whether the second prong is met in an
excessive force analysis hinges on “whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadisti-
cally to cause harm.”28 If force was applied in order to maliciously and
sadistically cause harm, societal standards of decency are always vio-
lated, regardless of the severity of the injury.29 The Court explained that
if this rule were not established, the Eighth Amendment “would permit
any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting
less than some arbitrary quantity of injury”; the significance of the in-
jury does not matter.30
Sexual assault is always sufficient to meet the second prong of the
test because courts assume sexual assault is always force applied mali-
ciously and sadistically to cause harm, and therefore violates societal
standards of decency, regardless of the assaulter’s actual state of mind
or the severity of the injury.31 However, this merely shifts the excessive
force inquiry when abuse claims are made to whether the guard has in
fact sexually abused the inmate, making the uncertainty over whether
22 Gabriel Arkles, supra note 12, at 804–05 (2014) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962)).
23 Hogan, supra note 7, at 432–33 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (emphasis
added)).
24 Arkles, supra note 12, at 807–08 (2014) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)
(emphasis added)).
25 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
26 Id. at 9.
27 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 12.
28 Id. at 6.
29 Id. at 9.
30 Id.
31 Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding sexual abuse
constitutes “conduct which itself establishes . . . sufficient evidence” of malicious intent).
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consent is a defense to an inmate-guard sexual assault claim even more
critical to address.
C. The Majority Approach: Consent Is a Defense to Eighth Amend-
ment Sexual Assault Claims
The Eighth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have found that “voluntary”
consensual relationships between inmates and correctional officers do
not violate the Eighth Amendment.32 In Freitas v. Ault,33 a male inmate
entered into a seemingly voluntary intimate relationship with a female
correctional officer, during which they would regularly kiss, hug, talk,
and write “hot sexy” letters to one another.34 The inmate ended the re-
lationship upon learning the correctional officer was sleeping with an-
other man and subsequently alleged that she had sexually harassed
him.35 The Eighth Circuit decided in favor of the correctional officer and
held that, “at the very least, welcome and voluntary sexual interactions,
no matter how inappropriate, cannot as a matter of law constitute ‘pain’
as contemplated by the Eighth Amendment.”36 Similarly, inHall v. Bea-
vin,37 a male inmate claimed an Eighth Amendment violation after he
was disciplined for his sexual relationship with a female correctional
officer.38 The Sixth Circuit held in favor of the defendants because the
inmate did not prove the correctional officer had sexually assaulted
him, but rather that he “voluntarily” engaged in the sexual relation-
ship.39
Initially, the Tenth Circuit’s approach was diametrically opposed
to that of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits. Until 2013, the Tenth Circuit
had held the Eighth Amendment precludes, as a per se rule, inmates
and correctional officers from entering into sexual relationships with
one another, regardless of consent.40 For example, in Lobozzo v. Colo-
rado Department of Corrections,41 a female inmate entered into a sexual
relationship with a male correctional officer that appeared to involve no
coercive factors. The Tenth Circuit ruled per se in favor of the inmate.42
32 See Hall v. Beavin, No 98-3802, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29700, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999);
Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1997).
33 109 F.3d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1997).
34 Id. at 1336.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1339.
37 No. 98-3802, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29700, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999).
38 Hall at *4.
39 Id.
40 See Lobozzo v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 429 F. App’x. 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1997).
41 429 F. App’x. 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1997).
42 See id. at 711.
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However, the Tenth Circuit changed course in Graham v. Sheriff of
Logan County43 and adopted the standard held by the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits.44 In Graham, an inmate and guard exchanged “sexually ex-
plicit notes” and regularly spoke about wanting to have sexual inter-
course with one another.45 On two occasions, the guard fulfilled the in-
mate’s requests for a candy bar and a blanket, but the inmate stated at
trial that she “did not think that she had received any special treatment
from [the guard].”46 Ultimately, the inmate engaged in sexual inter-
course with the guard she had been speaking with and another male
guard after she was placed in solitary confinement for an unrelated of-
fense.47 The inmate said the intercourse was consensual as it pertained
to the guard she had been speaking with prior to the incident, but
“didn’t really want [the other one] there.”48 In its opinion, the court em-
phasized:
[The inmate] did nothing to indicate lack of consent when the
guards entered her cell, when they removed her clothing, or
when they touched her. She never told either of them that she
did not want to have sex. She has stated repeatedly and consist-
ently that almost all the sexual acts that occurred were consen-
sual.49
The Tenth Circuit bolstered its departure from its decision in Lo-
bozzo by emphasizing that Lobozzowas an unpublished opinion and not
binding in the Tenth Circuit.50 The court also relied on the fact that the
judiciary had not reached a consensus as to whether consent is a de-
fense to Eighth Amendment sexual assault claims.51 The court treated
the case as a matter of first impression and held that “absent contrary
guidance from the Supreme Court . . . it [is] proper to treat sexual abuse
of prisoners as a species of excessive-force claim, requiring at least some
43 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013).
44 Id. at 1126.
45 Id. at 1120–21 (the court included in its opinion the text of a note the inmate had written
to the guard: “Hey Sexy, Damn you look good in that uniform. I just want to rip it off of you. I can
only imagine what you’ll look like in that deputy uniform. Mmm . . . the state troopers uniforms
are real sexy! The hat and all. I look forward to f**king you in, or around your patrol car. Damn,
just the thought of that gets my nipples hard. I’m such a nympho! Can you deal with that? Because
I want it all the time. Seriously, I think I might be a sex addict. So there’s a little bit more you
know about me. Have I freaked you out yet? I hope not cuz that’s not my intention. . . . You haven’t
smiled for me. What’s up? You down? Cheer up handsome. Peace.”).
46 Id. at 1121.
47 Id. at 1120.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1123.
50 Id. at 1124.
51 Id.
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form of coercion (not necessarily physical) by the prisoner’s custodians,”
adopting the Sixth and Eighth Circuit approach.52 Today, under this
majority approach, the inmate bears the burden to prove the sexual con-
duct was not consensual, otherwise known as the “burdened-inmate”
rule.53
D. The Proposed Per Se Rule: Consent Is Never a Defense to Eighth
Amendment Sexual Assault Claims
Although no circuit court has endorsed a per se rule under which
prisoners are incapable of consent to sexual relations with a guard, the
scholarship on this topic overwhelmingly supports a rule stipulating
consent is never a defense to an Eighth Amendment sexual assault
claim.54 Some district courts have endorsed this view as well. In Carri-
gan v. Davis,55 a female inmate alleged she had been raped by a guard,
whereas the guard alleged he had been seduced by the inmate and en-
gaged in consensual oral sex with her.56 The District Court of Delaware
held as a matter of law that “an act of vaginal intercourse and/or fellatio
between a prison inmate and a prison guard, whether consensual or not,
is a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment.”57 The court emphasized
that the Delaware legislature had “concluded that such action, whether
consensual or not, constitutes a criminal offense,”58 and the legislature
is the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values.”59 The court also reaffirmed that sexual conduct between pris-
oners and guards “destabilizes the prison environment by compromis-
ing the control and authority of the guard over the inmate, compromis-
ing the inmate’s health, security and well-being and creating tensions
and conflicts among the inmates themselves.”60 The Western District of
New York took an approach similar to Carrigan in Cash v. County of
52 Id. at 1126.
53 Hogan, supra note 7, at 426.
54 See generally Brenda V. Smith, Prison and Punishment: Rethinking Prison Sex: Self-Ex-
pression and Safety, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER&L. 185 (2006); Hannah Brenner et al., supra note 21;
M. Jackson Jones, supra note 19; Joanna E. Saul, Of Sexual Bondage: the “Legitimate Penological
Interest” in Restricting Sexual Expression in Women’s Prisons, 15 MICH. J. GENDER&L. 349 (2009);
Hogan, supra note 7; Kristen Seddiqui, Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County: Coercion in Rape and
the Plight of Women Prisoners, 92 DEV. U.L. REV. 671 (Fall 2015); Megan Coker, Common Sense
About Common Decency: Promoting a New Standard for Guard-on-Inmate Sexual Abuse Under the
Eighth Amendment, 100 VA. L. REV. 437 (2014).
55 70 F. Supp. 2d 448 (D. Del. 1999).
56 Id. at 451.
57 Id. at 452–53.
58 Id. at 453.
59 Id. (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
60 Carrigan, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
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Erie,61 quickly rejecting the guard’s defense that the sexual contact be-
tween himself and the inmate had been “physically consensual” on per
se grounds under New York state law.62
E. The Ninth Circuit’s Mixed Approach: ConsentMay Be a Defense
to Eighth Amendment Sexual Assault Claims
The Ninth Circuit has taken a mixed approach to resolving this is-
sue: consent may be a defense to an Eighth Amendment sexual assault
claim, but an inmate is entitled to a strong presumption that any in-
mate-guard relationship is non-consensual.63 In Wood v. Beauclair,64
the Ninth Circuit held “inmates are entitled to a presumption that any
relationship with a correctional officer is not consensual,” but the de-
fendant can “rebut this presumption by showing that the relationship
‘involved no coercive factors.’”65 The court did not “attempt to exhaust-
ively describe every factor that could be fairly characterized as coer-
cive.”66 However, it did state that while “explicit assertions of non-con-
sent indicate coercion,” “favors, privileges, or any type of exchange for
sex” may also indicate coercion.67
InWood, a male inmate entered into an intimate relationship with
a female correctional officer that appeared to involve no coercive factors
at its onset.68 They “conversed often about personal topics” and occa-
sionally hugged, kissed, and touched each other on the arms and legs.69
Upon learning that the correctional officer was married, the inmate at-
tempted to end the relationship, but the correctional officer responded
by beginning to make explicit sexual advances towards the inmate, in-
cluding cupping his groin.70
The Ninth Circuit held that inmates are entitled to the presump-
tion that any inmate-guard relationship is non-consensual.71 The de-
fendant, however, may rebut that presumption with evidence that his
or her conduct was not coercive.72 Under this standard, the correctional
officer bears the burden of proving both parties consented to the sexual
61 No. 04-CV-0182(M), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134049 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2009).
62 Id. at *6.
63 Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012).
64 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012).
65 Jones, supra note 19, at 278 (citing Wood, 692 F.3d at 1049 (9th Cir. 2012)).
66 Wood, 692 F.3d at 1049.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1047.
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contact.73 In this case, the state could not show that the guard’s behav-
ior was not coercive, so the court ruled in favor of the inmate.74 The
court was particularly concerned with the fact that “the power dynam-
ics between prisoners and guards make it difficult to discern consent
from coercion” and wanted to establish a rule that “explicitly recog-
nize[d] the coercive nature of sexual relations in the prison environ-
ment.”75
Numerous opinions from lower courts in the Ninth Circuit posi-
tively cite Wood, but they usually do so for its presumption that any
inmate-guard relationship is presumptively non-consensual rather
than its test for consent.76 The exception to this rule is Manago v. Wil-
liams,77 decided in 2013 by the Eastern District of California. An inmate
alleged prison guard Mary Brockett had verbally harassed him in a sex-
ual manner.78 After the verbal harassment, he agreed to take part in an
investigation of her misconduct in compliance with prison officials.79
The inmate alleged that Brockett “‘French kissed’ him, touched his gen-
itals, slapped his buttocks, and orally copulated him” without his con-
sent while the investigation was proceeding.80 Even though the inmate
seemingly consented to the behavior and at times initiated sexual con-
tact, he did so because he was directed by officials to “snar[e] Brockett
in official misconduct.”81
The court held that the Wood test required a ruling against Brock-
ett because her behavior was coercive.82 Further, the court emphasized
that “any allegedly personal interest that [the] plaintiff may have had
in a consensual sexual relationship with Brockett, which [the] plaintiff
denies, is overshadowed by [the investigation’s] reliance on [the] plain-
tiff, underscored by [the] plaintiff’s officially facilitated recording of his
interactions with Brockett.”83 The court did not find compelling the ar-
gument that the inmate was discouraged from engaging in sexual con-
duct.84 The inmate also testified that he engaged in sexual activity with
73 Hogan, supra note 7, at 426.
74 Id. at 1049.
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., Cleveland v. Curry, No. 07-cv-02809-NJV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22402, at *49
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (“under Wood, [defendant’s] sexual conduct ‘itself constitute[d] sufficient
evidence that force was used ‘maliciously and sadistically’ for the very purpose of causing harm’”).
77 No. 2:07-cv-2290 LKK KJN P, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183734 (E.D. Cal. March 13, 2013).
78 Id. at 57.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 59.
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Brockett solely for the purposes of the investigation and took active
steps to request the cessation of the investigation.85
III. FACTORSWEIGHING AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSENT IN THE
PRISON ENVIRONMENT
A wealth of scholarship addresses consent from a variety of angles,
the breadth of which is impossible to cover comprehensively in a Com-
ment of this scope. I will highlight the arguments flagged by scholars
focusing on issues of consent in prison.
A. Power Imbalance and Consent
Most scholars who advocate for a per se rule against consent as a
defense to Eighth Amendment sexual assault claims argue an “inherent
power imbalance between guard and inmate” exists that is “analogous
to the inherent power imbalance between adult and child.”86 Prison ex-
erts extreme levels of control over inmates’ day-to-day lives: correc-
tional officers control “every aspect of the inmates whom they supervise,
from privacy to opportunities to eat or bathe or interact with others,
culminating in the ultimate amount of time the inmates must stay in
prison.”87 Correctional officers also utilize their authority to “provide
goods and privileges as a method of compelling sexual relations or with-
holding goods and privileges as punishment for not engaging in sexual
contact.”88 Scholars advocating for the per se rule also worry about the
impact of the “social hierarchy” of prison on inmates’ ability to con-
sent.89 The pecking order of the inmates, based on the length of time
spent in prison and the nature of their criminal history, can increase
the likelihood of sexual coercion taking place, though most scholars dis-
cussing the social hierarchy are concerned about its effect on relation-
ships between inmates.90
Much of the scholarship in favor of a per se rule at least acknowl-
edges that power differentials exist between sexual partners outside of
prison as well.91 One partner may be in a far better financial situation
than another or hold a position of social or professional authority over
85 Id.
86 Brenner, supra note 21, at 546.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Saul, supra note 54, at 381–82.
90 See id. (“Within this structure, partners of the most powerful inmates rise in social stature.
Thus, not only might there be pressure from a more powerful inmate to engage in sex, but there
might also be pressure to accede in exchange for the social lift.”).
91 Saul, supra note 54, at 379 (“any power differential, however, has a coercive element that
may impair consent”).
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the other. That being said, there are compelling arguments as to why
the prison context is unique. In prison, inmates lack freedom of associ-
ation. They must continue to interact with guards based not on their
own preferences but on those of the correctional facility.92 If a guard is
assigned to a particular role that requires him or her to interact with a
particular inmate on a regular basis, the inmate has limited means by
which to remove him or herself from that situation. In addition, rela-
tionships that were once consensual can transform as conditions
change, and these changes are almost never subject to the control of the
prisoner. As one inmate put it, “sometimes it starts off being consen-
sual, but then later it becomes an abusive situation.”93 Furthermore,
some scholars argue that the total deprivation of liberty inherent in im-
prisonment requires the correctional system to shield inmates from
“sexual pressure.”94 Because the prison system strips inmates of much
of their autonomy, the prison system also has a heightened responsibil-
ity to protect them from sexual coercion.
Scholars are also concerned that relationships between inmates
and guards can “disrupt the prison environment,” bringing about jeal-
ousy from other inmates who believe, whether correctly or incorrectly,
that the inmate is receiving extra privileges as a result of a sexual re-
lationship with a correctional officer.95 Much of the coercive sexual con-
tact in prison is not characterized by physical force but is rather in ex-
change for privileges or power.96 In fact, “nearly half of the [correctional
officers] in . . . sexual abuse cases also smuggled contraband into pris-
ons for the inmates with whom they had sexual relationships.”97
Exchanging sex acts for increased privileges is a particularly strong
form of coercion in the prison context, where freedoms many take for
granted in the outside world become luxuries. Privileges exchanged for
sexual contact range from additional phone usage and greater contact
with an inmate’s children to desired goods such as cigarettes or gum.98
In the often austere prison environment where inmates have little au-
tonomy over their own lives, such privileges are particularly valuable.
This reality can lead to a dynamic that is not only coercive in nature
but also to significant underreporting of sexual assault, as many in-
92 Id.
93 Brenner, supra note 21, at 569.
94 Saul, supra note 54, at 379.
95 Jones, supra note 8, at 306.
96 Alice Ristroph, Prison and Punishment: Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
139, 141 (2006).
97 Jones, supra note 8, at 307.
98 Id.
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mates believe reporting could result in not “receiving unauthor-
ized privileges or contraband in exchange for the sexual acts [he or she
committed].”99
Scholars raise other concerns about the prison environment’s im-
pact on consent: for example, overcrowding increases the probability of
sexual coercion taking place.100 At first blush, this concern may seem
counter-intuitive: overcrowding means decreased privacy, supposedly
leading to more potential witnesses when a sexual assault takes place.
However, this reduction of privacy and less supervision can actually
make it easier for guards and inmates to commit sexual abuse.101 There
are “more bodies in the showers, more eyes of the guards and other in-
mates, more inmates being strip-searched together after visitation, and
greater need to place more inmates together in sleeping arrangements
that may increase an inmate’s vulnerability.”102 Over-crowding leads to
a higher inmate-to-guard ratio and greater anonymity within the
prison, making it easier for guards and inmates to engage in sex acts
without being detected, regardless of consent.
B. The Relationship Between Incarceration and Sexuality
Some scholars argue incarceration is “inherently a sexual punish-
ment” because of the extent to which prisons exercise control over pris-
oners’ bodily autonomy and integrity, and that sexual coercion is “an
inherent aspect of mass confinement.”103 Violence and social hierarchies
are essential to the functioning of prison, not merely “accidental or su-
perfluous” elements of the prison experience.104 Therefore, any efforts
to increase bodily autonomy of prisoners or legislate to protect them
from sexual violence will be incomplete at best.105 Because the Ameri-
can prison system relies on “total control over the bodies and behaviors
of prisoners” and depriving prisoners of any self-determination, incar-
ceration cannot exist without total control over prisoner sexuality and
depriving prisoners of any sexual self-determination as well.106
99 Id. at 304.
100 Saul, supra note 54, at 380–81.
101 Id. at 381.
102 Id.
103 See Alice Ristroph, supra note 96, at 140.
104 Arkles, supra note 12, at 809–10.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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C. The Impact of Stereotyping on Determining Consent
Some scholars argue stereotyping of correctional officers as “good
guys” and of prisoners as “bad guys” more likely to be sexual aggressors
negatively impacts prisoners’ likelihood of success in bringing sexual
assault claims. Juries and judges tend to favor correctional officers,
who, given their position as law enforcement officers, are considered to
have a “moral and upstanding character” and are assumed to comply
with the rules.107 In contrast, the benefit of the doubt usually cuts
against the claims of prisoners, who—assuming the justice system is
working properly—have engaged in at least some criminal behavior in
the past and society often deems “inherently deviant.”108 If they have
broken rules in the past, the thought goes, why would they not do so
again? Because of inmates’ perceived “deviance,” juries and judges may
be subject to implicit bias and more likely to make incorrect judicial
decisions by assuming these characters are both more likely to be the
sexual aggressor or want to consent to sex.109
D. Mental Illness, Family History, and Consent
Some scholars emphasize the prevalence of mental illness among
inmates and that inmates with mental illness are “at an increased risk
of sexual victimization.”110 Furthermore, histories of physical and sex-
ual abuse are common among inmates, particularly women: “of female
inmates in state prisons, 57.2% reported being abused prior to admis-
sion; 46.5% reported physical abuse, and 39% reported sexual abuse. Of
those who reported abuse, 40.1% experienced abuse at the hands of a
family member, and 60.1%, by an ‘intimate’ [partner].”111 Some argue
that “it is possible that these women may transpose their expectations
and experiences from their real family onto their prison family and be
accepting of abuse as part of the family dynamic.”112
IV. THEMERITS OF THENINTH CIRCUIT’SMIXED APPROACH
This Comment will argue the Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach pre-
serves prisoner autonomy as much as possible while maximizing pris-
oner safety, as well as explain why prisoner autonomy—particularly
prisoner bodily autonomy—is so critical for prisoner wellbeing. Prisoner




111 Id. at 382.
112 Id.
415] CONSENT BEHIND BARS 429
bodily autonomy is paradoxical by definition. To have autonomy and
bodily integrity, prisoners must be free from nonconsensual sex acts. At
the same time, prisoners must have the ability to welcome consensual
sex acts in order to be autonomous. On one hand, prohibitions on con-
sensual sex devalue consent by restricting an inmate’s control of his or
her body.113 Simultaneously, implicitly granting others a sense of enti-
tlement to an inmate’s body is also a horrific violation of bodily integ-
rity.114 The Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach should be adopted uni-
formly by the circuit courts because it ensures prisoner autonomy by
balancing these factors.
Scholars promoting greater deference to inmate consent generally
limit their arguments to relationships between inmates due to the
power imbalances addressed earlier in this Comment.115 However, un-
der the dignity and sexual autonomy arguments these scholars support,
it seems that consent in the inmate-guard context is indeed possible,
though exceptionally rare. While supporting prisoner wellbeing is what
motivates most advocates of the per se rule, precluding prisoners from
the ability to give consent in any guard-inmate context whatsoever fur-
ther punishes prisoners by stripping them of some of the deepest layers
of their bodily autonomy rather than shifting the focus to keeping
guards accountable. To preserve autonomy while keeping inmates safe
from sexual violence, the Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach strikes the
right balance by adopting a strong presumption against consent while
still promoting some degree of case-by-case analysis. The focus must be
on how the prison context creates conditions that may ultimately be co-
ercive and mask assault under a guise of consent rather than imposing
a per se rule.
A. The Harms of Limiting Sexual Autonomy in Prison
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that adults have a right to
personal autonomy and their bodily integrity.116 Though the Court has
not explicitly addressed whether this right extends to prisoners, numer-
ous lower courts have determined inmates are indeed entitled to such
113 Gabriel Arkles, Regulating Prison Sexual Violence, 7 NE. U. L.J. 66, 92 (2015).
114 Id.
115 Prison Reform: Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons: Confronting Con-
finement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 416 (2006) (“While [prison] plays an undeniable role in
creating inequality amongst inmates, just as it creates inequality between inmates and staff, the
power differentials are not as stark [as those between inmates and staff] and are therefore less
concerning in this context.”).
116 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992) (citing McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa.
D. & C.3d 90, 91 (C.P. 1978) (holding defendant was not required to engage in bone marrow trans-
plant with his cousin despite being the only potential matching donor)).
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protection.117 Though courts primarily apply this principle in the con-
text of prisoners’ right to refuse medical treatment, the Tenth Circuit
has extended it to the prison sexual assault context, holding inmates
have “a constitutional right to be secure in [their] bodily integrity and
free from attack by prison guards.”118 That said, incarceration in reality
often strips inmates’ of their sexual autonomy by both limiting their
ability to welcome wanted sexual interaction and placing them at high
risk for sexual assault.
This denial of bodily autonomy has significant negative conse-
quences for inmates. First, some scholars argue that absolving inmates
of their sexual autonomy is a missed opportunity: greater sexual auton-
omy may help inmates achieve better societal integration upon re-
lease.119 Decriminalizing sexual interactions and treating truly consen-
sual sex acts as something positive for prisoners can support the
development of healthy social skills and help mitigate the often trau-
matic nature of the current American prison system.120 In general,
greater prisoner autonomy is linked to greater productivity in society
after release.121 Increased autonomy can be empowering and healing.122
Second, greater prisoner autonomy is linked to reductions in prison
violence, particularly sexual violence.123 Some scholars argue bodily in-
tegrity in the form of “sexual self-determination”—meaning the ability
to say both “no” and “yes” to sexual interactions—is critical to prevent-
ing sexual violence in the prison context.124 Additionally, prohibiting
consensual sex can discourage prisoners from reporting instances of
sexual assault.125 Instead, they often choose not to report for fear of be-
ing punished for engaging in any sexual activity at all.126
Third, the mechanisms used to enforce limitations on sexual auton-
omy often require further infringement on prisoner bodily integrity, and
117 See Zant v. Prevatte, 286 S.E. 2d 715, 716–17 (Ga. 1982) (holding the state did not have a
compelling interest that overpowered the prisoner-plaintiff’s right to reject a medical treatment
when he was found to be sane); Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (holding state did not have a compelling interest that overpowered the prisoner-plaintiff’s
right to reject a medical treatment even though the prisoner chose to engage in a hunger strike).
118 Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1064–65 (10th Cir. 1993).
119 Michele C. Nielsen, Beyond PREA: An Interdisciplinary Framework for Evaluating Sex-
ual Violence in Prisons, 64 UCLA L. REV. 230, 258 (2017); see also Arkles, supra note 113, at 96.
120 Nielsen, supra note 119, at 258.
121 Sydney Tarzwell, The Gender Lines are Marked with Razor Wire: Addressing State Prison
Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender Prisoners, 38 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS
L. REV. 167, 212 n.224 (2006); id. at 275.
122 Id.
123 Id.; see also Prison Reform, supra note 115.
124 Arkles, supra note 113, at 68.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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the PREA’s emphasis on surveillance of prison rape has exacerbated
this issue.127 Prison surveillance systems are dehumanizing and simul-
taneously do not correct the problematic reporting mechanisms availa-
ble to victimized prisoners, nor do they remedy inadequate prison poli-
cies on consensual sex and rape.128 Surveillance often involves
examining, touching, or even penetrating the prisoner’s naked body
through searches or exams.129 After being discovered, prisoners may be
placed in solitary confinement or lose “good time credits,” forcing them
to remain in prison for a longer period of time.130 Both solitary confine-
ment and longer prison terms can render prisoners more vulnerable to
sexual violence.131 Increased surveillance and greater restrictions on
prisoner autonomy may reduce incidents of violent rape, but these ben-
efits require placing different yet significant limitations on inmate bod-
ily autonomy.132
The need to protect prisoner autonomy as much as possible seems
especially relevant in the context of a 2003 program developed by the
National Institute of Corrections to provide training to correctional fa-
cilities. Throughout the program, only six of fifty-nine problems the par-
ticipating prison wardens and directors raised were about prisoner be-
havior, whereas thirty-two were about “staff-related” issues, including
“staff sexual misconduct, staff morale, staff assaults on prisoners, con-
frontational episodes between staff and prisoners, the lack of ethnic di-
versity among staff, and difficulty recruiting and retaining quality
staff.”133
Because the party most at issue here is the prison guards, and more
broadly the prison system that makes possible the coercive factors at
play in guard-inmate relationships, it seems the legal system is respon-
sible for protecting prisoners as fully as possible. What it means to “pro-
tect,” however, is uncertain. The per se rule protects inmate autonomy,
if autonomy means freedom from nonconsensual sex acts. The rule fol-
lowed by the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits supposedly also protects
127 Nielsen, supra note 119, at 262–63.
128 Id.
129 Arkles, supra note 113, at 94.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Ristroph, supra note 96, at 184.
133 John J. Gibbons, Confronting Confinement Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s
Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 416 (2006).
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inmate autonomy,134 if autonomy means the ability to welcome consen-
sual sex acts.135 Both rules are incomplete and limit prisoner freedom
in some way, which seems inappropriate given prisoners’ extremely lim-
ited role in contributing to the problem of prison sexual assault.
B. How the Ninth Circuit’s Mixed Approach Ensures Prisoner Safety
For the compelling reasons enumerated above, this Comment em-
phasizes the importance of preserving as much prisoner bodily auton-
omy as possible while ensuring prisoner safety. This Comment also
acknowledges that true consent between a correctional officer and a
prisoner is rare. If courts were omniscient, they would probably observe
that a significant proportion of prisoner-guard relationships that seem
consensual at first glance are rooted in promises for prison contraband,
protection, or special privileges or influenced by other coercive fac-
tors.136 However, the Ninth Circuit approach succeeds by acknowledg-
ing the serious risks intimate relationships between guards and in-
mates pose. The mixed approach creates a meaningful mechanism by
which prisoners can raise claims of sexual assault and plausibly succeed
while cultivating greater respect for their autonomy. The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s rule encompasses the benefits of the per se rule without diminish-
ing the value of inmate consent.
The Ninth Circuit’s approach addresses the concerns raised by the
most passionate advocates of the per se rule. The Ninth Circuit will find
coercion occurred between a prisoner and guard if favors, privileges, or
any type of exchange for sex is present, encompassing the less tangible
factors that could render a seemingly consensual sexual relationship
non-consensual.137 In addition, the correctional officer bears the burden
of proving both parties consented to the sexual contact, reducing the
burden on the inmate to gain access to information and representation
that is more difficult to obtain in the prison context.138
134 See Hall v. Beavin, No 98-3802, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29700, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999);
Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1997); Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cty, 741 F.3d
1118, 1126 (10th Cir. 2013).
135 That said, the “burdened-inmate” rule the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits utilize (the
inmate bears the burden to prove the sexual conduct was not consensual) is a significant encum-
brance to inmates succeeding in bringing Eighth Amendment excessive force claims given limited
access to representation and information, as well as concerns about stereotyping by judges and
juries related to inmate credibility.
136 Saul, supra note 54, at 380 (“[M]ost prison sex, especially with women, comes not from
physical force or the threat of physical force, but from a bargain—a bargain made purely in the
context of prison conditions.”).
137 Wood, 692 F.3d at 1049.
138 Hogan, supra note 7, at 426.
415] CONSENT BEHIND BARS 433
Furthermore, inmates are “entitled to a presumption that any re-
lationship with a correctional officer is not consensual.”139 The pre-
sumption against consent is very strong: though numerous opinions
from lower courts in the Ninth Circuit positively cite Wood, they do so
for its presumption that sexual assault occurred, not its test for deter-
mining whether the inmate consented to the sex act in question.140 Fur-
thermore, the deterrent effect of the Ninth Circuit rule is significant. If
correctional facilities are on notice that the presumption in the Ninth
Circuit cuts strongly in favor of inmates, they will be incentivized to put
in place policies that minimize inappropriate guard behavior.
Furthermore, the court has chosen not to “attempt to exhaustively
describe every factor which could be fairly characterized as coercive.”141
This functionalist approach leaves plenty of room for lower courts to
assess the facts of each inmate’s situation as a whole and determine
whether coercion has taken place. Lower courts are not bound by a spe-
cific list of behaviors that constitute coercion, but rather are guided by
the example of the short list of behaviors the Ninth Circuit did include
in its opinion in Wood: “favors, privileges, or any type of exchange for
sex,” which is already a very expansive definition of what constitutes
coercion.142 The serious risks posed by inmate-guard relationships de-
mand a rigorous standard for inmate consent. Under the Ninth Circuit’s
rule, the facts would have to be overwhelmingly in favor of consent in
order for a court to find that the inmate was not influenced by outside
factors more than he or she would be beyond the confines of the prison
or jail.
The Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach undeniably raises a question
about judges’ and juries’ institutional capacity. Can courts effectively
weigh competing concerns to determine whether a personal relation-
ship between a guard and an inmate included “coercive factors?” The
facts alleged in prison sexual assault cases are often disputed and un-
clear, making it even more challenging for courts to come to case-by-
case conclusions regarding inmate consent. However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s presumption against consent is helpful in this regard. By requir-
ing that the facts be overwhelmingly in favor of consent in order for a
court to find that the inmate was not influenced by coercive factors, the
Ninth Circuit’s mixed approach reduces some of the burden on judges
139 Jones, supra note 19, at 278 (2014) (citing Wood, 692 F.3d at 1049).
140 See, e.g., Cleveland v. Curry, No. 07-cv-02809-NJV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22402, at *49
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (“[U]nder Wood, [defendant’s] sexual conduct ‘itself constitute[d] suffi-
cient evidence that force was used ‘maliciously and sadistically’ for the very purpose of causing
harm.’”).
141 Id.
142 Wood, 692 F.3d at 1049.
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and juries to make fine-grain factual determinations to accurately re-
solve prisoner sexual assault claims.
C. How the Ninth Circuit Rule Increases Prisoner Autonomy: Defin-
ing Consent in the Prison Context
The Ninth Circuit’s approach effectively achieves the aims of the
per se rule, yet its greater preservation of prisoner autonomy is what
sets it apart. The approach allows for greater inmate autonomy by ac-
knowledging that the fundamental human ability to welcome mutually
agreed upon sexual interaction still holds some muster in the prison
context, even if that ability is abridged. Whether consent is possible in
the prison context is a highly controversial topic, particularly because
inmate autonomy is so drastically constrained upon entry into the
prison or jail. Inmates’ daily activities are constantly monitored and
controlled by the prison system: they are told when to work, eat, sleep,
and shower. 143 The state becomes inmates’ “landlord, employer, tailor,
neighbor, and banker.”144 Prison is by design a harsh environment in-
tended to constrain what inmates can and cannot do. Some scholars de-
scribe prisons as “barren landscapes devoid of even the most basic ele-
ments of humanity.”145
Given the austerity of the prison environment, every deprivation
the prison system inflicts on prisoners is meaningful. One scholar lists
seemingly little things like “missing family photos, confiscation of mag-
azines deemed contraband, broken radios, opened mail, and cold meals”
as ways prisoners have said they are reminded of their lack of power
and dignity.146 Importantly, it is difficult to determine from beyond
prison walls what is most important to each individual prisoner. Poign-
antly, one inmate has said:
What’s small to one man might be great to another. [An officer]
goes home every day to his wife, to his mistress, to his boyfriend,
to whatever. So, what he might think be small might be major
to a guy who’s bein’ told when to eat, when to go to sleep, when
to boo-boo, when not to boo-boo.147
It is nearly impossible to effectively determine what deprivations
of liberty will most dramatically impact a prisoner’s sense of dignity.
143 Valerie Jenness and Kitty Calavita, “It Depends on the Outcome”: Prisoners, Grievances,
and Perceptions of Justice, 52 LAW& SOC’Y REV. 41, 62 (2018).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Jenness, supra note 143, at 62.
147 Id.
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Most decision makers in courts and prisons have not been incarcerated
themselves and can only understand to a certain extent what it means
to have things that may seem insignificant to others but are important
to them taken away. Therefore, minimizing restrictions on prisoner au-
tonomy—even those that seem negligible in their impact—is critical to
prioritizing inmate wellbeing.
As previously explained, the extreme power inequality between
prisoners and guards is reason for concern when considering prisoners’
ability to consent, as well as prisoners’ greater susceptibility to stereo-
typing and physical abuse. Some argue that because the American
prison system relies on “total control over the bodies and behaviors of
prisoners” and depriving prisoners of any self-determination, incarcer-
ation cannot exist without total control over prisoner sexuality and de-
priving prisoners of any sexual self-determination as well.148 However,
scholar Michele C. Nielsen’s analysis of whether consent is possible in
constrained circumstances is helpful here. She explains that the claim
that when “men construct the meaning of sexuality, they must also con-
struct the meaning of consent and even women’s experience of consent”
is mistaken.149 Rather, she argues that “while much of the world is con-
structed by men, women can still maintain some autonomy within the
warped system.150
Similarly, prisoners are capable of consent in an imperfect, but ad-
equate, matter in some particular circumstances.151Nielsen argues this
imperfect consent is limited to inter-inmate relationships and that in-
mate-guard relationships are too steeped in power imbalance for even
imperfect consent to be possible.152 However, claiming consent is com-
pletely impossible between any guard and any inmate is arbitrarily
drawing a line. Although rooted in meaningful concerns about the
power imbalance between guards and inmates generally, there are
some specific circumstances where the coercive effects advocates of the
per se rule are worried about are less relevant. For example, a guard
may be stationed at a post unrelated to where the prisoner is being held,
a situation that is especially possible in some of the country’s largest
prisons. Alternatively, the guard may not engage in any exchange of
special privileges or may not even have the access necessary to provide
the inmate with the special privileges he or she desires.
Some scholars argue that the constraints inmates face are more
similar to those imposed on free women than they appear: significant
148 Arkles, supra note 12, at 809–10.
149 Nielsen, supra note 119, at 254.
150 Id. at 254–55.
151 Id. at 256–57.
152 Id.
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economic inequality and a heightened risk of being the victims of violent
crime constrain women’s autonomy in the outside world.153 Though
there may be some similarities that connect the experience of some in-
mates to some free women, they are very general in nature. The vast
majority of inmates experience greater constraints on their personal au-
tonomy than most other members of society.154 Though societal and eco-
nomic pressures certainly impact how and why women consent in the
outside world, their bodily autonomy is not constrained to the same de-
gree as that of the prisoner population: in most typical circumstances,
they may decide for themselves when they want to eat, sleep, or shower.
That said, there is a connection between the way inmates and free
women consent. For both groups, their environment inherently impacts
what constitutes a coercive factor and what consent must look like in
order to bring about a truly voluntary—rather than a seemingly volun-
tary—interaction. In order to be a meaningful term, consent cannot
maintain the same definition across circumstances. Rather, it must re-
flect the constraints the environment imposes on the individual in ques-
tion. Consensual sex is “life affirming, restorative, and rejuvenating.”155
Nonconsensual sex is dehumanizing and traumatizing. This distinction
is mobile: it changes based on the context in which the individual in
question is giving consent.
In order to appropriately define what consent looks like in a partic-
ular situation, courts must strive to understand how individuals actu-
ally resist sexual advances given the constraints of that situation. In
the prison context, sociologists have found that when inmates push
back on correctional officers’ harassment, they do so in a subtle manner
to avoid retaliatory action, either through avoiding the problematic
guards or appearing indifferent to their advances.156 However, under
the framework advanced by the Eighth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits,
these subtle methods of resistance are insufficient for a prisoner to show
he or she did not consent to the guard’s advances.157
Proponents of the per se rule may argue that the Ninth Circuit’s
approach does not really afford prisoners greater autonomy because it
is unlikely a guard-inmate relationship will reach the threshold neces-
sary to be deemed consensual given the rigor of the test. However, pri-
oritizing greater prisoner autonomy does not mean disregarding pris-
oner safety. Prisoner-guard relationships are at high risk for becoming
153 Id. at 257.
154 Id. at 255.
155 Nielsen, supra note 119, at 256–57.
156 Camille Gear Rich, What Dignity Demands: the Challenges of Creating Sexual Harassment
Protections for Prisons and Other Nonworkplace Settings, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2009).
157 Id.
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coercive, and this reality must be taken into account when developing
legal rules surrounding those relationships. Rather, the legal system
must prioritize prisoner autonomy as much as ensuring prisoner safety
allows. Here, a rebuttable presumption rule provides for greater—albeit
imperfect—prisoner autonomy to welcome consensual sexual relation-
ships while maximizing prisoner autonomy to be free from unwelcome
sexual contact.
D. Power Imbalances and Consent Outside the Prison Context
Despite the advantages of the Ninth Circuit rule for prisoner au-
tonomy, advocates of the per se rule argue inmates are similar enough
to other groups whose sexual autonomy is constrained by the law or
private policies to justify a per se approach. In order to flesh out this
distinction, it is helpful to compare the per se rule in the inmate-guard
context to more widely accepted per se rules against certain forms of
sexual contact, such as those against statutory rape of minors under the
age of consent, university policies against intimate relationships be-
tween students and professors, and workplace policies against intimate
relationships between employees and their superiors.
1. Statutory rape
Minors’ inability to consent to sexual contact is not a compelling
analog to the validity of inmate consent to sexual relations with a guard.
This Comment certainly does not purport to argue prisoners are in the
same position to consent to sex acts as two fully autonomous adults, but
rather that comparing them to children as a means of justifying a per
se rule is too extreme of an analogy.
Accepting an argument that compares inmates to children, as
much of the scholarship on this topic has, is a devastating blow to pris-
oner autonomy. It is understandably tempting to characterize inmates
this way when so much of their lives are dictated by the prison system.
However, labeling members of marginalized groups as child-like while
stripping them of their autonomy is a familiar tool utilized by oppres-
sors throughout history to demean the disfavored. In addition, labeling
prisoners as child-like disregards the reality that prisoners continue to
have the normal sexual desires of adulthood upon entering prison, as
well as a desire to develop romantic relationships and reap the benefits
of connection with others. Prisoners often view prison regulations as
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intentionally “diminish[ing] their maturity” by “treating them like chil-
dren and fostering dependency.”158 An inmate-centric approach to re-
solving the epidemic of sexual assault in prison should take into account
this concern; the Ninth Circuit does so by weighing prisoner autonomy
in the rule-making calculus while accounting for the ways prison gives
rise to the power imbalances that make guard-inmate relationships
high risk.
2. Student-professor and employee-supervisor relationships
Relationships between students and professors or employees and
supervisors are a closer analog to inmate-guard relationships. In these
relationships, an imbalance in power exists between two adults, in-
creasing the likelihood of coercive factors making a seemingly consen-
sual relationship more harmful than it first appears. However, some
significant differences exist between the position of prisoners and that
of students and employees that render the analogy between these
groups an incomplete one.
For students and employees, classrooms and workplaces comprise
one aspect of their lives. At the end of the day, they are able to go home
and have alternative avenues to pursue sexual pleasure completely un-
related to academic or professional life. They have access to dating ap-
plications and social events and may come and go as they please. In
contrast, inmates do not have the same luxury. Their pool of options is
limited to the people who live or work in the prison or jail, and the over-
whelming majority of prisons and jails prohibit all inmate sexual activ-
ity of any kind anyways, often including self-stimulation.
Furthermore, in the case of minors, university students, and em-
ployees, they are unable to consent as a result of either being in a posi-
tion they have chosen to enter with some degree of control or a position
they are in as a virtue of a relatively normal stage of life. This is often
not the case with prison. A variety of factors influence an individual’s
likelihood of incarceration. For example, people living in rural areas are
50 percent more likely to be incarcerated than city dwellers.159 In addi-
tion, African Americans are “incarcerated at more than five times the
rate of whites,” and African American women are incarcerated at two
times the rate of white women.160 In fact, “if African Americans and
Hispanics were incarcerated at the same rates as whites, prison and jail
158 Brenner, supra note 21, at 546 (citation omitted).
159 Eli Hager,AMass IncarcerationMystery, MARSHALLPROJECT (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.t
hemarshallproject.org/2017/12/15/a-mass-incarceration-mystery [https://perma.cc/26XQ-76ZF].
160 Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP (last visited Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.naacp.org/crim
inal-justice-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/6EBY-SB7D].
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populations would decline by almost forty percent.”161 Moreover, schol-
ars estimate 20,000 American inmates are wrongfully incarcerated,
comprising one percent of the American prison population.162 Though
most inmates have made voluntary choices to engage in criminal activ-
ity, acknowledging the flaws within the American criminal justice sys-
tem is critical to developing policies that adequately ensure prisoners’
rights and wellbeing.163
It is true some employees may be coerced into sexual activity out of
fear of losing their jobs, knowing they need to provide for themselves or
for their families. This Comment fully acknowledges the significant
power of economic coercion. However, the total loss of control inherent
in the prison context is simply greater than it is in universities andmost
places of work. Though it is by no stretch of the imagination easy to
leave one’s job for another or transfer universities, that option is avail-
able to students and employees. In contrast, prisoners have no control
over their conditions and often have no means of changing their circum-
stances. Particularly for those prisoners serving decades-long sen-
tences, it seems unreasonable to compare restrictions on their sexual
activity to those on students and employees.
E. Weighing Other Proposed Solutions in the Context of the Ninth
Circuit Rule
At first glance, conjugal visits appear to be a meaningful way to
improve prisoner sexual autonomy. However, this system disfavors in-
mates that enter prison without a long-term partner willing to visit
them, especially those inmates serving longer prison terms. Another po-
tential solution is permitting consensual sexual relationships between
inmates:164 decriminalizing inter-inmate sexual contact may decrease
incidents of sexual assault by reducing the “ideal victimhood” of in-
mates starved for physical intimacy.165
161 Id.
162 HowMany Innocent People are in Prison?, INNOCENCEPROJECT (Dec. 12, 2011), https://www
.innocenceproject.org/how-many-innocent-people-are-in-prison/ [https://perma.cc/CU3C-SFRR].
163 These concerns are particularly salient in the context of the #MeToo Movement, where
many woman are incarcerated for reasons beyond their control. See Helene Ferris, Female Prison-
ers and #MeToo, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/opinion/letters/fe-
male-prisoners-metoo.html [https://perma.cc/R8BF-TL7Q] (“Many of the women . . . are incarcer-
ated because of what the men in their lives have forced them to do. Some are serving long sentences
for defending themselves against abuse and rape; some have agreed to take the rap for their
spouses because the spouse is the wage earner; some have been led into drug-dealing and prosti-
tution because they wanted to please their men, or were afraid of them. And some of them were
just silent about the men who perpetrated horrible acts against them.”).
164 Nielsen, supra note 119, at 258.
165 Id.
440 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
Ultimately, this Comment does not purport to suggest the Ninth
Circuit rule alone is sufficient to create an environment where prison-
ers’ bodily and sexual autonomy is honored. If carefully implemented,
policies permitting relationships between inmates may be an effective
way to balance prisoner protection and autonomy, but determining the
legitimacy of that solution is beyond the scope of this Comment. The
Ninth Circuit rule does not attempt to resolve the question of inter-in-
mate relationships’ legitimacy. Rather, it specifically addresses the
abridged ability to consent that prisoners maintain upon entering the
correctional system in the context of inmate-guard relationships. Bal-
ancing this autonomy against its risks is an important step towards
cultivating greater respect for prisoner bodily integrity.
F. The Discursive Effects of the Ninth Circuit Rule
Courts’ decisions as to whether consent is possible in the prison
context between inmates and correctional officers have effects far be-
yond specific Eighth Amendment sexual assault cases that come before
the judiciary. In fact, if the Ninth Circuit approach will result in very
few cases in which a prison guard may effectively utilize inmate consent
as an affirmative defense, the outcomes for prisoners bringing sexual
assault claims will be only slightly different than if there were a per se
rule. As a result, one could argue prisoner autonomy is not really better
preserved under the Ninth Circuit’s rule than it would be under a per
se rule against consent.
However, prisoners are not the only population to consider when
weighing which legal rule is appropriate in these circumstances. Courts
should also consider the rule’s impact on judges, policymakers, attor-
neys, and high-level officials within correctional facilities. These are the
individuals who develop the regulations that impact inmates on a daily
basis and who are most likely to be aware of changes in the law pertain-
ing to prison issues. If the law dehumanizes prisoners and creates an
image of them as incapable of making decisions about their own bodily
integrity and autonomy, that image will be reflected in the rules these
stakeholders establish. Instead of granting prisoners more control over
their lives in prison—a step critical to improving inmate quality of life—
imbuing into the law a child-like image of inmates and their capabilities
incentivizes stakeholders to enact regulations that further constrain
prisoner autonomy, an outcome that will ultimately act as a detriment
to prisoner wellbeing.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit rule is a step forward in preserving
prisoner autonomy by both protecting inmates from unwanted advances
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and allowing them to make decisions core to their bodily integrity for
themselves. While a per se rule is appropriate in some contexts, it is
telling that no circuit court has adopted it to understand how consent
operates between inmates and guards in the prison environment. Per-
haps most importantly, the Ninth Circuit rule reflects an important re-
ality about the definition of consent. It is fluid and hinges on the situa-
tion in which an individual is giving it to another. While the consent
between a guard and inmate differs from the consent between individ-
uals elsewhere, the ultimate aim is the same across contexts: to utilize
consent as a tool to protect individual autonomy, both to be free from
forced sexual advances and to welcome those that are wanted.
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Challenging Abortion Informed Consent
Regulations through the First Amendment: The
Case for Protecting Physicians’ Speech
Maia Dunlap†
INTRODUCTION
A woman finds out she is pregnant. She makes the choice to termi-
nate her pregnancy. Maybe she decides this instantly. Perhaps she
reaches her decision through a series of conversations with her partner,
her family, or her friends. Regardless, there is only one person she will
need to have a conversation with before she can have an abortion: her
physician.
Right? Actually, wrong. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,1 the Supreme Court allowed states to add them-
selves to the mix. While affirming a woman’s right to have an abortion,
the Casey Court also acknowledged states’ rights to regulate and ex-
press disapproval of the practice. In so doing, the Court opened the door
for states to join the private conversation between a woman and her
physician. In the years since Casey, states have increasingly used this
door to regulate what a physician must do or say to a woman before she
can give her “informed consent” to an abortion.
Because of this, obtaining an abortion can be a dramatically differ-
ent experience depending on where you live.2 In some states, abortion
is treated like any other medical procedure, can be completed in one
day, and only requires the signing of a standard medical consent form.3
In contrast, many others states require all women seeking abortions to
† B.F.A. 2013, Fordham University; J.D. Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law
School. Many thanks to Professors Daniel Hemel and Geoffrey Stone for their insight and thought-
ful feedback, and to the past and present staff and board of The University of Chicago Legal Forum.
1 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2 Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://ww
w.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion [https://perma.cc/
V9ED-QU3M].
3 Audrey Carlsen, Ash Ngu & Sara Simon,What It Takes to Get an Abortion in the Most Restr-
ictive U.S. State, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/20/us/
mississippi-abortion-restrictions.html [https://perma.cc/WRA6-NHJ8].
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first receive an ultrasound,4 a medically unnecessary procedure for
first-trimester abortions (which 89% of abortions are).5 Some states fur-
ther regulate how physicians must narrate these ultrasounds and how
women must listen.6Many states require mandatory pre-abortion coun-
seling and a waiting period between receiving counseling and obtaining
the procedure.7 Women may also hear that personhood begins at con-
ception,8 and medically inaccurate claims that medical abortion can be
reversed9 and increases risk of breast cancer,10 suicide,11 and future in-
fertility.12
Claiming to balance the rights of women with those of the state,
the Casey court created a new test, dubbed the undue burden standard.
Under this test, regulations on abortion are permissible provided they
do not impose an undue burden on a woman’s choice to have an abortion
before the fetus reaches viability (i.e. is potentially able to live outside
the woman’s body).13 Most subsequent challenges to state abortion reg-
ulations have thus claimed that the regulations at issue impose an un-
due burden on a woman’s right to choose.14
However, the undue burden standard poses a low bar that most
regulations clear. As an alternative, some challengers have brought
their claims as violations of physicians’ free speech rights under the
First Amendment. Courts review First Amendment challenges under
standards ranging from strict scrutiny to rational basis review, “de-
pending on the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes
underlying it.”15 In the context of informed consent, First Amendment
claims have been subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny that can
invalidate regulations which would otherwise likely survive an undue
burden challenge.
4 Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.o
rg/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound [https://perma.cc/XK9E-6KXS].
5 Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2018), https://www.guttma
cher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-states [https://perma.cc/QHU5-Z8NM].
6 Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 4.
7 Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2.
8 Id.
9 Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be Reversible, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/politics/arizona-doctors-must-say-
that-abortions-with-drugs-may-be-reversed.html [https://perma.cc/WAJ3-6HCQ].
10 Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 2.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (defining viability as “potentially able to live outside
the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid”).
14 See Christine L. Raffaele, Annotation, Validity of State “Informed Consent” Statutes by
Which Providers of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient Seeking Abortion with Certain In-
formation, 119 A.L.R. 5th 315 (originally published 2004).
15 Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
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The challengers in Casey brought precisely such a claim, arguing
that the informed consent provisions at issue infringed physicians’ First
Amendment rights. The Court dismissed this claim in an ambiguous
three-sentence paragraph that left open the question of whether such
challenges can be sustained in the abortion context.16 Whether the un-
due burden test is the exclusive way through which to assess the con-
stitutionality of informed consent measures remains a live issue. A cir-
cuit split has developed, with the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits
disallowing separate First Amendment challenges to “truthful, nonmis-
leading, and relevant” informed consent disclosures while the Fourth
Circuit permits them. This leads to a second open question: if Casey
does not foreclose physicians’ First Amendment challenges to informed
consent laws, what standard of review should apply?
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the Supreme
Court’s abortion jurisprudence with particular emphasis on Casey. Part
II analyzes the circuit split and the rationales of the Eighth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourth Circuits. Part III looks closely at the language and
reasoning of Casey and argues that it supports the view that First
Amendment challenges to informed consent measures—even those that
are truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant—can exist independently of
the undue burden standard. Part IV advocates for intermediate scru-
tiny as the appropriate standard of review for such challenges.
I. ABORTION AT THE SUPREME COURT
A. Pre-Casey
A woman’s right to have an abortion has been constitutionally pro-
tected since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade17 in 1973. In Roe,
a pregnant unmarried woman brought suit against Wade, a Texas dis-
trict attorney, challenging an article of the Texas Penal Code that lim-
ited abortions to those done for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother.18 Roe raised the question: does the constitutional right to pri-
vacy encompass a woman’s decision to have an abortion?19
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative and struck down
the Texas statute.20 However, while acknowledging that the right to
personal privacy included a woman’s decision to have an abortion, the
Court did not leave this right unqualified. Instead, it developed a three-
16 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18 Id. at 120.
19 Id. at 153.
20 Id. at 166.
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part framework roughly aligned with the trimesters of pregnancy, al-
lowing for increased state interference and regulation as pregnancy pro-
gresses.21 The Court acknowledged states’ “important and legitimate
interest in potential life,”22 but found this interest compelling only at
the point of viability.23 The framework broke down as follows: 1) until
approximately the end of the first trimester, states could not interfere
with a woman’s right to have an abortion; 2) after the first trimester
but before viability, states could regulate abortion only “in ways that
are reasonably related to maternal health;”24 3) after viability, states
could freely regulate abortion and even prohibit it, as long as exceptions
existed for the health or life of the woman.25
B. Casey and the Undue Burden Standard
Roe’s trimester framework governed abortion regulations, albeit
shakily,26 for nearly two decades. In 1992, however, the Court offered a
new approach in Casey. In Casey, Planned Parenthood brought a suit
against Robert Casey, the governor of Pennsylvania, challenging a
Pennsylvania law that restricted abortion access by requiring: 1) writ-
ten informed consent from a woman seeking an abortion; 2) a twenty-
four-hour waiting period between providing a woman with the informed
consent information and performing an abortion; 3) if the woman was a
minor, the informed consent of at least one parent; and 4) if the woman
was married, a statement indicating her husband had been notified of
the pending abortion.27 The informed consent provisions required phy-
sicians to inform women of the nature of the procedure, the health risks
of abortion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the
“unborn child.”28 Women had to be informed of the availability of
printed materials published by the state that described fetal develop-
ment and provided information about medical assistance for childbirth,
21 Id. at 164–65.
22 Id. at 163.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 164. The Court listed examples of “permissible state regulation in this area,” which
included regulating qualifications of the performing physicians and facilities in which abortions
occur, including licensure. Id. at 163.
25 Id. at 164–65.
26 The Casey court acknowledged the uncertainty that followed Roe in its bold opening:
“[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Con-
stitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages . . . that definition
of liberty is still questioned.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
27 Id. at 844.
28 Id. at 881 (quotation marks omitted).
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child support, and agencies providing adoption and abortion alterna-
tives.29 If requested, physicians had to provide these materials.30 Under
its new undue burden standard, the Court upheld all of the Pennsylva-
nia provisions except for spousal notification.31 Specifically, the Court
noted that “the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the
nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of child-
birth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus” did not create an
undue burden.32
While discarding Roe’s trimester framework, the Court claimed to
affirm “Roe’s essential holding”33 through the undue burden standard.
This test has three clearly elucidated parts: first, a woman has the right
to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without
undue interference from the state;34 second, the state has power to re-
strict abortions after fetal viability (but must allow exceptions for preg-
nancies endangering the life of the mother); and third, the state has a
legitimate interest from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health
of women and the life of the fetus.35 This new structure tempered Roe
considerably: states could now regulate the procurement of abortions at
all stages of pregnancy, provided the regulations did not constitute an
undue burden having “the purpose or effect of placing a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fe-
tus.”36 Additionally, in an expression of the extent of its recognition of a
state’s interest in “the life of the unborn,”37 the Casey court allowed for
“state measure[s] designed to persuade [women] to choose childbirth
over abortion,”38 provided the measures “reasonably related to that
goal.”39
While the petitioners in Casey challenged the Pennsylvania statute
primarily as a violation of Roe, they also brought a First Amendment
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 898.
32 Id. at 882.
33 Id. at 846.
34 The Court grounded this right in the Due Process Clause, a departure fromRoe’s penumbral
privacy approach. See id. at 846.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 877.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 878.
39 Id. The measures must still conform to the undue burden standard and cannot create “a
substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” Id. at 877.
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challenge, claiming the informed consent provisions impermissibly con-
trolled physicians’ speech.40 After assessing the informed consent pro-
visions under the undue burden standard, the Court dismissed this al-
ternative claim in three sentences:
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information
about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner man-
dated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment
rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard [cita-
tion omitted], but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject
to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen
v. Roe [citation omitted]. We see no constitutional infirmity in
the requirement that the physician provide the information
mandated by the State here.41
Thus, while overall the Court upheld the informed consent re-
quirements under the undue burden standard,42 its treatment of the
First Amendment claim lacks clarity and does not expressly foreclose
independent First Amendment challenges to informed consent provi-
sions.
The undue burden standard remains good law. The Court used it
in Gonzales v. Carhart,43 and more recently in Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt.44 While these watershed abortion cases demonstrate the
Court’s continued commitment to the undue burden test, they did not
deal with informed consent provisions or First Amendment claims in
the abortion context. Confusion over Casey’s framing has created a cir-
cuit split regarding the permissibility of First Amendment challenges
to abortion informed consent measures, with the Eighth, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits on one side, and the Fourth Circuit on the other.
A recent Supreme Court case also deserves mention. In National
Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (“NIFLA”),45 crisis
pregnancy centers challenged a California statute that (a) required li-
censed centers to post notices explaining the existence of publicly
funded family-planning services, including abortion, and (b) required
40 See id. at 881.
41 Id. at 884.
42 “[T]he right protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue
interference by the State . . . The informed consent requirement is not an undue burden on that
right.” Id. at 887.
43 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a federal ban on “partial-birth” abortions under the undue
burden standard).
44 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (striking down a Texas regulation on abortion clinics under the undue
burden standard).
45 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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unlicensed centers to post notices stating that they were not licensed.46
The Court found the fact that the notice requirement for licensed cen-
ters was not directly tied to a medical procedure to be dispositive.47 Re-
moved from an informed consent context, the licensed requirements
were viewed as pure content-based regulations of speech.48 Subject to
at least intermediate scrutiny, the Court held the licensed notice re-
quirements unconstitutional.49 The Court also struck down the unli-
censed center requirements as “unjustified and unduly burdensome.”50
Relevant here, in its opinion the NIFLA Court characterized the
informed consent provisions in Casey as regulations of professional con-
duct only incidentally burdening speech, a category subject to a lower
standard of review.51 This indicates a willingness of the current Su-
preme Court to consider informed consent provisions as regulations of
conduct, not speech, thus weakening the case for robust First Amend-
ment review. Respectfully, I do not believe the NIFLA Court’s framing
conclusively demystifies Casey, as it occurs in dicta52 and does not en-
gage with alternative explanations for Casey’s reasoning. Moreover,
even assuming the NIFLA court correctly characterized Casey, this can
be read as limited to Casey’s facts. At best, read in conjunction with
Casey, NIFLA “create[s] the guiding principle that reasonable regula-
tions that facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure are ex-
cepted from heightened scrutiny”53—an uncontroversial proposition.
Notwithstanding NIFLA, the scope of permissible First Amendment
challenges to abortion informed consent measures remains an open
question.
46 Id. at 2368.
47 Id. at 2373–74.
48 Id. at 2375.
49 Id. The state argued that the requirements should be considered professional speech and
therefore receive a lower standard of review. The Court, although highly skeptical of the profes-
sional speech doctrine, determined it did not need to answer the professional speech question “be-
cause the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.” Id.
50 Id. at 2378. The State argued that, as commercial speech, the unlicensed requirements
should be subject to the more deferential Zauderer standard. The Court again did not feel the need
to answer whether Zauderer applied because it held that the unlicensed center notice require-
ments could not meet even its lower standard of review.
51 Id. at 2372–73.
52 The Court’s characterization of Casey provides only an example of a category of speech the
Court notes as warranting lower protection. The Court supports this category with citations to
many other cases as well. Id. at 2373. Defining Casey is therefore “not necessary” nor a “necessary
antecedent” to the Court’s holding. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1053 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
53 EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 449 (6th Cir. 2019) (Don-
ald, J., dissenting).
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: SINGULARITY OF THEUNDUE BURDEN
STANDARD?
A. Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits Dismiss First Amendment Chal-
lenges to Informed Consent Laws
The Eighth Circuit has twice upheld the supremacy of the undue
burden test when considering First Amendment challenges to informed
consent requirements. In Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Da-
kota, South Dakota v. Rounds (Rounds I),54 the Eighth Circuit, sitting
en banc, rejected a compelled-speech challenge to a South Dakota law
requiring doctors to provide several statements to women seeking abor-
tions as part of obtaining informed consent. These included statements
that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being,” which “the pregnant woman has an existing [constitu-
tionally protected] relationship with,” and “[t]hat by having an abor-
tion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights
with regards to that relationship will be terminated.”55
Overruling the district court, the Eighth Circuit found the man-
dated statements well within the state’s regulatory power. The court
concluded:
Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot com-
pel an individual simply to speak the State’s ideological mes-
sage, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to
provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a pa-
tient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information
might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abor-
tion.56
Therefore, in order to succeed on its compelled speech claim,
Planned Parenthood had to show that the mandated disclosures were
untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant.57 The statute at issue defined “hu-
man being,” for the purposes of the informed consent provision, as “in-
cluding the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal
ages from fertilization to full gestation,”58 and the court held the statu-
tory definition controlling.59 Given this, the court found the challenged
54 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
55 Id. at 726.
56 Id. at 734–35.
57 See id. at 735.
58 Id. at 727.
59 “South Dakota recognizes the well-settled canon of statutory interpretation that ‘[w]here [a
term] is defined by statute, the statutory definition is controlling.’” Id. at 735 (citing Bruggeman
v. S.D. Chem. Dependency Counselor Certification Bd., 571 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997)).
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disclosures truthful and relevant.60 In sum, the Eighth Circuit held Ca-
sey and Gonzales precluded First Amendment claims to informed con-
sent laws when the speech at issue is truthful, nonmisleading, and rel-
evant.
Four years later, the Eighth Circuit, again sitting en banc and
again reversing the district court, reaffirmed its reading of Casey and
upheld another part of the South Dakota statute in Rounds II.61 As part
of obtaining informed consent, the statute required physicians to pro-
vide a written “description of . . . statistically significant risk factors to
which the pregnant woman would be subjected, includ-
ing . . . [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”62 The Eighth
Circuit held that this statement did not imply a causal link between
abortion and suicide but rather indicated relative risk, which it found
sufficiently supported by the scientific record and therefore truthful.63
The court further held that despite medical and scientific uncertainty,
the record did not conclusively rule out abortion as “a causal factor in
the observed correlation between abortion and suicide,”64 and therefore
the required disclosure was not misleading or irrelevant.65
The Fifth Circuit held similarly in Texas Medical Providers Per-
forming Abortion Services v. Lakey.66 In Lakey, physicians and abortion
providers brought a section 1983 action against the state of Texas, chal-
lenging a recently enacted bill that significantly amended Texas’ in-
formed consent laws.67 The challenged amendments required physi-
cians performing abortions to “perform and display a sonogram of the
fetus, make audible the heart auscultation of the fetus . . . [and] ex-
plain . . . the results of each procedure.”68 A woman had to certify her
physician’s compliance with these measures and wait 24 hours before
receiving an abortion.69 The statute permitted a woman to decline to
view the images or hear the heartbeat, but she could only decline to
60 Id. at 735. The court did not explicitly discuss why this statement is not misleading, but did
note that it would be “incumbent upon one preparing the disclosure form required by [the statute],
and upon a physician answering a patient’s questions about it, to account for any applicable stat-
utory definitions.” Id.
61 Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).
62 Id. at 894.
63 “[T]he studies submitted by the State are sufficiently reliable to support the truth of the
proposition that the relative risk of suicide and suicide ideation is higher for women who abort
their pregnancies compared to women who give birth or have not become pregnant.” Id. at 898–
99.
64 Id. at 904.
65 Id. at 905.
66 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
67 Id. at 572.
68 Id. at 573.
69 Id.
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receive an explanation of the sonogram images under three conditions:
1) if her pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, 2) if she was a minor,
or 3) if the fetus had a documented irreversible medical condition or
abnormality.70 The district court granted a preliminary injunction
against the disclosure provisions as impermissible compelled speech.71
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Casey precluded the plain-
tiffs’ First Amendment challenge. The Lakey court focused on Casey’s
brief discussion of the First Amendment claim, finding its absence of
inquiry into compelling interests or narrow tailoring to be the “antithe-
sis of strict scrutiny.”72 The Fifth Circuit then turned to Gonzales, not-
ing its reaffirmance of Casey in upholding states’ “significant role . . . in
regulating the medical profession” and the government’s ability to “use
its voice and regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the
life within the woman.”73 The court found that these two cases clearly
established that “informed consent laws that do not impose an undue
burden on the woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if they
require truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures,” and “are
part of the state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice and do not
fall under the rubric of compelling ‘ideological’ speech that triggers First
Amendment strict scrutiny.”74 The court supported this interpretation
of the case law by citing the Eighth Circuit in Rounds I.75
The Fifth Circuit then noted that, unlike the plaintiffs in Casey and
Rounds, the plaintiff-appellees in the case at hand had brought solely a
First Amendment claim.76 The court found this impermissible:
If the disclosures are truthful and non-misleading, and if they
would not violate the woman’s privacy right under theCasey plu-
rality opinion, then Appellees would, by means of their First
Amendment claim, essentially trump the balance Casey struck
between women’s rights and the states’ prerogatives. Casey,
however, rejected any such clash of rights in the informed con-
sent context.77
70 Id. at 578 n.6.
71 Id. at 573. The provisions were also challenged as void for vagueness, outside of the scope
of this Comment.
72 Id. at 575.
73 Id. at 575–76 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007)) (internal quotations
omitted).
74 Id. at 576.
75 “Fortifying this reading, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc construed Casey and Gonzales
in the same way.” Id. at 576–77 (citing Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735
(8th Cir. 2008)).
76 Id. at 577.
77 Id.
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The Fifth Circuit finally denied the contention raised by plaintiff-
appellees that the disclosure requirements at issue differed qualita-
tively from those in Casey.78 The appellees’ argument here focused on
two distinctions. First, because the disclosures of the sonogram and fe-
tal heartbeat were “medically unnecessary,” they went “beyond the
standard practice of medicine within the state’s regulatory powers.”79
Second, requiring the physician to explain the results of the sonogram
and fetal heart auscultation verbally “makes the physician the ‘mouth-
piece’ of the state.”80 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the first point under
Casey and Gonzales.81 As to the second point, the court held that this
“mode of delivery does not make a constitutionally significant difference
from the ‘availability’ provision in Casey . . . [t]he mode of compelled
expression is not by itself constitutionally relevant, although the con-
text is.”82 For all these reasons, the court found that the provisions did
not violate the First Amendment because they were “sustainable under
Casey . . . [and] within the State’s power to regulate the practice of med-
icine.”83 The Fifth Circuit denied petitioners appeal for en banc re-
view.84
The Sixth Circuit recently confronted the issue and aligned in de-
cision with the Eighth and Fifth Circuits. In EMW Women’s Surgical
Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar,85 the court overruled the district court and up-
held the constitutionality of a Kentucky informed consent statute
(H.B.2) against a First Amendment challenge.86 Echoing the Texas law
at issue in Lakey, H.B.2 required that before giving an abortion a phy-
sician perform an ultrasound, display and explain the images, and aus-
cultate the fetal heartbeat.87 Although any patient could request that
78 Id. at 578.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 579.
81 “Appellees’ argument ignores that Casey andGonzales . . . emphasize that the gravity of the
decision may be the subject of informed consent through factual, medical detail, that the condition
of the fetus is relevant, and that discouraging abortion is an acceptable effect of mandated disclo-
sures.” Id.
82 Id. at 579–80.
83 Id. at 580.
84 Press Release, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Denies
Request to Rehear Texas Ultrasound Case (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.reproductiverights.org/pres
s-room/fifth-circuit-court-of-appeals-denies-request-to-rehear-texas-ultrasound-case [https://perm
a.cc/2X5L-7W5Y].
85 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019).
86 Id. at 446.
87 Id. at 424.
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the physician turn down the volume of the auscultation, the law pro-
vided no exemptions from these disclosures except in the case of a med-
ical emergency or a medically necessary abortion.88
Relying heavily on its reading of Casey and NIFLA, the Beshar
court determined that “First Amendment heightened scrutiny does not
apply to incidental regulation of professional speech89 that is part of the
practice of medicine and . . . such incidental regulation includes man-
dated informed-consent requirements, provided that the disclosures are
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.”90 Characterizing the sonogram
provisions as “‘materially identical’”91 to Casey’s requirements and
highly relevant,92 the court found no constitutional infirmity in H.B.2.
The court discussed Lakey andRounds I at length, noting their “support
[for] our holding today.”93
B. Fourth Circuit Upholds First Amendment Challenge to Informed
Consent Law
Two years after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lakey, but before the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Beshar, the Fourth Circuit addressed a com-
pelled speech challenge to a strikingly similar statute. In Stuart v. Cam-
nitz,94 physicians and abortion providers challenged the Display of
Real-Time View Requirement of the North Carolina Woman’s Right to
Know Act (“WRKA”).95 The requirement mandated ultrasounds for all
women seeking abortions and required physicians to display the sono-
gram and “describe the fetus in detail, ‘includ[ing] the presence, loca-
tion, and dimensions of the unborn child within the uterus and the num-
ber of unborn children depicted,’ . . . as well as ‘the presence of external
members and internal organs, if present and viewable.’”96 It also re-
quired physicians to provide women the option of hearing the fetal heart
auscultation.97 The WRKA allowed exceptions to these measures only
in the case of medical emergency; however, a woman could always
“‘avert[ ] her eyes from the displayed images’ and ‘refus[e] to hear the
88 Id. at 424–25.
89 The Beshar court made NIFLA’s characterization of Casey central to its analysis and dis-
missed the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stuart (see part B) because it pre-dated NIFLA and there-
fore gave “insufficient regard” to NIFLA’s characterization of Casey. Id. at 435.
90 Id. at 429.
91 Id. at 431 (internal citations omitted).
92 Id. (“one can hardly dispute the relevance of sonogram images for twenty-first-century in-
formed consent.”).
93 Id. at 434.
94 774 F. 3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
95 Id. at 242–43.
96 Id. at 243.
97 Id.
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simultaneous explanation and medical description’ by presumably cov-
ering her eyes and ears.”98 The district court, applying heightened, in-
termediate scrutiny, held that these requirements violated the physi-
cians’ First Amendment rights to free speech and entered a permanent
injunction.99
Unlike in Lakey or Rounds, here a unanimous Fourth Circuit af-
firmed.100 Analyzing the regulations first through a compelled speech
lens, the Fourth Circuit held “[t]he Requirement [the regulations de-
scribed above] is quintessential compelled speech. It forces physicians
to say things they otherwise would not say. . .[T]he statement com-
pelled here is ideological; it conveys a particular opinion.”101 Referenc-
ing Lakey, the court acknowledged that the mandated disclosures at is-
sue were factual but did not find this fact dispositive:
[While] it is true that the words the state puts into the doctor’s
mouth are factual, that does not divorce the speech from its
moral or ideological implications. “[C]ontext matters.” . . . [The
regulations] explicitly promote[] a pro-life message by demand-
ing the provision of facts that all fall on one side of the abortion
debate—and does so shortly before the time of decision when the
intended recipient is most vulnerable.102
The Fourth Circuit then assessed the requirements as standard
medical regulation, acknowledging that states retain rights to regulate
professional speech and mandate informed consent to medical proce-
dures.103 Despite this, the court held “individuals [do not] simply aban-
don their First Amendment rights when they commence practicing a
profession,”104 and that “[w]ith all forms of compelled speech, [the court]
must look to the context of the regulation to determine when the state’s
regulatory authority has extended too far.”105 In the context of the
WRKA, the court held that “the confluence of these factors points to-
ward borrowing a heightened intermediate scrutiny standard used in
certain commercial speech cases.”106
98 Id.
99 Id. at 244.
100 Id. at 256.
101 Id. at 246. Note that the state freely admitted “the purpose and anticipated effect of the
Display of Real-Time View Requirement is to convince women seeking abortions to change their
minds or reassess their decisions.” Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 247.
104 Id. The court supported this with reference to Casey (“[T]he physician’s First Amendment
rights not to speak are implicated.”) Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 248.
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The Fourth Circuit explicitly stated its reasons for diverging from
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits:
With respect, our sister circuits read too much into Casey and
Gonzales. The single paragraph in Casey does not assert that
physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights in the proce-
dures surrounding abortions, nor does it announce the proper
level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations that compel
speech to the extraordinary extent present here . . . the plurality
simply stated that it saw ‘no constitutional infirmity in the re-
quirement that the physician provide the information mandated
by the State here.’ That particularized finding hardly announces
a guiding standard of scrutiny for use in every subsequent com-
pelled speech case involving abortion.107
The court also heldGonzales, an undue burden case raising no First
Amendment claim, inapplicable to the issue at hand. The court noted
that Gonzales “says nothing about the level of scrutiny courts should
apply when reviewing a claim that a regulation compelling speech in
the abortion context violates physicians’ First Amendment free speech
rights.”108 The Fourth Circuit thus found its First Amendment analysis
consistent with Casey andGonzales. The State appealed to the Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari.109
III. CASEYDOESNOT FORECLOSE PHYSICIANS’ FIRST AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES TO INFORMED CONSENT LAWS
A. Casey Does Not Displace First Amendment Protection for Physi-
cians
The Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have curtailed First Amend-
ment protection for physicians in the context of abortion informed con-
sent measures. Each circuit held that when mandated informed consent
disclosures are truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the decision to
have an abortion, they are permissible under Casey as long as they do
not constitute an undue burden. Essentially, these circuits have disal-
lowed independent First Amendment analysis of physicians’ compelled
speech claims by collapsing free speech analysis into the undue burden
test. This reasoning misinterprets Casey. As Nadia Sawicki writes, “it
is essential to recognize that the ‘truthful, not misleading, and relevant’
requirement is a condition on the constitutionality of disclosure laws
107 Id. at 249.
108 Id.
109 Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘undue burden’ standard, rather
than a condition of the First Amendment.”110 As recently articulated by
Judge Donald in her powerful dissenting opinion in Beshar:
The majority relies on undue burden jurisprudence to fashion a
test that they believe comprehensively captures informed con-
sent. The result is erroneous . . . The three elements the major-
ity identifies—truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant—were
drawn from Casey, a controlling case that considered both an un-
due burden and a First Amendment challenge. These three ele-
ments, however, were central only toCasey’s undue burden anal-
ysis . . . Nowhere are these elements even mentioned in Casey’s
discussion of the First Amendment. It is a mistake to transpose
Casey’s holding on undue burden to the First Amendment chal-
lenge here.111
In other words, Casey holds that truthful, nonmisleading, and rel-
evant informed consent disclosures do not per se violate a woman’s con-
stitutional right to choose. Casey does not, however, indicate that such
disclosures can never be subject to First Amendment review.
Common sense indicates that this must be the case. Imagine South
Dakota revises its disclosure requirement with the only change being
physicians are now required to stand up on a chair and yell at a woman
that her abortion will end the life of a unique living human being. While
this hypothetical obviously steps outside of the bounds of the regula-
tions considered in Casey, the Eighth Circuit does not offer a framework
through which to challenge it. The disclosure has already been held
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant, ending the First Amendment in-
quiry. While the yelling could be challenged as creating an undue bur-
den, the Eighth Circuit would struggle to qualitatively differentiate it
from the written statement, especially given the permissibility of regu-
lations designed to dissuade women from choosing abortion.112 Even if
the Eighth Circuit invalidated this law under the undue burden stand-
ard, the fact remains that it would be impossible, under Eighth Circuit
110 Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and
Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 24–25 (2016).
111 EMWWomen’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F. 3d 421, 448 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald,
J., dissenting).
112 “Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an individual simply to
speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to
provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an abortion,
even if that information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.”
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis
added).
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precedent, for a physician to challenge this law under the First Amend-
ment. This significantly reduces protection of physicians’ speech.
It does not seem plausible that the Court would create this large
exemption from First Amendment protection in such an ambiguous
way. Justice Scalia famously wrote that “Congress . . . does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouse-
holes.”113 The same reasoning should apply to Supreme Court holdings,
particularly in the context of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
has historically been hesitant to create exceptions to free speech protec-
tion. As the Court recently stated in NIFLA, “[t]his Court has ‘been re-
luctant to mark off new categories of speech for diminished constitu-
tional protection,’”114 and “[we have] been especially reluctant to
‘exemp[t] a category of speech from the normal prohibition on content-
based restrictions.’”115 In this context, reading the three sentences in
Casey as creating a new category of lessened speech protection—for
truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant informed consent disclosures—
seems all the more implausible.116 A simpler, more reasonable reading
of Casey is that the Court, having already held the informed consent
provisions permissible under the undue burden standard, and finding
the regulations at issue within the usual confines of a state’s regulatory
power, did not feel the need to explore the First Amendment issue fur-
ther.117
B. Whalen Does Not Trump Wooley
In its discussion of the First Amendment issues in Casey, the Court
cited to Wooley v. Maynard118 andWhalen v. Roe,119 two seemingly con-
flicting cases. InWooley, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a
New Hampshire statute that required residents to display “Live Free
113 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
114 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (citing Denver
Area Ed. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 804 (1996)).
115 Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012)).
116 I recognize the irony of using NIFLA to support this claim, given its characterization of
Casey—but disputing that characterization does not rob other portions of the opinion of their per-
suasiveness.
117 The courts that have found otherwise have arguably fallen prey to a phenomenon recently
articulated in a different context by Justice Gorsuch: “treating judicial opinions as if they were
statutes, divorcing a passing comment from its context, ignoring all that came before and after,
and treating an isolated phrase as if it were controlling.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
118 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
119 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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or Die” on their license plates.120 In Whalen, the Court upheld, as an
appropriate use of state police power, a New York statute requiring phy-
sicians to disclose to the government prescription records of certain
drugs.121 As Robert Post writes, “[e]xactly how the strict First Amend-
ment standards of Wooley are meant to qualify the broad police power
discretion ofWhalen is left entirely obscure.”122However, a close look at
each case shows that Whalen should not qualifyWooley to the extent of
foreclosing a physician’s ability to bring First Amendment challenges
to informed consent laws.
The Supreme Court struck down the license plate statute in
Wooley, recognizing that “the right of freedom of thought protected by
the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”123 In Lakey,
the Fifth Circuit took upWooley as a defense against the plaintiffs’ con-
tention that requiring physicians to voice the mandated information
was constitutionally significant. The Lakey court cited Wooley as sup-
port for the statement that “[t]he mode of compelled expression is not
by itself constitutionally relevant, although the context is.”124 However,
Wooley suggests more than that. Comparing the case to West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,125 the seminal case in which the
Supreme Court acknowledged a First Amendment right to be free from
compelled speech in the context of the school flag salute, the Wooley
Court stated that “[c]ompelling the affirmative act of a flag salute in-
volved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the
passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the differ-
ence is essentially one of degree.”126 This statement supports two suppo-
sitions: first, compelled speech is an infringement, and second, the ex-
tent to which it is compelled can affect the analysis. Therefore, the
Lakey court’s exclusive focus on context is incomplete.Wooley indicates
that the mode of compelled expression is also relevant insofar as it can
heighten the severity of the infringement. A provision demanding that
doctors voice the state’s information in their own words requires signif-
icantly more affirmative action thanmerely providing pamphlets. Thus,
120 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 (“We must also determine whether the State’s countervailing inter-
est is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the state motto on their li-
cense plates.”).
121 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
122 Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Phy-
sician Speech, U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 946 (2007).
123 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
124 Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir.
2012).
125 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
126 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added).
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the provisions at issue in Lakey analogize more closely to Barnette than
to Wooley, and Wooley suggests that this increases the gravity of the
infringement.
Immediately following its reference to Wooley, the Casey court
acknowledges that the medical context tempers its First Amendment
analysis, citing to Whalen. In Whalen, the Court upheld, against a pri-
vacy challenge, a New York statute requiring that the state receive a
copy of every prescription for a certain class of drugs categorized as
highly dangerous.127 In Lakey, the Fifth Circuit describedWhalen in one
sentence as a case “in which the Court had upheld a regulation of med-
ical practice against a right to privacy challenge.”128 Again, their synop-
sis is imprecise. In analyzing the constitutional validity of the provision,
theWhalen court considered its effect on the independence of physicians
and patients:
Nor can it be said that any individual has been deprived of the
right to decide independently, with the advice of his physician,
to acquire and to use needed medication . . . the decision to pre-
scribe, or to use, is left entirely to the physician and the patient.
We hold that . . . [the] impact of the patient-identification re-
quirements in the [statute] on either the reputation or the inde-
pendence of the patients is [not] sufficient to constitute an inva-
sion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment (emphasis added).129
While the Court did uphold the medical regulation, it clearly
weighed, as highly significant, the regulation’s effect on the independ-
ence of patients’ and physicians’ decision making. With regards to the
independence of patients, Casey and Gonzales admittedly allow for
states to voice their disapproval of abortion even if it results in altering
a woman’s choice to have one. Application of the undue burden standard
thus encompasses any infringement on patients’ decision making in its
calculation. However, while the undue burden standard speaks to the
relevance of women’s independence in receiving abortions, it does not
speak to that of the physicians offering them.
The Casey Court’s citation to Whalen indicates that infringements
on the independence of doctors should be factored into the permissibil-
ity of medical regulations. Excluding First Amendment challenges to
informed consent measures, however, removes the only avenue through
which such infringements can be considered. Although in Casey, like in
127 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04.
128 Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575.
129 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added).
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Whalen, the extent of infringement on the independence of the physi-
cian-patient relationship fell within permissible grounds, that determi-
nation was limited to the facts of Casey.130 The provisions in Rounds,
Lakey, Beshar, and Stuart, which prescribed descriptive and invasive
procedures doctors must follow, intrude on the physician-patient rela-
tionship significantly more.
In sum, allowing physicians to bring First Amendment challenges
to informed consent provisions does not “trump the balance Casey
struck between women’s rights and the states’ prerogatives.”131 Casey
weighed women’s rights and states’ rights in crafting the undue burden
standard, but it did no such careful weighing in regard to physicians’
First Amendment rights. Thus, when the burden on physicians’ speech
goes significantly beyond the regulations upheld in Casey, Casey no
longer applies.
IV. ADOPTING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AS THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Competing Interests Clash in the Context of Informed Consent
Laws
Assuming that Casey does not foreclose physicians from bringing
First Amendment challenges to informed consent laws, there remains
an open question: what standard should courts use to review these chal-
lenges? With First Amendment claims, context drives this inquiry.132
As noted by the Fourth Circuit in Stuart, informed consent laws lie at
a unique intersection between impermissible content-based compelled
speech and permissible state regulations of mandated informed consent
to a medical procedure.133 The Supreme Court has not conclusively
weighed in on this muddled area of First Amendment law; conse-
quently, Casey, with all its resulting confusion, offers the Court’s clear-
est declaration on the issue.
Content-based restrictions on speech are generally assessed under
strict scrutiny.134 For a law to pass strict scrutiny, it must further a
compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to effectuate
130 “We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the infor-
mation mandated by the State here.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992) (emphasis added).
131 Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577.
132 “Laws that impinge upon speech receive different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on
the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes underlying it.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774
F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014).
133 Id.
134 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
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that interest.135 Many commenters consider this rigorous standard es-
sentially fatal, as the Supreme Court has upheld only two speech re-
striction laws under it.136 Freedom from compelled speech, or the right
not to speak, has long been recognized as protected under the First
Amendment. Compelled speech is necessarily content-based and thus
also assessed under strict scrutiny.137 Viewed purely through this lens,
informed consent laws that compel physician speech, like those in
Rounds, Lakey, Beshar, and Stuart, would be reviewed under strict
scrutiny and would almost certainly be stricken down.
However, compelled speech of medical professionals runs up
against another line of precedent. States have police powers through
which they can regulate medicine and other professions.138 Courts gen-
erally review regulations of this sort under rational basis review, which
merely requires a statute be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment interest.139 While not quite a rubber stamp, most laws pass this
deferential standard. Additionally, the necessity of informed consent to
medical procedures is well established under tort law.140 Similarly, phy-
sicians are routinely held liable for malpractice, even when the harm
results from a physician’s speech or lack thereof (e.g. failure to inform
a patient of a procedure’s risks or giving incorrect medical advice).141
In Casey, the Court acknowledged both these lines of precedent:
“the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated,
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licens-
ing and regulation by the State.”142 Beyond this statement and the ci-
tations to Wooley and Maynard discussed in Part III, the Casey Court
did not offer a precise standard through which to assess infringements
on physicians’ First Amendment rights.
135 Id.
136 Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Protecting Oc-
cupational Speech, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 197, 205 (2018).
137 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (U.S. 1988) (“Mandating speech
that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.”).
138 Police powers come from the Tenth Amendment. “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend X. See also Sawicki, supra note 112 at 12 (“States are
authorized to regulate medicine and other professions by virtue of their police power, the unenu-
merated power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of a state’s citizenry”). See also Dent v.
W. Va., 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
139 Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV 1627, 1629
(2016).
140 See generally W.M. Moldoff,Malpractice: Physician’s Duty to Inform Patient of Nature and
Hazards of Disease or Treatment, 79 A.L.R. 2d 1028 (originally published 1961).
141 “Without so much as a nod to the First Amendment, doctors are routinely held liable for
malpractice for speaking or for failing to speak.” Post, supra note 122, at 950.
142 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (internal citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
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B. Eliminating the Extremes (Strict Scrutiny and Rational Basis Re-
view)
While the appropriate standard could thus fall anywhere from
strict scrutiny to rational basis review, the endpoints of the range can
be eliminated from consideration. A standard of strict scrutiny seems
hard to reconcile with Casey.143 As the Lakey court rightfully notes, the
Casey Court’s three-sentence First Amendment discussion “is clearly
not a strict scrutiny analysis . . . [because] [i]t inquires into neither
compelling interests nor narrow tailoring.”144 Moreover, applying strict
scrutiny to abortion informed consent laws would run afoul of the
Court’s historic recognition of state laws regulating the medical profes-
sion, a point noted by the Casey court itself.145 Sound policy reasons
buoy this recognition. Patients depend on physicians to inform them of
their treatment options, but they usually lack the necessary medical
background or understanding to validate the information inde-
pendently. Thus, by necessity, patients place blind trust in the advice
they receive from their doctors. This trust is made less blind, however,
by two systems working in tandem: indirect regulation through medical
malpractice liability, and direct regulation by the state. Reviewing
these regulations under strict scrutiny would inappropriately encumber
this system, even in the limited context of abortion informed consent
measures.
Rational basis review, at first blush, appears better supported by
the language used by the Casey court in its discussion of the First
Amendment claim. The Court’s use of the word “reasonable” can be read
as synonymous with rational,146 and its cursory First Amendment anal-
ysis could indicate deference to the state’s regulatory power. However,
as Carl Coleman explains, “the plurality made this statement only after
having already determined (in the context of its due process analysis)
that the state had a ‘substantial’ interest in requiring the disclosures
and noting ‘the ways in which the speech requirement was narrowly
143 This statement should not be taken as an endorsement of Casey’s holding. However, this
Comment seeks to offer a standard that coheres with precedent and could be used with the current
state of the law. Consistency with Casey is a necessary element of such a standard.
144 Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir.
2012). See also Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, N.C. L. REV. 9 (forthcoming), avail-
able at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3234300 (“The most that can be said about Casey is that the plu-
rality was clearly not applying strict scrutiny in its First Amendment analysis, as it made no effort
to determine whether the statute was ‘narrowly tailored’ or based on a ‘compelling state interest.’”).
145 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
146 “On the one hand, [the Casey plurality’s] use of the word ‘reasonable’ might mean that such
laws are permissible as long as they have a rational basis, given that the word ‘reasonable’ is often
used as a synonym for ‘rational.’” Coleman, supra note 144, at 9.
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drawn.’”147 Given this context, the word “reasonable” alone should not
determine the standard of review. Moreover, application of rational ba-
sis review would render the discussion in Part III largely academic, be-
cause all of the informed consent measures mentioned so far would
likely survive. This would essentially allow the carve-out of First
Amendment protection for informed consent measures functionally
claimed by the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Thus, for the reasons
discussed in Part III, rational basis review cannot be the appropriate
standard.
In sum, both extremes—strict scrutiny and rational basis review—
fail as potential standards of review. Strict scrutiny is incompatible
with the language in Casey and fails to acknowledge the state’s legiti-
mate regulatory role in the realm of medical disclosures. Rational basis
review ignores the context of Casey and would, in effect, impermissibly
excuse abortion informed consent measures from meaningful review.
C. Searching the Middle for a Standard
Rejecting both strict scrutiny and rational basis review eliminates
the clearest available standards, forcing an examination of the mushy
middle ground of First Amendment protection. As will be discussed in
sub-section D, intermediate scrutiny emerges from this search as the
best standard. Reaching that conclusion requires analysis of why other
possible intermediate standards fail in the context of informed consent
to abortion.148 In this section, two other potential standards that have
been offered as options will be examined: “truthful, nonmisleading, and
relevant” (hereinafter “TNR”), and “factual and noncontroversial” (the
Zauderer standard). Both fail to strike the right balance of protection.
As discussed in section II(a), the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth circuits
used a “truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant” standard to assess the
challenged informed consent measures. In so doing, these circuits inap-
propriately folded First Amendment analysis into the undue burden
test (see section III). This does not, however, mean that a TNR standard
should be disregarded per se. While the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth circuits
147 Id.
148 For the purposes of this Comment I have set aside the concept of professional speech as a
framework through which to consider abortion informed consent requirements. Professional
speech has received varied and inconsistent treatment in the circuit courts. See Erika Schutzman,
We Need Professional Help: Advocating For a Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of
Professional Speech Implicate the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 2019, 2023 (“Courts have pro-
vided little clarity as to the extent to which the First Amendment rights of professionals should be
protected or balanced against the interests of the state . . . several circuits have tackled the issue
of professional speech, with varying results.”). Moreover, the Court’s opinion inNIFLA casts doubt
on the validity of the professional speech doctrine. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v.
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (“this Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a
separate category of speech.”).
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erred in failing to acknowledge the necessity of an independent First
Amendment analysis, had they done so, TNR could have been an appro-
priate standard. Such an approach would uphold informed consent
measures that mandate truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclo-
sures.
A TNR test has the benefit of seemingly easy compatibility with
Casey. The Casey court held the truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant
disclosures at issue in the Pennsylvania law admissible under the un-
due burden test. It then went on to find no First Amendment issue with
the mandated disclosures. It follows that, at a minimum, truthful, non-
misleading, and relevant disclosures similar in kind to those seen in
Casey pass First Amendment scrutiny.149
Applied beyond Casey, however, TNR offers a slippery standard.
The circuit split discussed in Part II illustrates this: in some jurisdic-
tions, information relevant to having an abortion includes an often un-
necessary and costly medical procedure, while in others it does not. La-
boratories of democracy notwithstanding, a standard does not offer good
guidance if speech relating to a medical procedure can be so differently
conscripted depending on the state in which it occurs. Pulling a unique
First Amendment standard from Casey stretches the Court’s acknowl-
edgment of abortion exceptionalism beyond recognition.150
Another midway standard comes from the context of commercial
speech. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court
of Ohio,151 the Court upheld an Ohio Disciplinary Rule that required
attorneys advertising contingent-fee based representation to disclose
that clients may have to pay certain costs if they lose.152 The Court in
149 However, a reasonableness assessment also seems baked into the Casey Court’s discussion
of the informed consent measures. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (“In short, requiring that the woman
be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal development and the assistance
available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure
an informed choice”) (emphasis added); id. at 885 (“Thus, we uphold the provision [requiring a
physician as opposed to a qualified assistant to provide information regarding informed consent]
as a reasonable means to ensure that the woman’s consent is informed”) (emphasis added). There-
fore, truthful, nonmisleading, and reasonable (as opposed to or in addition to relevant) could be a
more appropriate test to draw from Casey. Given that none of the circuits discussed in this Com-
ment offered it as a standard, I am not giving this test full analysis. Moreover, I am not proffering
it as an alternative standard because the flexibility of a reasonableness assessment would not
adequately safeguard against free speech abuses in the abortion context.
150 Id. at 852 (“Abortion is a unique act . . . the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense
unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.”). See also Linda Greenhouse,Why Courts
Shouldn’t Ignore the Facts About Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/02/28/opinion/sunday/why-courts-shouldnt-ignore-the-facts-about-abortion-rights
.html (“‘abortion exceptionalism’” is the argument “that abortion has a moral valence that makes
it different from the many other medical procedures that states subject to less rigorous oversight.
The Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence recognizes this”).
151 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
152 Id. at 652.
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Zauderer indicated that disclosure requirements mandating only
“purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under
which . . . services will be available”153 would be upheld if they “reason-
ably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consum-
ers,”154 and were not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”155 From this
language the Zauderer standard emerged, namely “more deferential re-
view to some laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncon-
troversial information in their ‘commercial speech.’”156 Elements of the
reach and scope of Zauderer remain unclear.157
Some commentators have suggested that courts could use the Zau-
derer standard to assess regulations relating to abortion, including in-
formed consent measures.158 Such an approach would uphold the con-
stitutionality of factual and uncontroversial informed consent
disclosures. Prior to NIFLA, this approach arguably had legs. In the
wake of NIFLA, however, the use of Zauderer in the abortion context
cannot stand. In considering the appropriate standard of review for the
California notice requirement for licensed clinics, the Court stated: “The
Zauderer standard does not apply here . . . The notice in no way relates
to the services that licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these
clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored services—includ-
ing abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic. Accordingly, Zau-
derer has no application here.”159 Arguably, informed consent measures
differ qualitatively from the notice provisions in NIFLA because they
relate more directly to the service being offered (abortion). However,
NIFLA clearly colors abortion as a controversial topic, sharply circum-
scribing Zauderer’s application. Moreover, even without considering
NIFLA, Zauderer review would likely strike down many of the informed
consent measures upheld in Casey (while describing the nature of the
procedure and associated health risks might pass, requiring notice of
153 Id. at 651.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
157 Open questions include whether state interests aside from preventing consumer deception
can sustain disclosure requirements, and what qualifies as “controversial.” For one circuit’s take,
see Am.Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that government
interests in addition to correcting deception can be invoked to sustain disclosure mandates under
Zauderer); Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding as
controversial an S.E.C. requirement that a company that could not determine the origin of its
minerals must list its products as not Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict free).
158 See Coleman, supra note 144, at 22 (noting the similarity between theRounds I court’s focus
on whether the compelled disclosures were “truthful and not misleading” and the Zauderer stand-
ard). Interestingly, this was the approach adopted by the Third Circuit in Casey. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705–06 (3d Cir. 1991) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
159 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
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the probable gestational age of the child as well as state-sponsored ma-
terials regarding alternatives seems controversial). Given both this and
the framing of abortion inNIFLA, it follows that abortion informed con-
sent disclosures do not qualify for Zauderer review.
D. Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Appropriate Standard
Intermediate scrutiny (sometimes also referred to as heightened
scrutiny) straddles the line between rational basis review and strict
scrutiny. It developed as a response to gender discrimination claims un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment160 and more recently has emerged as
the standard for assessing regulations of some commercial speech.161
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the state demonstrate “at least that
the statute directly advances a substantial governmental interest and
that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest,”162 with a “fit be-
tween the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends.”163 Courts sometimes define the appropriate fit as one that is not
“more extensive than necessary.”164Under intermediate scrutiny, “[t]he
court can and should take into account the effect of the regulation on
the intended recipient of the compelled speech, especially where she is
a captive listener.”165
Intermediate scrutiny appropriately balances the tensions created
by informed consent measures. On the one hand, the regulation of pri-
vate medical decisions falls within the ambit of the state. On the other
hand, abortion is a matter of public concern, and many informed con-
sent measures are designed precisely to express the state’s disapproval
of the practice in general. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that
“[i]t is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the
First Amendment’s protection’. . . In contrast, speech on matters of
purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”166 Govern-
mental regulations of speech on matters of public concern traditionally
trigger a higher level of scrutiny.167 Abortion qualifies as an issue in
both realms: private as applied to a woman’s particular circumstances,
160 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
161 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
162 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011).
163 Id. at 572 (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))
(internal citations omitted).
164 Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 (2d Cir. 2014) (defining inter-
mediate scrutiny as looking to whether a law is “no more extensive than necessary to serve a
substantial governmental interest”).
165 Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2014).
166 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985).
167 Id. at 759.
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which are wholly her own, yet a controversial part of the public forum.
In choosing the dialogue between a woman and her physician as a time
during which to express disapproval of abortion, states have introduced
the public forum into a “deeply personal decision[].”168
This raises concerns of government overreach, flagged by Justice
Thomas in NIFLA. Justice Thomas observed that the Supreme Court
“has stressed the danger of content-based regulations ‘in the fields of
medicine and public health, where information can save lives.’”169 Not-
ing that “‘[d]octors help patients make deeply personal decisions, and
their candor is crucial,’”170 Justice Thomas warned that “[t]hroughout
history, governments have ‘manipulat[ed] the content of doctor-patient
discourse to increase state power and suppress minorities.”171 Context
can either increase or mitigate this concern. State regulations designed
to empower personal and private decisions by requiring physicians to
provide largely uncontroversial information lessen this concern. For ex-
ample, a law requiring disclosure of specific risks about electroconvul-
sive treatment mostly affects a private treatment decision and does not
implicate a greater public issue. Content-based regulations that touch
on issues of public concern, however, increase the fear of government
manipulation, and therefore require more protection under the First
Amendment. Using intermediate scrutiny for abortion informed con-
sent measures recognizes the state’s regulatory power while ensuring
that regulations impacting speech on an issue of public concern receive
adequate First Amendment protection.172
Moreover, informed consent measures implicate two constitutional
guarantees: a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, and her phy-
sician’s right to be free from compelled speech. As noted, the law han-
dles each separately, under the undue burden test and the First Amend-
ment, respectively. However, a better approach would recognize that
each infringement does not occur in a vacuum. In compelling physi-
cians’ speech and conduct, informed consent measures necessarily
touch on a woman’s right to an abortion as well. The law should recog-
nize this dual infringement by adopting a higher standard of review in
168 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018) (citing Woll-
schaleger v. Governor of Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1328 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc)) (quotations omit-
ted).
169 Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)).
170 Id. (citing Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1328).
171 Id. (citing Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to
Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U.L. REV. 201, 201–202 (1994)).
172 While this Comment has focused narrowly on abortion informed consent measures, this
approach could supply a model for other regulations of physicians’ speech that touch issues of
public concern, e.g. informed-consent to vaccinations.
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assessing the relevant free speech claim—namely, intermediate scru-
tiny.173 Notably, the Supreme Court has adopted such a hybrid rights
approach in regard to one category of free speech claims.174
Analogous reasoning should apply in the case of abortion informed
consent measures. This is not to advocate for a generally more liberal
adoption of the hybrid rights approach. However, such an approach
would be particularly appropriate in the limited context of abortion in-
formed consent measures, where the relevant harm to women is deem-
phasized when informed consent measures are challenged under the
First Amendment (see part E). A hybrid rights approach would also
help insulate informed consent measures from being challenged as reg-
ulations of conduct that only incidentally burden speech, thereby ensur-
ing a higher standard of review.
Advocating for intermediate scrutiny as the correct standard for
assessing abortion informed consent requirements necessitates ad-
dressing its consistency with Casey. The Fourth Circuit in Stuart of-
fered intermediate scrutiny as consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent but did not explain its rationale.175 Examined closely, consistency
with Casey is the main weakness of intermediate scrutiny. The problem
does not stem from the text;176 rather, one can legitimately argue that
the informed consent provisions upheld in Casey would flunk interme-
diate scrutiny. A state’s substantial interest in the potentiality of life is
clearly supported by Casey and Gonzales. This leaves only an inquiry
into the fit between this end and the means used in Casey. It is not clear
that requiring physicians to tell a woman the probable gestational age
of the fetus, and give her information regarding abortion alternatives,
are measures reasonably drawn to achieve that interest. Perhaps an
173 Under this reasoning, the reverse, a higher standard of review for assessing the infringe-
ment on the constitutional right to an abortion when physicians’ First Amendment rights are im-
plicated, would also be true. This argument proves more difficult, given that in the case of abortion
rights the Court has codified the standard of review into the constitutional test itself. One would
have to argue that the threshold of what constitutes an undue burden rises when physicians’ First
Amendment rights are involved. While not untenable, there is more room to make the argument
for a hybrid rights approach on the flip side, where the standard of review has not been set.
174 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (defin-
ing hybrid rights as a Free Exercise Clause claims in conjunction with another constitutional vio-
lation).
175 “[Casey] says nothing about the level of scrutiny courts should apply when reviewing a claim
that a regulation compelling speech in the abortion context violates physicians’ First Amendment
free speech rights . . . A heightened intermediate level of scrutiny is thus consistent with Supreme
Court precedent and appropriately recognizes the intersection here.” Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F. 3d
238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014).
176 As discussed in part B supra, while the word “reasonable” could be read to mean “rational,”
the Court makes this statement only after having already concluded the existence of a substantial
state interest and noting the tailoring of the regulation. Thus, the Court’s language in Casey does
not preclude intermediate scrutiny.
470 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
appropriate fit would only require that physicians offer to tell the ges-
tational age, and that the state raise awareness about abortion alterna-
tives through a general advertising campaign rather than through doc-
tors. One can thus argue that the Casey provisions overstep a state’s
interest and therefore would fail intermediate scrutiny review.
However, one can also plausibly argue that the Casey requirements
would withstand intermediate scrutiny review. In light of the weight
the Supreme Court has given to this particular state interest, the dis-
closure requirements in Casey seem minimally invasive and appropri-
ately tailored. To put it simply, this is a close call. However, given the
other reasons weighing in favor of intermediate scrutiny, a slightly pre-
carious relationship with Casey should not ultimately be disqualifying.
Rather, courts should use Casey as a helpful guide for framing their fit
inquiry. Regulations similar in kind to those in Casey, such as giving
the age of the fetus or offering printed materials describing alternative
options and support, can be seen as representative of the appropriate
balance between a state’s interest in potential life and the means it can
use to further it.
E. #MeToo Movement Supports Use of Intermediate Scrutiny
The context of #MeToo also supports the use of intermediate scru-
tiny for assessing informed consent regulations. When Casey replaced
Roe’s trimester system, it fundamentally altered the reproductive
rights of women. Casey’s undue burden standard has allowed states to
encumber pre-viability abortions through a wide range of regulations.
The laxity of the undue burden standard as a tool through which to at-
tack these increasingly severe state regulations has created a special
need for First Amendment claims in this context.
First Amendment claims to informed consent measures, however,
necessarily shift the focus from women to their doctors. The relevant
constitutional harm is no longer the burden on the woman, but rather
the infringement on her doctor. Particularly in the context of #MeToo,
this should give us pause. The #MeToo movement has shone a bright
and harsh light on the prevalence of sexual violence and harassment
against women. While sexual harassment is a critical issue, #MeToo
also goes beyond this. At its core, it speaks to our culture’s historic and
deeply-rooted disregard of women’s agency in all aspects of life, from
the bedroom, to the boardroom, to the street. The Court in Casey
acknowledged that the right to an abortion is justified in part by “the
right to physical autonomy.”177 We should consider the laws discussed
earlier in this light. Giving a woman false information that abortion
177 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
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increases her suicide risk tells her that the state knows her better than
she knows herself. Forcing her to endure an invasive medical procedure
solely to show her images of the pregnancy she came to the doctor to
terminate implies that she does not fully know what she is doing.
This harm is lost, though, when framing the legal issue under the
First Amendment. This is not to question the exigency of free speech
concerns. However, the informed consent laws considered in this Com-
ment were designed, above all, to impact women seeking abortions, not
their doctors. By focusing on physicians, we surrender the interests of
women to those of others.178 This denies women agency in yet another
arena where it has been historically neglected: the courtroom. Particu-
larly in the era of #MeToo, we shouldn’t lose sight of this quiet injustice.
The undue burden test does not adequately protect women’s agency
and autonomy when seeking an abortion. Free speech challenges to
abortion informed consent measures offer a second-best tool with which
to attack invasive regulations. Assessing these regulations through in-
termediate scrutiny allows courts to consider how a state has tailored a
regulation and its effect on the listener. In this inquiry, there is room to
consider a regulation’s impact on women. Therefore, adopting interme-
diate scrutiny as the standard of review for informed consent measures
does some work toward remedying the harm done by the First Amend-
ment framing of this issue.
CONCLUSION
In crafting the undue burden standard in Casey, the Supreme
Court carefully weighed the rights of women and the rights of the state.
The rights of physicians, however, received no such measured consider-
ation. Reading Casey as exempting abortion informed consent provi-
sions from First Amendment challenge bends reason to the breaking
point. Casey does not foreclose these challenges, nor does it offer a pre-
cise standard with which to review them. Intermediate scrutiny is the
only standard that appropriately handles the conflicting interests at the
heart of abortion informed consent regulations, particularly in the era
of #MeToo.
178 Admittedly, many physicians are female. However, this does not negate the harm in a shift
from an entirely female category—women seeking abortions—to a category that, while inclusive
of women, also includes men. Moreover, the necessity of obtaining an abortion for the women seek-




Breaking the Bank: Split Interpretations of the
Bank Acts in the Era of #MeToo
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE BANK ACTS
Many conflicts exist between state anti-discrimination laws and
federal banking statutes. Traditionally, federal law provided certain
banks carte blanche to terminate qualifying employees at will, or “at
pleasure.”1 But some federal courts now afford state law protections to
these discharged employees through a more nuanced interpretation of
federal law.2 Today, those courts find that banks do not have an abso-
lute right to fire employees “at pleasure” if the firing violates a state
anti-discrimination law. Consequently, their interpretations conflict
with the interpretations of circuits that hold that federal law provides
certain banks the absolute right to dismiss qualifying personnel “at
pleasure,” subject only to federal law.3
Three different statutes encompass the “Bank Acts”: the National
Bank Act,4 the Federal Reserve Act,5 and the Federal Home Loan Bank
† B.P.A. 2015, The University of Texas at San Antonio; J.D. Candidate, The University of
Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Professor Daniel Hemel for his advice, guidance, and
feedback. Additionally, I would like to thank the past and present staff and board of The University
of Chicago Legal Forum, as well as my fiancé, Tara Haugvoll, for their support.
1 This Comment uses the terms “at will” and “at pleasure” synonymously. See Wiersum v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 492 (11th Cir. 2015) (“At pleasure” was utilized by Congress to
mean “only that Bank officers are ‘at will’ employees, as opposed to ‘term’ employees.”).
2 See Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006); Kroske v. U.S. Bank
Corp., 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005); Morris v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:12-cv-281-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3950 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 10, 2013); Risinger v. HNB Corp., No. 10-2640-KHV/KMH, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 148560 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2011); Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645
F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa 2009); Crowe v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, No. 4:08CV1057 HEA,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3427 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009); James v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 471 F.
Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995); Booth v. Old Nat’l Bank, 900 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. W. Va.
1995); Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 835 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
3 See Wiersum, 785 F.3d 483; Schweikert v. Bank of Am., N.A., 521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008);
Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987).
4 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq. (2012).
5 12 U.S.C. §§ 221 et seq. (2012).
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Act.6 Each of the Bank Acts contains different requirements for govern-
ance. For example, to be governed by the National Bank Act, a bank
must include the word “National” in its title and must be certified as a
national banking institution by the comptroller of the currency.7 The
Federal Reserve Act binds all twelve of the United States Federal Re-
serve Banks.8 And the Federal Home Loan Bank Act governs the eleven
banks supervised by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.9
The Bank Acts all contain similar language within what is known
as their “at-pleasure” provisions,10 and thus, courts often apply juris-
prudence regarding one Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision interchange-
ably with the same provision of another Bank Act.11 These provisions
allow a bank’s board of directors governed by one of the Bank Acts to
dismiss certain personnel for whatever reason the board sees fit,12 and
for the most part, without any legal consequence.13 Under the National
6 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421 et seq. (2012).
7 12 U.S.C. § 35.
8 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522.
9 12 U.S.C. § 1442a.
10 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 24 (A national banking association “shall have power . . . [t]o elect or
appoint directors, and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and
other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such
officers or any of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.”) with 12 U.S.C. § 341
(“[A] Federal reserve bank . . . shall have power . . . to appoint by its board of directors a president,
vice presidents, and such officers and employees as are not otherwise provided in this Act, to define
their duties, require bonds for them and fix the penalty thereof, and to dismiss at pleasure such
officers or employees.”).
11 Schweikert v. Bank of Am., N.A., 521 F.3d 285, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he at-pleasure pro-
visions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act . . . and the Federal Reserve Act . . . have [been] inter-
preted [ ] consistently with each other and with the at pleasure clause of the [National Bank Act].”);
Stone v. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 92-cv-211, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7927, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. June 6,
1996) (“[T]he ‘dismissal at pleasure’ language is nearly identical in all of these federal bank acts.
Thus, plaintiff cannot avoid [the application of] other cases . . . [because] the employers therein
were not banks organized under the National Bank Act.”); Farmer v. Nat’l City Corp., c-2-94-966,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21478, at *20–21 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 1995) (finding the “at pleasure” lan-
guage of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, the Federal Reserve Act, and the National Bank Act
are identical).
12 This dismissal power extends to other employees in some contexts. Porter Wright, Nat’l
Bank Act May Preempt Certain Bank Officer Employment Claims, EMPLOYER LAW REPORT (Nov.
12, 2008), https://www.employerlawreport.com/2008/11/articles/eeo/national-bank-act-may-preem
pt-certain-bank-officer-employment-claims/ [https://perma.cc/L2XT-PVKN]; see also Schweikert,
521 F.3d at 290 (“We hold that ratification by a board of directors of a termination is sufficient to
invoke the preemptive effect of the at-pleasure provision of the [National Bank Act].”). Contra
Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 811 P.2d 1025, 1032–33, 1036 (Cal. 1991) (“Board action of
many kinds is often ratification of recommendations by senior management. But the board re-
mains responsible for performing its statutory and other functions . . . If [the National Bank Act]
unreasonably requires such a function to be carried out by a bank’s board, the remedy lies with
Congress, not with this court.”).
13 Kemper v. First Nat’l Bank, 418 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“The provision for
dismissal of officers at the pleasure of the board of directors has been construed consistently to
allow a national bank to discharge an officer without liability.”); see also Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l
Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 524–25 (9th Cir. 1989); Kozlowsky v. Westminster Nat’l Bank, 6 Cal. App. 3d
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Bank Act, these employees include presidents, vice presidents, and
other officers of qualifying banks.14 The Federal Reserve Act extends
dismissal to additional employees.15 Moreover, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act allows for the “at-pleasure” dismissal of attorneys and
agents.16 Today, in the era of #MeToo, an interesting question is
whether a board’s power to dismiss personnel at will preempts state
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex or other personal
characteristics.17
This Comment argues that the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions
preempt all contradictory state laws.18 However, the Bank Acts should
be amended to allow plaintiffs to bring state law discrimination claims
that parallel—or exactly match—their federal counterparts. Part II of
the Comment explores the origin and purpose of the “at-pleasure” pro-
vision. Part III provides a quick overview of anti-discrimination provi-
sions and their applications and interactions with at-will employment.
Part IV discusses the Supremacy Clause and the preemption doctrine
as lenses through which to view this issue. Part V dives into the inter-
section of state law claims and the supremacy of the Bank Acts. Part VI
discusses solutions to discrimination in the era of #MeToo when feder-
alism preempts state law anti-discrimination provisions.
II. THEORIGIN OF THE “AT-PLEASURE” PROVISION
The “at-pleasure” provision was first introduced in 1863 as part of
the National Currency Act.19 Congress left “no record of any discussion
of [the ‘at-pleasure’ provision], or of any specific purpose or motive it
593, 596–97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); First Nat’l Bank of Colquitt v. Miller, 98 S.E. 402, 404–05 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1919); Copeland v. Melrose Nat’l Bank, 229 A.D. 311, 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930), aff’d, 173
N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1930); Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118, 122–23 (8th Cir. 1896).
14 12 U.S.C. § 341.
15 See Little v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 601 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(determining the Federal Reserve Bank could fire a security guard at pleasure under the Federal
Reserve Act); Obradovich v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 569 F. Supp. 785, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that a painter whose duties did “not seem essential to the Federal Reserve’s discharge of
its financial responsibilities” could be dismissed at pleasure).
16 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (2012).
17 See, e.g., Boesch v. Champaign Nat’l Bank, 2008 Ohio 3282 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (finding a
bank officer’s gender discrimination claim brought under state law was preempted by the NBA).
18 Courts interpreting the “at pleasure” language in the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal
Home Loan Act look to the interpretation of the National Bank Act’s nearly identical provision to
identify the preemptive scope of all three federal banking act provisions. See, e.g., Fasano, 457
F.3d at 286–87. This interpretative method is supported by congressional intent. Decades after the
National Bank Act, when enacting the Federal Reserve Act, Congress specified that the purpose
of the “at-pleasure” provision was “precisely analogous to those of the national banks.” H.R. REP.
NO. 63-69 (1913).
19 Act of Feb. 25, 1863 ch. 58, § 11, 12 Stat. 665, 668 (1863).
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might have had in enacting it.”20 Yet as courts21 and commentators22
have noted, historical context suggests that the provision served a
“quite narrow” purpose.23 Its purpose is likely derivative of the National
Currency Act’s purpose, which some have argued Congress passed to:
(1) develop a national currency; (2) create a federal bond market to fi-
nance the Civil War; and (3) establish a nationally governed depository
for government funds.24 But the oldest commentator argues that the
National Currency Act, subsequently the National Bank Act once
amended in 1864,25 was passed “to create a market for loans of the gen-
eral government” and to facilitate the “issu[ance] and circulation of a
currency based upon the credit of the government.”26 Although state
bank notes are obsolete today—long ago replaced by federal currency—
federal banks faced fierce competition from state banks during the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century.27 Congress appeared “solicitous of
the new national banks, their competitiveness, and ultimately, the sys-
tem’s survival,”28 going as far as to enact a ten percent tax on all bank
notes issued by state-chartered banks in an effort to make national
banks competitive.29 The tax proved so successful that it was later con-
sidered to have taxed the state banks out of existence.30
Although the congressional record lacks any discussion of the Na-
tional Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision, some courts argue that Con-
gress intended it “to place the fullest responsibility upon the directors
20 Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
21 Id.
22 Miriam Jacks Achtenberg, Rereading the Nat’l Bank Act’s ‘At Pleasure’ Provision: Preserv-
ing the Civil Rights of Thousands of Bank Employees, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 172 (2008).
23 Goonan, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (interpreting the Federal Reserve Act’s identical language).
24 Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 176; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking Sys.,
53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Historical
Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 699 (1983); CHARLES THEODORE BOONE, THE LAW OF
BANKS AND BANKING 290 (1892).
25 Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 88, 101 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq.)
(“[A] national banking association . . . shall have power . . . to elect or appoint directors, and by its
board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other officers, define their
duties, required bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at
pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.”).
26 BOONE, supra note 24, at 290.
27 See Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 412 (1873) (describing the National
Bank Act’s pro-competitive policies); M.B.W. Sinclair, Employment at Pleasure: An Idea Whose
Time Has Passed, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 531, 533 (1991).
28 Sinclair, supra note 27, at 533.
29 Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 93, 146 (1866); see also Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869) (upholding the constitutionality of the tax).
30 BOONE, supra note 24, at 290 (quoting Tiffany, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 413) (“Much has ac-
cordingly been done to insure their national banks’ taking the place of state banks. The latter, it
is said, ‘have been substantially taxed out of existence.’”).
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[of national banks] by giving them the right to discharge [ ] officers at
pleasure.”31 Specifically, “the power to dismiss bank officers at will re-
flects the constitutional mandate to establish an independent national
system in order to maintain the stability of, and promote the welfare of,
the national banks.”32 Furthermore, it empowers banks to immediately
remove questionable individuals on the basis that a strong public image
is important to a bank’s prosperity.33 Although simple,34 this argument
is nevertheless valid. Because banks profit by caring for their custom-
ers’ money, untrusting customers will withdraw that money, and the
banks’ prosperity will leave with it.35 While national banks no longer
need a competitive advantage over state banks, customers simply will
not deposit money in institutions they do not trust. Whether that trust
is lost by a bank officer’s actual misbehavior, mismanagement, or by
some fiction, the same result occurs: less money is deposited and less
prosperity is achieved. Federal deposit insurance may mitigate the ef-
fects of untrusting customers; however, it likely cannot eliminate their
fears altogether.36
Their effectiveness aside, the “at-pleasure” provisions remain
largely untouched since their enactments and continue to serve their
alleged purpose.37 Yet, lacking other evidence and left with this broad
purpose, some courts interpret the provisions according to their more
tailored views. Until relatively recently, courts truly and consistently
upheld a bank’s right to discharge its officers “at pleasure.” But in the
31 Copeland v. Melrose Nat’l Bank, 229 A.D. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930), aff’d, 173 N.E. 898
(N.Y. 1930). But see Note, Statutory Provision for Removal of Corporate Officer “At Pleasure”, 50
HARV. L. REV. 518, 520 (1937) (characterizing Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118 (8th Cir.
1896), similar interpretation of the purpose of the “at-pleasure” provision as “conjecture”).
32 Alegria v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 723 P.2d 858, 860 (Idaho 1986) (citing Westervelt, 76 F.
at 122).
33 See Westervelt, 76 F. at 122 (“Observation and experience alike teach that it is essential to
the safety and prosperity of banking institutions that the active officers, to whose integrity and
discretion the moneys and property of the bank and its customers are instructed, should be subject
to immediate removal whenever the suspicion of faithlessness or negligence attaches to them. High
credit is indispensable to the success and prosperity of a bank.”); Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank,
867 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1989) (The purpose of the provision is to give national banks “the
greatest latitude possible to hire and fire their chief operating officers, in order to maintain the
public trust.”).
34 Sinclair, supra note 27, at 534.
35 Id.
36 For example, because federal deposit insurance insures up to $250,000, adjusted for infla-
tion, a person with funds exceeding $250,000 may choose to place that money elsewhere. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821 (2012). Moreover, 27 percent of millennials think Bitcoin is more trustworthy than incum-
bent banks, such as JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs. Blockchain Capital,
Bitcoin Survey Fall 2017, http://www.survey.blockchain.capital/#1509374164943-0459e9
29-976e [https://perma.cc/V2F2-MQWX].
37 See Westervelt, 76 F. at 122 (“to provide for [the lack of public confidence in a bank officer]”).
Remember, courts interpret the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions analogously. See Fasano v.
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274, 286–87 (3d Cir. 2006).
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era of #MeToo and other anti-discriminatory movements, courts might
view the “at-pleasure” provisions from a different perspective.
III. EMPLOYMENT “AT PLEASURE” AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
PROVISIONS
Traditionally, at-will,38 or “at-pleasure,”39 employment barred a
“claim of entitlement to continued employment enforceable against the
employers.”40 However, the Supreme Court has upheld some re-
strictions on these employment relationships.41 Various state laws have
forbidden employment discrimination since the 1940s, and similar fed-
eral statutes have done so since the 1960s.42 Today, federal statutory
restrictions prohibit discrimination on the basis of age,43 physical disa-
bility,44 “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”45 wage garnish-
ment,46 “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,”47 mili-
tary status,48 jury duty,49 and a myriad of other classifications50 that
limit an employer’s ability to fire an employee at will. Many of these
federal anti-discrimination statutes contain express anti-preemption
provisions that preserve parallel state laws and remedies.51 Yet no such
provision exists in any of the three Bank Acts. Consequently, courts of-
ten struggle to properly apply the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions.
While “[a]ll courts recognize that, to the extent that the federal banking
38 Black’s Law Dictionary, (11th ed. 2019), available atWestlaw BLACKS (“Employment that
is usu. undertaken without a contract and that may be terminated at any time, by either the em-
ployer or the employee, without cause.”).
39 “That Congress used the term ‘at pleasure’ instead of ‘at will’ in the National Bank Act is
not surprising. The term ‘at will’ would not be employed for more than a decade after Congress
passed the National Bank Act.” Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 172.
40 Cherin v. Lyng, 874 F.2d 501, 504 (8th Cir. 1989).
41 See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding a federal
restriction on employment at will that sought to balance the relationship between employers and
employees).
42 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 12, 1945, ch. 118, 1945 N.Y. Laws 457; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-353, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
43 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2012).
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2012).
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2012).
46 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2012).
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
48 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012).
49 28 U.S.C. § 1975 (2012).
50 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012) (protecting employees under the Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3608
(2012) (providing employee protection in asbestos actions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997d (2012) (providing
protection to employees reporting the mistreatment of an institutionalized person).
51 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.
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acts conflict with subsequently enacted anti-discrimination laws, sub-
sequent federal anti-discrimination law must prevail,”52 courts often
split with one another when attempting to simultaneously apply the
“at-pleasure” provisions and state anti-discrimination statutes.
IV. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE PREEMPTIONDOCTRINE
National State Bank v. Long53 explains that “whatever may be the
history of federal-state relations in other fields, regulation of banking
has been one of dual control since the passage of the National Bank Act
in 1863.”54 Still, since as early as 1819, the Supreme Court has main-
tained that nationally chartered banks are federal instrumentalities
entitled to regulate themselves without state interference.55 State laws
only apply to a bank governed by the Bank Acts insofar as the laws do
not “infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on
the performance of the bank’s functions.”56 Therefore, otherwise valid
state law discrimination claims must be dismissed if they conflict with
the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions. Nevertheless, because courts
exercise substantial discretion in determining whether a state and fed-
eral law conflict, and consequently, whether a federal law preempts a
state law, some state law discrimination claims proceed despite being
barred by the “at-pleasure” provisions.
Federal preemption, read from the Supremacy Clause of the Con-
stitution,57 requires reviewing courts to examine congressional intent58
and the “purpose of the disputed federal statute.”59 Preemption exists
in three different forms: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption;
and (3) conflict preemption.60 First, express preemption occurs when
Congress explicitly defines the “extent to which its enactments pre-
empt state law.”61 An explicit congressional preemption of state laws
52 Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 167 (emphasis in original).
53 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980).
54 Id. at 985.
55 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819).
56 Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944); see also Barnett Bank, N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (“Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair signifi-
cantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted. To say this is not to deprive States
of the power to regulate national banks, where (unlike here) doing so does not prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of power.”); Aalgaard v. Merch. Nat’l Bank, Inc.,
224 Cal. App. 3d 674, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
57 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land.”).
58 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990); Aalgaard, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 686.
59 Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
60 Peatros v. Bank of Am. NT & SA, 990 P.2d 539, 542–43 (Cal. 2000).
61 Id.
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that regulate banks is a rare occurrence.62 The “at-pleasure” provisions
do not expressly preempt state anti-discrimination laws and courts are
generally left to determine the proper boundaries and application of fed-
eral and state laws.63
Second, field preemption occurs when a state law “regulates con-
duct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to oc-
cupy exclusively.”64 Congressional “intent may be inferred from a
‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ or
where an Act of Congress ‘touches a field in which the federal interest
is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude en-
forcement of state laws on the same subject.’”65 In 1869, the Supreme
Court noted that national banks were “subject to the laws of the State
and are governed in their daily course of business far more than the
laws of the State than of the Nation.”66 Since then, it has generally been
accepted that the Bank Acts do not employ field preemption.67 Conse-
quently, courts recognize the “historic dual regulation of banks by state
and federal law.”68
Third, conflict preemption occurs when a state law “actually con-
flicts” with a federal law.69 The Supreme Court recognizes that “‘federal
62 See Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (“In only a few instances has
Congress explicitly preempted state regulations of national banks. More commonly, it has been
left to the courts to delineate the proper boundaries of federal and state supervision.”).
63 See id.; Goonan, 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 491 (2013) (“The [Federal Reserve Act] contains no
such express preemption clause and does not, by its plain language terms, speak to state-antidis-
crimination laws.”); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000); see also, e.g., Cham-
ber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594–95 (2011).
64 Peatros, 990 P.2d at 542; see also Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25,
31 (1996); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990).
65 English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
66 First Nat’l Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1869).
67 Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995) (“[A] state may attempt to affect the conduct of [national] bank officials so
long as the exercise of their authority does not conflict with, or frustrate the purposes of federal
law or impair the efficiency of banks to perform their statutory duties.”); see alsoWells Fargo Bank
N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Since shortly after the Bank Act was enacted
in 1864, the Supreme Court has oft reiterated that federal substantive authority over national
banks is not exclusive.”).
68 Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Nat’l State Bank v.
Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Whatever may be the history of federal-state relations in
other fields, regulation of banking has been one of dual control since the passage of the first Na-
tional Bank Act.”); Idaho v. Sec. Pac. Bank, 800 F. Supp. 922, 925 (D. Idaho 1992) (“It is clear that
Congress has not completely preempted the entire banking field.”).
69 Peatros, 990 P.2d at 542–43; see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000) (Con-
flict preemption “occurs when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objective of Congress.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted
if that law actually conflicts with federal law[.]”).
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law may be in irreconcilable conflict with state law,’ such that ‘[c]ompli-
ance with both statutes’ results in a ‘physical impossibility,’ and
caus[es] the state law to stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”70 The
Bank Acts neither employ express preemption nor exclusively occupy
the field of banking regulation; consequently, conflict preemption must
apply, voiding state laws “if they conflict with federal law, frustrate the
purposes of[,] . . . or impair the efficiency of national banks to discharge
their duties.”71
V. THE INTERSECTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS AND THE SUPREMACY
OF THE BANK ACTS
Plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination often pursue claims
under both state and federal law. Federal circuit courts—as well as
many federal district courts—are split concerning whether the Bank
Acts preempt state anti-discrimination laws.72 While similarities often
exist between federal and state anti-discrimination laws, the laws are
not always identical. These differences often result in drastically differ-
ent outcomes for plaintiffs depending on the location where a cause of
action arises. Consequently, if a uniform preemption application is to
be applied, the Supreme Court will need to clarify the extent to which
the “at-pleasure” provisions preempt contradictory state laws.
If the “at-pleasure” provisions are read according to their plain
text,73 then it follows that the Bank Acts preempt all state law discrim-
ination claims. Despite this, not all courts adopt such a textualist
70 Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 491 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Barnett Bank,
N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996)); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982).
71 Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 561 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Barnett Bank, 517
U.S. at 33–37 (holding that a federal statute granting national banks authority to sell insurance
conflicts with, and therefore preempts, state laws forbidding national banks from selling insur-
ance); Franklin Nat’l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 377–79 (1954) (determining that the power
of national banks to receive deposits conflicts with, and therefore preempts, a state statue prohib-
iting the use of the word “savings” in banking advertisements); Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett,
321 U.S. 233, 248–49 (1944) (holding that a state law allowing the transfer of abandoned bank
deposits was not preempted because “national banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws
infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on them”).
72 See, e.g., Morris v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:12-cv-281-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950 (E.D. Ark.
Jan. 10, 2013); Risinger v. HNB Corp., No. 10-2640-KHV/KMH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148560 (D.
Kan. Dec. 21, 2011); Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645 F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa
2009); Crowe v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, No. 4:08CV1057 HEA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3427
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009); James v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 471 F. Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007);
Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 3, 1995); Booth v. Old Nat’l Bank, 900 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. W. Va. 1995); Moodie v. Fed. Re-
serve Bank of N.Y., 835 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
73 See Kemper v. First Nat’l Bank in Newton, 418 N.E.2d 819, 171–72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(“[T]he words “dismiss * * * at pleasure” should be taken to signify exactly that, as courts in many
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view.74 The circuits take one of three approaches: (1) total preemption;
(2) retail preemption; and (3) wholesale preemption.75 The Fourth,
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the total preemption approach.76
Total preemption requires that the “at-pleasure” provisions preempt
contradictory state laws without question, even if the state statutes are
consistent with federal law.77 The Ninth Circuit follows the retail
preemption approach.78 Retail preemption requires that a federal law
preempt a state law only to “the minimum extent necessary,” as long as
the state law “substantively mirrors” the federal law.79 Finally, the
Third Circuit follows the wholesale preemption approach.80 Wholesale
preemption requires that federal laws preempt state laws that do not
“exactly match” their federal counterparts; that is, the discrimination
causes of actions and remedies under state law must be exactly the
same as those allowed for under federal law.81
Moreover, numerous federal district courts in circuits that have not
addressed the preemption issues of the Bank Acts fall within those cat-
egories. It is important to note these district court rulings because those
rulings may indicate which preemption theory a circuit court will em-
ploy. For example, in Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,82
the Third Circuit “count[ed] [itself] fortunate to have the benefit of a
very well-reasoned opinion of Judge Padova of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania”83 from Evans v. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.84
jurisdictions have said for over a century.”).
74 See generally Kroske, 432 F.3d 976; Morris, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950; Ewing, 645 F.
Supp. 2d 707; James, 471 F. Supp. 2d 226; Lambright v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., No.
C074340CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91075 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007);Moodie, 835 F. Supp. 751.
75 Another approach, proposed by three dissenting justices of the Supreme Court of California,
strongly suggests that later-enacted federal anti-discrimination regulations do not impliedly
amend the Federal Reserve Act. This would immunize the Federal Reserve Banks from any liabil-
ity under Title VII, the American with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and other federal anti-discrimination statutes. No federal courts have adopted this approach.
See Peatros, 990 P.2d 539, 183–89 (Brown, J., dissenting).
76 SeeWiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015); Schweikert v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008); Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th
Cir. 1987).
77 See Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]otal preemp-
tion holdings suggest that any state-created limitation on the bank’s power would fundamentally,
and irreconcilably, conflict with Congress’s intent to grant total, unlimited discretion.”) (emphasis
in original).
78 See Kroske, 432 F.3d 976 (2005).
79 Id. at 986–87.
80 See Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006).
81 Id. at 274.
82 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006).
83 Id. at 287.
84 No. 03-4975, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2004).
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Thus, district court decisions occasionally predict how an undecided cir-
cuit might resolve preemption or provide a roadmap for a circuit court
that has not considered the issue.
A. Total Preemption (Followed by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits)
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the
Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions completely forbid state law prohibi-
tions that limit a qualifying bank’s ability to discharge certain person-
nel. In Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,85 one of the
older cases concerning the Bank Acts’ preemption of state law, the Sixth
Circuit determined that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provi-
sion preempted state law discrimination claims.86 Plaintiff Ana Leon T.,
a woman of Colombian origin and former employee of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago, filed an action under both Title VII and Michi-
gan’s Elliott-Larsen Act87 for wrongful discharge based on her national
origin.88 With little analysis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Fed-
eral Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision prevented a bank employee
from stating a claim under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act, a statute pro-
hibiting employers from discriminating against employees on the basis
of national origin.89 Despite its lack of analysis, the Sixth Circuit ruled
broadly: the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision “preempts
any state-created employment right to the contrary.”90
The Ana Leon T. ruling was not met without criticism. For in-
stance, in Katsiavelos v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,91 the North-
ern District of Illinois criticized “[t]he Leon court [for] provid[ing] no
reasons or policy for its holding.”92 The Southern District of New York
refused to follow the decision because “the Sixth Circuit’s pronounce-
ment [in Ana Leon T.] gives no basis for its opinion and sets forth no
policy reasons for its holding.”93 Moreover, in White v. Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland,94 the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he Sixth
85 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987).
86 Id. at 931.
87 MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a) (2018).
88 See generally, Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 928.
89 MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a); Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 929–31.
90 Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 931 (emphasis added); accord Kispert v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of
Cincinnati, 778 F. Supp. 950, 952–53 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (determining the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempted a state claw claim for age discrimination).
91 No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995).
92 Id. at *6.
93 Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 831 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
94 660 N.E.2d 493 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
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Circuit . . . failed to engage in any analysis or state the basis of its deci-
sion.” Thus, the Ohio court “decline[d] to rely upon the holding in Ana
Leon T.”95 Despite these criticisms and the passage of nearly twenty
years, the Sixth Circuit has since reiterated its holding in Ana Leon T.
that the “at-pleasure” provision preempts all state law employment dis-
crimination claims.96 Similarly, before Ana Leon T., in Wiskotoni v.
Michigan National Bank-West,97 the Sixth Circuit observed that the
National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision “has consistently been con-
strued by both federal and state courts as preempting state law govern-
ing employment relations between a national bank and its officers and
depriving a national bank of the power to employ its officers other than
at pleasure.”98
Likewise, in Schweikert v. Bank of America, N.A.,99 the Fourth Cir-
cuit determined that the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision
preempted the state law claims before the court.100 Plaintiff Schweikert,
a bank officer, was terminated by his former employer’s board of direc-
tors for failing to cooperate with both internal and external investiga-
tions of the bank.101 Schweikert sued the Bank of America, alleging
wrongful or abusive discharge.102 Relying on the National Bank Act’s
“at-pleasure” provision, the district court dismissed Schweikert’s action
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.103 In its decision, the Fourth Circuit
noted that it previously interpreted the analogous “at-pleasure” provi-
sion of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act in a wrongful discharge action
based on state law.104 This precedent—Andrews v. Federal Home Loan
Bank of Atlanta105—concluded that “Congress intended for federal law
to define the discretion which the Bank may exercise in the discharge
of employees.”106 Any wrongful termination claim under state law
95 Id. at 495.
96 See Arrow v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 358 F.3d 392, 393 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[I]nasmuch
as Arrow was an employee of a Federal Reserve Bank, her rights under Kentucky state law were
preempted by federal law.”).
97 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
98 Id. at 387; accord Arrow, 358 F.3d at 394.
99 521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008).
100 Id. at 288–89; see also Citizens Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stockwell, 675 So. 2d 584, 586
(Fla. 1996) (Prior to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the “at-
pleasure” provision precludes any “limitation on the power of a bank to remove its officers” under
the National Bank Act).
101 Schweikert, 521 F.3d at 287.
102 Id.
103 See generally id.
104 Id. at 288 (citing Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Atl., 998 F.2d 214, 220 (4th Cir.
1993)).
105 998 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1993).
106 Id. at 220.
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“would plainly conflict with the discretion accorded the Bank by Con-
gress.”107 Consequently, and consistent with Andrews,108 the Fourth
Circuit held that “the at-pleasure provision of the National Bank Act
preempts state law claims for wrongful discharge.”109
Finally, in Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,110 a succinct opinion citing
Wiskotoni,111 the Eleventh Circuit joined the Sixth and Fourth Cir-
cuits.112 Plaintiff Wiersum alleged wrongful termination by U.S. Bank,
N.A. under the Florida Whistleblower Act113 for his discharge after he
objected to certain activities that he believed were unlawful and refused
to participate in them.114 After noting that several circuits, as well as
the Supreme Court of Florida, had found conflict preemption between
similar state laws and the Bank Acts, the Eleventh Circuit followed suit
in finding preemption without providing much reasoning of its own.115
Together, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits constitute the
three circuits that provide for the Bank Acts’ total preemption of state
law. The total preemption approach is alive and well, and its position
as the approach followed by the most circuits suggests it might be
adopted by other courts in the future that have yet to rule upon the
proper application of the “at-pleasure” provisions.
B. Retail Preemption (Followed by the Ninth Circuit)
In Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp.,116 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempts state
law, ultimately rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s “summary conclusion” in
Ana Leon T.117 Plaintiff Kroske, a bank officer, alleged that the bank
terminated her in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimi-
nation, a state law prohibiting age discrimination in employment.118
Although Kroske did not pursue a claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act,119 or any federal claim at all,120 the court concluded
107 Id.
108 998 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1993).
109 Schweikert, 521 F.3d at 288–89.
110 785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015).
111 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
112 Wiersum, 785 F.3d at 491.
113 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102(3) (2018).
114 Wiersum, 785 F.3d at 486.
115 Id. at 489–91.
116 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).
117 Id. at 980–89.
118 Id. at 978; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.010 et seq. (2018).
119 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2012).
120 The court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012); Kroske, 432 F.3d at 979.
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that the National Bank Act did not preempt her claim.121 Instead, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act impliedly amended the Na-
tional Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision to “the minimum extent nec-
essary” to resolve contradictory federal laws.122 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that because Kroske’s state law claim under the Washington
Law Against Discrimination “substantively mirrored” a federal claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the National Bank
Act did not preempt her state claim.123 Although the Ninth Circuit
failed to define its “substantively mirrors” standard, it explained that
“state law provisions prohibit[ing] termination on grounds more expan-
sive than the grounds set forth in federal law” remain preempted.124
While district courts in the Second Circuit have reached conflicting
decisions as to whether the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions preempt
state anti-discrimination law, they have more recently followed the re-
tail preemption approach. For example, in James v. Federal Reserve
Bank of New York,125 the Eastern District of New York adopted the Su-
preme Court of California’s retail preemption approach, concluding that
federal law preempts state law to the extent that the laws conflict, but
that federal law does not preempt state law to the extent that the laws
do not conflict.126 And as of yet, the Southern District of New York
seems to agree. In Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,127 the
court held that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision did not
preempt the New York State Human Rights Law because “Congress did
not intend the Federal Reserve Act to preempt state anti-discrimination
121 Kroske, 432 F.3d at 987, 988 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 102 (1983)
(noting that its “conclusion is buttressed by the ‘importance of state fair employment laws to the
federal enforcing scheme’” and that “parallel state anti-discrimination laws are explicitly made
part of the enforcement scheme of federal laws”)).
122 Id. at 986.
123 Id. at 987; see also Anderson v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 336 F.3d 924, 926 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (stat-
ing the Washington Law Against Discrimination “tracks federal law”); Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget
Sound, Inc., 753 P.2d 517, 520 (Wash. 1988) (holding that because the Washington Law Against
Discrimination “does not provide any criteria for establishing an age discrimination case,” Wash-
ington courts look to federal cases construing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
124 Kroske, 432 F.3d at 989. Beyond the “substantively mirrors” standard, at least one federal
district court in a circuit yet to rule on this issue, without citing any other court’s opinion on this
issue, determined that the “at-pleasure” provision of the National Banking Act does not preempt
a retaliatory discharge claim because public policy favors allowing such a claim. See Ruisinger v.
HNB Corp., No. 10-2640-KHV/KMH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148560, at *13 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2011)
(citing Sargent v. Cent. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 809 P.2d 1298, 1301–02 (Okla. 1991)).
125 471 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
126 James, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 236; see also Peatros v. Bank of Am., 990 P.2d 539, 553 (Cal.
2000) (“In a preemption case . . . state law is displaced only to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law. This rule [is] that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute
further than necessary to dispose of the case before it.” (citing Dalton v. Little Rock Family Plan-
ning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1995) (per curiam)).
127 835 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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laws that are consistent with federal anti-discrimination legislation.”128
Moreover, the court found that Title VII made no mention of exempting
qualifying bank personnel from the act’s requirements.129 Conse-
quently, the court reasoned that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
is subject to New York anti-discrimination laws to the extent that those
laws are analogous to federal law.130 The Southern District of New
York’s decision in Moodie backtracks on Osei-Bonsu v. Federal Home
Loan Bank of New York,131 an earlier decision from the same district.
There, the court held that a New York state human rights agency could
not pursue a state claim against a national bank because the Federal
Home Loan Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempted the cause of
action.132
Similarly, the Northern District of California determined that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corporation133 allows
courts to “limit relief for [a] Plaintiff’s [state law discrimination] claims
against Defendant [Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco] to that
which is available under Title VII.”134When adopting this approach, the
Southern District of Iowa described it as the “most consistent with the
law of conflict preemption.”135 And the Eastern District of Arkansas,
following Ewing v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines,136 noted
that “[t]he relevant inquiry is the variance” between the federal and
state anti-discrimination laws at issue, “and whether [the state law]
conflicts with [the federal law] such that all or part of [the state law] is
preempted.”137 To the Eastern District of Arkansas, such a conflict must
make a legal difference in the case,”138 which did not include “differing
statutes of limitation, exhaustion requirements, punitive damages
caps, and permissible liability against supervisors under Arkansas law
[but not federal law].”139 Despite such differences, the Eastern District
128 Moodie, 835 F. Supp. at 753.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 726 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
132 Id. at 98.
133 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).
134 Lambright v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., No. C074340CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91075,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007).
135 Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720 (S.D. Iowa 2009).
136 645 F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa 2009).
137 Morris v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:12-cv-281-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950, at *5 (E.D. Ark.
Jan. 10, 2013).
138 Id.
139 Id. at *6.
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of Arkansas characterized the state anti-discrimination law as a
“mere[] echo[] of Title VII.”140
In Katsiavelos v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,141 the Northern
District of Illinois held that the bank was subject to the Illinois Human
Rights Act,142 a statute containing anti-discrimination provisions mod-
eled after federal anti-discrimination law.143 The district court disa-
greed with the Sixth Circuit’s Ana Leon T. ruling, finding that the Fed-
eral Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempts only contractual
rights and not other, non-contractual federal or state rights in employ-
ment.144 In fact, the Northern District of Illinois criticized the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s Ana Leon T. decision, claiming that the ruling “provided no rea-
sons or policy for its holding that all state employment rights were pre-
empted by the dismiss at pleasure language.”145 In doing so, the North-
ern District of Illinois determined that “dismiss at pleasure is analogous
to dismiss at will, implying the absence of a contractual relationship
between employer and employee. The right to be free from discrimina-
tion is not a contractual right, and therefore is not necessarily embodied
in the dismiss at pleasure language.”146
C. Wholesale Preemption (Followed by the Third Circuit)
In Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,147 the Third Circuit
reasoned that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision en-
tirely148 preempts state laws that fail to “exactly match” their federal
counterparts.149 Plaintiff Fasano, pursuing claims under New Jersey
140 Id. at *7.
141 No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995).
142 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 (LEXIS 2018).
143 Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995).
144 Id. at *2; accord White v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 660 N.E.2d 493, 495 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (agreeing with Katsiavelos and holding that plaintiff’s state law claim of handicapped
discrimination was not preempted by the Federal Reserve Act).
145 Katsiavelos, No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603, at *2.
146 Id. Contra Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We hold
that the Federal Reserve Act precludes enforcement against a federal reserve bank of an employ-
ment contract that would compromise its statutory power to dismiss at pleasure, and prevents the
development of a reasonable expectation of continued employment.”).
147 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006).
148 Compare id. at 290 (“There is simply no way to give full effect to [ ] state laws while picking
and choosing which parts of them may apply.”) with Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.2d at 987–
88, 989 (holding that only actual inconsistencies in state laws are preempted rather than entire
provisions).
149 Fasano, 457 F.3d at 290; cf. Mele, 359 F.3d at 255 (previously holding the “at-pleasure”
provision of the Federal Reserve Act bars all contractual employment claims against a Federal
Reserve Bank; however, leaving unresolved whether preemption extends to statutory employment
claims).
473] BREAKING THE BANK 489
law, alleged she was fired by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in
retaliation for complaining about illegal activity and that the bank
failed to accommodate her disability.150 As it “wad[ed] into murky wa-
ters,” the Third Circuit explicitly rejected both the Sixth Circuit’s Ana
Leon T.151 approach and the substantive-mirror approach adopted by
the Ninth Circuit in Kroske.152 Developing its own, self-described “par-
tial preemption” approach, the Third Circuit requires that, to avoid
preemption, state laws must “exactly match” their federal counterparts
because the court will not “pare back” state law to match federal law.153
Ultimately, despite the fact that federal law and New Jersey law both
covered Fasano’s causes of action, because the courts had not identically
interpreted the remedies of Fasano’s state claims, her claims were
preempted in their entirety.154
Similarly, in Crowe v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,155 the
Eastern District of Missouri adopted the Third Circuit’s approach, de-
termining that “broad state employment laws cannot apply to the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks when those state laws prohibit those acts that are
incident to Federal Reserve Banks dismissing ‘at pleasure’ their em-
ployees, within the bounds of the [Americans with Disabilities Act.]”156
In doing so, the court dismissed a plaintiff’s claim that would have al-
lowed him to seek additional remedies under state law beyond those
allowed for under federal law.157
VI. FEDERALISM IN THE ERA OF #METOO
A “wide split in authority” exists158 and continues to grow with little
evidence that the Supreme Court will enter the fray.159 At one extreme,
the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that personnel dismissed
150 These claims respectively fall under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 et seq. (2018), and New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-1 et seq. (2018). Federal law prohibits retaliation against bank employees complaining of
illegal conduct. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(j) (2012). It also prohibits employers from discrimination on the
basis of disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2012).
151 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987).
152 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).
153 Fasano, 457 F.3d at 290.
154 Id.
155 No. 4:08CV1057 HEA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3427 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009)
156 Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157 Id. at *4.
158 Fasano, 457 F.3d at 279.
159 Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1655
(2016); Fasano, 457 F.3d 274, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 977 (2007); Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432
F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 822 (2006); Ana. Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987).
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“at pleasure” may only pursue federal law claims against a bank gov-
erned by the Bank Acts.160 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit holds that a
state anti-discrimination statute must “substantively mirror” federal
anti-discrimination law to avoid dismissal.161 And the Third Circuit
falls somewhere in between, requiring that the state regulation “exactly
match” federal law.162
The “starting presumption” is that Congress did not intend for fed-
eral law to preempt state law.163 Instead, any “[c]onsideration of issues
arising under the Supremacy Clause ‘start[s] with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
. . . [the] Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”164 And of course, no provision of the Bank Acts expressly
preempts state law. Moreover, courts consistently hold that federal law
does not “preempt the field” of state employment law.165 Consequently,
courts must rely on conflict preemption to resolve the preemption ques-
tion posed by an application of the Bank Acts.
Preemption is “fundamentally a question of congressional intent”
that requires statutory interpretation.166 As commentators have noted,
the National Bank Act, which the subsequent Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure”
language is modeled from, was passed “to create a market for loans of
the general government” and to facilitate the “issu[ance] and circulation
of a currency based upon the credit of the government.”167 But why Con-
gress included the “at-pleasure” provision in the National Bank Act re-
mains a mystery; Congress did not mention the provision in any rec-
orded debates.168
160 Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 491 (11th Cir. 2015); Schweikert v. Bank of Am.,
521 F.3d 285, 288–89 (4th Cir. 2008); Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 931.
161 Kroske, 432 F.3d at 987.
162 Fasano, 457 F.3d at 290.
163 N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654
(1995).
164 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
165 See, e.g., Nat’l State Bank, Elizabeth, N.J. v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[R]eg-
ulation of banking has been one of dual [federal and state] control since the passage of the National
Bank Act”).
166 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption
case.”).
167 BOONE, supra note 24, at 290.
168 See Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(noting that Congress left no record that it discussed the “at-pleasure” provision). The earliest
mention of the provision by courts occurred in 1896, over thirty years after the National Bank Act’s
passage. See generallyWestervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118 (1896).
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Considering the National Bank Act’s purpose at face value, that
purpose, or any other purpose alleged by commentators,169 does not ex-
pressly indicate an intent to preclude a plaintiff’s ability to pursue state
claims. One early source, written thirty years after the National Bank
Act’s passage, suggests the “at-pleasure” provision was purposed to pre-
vent banks from entering into fixed-term contracts to preserve their
ability to remove qualifying personnel who had lost the public’s trust.170
Assuming the “at-pleasure” provisions’ purpose is to protect public
trust, as many argue,171 permitting the Bank Acts to prohibit state law
sex discrimination claims, especially in the #MeToo era, arguably un-
dermines that purpose. And a bank’s ability to fire untrustworthy per-
sonnel is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by most state anti-discrimina-
tion regulations, as the bank remains subject to federal anti-
discrimination law.
Nonetheless, some courts are rightfully reluctant to tinker with the
“at-pleasure” provisions’ preemptive capabilities. As Evans articulated:
subjecting the federal reserve banks to state employment laws
and regulations which broaden the rights and remedies availa-
ble under federal law will subject the federal reserve banks, and
possibly their employees, to a myriad of different laws and reg-
ulations which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.172
Not only would doing so violate the plain text of the “at-pleasure”
provisions, but, if the provisions’ purpose to maintain public trust is to
be believed, it would frustrate the alleged intent of Congress “to allow
the [qualifying] banks the ‘greatest latitude possible’ in terminating
employees.”173 Furthermore, accidental frustration of purpose is not the
only reason courts should be reluctant to tinker with the provisions.
169 See Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 176; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking
Sys., 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Histor-
ical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 699 (1983).
170 See Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he purpose of the
[‘at-pleasure’ dismissal] provision in the National Bank Act was to give those institutions the
greatest latitude possible to hire and fire their chief operating officers, in order to maintain the
public trust.”). Compare Westervelt, 76 F. at 122 (“High credit is indispensable to the success and
prosperity of a bank. Without it, customers cannot be induced to deposit their moneys. . . . In such
a case it is necessary . . . that the board of directors should have power to remove [ ] an officer, and
to put in his place another, in whom the community has confidence.”) with Statutory Provision for
Removal of Corporate Officer “At Pleasure”, supra note 31, at 520 (criticizing the purpose of the
“at-pleasure” provision articulated in Westervelt as “conjecture”).
171 Westervelt, 76 F. 118 at 122; see also Mackey, 867 F.2d at 526.
172 Evans v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., No. 03-4975, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265, at *17
(E.D. Pa. July 8, 2004).
173 Id. at *17–18 (citingMackey, 867 F.2d at 526); see also Talbott v. Silver Bow Cty., 139 U.S.
438, 35 (1891) (noting Congress designed the National Bank Act to create a national banking sys-
tem with “uniform operation”).
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When interpreting a statute, the “starting point must be the language
employed by Congress, and [the Court] assume[s] that the legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”174 By
this canon, “at pleasure,” with no qualifications, speaks for itself. Under
the provisions’ “straightforward statutory command, there is no reason
to resort to legislative history.”175 But even disregarding this canon, one
can only resort to legislative history to little avail since Congress left no
record of the “at-pleasure” provisions’ purpose.176
No court, and few judges,177 dispute that banks governed by the
Bank Acts are subject to Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and other federal anti-
discrimination statutes. Preemption only occurs where the federal and
state laws conflict so that it is “impossible . . . to comply with both”178 or
where state law stands as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives underlying the federal law.”179
Yet the Ninth Circuit takes this a step further, stating in Kroske that
“in the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary . . . Kroske’s
claim of age discrimination under the Washington Law Against Dis-
crimination is not preempted by [the National Bank Act], as limited by
the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act].”180
Surely the last-in-time rule181 amends the Bank Acts to the “mini-
mum extent necessary” to resolve any conflict with federal anti-discrim-
ination laws.182 However, the “minimum extent necessary” cannot logi-
cally include rights and remedies beyond those allowed for by federal
law. Repeal or amendment may only occur if “the two acts are in irrec-
oncilable conflict, or [if] the later statute covers the whole ground occu-
pied by the earlier and is clearly intended as a substitute for it.”183 The
“at-pleasure” provisions provide qualifying banks the absolute, unlim-
ited power to dismiss certain employees. Conversely, Title VII and other
federal anti-discrimination laws prohibit such banks from dismissing
174 Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (citations and internal quotationmarks
omitted).
175 United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there.”).
176 Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
177 See Peatros v. Bank of Am., 990 P.2d 539, 183–89 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, J., dissenting).
178 English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
179 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
180 432 F.3d 976, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 822 (2006).
181 See Doe v. Considine, 73 U.S. 458, 468 (1868) (“The rule applicable to the construction of
conflicting statutory provisions is, that the last in order of time . . . must take effect.”).
182 See Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2005).
183 Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 504 (1936).
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employees under certain conditions.184 Therefore, any unconditioned
right to dismiss granted by the “at-pleasure” provisions is made illegal.
That is, to the extent that federal anti-discrimination laws irreconcila-
bly conflict with the “at-pleasure” provisions, those laws impliedly
amend the Bank Acts to grant the qualifying banks “a limited power to
dismiss [qualifying personnel] at pleasure.”185
Despite any implied amendments, state causes of action remain
barred even though some federal statutes contain provisions known as
“saving clauses,” which preserve state laws.186 The “double saving
clause” argument holds that the “at-pleasure” provisions do not
preempt federal anti-discrimination laws containing saving provisions,
and in turn, those federal anti-discrimination laws do not preempt state
anti-discrimination laws.187 But the Supreme Court has dismissed such
reasoning.188 Federal laws containing a saving clause do not transform
state laws into federal laws that are saved from preemption.189 Further-
more, because Title VII and many other federal laws contain such non-
preemption provisions, applied to all state laws with which they do not
conflict, and taken to its logical extreme, the double saving clause argu-
ment would protect almost all state laws from preemption by the “at-
pleasure” provisions.190
As the Supreme Court explained, “[o]rdinarily, state causes of ac-
tion are not pre-empted solely because they impose liability over and
above that authorized by federal law.”191 Yet the “at-pleasure” provi-
sions remain plain, blanket prohibitions on state law to the contrary.192
184 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (forbidding certain types of discrimination on the basis of “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin”); see also, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2012); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101 et seq. (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2012); 38 U.S.C.
§ 4311 (2012).
185 Peatros, 990 P.2d at 549–50.
186 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7; California Fed. Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 288 (1964) (Title VII “assert[s] the intention of Congress to preserve existing civil rights laws.”
(quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2788 (1964) (statement of Rep. Meader)).
187 See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101 n.22 (1983).
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (“Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve
any person from any liability, duty penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law
of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require
or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title.”).
191 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 89 (1990).
192 The “double saving clause” argument, that the “at-pleasure” provision does not preempt
federal anti-discrimination law, and federal anti-discrimination law does not preempt state anti-
discrimination laws, has been described a simplistic. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101
n.22 (1983). For example, Title VII does not transform state laws into federal laws that are saved
from preemption. See id. Furthermore, because Title VII’s saving clause applies to all state laws
with which it is not in conflict, and since many federal laws contain non-preemption provisions,
the double saving clause argument, taken to its logical extreme would save almost all state laws
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Thus, as observed by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, the “at-
pleasure” provisions preempt any state anti-discrimination law that
contradicts them.193 Courts should not “rewrite the statute to reflect a
meaning” they “deem more desirable.”194 Under the retail approach,
courts fail to “give full effect to . . . state laws [by] picking and choosing
which parts of themmay apply,”195 and consequently, courts replace any
“absence of legislative intent” with their own.196 In Fasano v. Federal
Reserve Board of New York,197 the Third Circuit demonstrated the prob-
lems with such an approach:
For example . . . the [state law] does not require exhaustion of
administrative remedies; a plaintiff elects whether to proceed in
the administrative arena, or in court, but a final decision in ei-
ther forum is binding and renders the other forum unavailable.
Were we to graft the [Americans with Disabilities Act]’s exhaus-
tion requirement onto the [state law], we would transform for-
merly final, binding administrative determinations into non-
binding preliminaries to litigation. We will not step on the toes
of the New Jersey legislature in this or any other like manner.198
Not only does Kroske’s reasoning step on the toes of state legisla-
tures, it also disregards Congress’ intent—whatever it was—when en-
acting the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision, and its intent
when enacting subsequent Bank Acts that purposely and deliberately
borrowed that same language.199 Instead, by looking to the ordinary
meaning, courts can avoid “rewriting” state laws “to parrot Federal
anti-discrimination law” as occurs under the retail approach.200 Such
reasoning is not only faithful to the plain language, but also to Title VII
and other federal anti-discrimination laws, impliedly repealing the
Bank Acts only to the extent necessary to give effect to those laws, and
no further.
from pre-emption. Id.
193 See Crowe v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, No. 4:08CV1057 HEA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3427, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009) (“If preemption only applied to state laws that directly contra-
dict federal laws, federal laws could be effectively nullified by state laws prohibiting those acts
that are incident to, but not specifically authorized, by federal law.”) (internal quotations marks
omitted).
194 Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228 (2008).
195 457 F.3d 274, 290 (3d Cir. 2006).
196 See Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2005).
197 See generally Fasano, 457 F.3d 274.
198 Id.
199 See H.R. REP. NO. 63-69 (1913) (stating the purpose of the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleas-
ure” provision is the same as that of the National Bank Act).
200 Evans v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., No. 03-4975, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265, at *21
(E.D. Pa. July 8, 2004).
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Moreover, the total preemption approach allows for the efficient
administration and governance of qualifying banks because anti-dis-
crimination laws are then applied to them uniformly across the coun-
try.201 Conferring qualifying personnel different rights and remedies
“would frustrate the ability of the national banks to make crucial em-
ployment decisions, ultimately undermining confidence in the national
banking system.”202 While Congress’ original intent for including the
“at-pleasure” provision is unknown and relies on speculation, this effi-
ciency argument furthers the purpose of the National Bank Act, and
subsequent acts, as a whole by giving full effect to the language em-
ployed by Congress.
Adopting this approach—that the Bank Acts preempt all state laws
prohibiting the at-will dismissal of qualifying personnel—still demands
congressional action. Although Title VII affords plaintiffs alleging sex
discrimination a meaningful remedy, Congress should narrow the “at-
pleasure” provisions’ scope. In the era of #MeToo and other anti-dis-
criminatory movements, it would be wise to eliminate barriers to pur-
suing sex discrimination claims. Congress should proceed cautiously,
however, as undesirable consequences may accompany such duplicative
claims. For example, allowing for state law remedies to discrimination
may “dissuade[] employers from executing lawful and economically nec-
essary terminations” because such terminations might be characterized
as discriminatory “and could subject employers to more time-intensive
and expensive litigation.”203The Third Circuit’s approach, articulated in
Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,204 avoids such problems
because entities governed by the Bank Acts, while subject to both state
and federal anti-discrimination law, are subject to only one set of
claims: those arising under federal anti-discrimination law and state
anti-discrimination law to the extent that the state law “exactly
match[es]” the federal law.205 By adopting this approach, Congress
would neither unknowingly disturb any of the alleged purposes of the
Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions, nor would Congress fail to give
state laws their full effect by allowing courts to pick and choose which
various provisions of state laws to apply.206 This remains faithful to
Congress’ purpose for including the “at-pleasure” provisions in the
Bank Acts, while effectuating the purposes of state anti-discrimination
201 See Peatros v. Bank of Am., 990 P.2d 539, 562 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, J., dissenting).
202 Id.
203 Katherine R. Morelli, Note, A Misguided Reversal: Why the Okla. Supreme Court Should
Not Have Interpreted Saint v. Data Exchange, Inc. to Provide a Burk Tort Cause of Action to Plain-
tiffs Alleging Age Discrimination in Employment, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 329, 352 (Winter 2010).
204 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006).
205 Id. at 290.
206 See id.
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laws to the extent that they are consistent with federal law. Such an
approach bolsters anti-discrimination protections by expanding the
number of options207 available to those harmed while protecting Con-
gress’ purpose for including the “at-pleasure” provisions in the Bank
Acts and without butchering the intent of state legislatures.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits adopt the correct reading
and application of the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions.208 Their ap-
proach is not only true to the plain meaning of the provisions’ words,
but also to Congress’ purpose for including the provisions in the acts—
whatever that purpose may be.209 Moreover, their approach respects
legislative intent by giving full effect to state laws without picking and
choosing which portions of those laws should apply.
But in the #MeToo era, Congress need not settle for this interpre-
tation. Instead, Congress can remain faithful to both federal and state
legislative intent while strengthening anti-discrimination regulations.
To do so, Congress should adopt the Third Circuit’s wholesale preemp-
tion approach,210 providing that the Bank Acts do not preempt state
anti-discrimination laws to the extent that the state laws “exactly
match” federal laws.211 Such an approach does not remove the “at-pleas-
ure” provisions from law, leaving them to serve whatever purpose they
may. And in preserving the provisions, it bolsters plaintiffs’ ability to
seek anti-discrimination relief by providing them with matching state
law options to pursue. Consequently, the Third Circuit’s approach in-
creasingly deters qualifying banks from engaging in discrimination
while respecting the “at-pleasure” provisions’ purpose.
207 Such as bringing state law claims in state court.
208 SeeWiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015); Schweikert v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008); Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th
Cir. 1987).
209 See Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(finding “at-pleasure” provision is not mentioned in any congressional records).
210 See Fasano, 457 F.3d at 290.
211 Id.
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Antidiscrimination Statutes and Women-Only
Spaces in the #MeToo Era
Anna Porter†
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the #MeToo Movement, many organizations began
attempting to find creative ways to address the realities people who
identify as women face both at work and in public spaces.1 These organ-
izations often focus on closing the gender pay gap and increasing repre-
sentation in leadership, both indicators tied to sexual harassment in
the workplace.2 Although the organizations discussed below are open to
female-identifying and non-binary people, they exclude men.3 Organi-
zations argue that providing women-only events “offer forums for dis-
cussing discrimination, a haven for people who may feel excluded by the
dominant culture of broader professional groups, and career advance-
ment opportunities for demographics at a statistical disadvantage.”4
From co-working spaces to empowerment seminars to women-only
showings of Wonder Woman, the popularity of these spaces suggests
that women respond to the idea of having a space where they know they
† B.A. 2011, Bellarmine University; M.A. 2015, University of Florida; J.D. Candidate 2020,
The University of Chicago Law School. Many thanks to Professor Aziz Huq for his guidance and
feedback. I would also like to thank the past and present staff of The University of Chicago Legal
Forum for their support and comments.
1 Leigh Stringer, Where is the Demand for Women-Only Co-Working Spaces Coming From?,
SLATE (May 17, 2018), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/05/the-wing-demand-for-women-onl
y-co-working-spaces-is-high.html [https://perma.cc/S8MZ-H63Q].
2 See Jennifer Calfas, Inside Sexual Harassment’s Hidden Toll on Equal Pay, TIME (April 9,
2018), http://time.com/5227742/sexual-harassment-equal-pay-wage-gap; Karen Higginbottom, Th-
e Link Between Power and Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, FORBES (June 11, 2018), https://w
ww.forbes.com/sites/karenhigginbottom/2018/06/11/the-link-between-power-and-sexual-harassm
ent-in-the-workplace/#487cd27b190f [https://perma.cc/8R9D-3HA8].
3 In discussing women-only spaces, this Comment is not referring to events held by Trans-
Exclusionary Radical Feminists.
4 Christina Cauterucci,Members of a Men’s Rights Group Sued a Women’s Networking Group
for Sex Discrimination, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2016), https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/01/members-
of-a-men-s-rights-group-sued-a-women-s-networking-group-for-sex-discrimination.html [https://p
erma.cc/RZZ8-GXFU].
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will only be surrounded by other women.5 However, because these ini-
tiatives are by nature segregated by gender (excluding men), they risk
coming into contact with state antidiscrimination statutes.6 For this
reason, many of these organizations have recently come under fire by
men bringing charges of discrimination.7
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which addresses discrimina-
tion in public accommodations, does not include sex or gender as a pro-
tected category.8 Because there is no national standard with respect to
sex discrimination in public accommodations, plaintiffs rely on state
statutes in the majority of these cases.9 The amount of protection af-
forded by various states changes depending upon “legislative defini-
tions and judicial interpretations of what constitutes a public accommo-
dation.”10 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act is one example of an
expansive antidiscrimination statute.11 Enacted by the California legis-
lature in 1959 as an amendment to the Civil Code, the Unruh Civil
Rights Act prohibits California businesses from discriminating based
on protected characteristics.12 Sex was added as a protected character-
istic through a 1974 amendment to the law.13
While the tension between sex-segregated spaces and laws prohib-
iting discrimination is not new, in the past the vast majority of these
lawsuits targeted men-only organizations (and laws prohibiting it envi-
sionedmen-only organizations discriminating against women).14 Today,
male plaintiffs in California suing women’s organizations for sex dis-
crimination argue that these cases should not be treated any differently
than other cases of discrimination brought under the Unruh Act.15 The
5 Stringer, supra note 1.
6 Rebecca Gale,When Men Sue Women’s Empowerment Orgs for Gender Discrimination, SLA-
TE (July 3, 2018), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/07/men-are-suing-womens-empowerment
-organizations-for-gender-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/EGB8-W7VA].
7 Id.
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
9 Jessica E. Rank, Is Ladies’ Night Really Sex Discrimination?: Public Accommodation Laws,
De Minimis Exceptions, and Stigmatic Injury, 36 SETONHALL L. REV. 223, 225 (2005). This Com-
ment refers to sex discrimination, rather than gender discrimination, in keeping with the way
legislatures and the courts use the term. The statute at issue in California clarifies that “sex”
includes gender identity and gender expression. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(e)(5).
10 Marissa L. Goodman, A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy . . . and Het-
erosexual? Gays in the Boy Scouts of America, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 825, 830 (1999).
11 Cal. Civ. Code § 51.
12 Id.
13 Jean Douglas Murphy, Women’s Rights Legislation—A Vintage Year, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1974, at H1.
14 Deborah Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 NW. U.L. REV. 106, 114 (1986).
15 Complaint at 3, Rich Allison v. Red Door Epicurean, LLC, No. 2017-00036282, Cal. Super.
Ct. (2017) (“For a business operating in the progressive state of California, in the year 2017, to
provide accommodations, advantages, privileges, or services to only female patrons, is as repug-
nant and unlawful as businesses being involved in a “Caucasian Night” or a “Heterosexual Night”
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extent to which a California court would agree is as yet unclear, as or-
ganizations to this point have settled these cases rather than face ex-
pensive legal defense fees.16
This Comment will analyze the application of California’s Unruh
Civil Rights Act to women-only organizations and events in the #MeToo
Era. California provides an especially interesting case study because of
the wide protections against discrimination under its civil rights law.
In part because discrimination under the law is per se injurious, there
is a plethora of available cases to review.17 Further, in the past few
years, several California men have brought lawsuits against women’s
empowerment organizations for hosting women-only events. Given the
current appeal of these types of organizations, as well as the media at-
tention on #MeToo, it is an interesting time to engage in a discussion
about the scope of state antidiscrimination statutes and the ways courts
might or should apply the law to these new organizations. As California
has such broad protections, outlining more clearly the scope of the law
and providing strategies for ways to defend against allegations is im-
portant for organizations seeking to promote women’s empowerment.
Further, as the statute’s protections are broad, it can serve as an exam-
ple for other state legislatures and courts.
Part II of this Comment will track the jurisprudence surrounding
the Unruh Act in order to highlight how California courts have inter-
preted the law in cases of sex discrimination claims to this point. Part
III will look to the purpose of the Unruh Act to analyze whether the
California legislature contemplated these types of suits under the law.
The law has primarily expanded to protect different identified margin-
alized groups. The fact that it might be wielded by more privileged
groups against organizations seeking to promote gender equality high-
lights potential inconsistencies with the Unruh Act and its application.
Part IV will argue that courts in California should follow Supreme
Court jurisprudence in Fourteenth Amendment cases, limiting applica-
tion to discrimination that perpetuates irrational stereotypes. Finally,
Part V will suggest a legislative alternative to judicial action, carving
out an exception to the Unruh Act for remedial actions taken by histor-
ically marginalized groups.
and denying admission and discounted drinks and other accommodations, advantages, privileges,
or services to patrons of color or to gay or lesbian patrons, respectively.”).
16 Rebecca Gale,When Men Sue Women’s Empowerment Orgs for Gender Discrimination, SLA-
TE (July 3, 2018), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/07/men-are-suing-womens-empowerment
-organizations-for-gender-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/EGB8-W7VA].
17 Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 33 (1985) (“[B]y passing the Unruh Act, the Legis-
lature established that arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses is per se injurious.”)
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II. JURISPRUDENCE SURROUNDING THEUNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
This section will first consider California courts’ interpretation of
the Unruh Act and the way that interpretation has been used in the
past to combat discrimination against women in places of public accom-
modation. Most of the early cases of sex discrimination in California
involve women seeking access to men-only spaces. This section will
show how the courts in California expanded the definition of “business
establishments” to include things like a nonprofit Boys’ Club18 and the
Rotary Club,19 but not the Boy Scouts of America20 or a local private
high school.21 This sometimes-fine line the courts have drawn makes it
potentially difficult for defendants to know when they might be subject
to provinces of the Unruh Act. The section then turns to cases brought
over the past decades by men against businesses offering promotions to
women, largely in the form of “Ladies’ Night” discounts. Finally, it con-
siders recent examples of men suing organizations that host women’s
empowerment events.
A. California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and “Business Establish-
ments”
Enacted in 1959, the Unruh Civil Rights Act provides broad protec-
tions against discrimination. As most recently amended in 2015, the
Unruh Act currently provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ances-
try, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic infor-
mation, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary
language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.22
The Unruh Act provides a private cause of action and either a maximum
of three times the actual damages or statutory damages of at least
18 Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985).
19 Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. Of Dirs., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, aff’d Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
20 Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218, 237 (Cal. 1998).
21 Doe v. California Lutheran High Sch. Assn., 170 Cal. App. 4th 828, 838 (2009).
22 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b); The Act further clarifies that “‘Sex’ includes, but is not limited to,
pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth. ‘Sex’ also includes,
but is not limited to, a person’s gender. ‘Gender’ means sex, and includes a person’s gender identity
and gender expression. ‘Gender expression’ means a person’s gender-related appearance and be-
havior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.” CAL. CIV.
CODE § 51(e)(5).
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$4,000 for each violation.23 It further allows a court to award attorney’s
fees to prevailing plaintiffs.24
To avoid First Amendment concerns related to the freedom of pri-
vate association, state statutes follow the Supreme Court in providing
exceptions for private clubs.25 They prohibit discrimination only in
places of public accommodation, which is defined slightly differently
from state to state.26 The Supreme Court has noted that the First
Amendment “afford[s] constitutional protection to freedom of associa-
tion in two distinct senses.”27 First, the Court has held that individuals
are protected in their intimate or private relationships.28 In order to
determine whether a given relationship qualifies for this type of protec-
tion, the Court looks to “factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and
whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship.”29
Second, the Court has defined the rights of individuals to expressive
association, “to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of po-
litical, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”30 In
attempting to square First Amendment freedom of association concerns
with state public accommodation statutes prohibiting discrimination,
the Supreme Court uses a balancing test that weighs “the infringement
upon a group’s right to freedom of expressive association against the
state’s compelling interest in eradicating and preventing discrimina-
tion.”31
The Unruh Act prohibits discrimination “in all business establish-
ments of any kind whatsoever.”32 In interpreting this language, Califor-
nia courts have recognized a legislative “intent to use the term ‘business
establishments’ in the broadest sense reasonably possible.”33 In keeping
with First Amendment freedom of association rights, the California Su-
preme Court has concluded that the provisions of the Unruh Act “do not
apply to the membership decisions of a truly private social club.”34
Although “truly private” clubs are not subject to the Unruh Act,
merely stating that a club is private does not preclude enforcement of
23 Id. at § 52(a).
24 Id.
25 Goodman, supra note 10.
26 Id.
27 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 546, citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
30 Id. at 549.
31 Goodman, supra note 10.
32 CAL. CIV. CODE §51(b).
33 Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 786 (1995).
34 Id. at 791.
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the Unruh Act against it.35 The California Supreme Court faced the is-
sue of the application of the Unruh Act to “private” clubs when a woman
sued a nonprofit private country club in Warfield v. Peninsula Golf &
Country Club.36 There, the court discussed the legislative history of the
Unruh Act and concluded that the term “business establishment” was
designed “to include any entity that would have been considered a ‘place
of public accommodation or amusement’ under the pre-1959 version of
section 51.”37 As private social clubs were typically excluded from public
accommodation statutes based on First Amendment freedom of associ-
ation rights, the court determined that they would similarly be excluded
under the Unruh Act, so long as they “are genuinely selective in their
membership and in which the relationship among members is continu-
ous, personal, and social.”38 That is, an entity does not avoid liability
under the Unruh Act simply by naming itself a private social club. In
Warfield, although the nonprofit country club at issue purported to be
a private social club, the court determined that it was a “business es-
tablishment” subject to the Unruh Act because of its “regular business
transactions with nonmembers” that made it the functional equivalent
of a commercial enterprise.39
In Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.,40 the California Su-
preme Court further extended the understanding of what might be con-
sidered a business establishment under the Unruh Act. There, girls
sued after the Boys’ Club rejected their membership applications based
on sex.41 The Boys’ Club, “a private charitable organization which oper-
ates a community recreational facility,”42 argued that it was not subject
to the Unruh Act. The Club reasoned that, as a non-profit without an
economic function, it should not be viewed as a “business establish-
ment” covered by the Unruh Act.43 The court disagreed, finding that the
Club was primarily a “place of public accommodation or amusement”
under the Unruh Act, as “relations with and among its members are of
a kind which take place more or less in “public view,” and are of a “rel-
atively nongratuitous, continuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial sort.”44
For the California Supreme Court, membership in the Boys’ Club was
35 Id.
36 896 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1995).
37 Id. at 789.
38 Id. at 790.
39 Id. at 793.
40 Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 214.
43 Id. at 218.
44 Id. at 218.
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“equivalent to admission to a place of public amusement,”45 which
would have been covered by the previous public accommodations stat-
ute. A dissenting justice in Ibister cautioned that this reasoning would
threaten “many traditionally sex-segregated institutions, such as fra-
ternities and sororities, private schools, and scouting organizations.”46
The California Supreme Court responded to that dissent in Curran
v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts47 by distinguishing those in-
stitutions, which it viewed as truly private, from the case in Ibister. The
Boy Scouts in that case denied a leadership position to a gay man, who
sued under the Unruh Act.48 Unlike the Boys Club, the California Su-
preme Court found that the Boy Scouts “is an organization whose pri-
mary function is the inculcation of a specific set of values in its youth
members, and whose recreational facilities and activities are comple-
mentary to the organization’s primary purpose.”49 The Court argued
that this was distinct from Ibister, as membership in the Boy Scouts is
more than “simply a ticket of admission to a recreational facility that is
open to a large segment of the public and has all the attributes of a place
of public amusement.”50
Similarly, the California Supreme Court determined in Doe v. Cal-
ifornia Lutheran High School Association51 that a private all boys high
school was not a business establishment for purposes of the Unruh Act
as its primary function was not commercial but instead “an expressive
social organization whose primary function was the inculcation of val-
ues in its youth members.”52 In both this case and Curran, the court
found that some business activities with nonmembers would not make
the Boy Scouts or the high school business establishments as under
Warfield because the transactions with nonmembers “do not involve the
sale of access to the basic activities or services offered by the organiza-
tions.”53 Whereas in Warfield the country club sold to nonmembers ac-
cess to the services provided members, the Boy Scouts or high school
sales of goods to nonmembers is distinct. That is, while the Boy Scouts
sold goods to nonmembers through its stores, it did not sell “entry to
pack or troop meetings, overnight hikes, the national jamboree, or any
portion of the Boy Scouts’ extended training and educational process.”54
45 Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218, 237 (Cal. 1998).
46 Ibister, 707 P.2d at 226 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
47 Curran, 952 P.2d at 237.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 236.
50 Id.
51 Doe v. Cal. Lutheran High Sch. Assn., 170 Cal. App. 4th 828, 838 (2009).
52 Id. at 838 (citing Curran, 952 P.2d at 238).
53 Curran, 952 P.2d at 238 (emphasis in original).
54 Id.
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The California Supreme Court noted that the nonmember transactions
(at sporting events or through the retail stores) would be subject to the
Unruh Act.55
A California Court of Appeals found a local rotary club to be a busi-
ness establishment subject to the Unruh Act in Rotary Club of Duarte
v. Board of Directors.56 In that case, two women and a local rotary club
charged that the male-only policy of the International Rotary Club vio-
lated the Unruh Act after the International Rotary Club revoked the
local club’s charter for its policy of admitting women.57 There, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals looked to the commercial aspects of the Rotary
Club, the business benefits it offered to members, and the public nature
of the community services done by Rotary members.58 In determining
that the Rotary was not a private organization exempt from the Unruh
Act, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he relationship among Ro-
tarians is not continuous, personal and social.”59 The Supreme Court
affirmed this decision, finding that “rather than carrying on their activ-
ities in an atmosphere of privacy, [Rotary Clubs] seek to keep their win-
dows and doors open to the whole world.”60
The defendants in that case further alleged that disallowing its
male-only policy infringed upon their rights to freedom of expressive
association under the Constitution.61However, that the “the male-only-
membership policy [was] valued by a substantial majority of Rotarians
throughout the world and . . . ha[d] enabled the organization to work
effectively on a worldwide basis” did not persuade the Court of Ap-
peals.62 The United States Supreme Court addressed this question after
the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review.63 The
United States Supreme Court found that the Unruh Act did not violate
the First Amendment rights of the Rotary Club by forcing them to admit
women.64 The Unruh Act did not violate the Rotary Clubs right to ex-
pressive association because admitting women to the Clubs would not
“affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out
55 Id.
56 Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (1986), aff’d Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1058.
59 Id. at 1059.
60 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 547, quoting 1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on Rotary
60–61 (1981) (internal quotations omitted).
61 Id. at 1060.
62 Rotary Club of Duarte, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1060.
63 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 543.
64 Id.
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their various purposes.”65 Further, the Court found that even should
the members suffer a small infringement in their rights to expressive
association, it was “justified because it serve[d] the State’s compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination against women.”66
B. Ladies’ Night Discounts and Men’s Early Claims of Sex Discrimi-
nation under the Unruh Act
Whereas in the past women seeking access to establishments that
catered to men brought the majority of sex-discrimination claims under
the Unruh Act, more recently, men have also brought claims under the
Act against businesses or organizations that host women’s only events
or provide discounts for women.67 Once established that the discrimina-
tion takes place in a “business establishment,” the act forbids “all un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or invidious discrimination.”68 California courts
have found this discrimination “where the policy or action emphasizes
irrelevant difference between men and women or perpetuates any irra-
tional stereotypes.”69
In Koire v. Metro Car Wash,70 the plaintiff successfully brought
claims under the Unruh Act against several car washes and nightclubs
that offered discounts to women.71 The defendants in that case tried to
argue that the sex-based discount policies were not “arbitrary” in viola-
tion of the Act as they were motivated by “substantial business and so-
cial purposes.”72 Further, one defendant nightclub argued that its La-
dies’ Night promotions encouraged more women to come to the bar,
“thereby promoting more interaction between the sexes,” which it con-
sidered a “socially desirable goal.”73 The California Supreme Court dis-
agreed that this was a sufficient policy interest warranting an exception
to the Act, distinguishing it from “the compelling societal interest in
ensuring adequate housing for the elderly which justifies differential
treatment based on age.”74 Instead, it maintained that a business’s eco-
nomic interest would not be enough to warrant an exception.75
65 Id. at 548.
66 Id. at 549.
67 Gale, supra note 6.
68 Cohn v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401 (2008).
69 Id. at 404 (internal quotations omitted).
70 40 Cal. 3d 24 (1985).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 32.
73 Id. at 33.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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Considering damages, the defendants further raised the argument
that the plaintiff was not injured by the price differences.76 The court
however stated that “by passing the Unruh Act, the Legislature estab-
lished that arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses is per se injuri-
ous.”77 Statutory damages are provided under the Act for each violation
“regardless of the plaintiff’s actual damages.”78 The California Supreme
Court cautioned that “differential pricing based on sex may be generally
detrimental to both men and women, because it reinforces harmful ste-
reotypes.”79 The court was critical of a Washington Supreme Court de-
cision on the same issue.80 The Washington Supreme Court had previ-
ously ruled that a Ladies’ Night promotion at a basketball game did not
violate the state’s antidiscrimination law precisely because the male
plaintiff in that case suffered no damages as a result.81 In Koire, the
California Supreme Court favorably cited law review articles that dis-
cussed the danger in allowing legal systems to treat men and women
differently.82 The court further chastised the Washington Supreme
Court for “succumb[ing] to sexual stereotyping in upholding the Seattle
Supersonics’ ‘Ladies’ Night,’” a decision in which it found that discounts
for women were reasonable because “women do not manifest the same
interest in basketball that men do.”83 According to the California Su-
preme Court, this kind of sexual stereotyping “is precisely the type of
practice prohibited by the Unruh Act.”84
The California Supreme Court upheld the understanding that ar-
bitrary discrimination was per se injurious under the Unruh Act in An-
gelluci v. Supper Club.85 In that case, another situation where a man
was charged higher price for admission than women for entry into a
nightclub, the court further held that plaintiffs did not have to affirma-
76 Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 33.
77 Id.
78 Id. (emphasis in original).
79 Id. at 34.
80 Id.
81 Maclean v. First Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc., 635 P.2d 683, 685 (Wash. 1981) (“RCW 49.60.030
authorizes private actions for violations of the chapter, but only for the “actual damages sus-
tained.”).
82 Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 34–35 (“As long as organized legal systems, at once the most respected
and most feared of social institutions, continue to differentiate sharply, in treatment or in words,
between men and women on the basis of irrelevant and artificially created distinctions, the likeli-
hood of men and women coming to regard one another primarily as fellow human beings and only
secondarily as representatives of another sex will continue to be remote.”).
83 Id. at 35, citing MacLean, 635 P.2d at 684.
84 Id. at 35.
85 158 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2007).
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tively seek nondiscriminatory treatment in order to have standing un-
der the Unruh Act.86 In dicta, the court suggested that there may be
constitutional or equitable relief available for a business facing abusive
litigation under the Unruh Act.87 In that case, both the trial and appel-
late courts expressed concerns about the potential for abusive litigation.
In the case, the defendant complained that the “plaintiffs made repeated
unannounced visits to defendant’s business establishment in order to
increase the statutory damages they could seek for multiple violations
of the Act.”88 However, the court chose to leave it to the legislature to
“determine whether to alter the statutory elements of proof to afford
business establishments’ protection against abusive private legal ac-
tions and settlement tactics.”89
A California appeals court similarly raised concerns about the po-
tential for abusive litigation in Cohn v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc.90 The
court expressed a distaste for the repeat-player plaintiffs in the case,
who it viewed as being involved in shake-down lawsuits.91 It upheld a
Mother’s Day special at an Angels baseball game that gave away gift
bags to all women over age eighteen.92 Rather than the kind of “arbi-
trary discrimination the Unruh Act is meant to protect,” the court found
that the promotion was intended to honor mothers.93 Gender was a sec-
ondary consideration, as the goal was to provide gifts to mothers.94
Providing gifts to all women in attendance, rather than attempting to
find out which women at the game were mothers, was an acceptable
method of giving gifts to mothers.95 Unlike in Koire, the promotion here
was less egregious as it did not “emphasize an irrelevant difference, nor
perpetuate an irrational stereotype.”96
86 Id. at 719.
87 Id. at 729.
88 Id. at 728 (emphasis in original).
89 Id. at 729.
90 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); (“No other fans complained about the giveaway,
and Cohn’s complaint only came after he went to the game to deliberately generate his “injury.”
Cohn’s complaint gathers further suspicion because Cohn, his friends, and his counsel have been
involved in numerous of what have been characterized as “shake down” lawsuits. (E.g., Angelucci
v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 160, 178 [158 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2007)].) They proclaim
themselves equal rights activists, yet repeatedly attempted to glean money from the Angels
through the threat of suit. The Act is a valuable tool for protecting our citizens and remedying true
injuries. We are not convinced the Angels’ tote bag giveaway was in any way unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or invidious discrimination.”)
91 Id. at 405.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 404–05.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Cohn, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404.
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C. Recent Lawsuits Targeting Women-Only Events
In California, several lawsuits in recent years have been brought
by male plaintiffs against women’s empowerment organizations alleg-
ing violations of the Unruh Act. Because these lawsuits have settled
without judicial opinion, it is unclear how California courts might deal
with these charges. Apart from seeking statutory damages, many of
these settlements require the organizations to change their admission
policies.97
Some of the events describe the need for women-only admission
policies in order to provide safe spaces for women. In 2017, two men
refused entry to her show “Girls Night In” sued comedian Iliza Shle-
singer.98 A comedy show at a theater, open to the public, that charges a
fee for entry would clearly fall under the Unruh Act. In this case, the
only limitation was based on gender. In the wake of breaking allega-
tions against Harvey Weinstein and Louis C.K., the event was mar-
keted as:
[A] hybrid stand up show and interactive discussion between
Iliza and the women in the audience aimed at giving women a
place to vent in a supportive, fun and inclusive environment.99
Shlesinger described the event as an opportunity for “women to get to-
gether, talk and laugh about the things we go through.”100 The com-
plaint charges against what it refers to as the defendants’ “War on
Men,” comparing the admission policy “as being akin to the Montgom-
ery City Lines bus company in Montgomery, Alabama circa 1955.”101
Although the plaintiff in this case withdrew the complaint without prej-
udice, the same attorney refiled the case as a putative class action in
2018.102 The named plaintiff in the first case is named in the second,
and the complaint is very similar to the original.103
With regards to the alleged Unruh Act violations, the defendants
requested that the court dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
97 Iman Hariri-Kia, Ladies Get Paid Was Sued for Gender Discrimination – But It’s Not Giving
up Its Mission, BUSTLE (June 1, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/ladies-get-paid-was-sued-for-gen-
der-discrimination-but-its-not-giving-up-its-mission-9229052 [https://perma.cc/5H7H-GCKV].
98 St. George v. Shlesinger, No. B687568 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2017).
99 Complaint at 16, Exhibit I, supra note 98.
100 Gene Maddaus, Iliza Shlesinger Sued for Banning Men from Comedy Show, VARIETY (Dec.
27, 2017), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/iliza-shlesinger-girls-night-mens-rights-lawsuit-1202
649230/ [https://perma.cc/HA5M-Z4NV].
101 Complaint at 3, supra note 98.
102 Pollister v. Shlesinger, No. Bc705961 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 2018).
103 Id.
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discrimination was “neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.”104 The defend-
ant argued that any discrimination did not perpetuate stereotypes or
“emphasize irrelevant differences.”105 Instead, the defendants argued
that the admissions policy served to create “a safe space for women to
discuss issues uniquely facing this sector of society.”106 This purpose,
the defendants argued, “would be hindered by the presence of men.”107
The court denied the defendants’ demurrer, finding that it did not have
enough information from the complaint to determine whether the ad-
mission policy emphasized irrelevant differences or perpetuated irra-
tional stereotypes.108
Other organizations have focused on women’s networking and
providing opportunities for women to meet and discuss realities they
face in the workplace. These organizations attempt to address barriers
women face, including sexual harassment, in spaces without men. The
women’s empowerment organization Ladies Get Paid was sued for vio-
lations of Unruh after it held women-only “Ladies Get Drinks” events
at California bars, which were also sued.109 Ladies Get Paid settled the
lawsuit rather than risk potential bankruptcy.110 As the attorney rep-
resenting the organization said, “[i]f you are a young company, you are
not going to test the merits. You are going to wind up paying the plain-
tiff to go away.”111 This is especially true because the Unruh Act pro-
vides for fee-shifting for prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases, creat-
ing a greater risk for defendants unsure about their chances in
litigation.112 As a part of the settlement, it had to change its policy to
allow men to attend their events.113 Similarly, a women’s networking
group that held “Clinics and Cocktails” events to teach women golf was
sold after settling a lawsuit alleging Unruh Act violations.114
In 2018, the San Diego Fire Rescue Foundation cancelled a free,
city-sponsored Girls’ Empowerment Camp meant to teach girls about
firefighting after being threatened with suit for alleged violations of the
104 Demurrer to First Amended Complaint at 8, supra note 102.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 25.
108 Pollister v. Shlesinger, No. Bc705961 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 2019).
109 Allison v. Red Door Epicurean, LLC, No. 2017-00036282 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2017);
St. George v. Ladies Get Paid, LLC, No. Sc128611 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2017).
110 Judith Ohikuare, “Ladies Get Sued”: How A Civil Rights Law Could End Women-Only Eve-
nts, REFINERY 29 (May 25, 2018), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2018/05/199558/ladies-get-pai
d-unruh-civil-rights-act-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/W28P-VVRF].
111 Gale, supra note 6.
112 CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.
113 Hariri-Kia, supra note 97.
114 Crouch v. Maderas, No. 37-2013-00060313-CU-CR-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. July 30, 2013).
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Unruh Act.115 The San Diego Fire Rescue Foundation started the camp
in efforts to address the gender disparity among firefighters in the city,
where women comprise only four percent of the department.116 The city
of San Diego pulled funding for the camp after receiving a complaint
letter from an attorney representing a man who wanted to enroll his
son in the camp.117 Although originally cancelled, the mayor directed
city staff to reschedule the event as planned, changing the event to in-
vite both boys and girls to participate in the Girls Empowerment
Camp.118
Some challengers have gone beyond events that actually exclude
men to raise objections to events designed for or marketed towards
women.119 Los Angeles craft beer company Eagle Rock Brewery was
sued over their Women’s Beer Forum, a monthly event for women who
are interested in beer.120 The event allowed men to attend, but it aimed
to be a “space where the women would outnumber the men while dis-
cussing craft beer, a rarity.”121 One man filed a claim with California’s
Department of Fair Employment and Housing after a staff member mis-
takenly told him the event was for women only when he emailed re-
questing a ticket.122 The Brewery settled with the man after the Depart-
ment told the Brewery that it believed the claim had merit.123 Brewery
owner Ting Su regretted having to settle and continues to work to “elicit
some form of change at the legislative level to minimize the exploitation
of the Unruh Act by career plaintiffs.”124
115 Karen Kucher, Girls Empowerment Camp Canceled after Attorney Claims It Violates Anti-
Discrimination Laws, SANDIEGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 27, 2018) http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
news/public-safety/sd-me-camp-cancelled-20180226-story.html [https://perma.cc/6D4P-3ZGF].
116 Jade Hindmon, San Diego Mayor Says Girls Empowerment CampWill Go on Despite Discri-




119 Farley Elliott, LA Brewery Owner Fights Men’s Rights Activist over Women’s Beer Forum,
EATER LOSANGELES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://la.eater.com/2018/10/18/17995464/la-brewery-women-
beer-forum-mens-rights-activist-eagle-rock [https://perma.cc/NC3Z-V6HW].
120 Id.




123 Elliott, supra note 119.
124 Id.
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III. COURTS SHOULD LOOK TO THE PURPOSE OF THEUNRUH ACT IN
DECIDING THESE CASES
When the legislature added sex as a protected category under the
Unruh Act in 1974, people understood the move to be aimed at protect-
ing women.125 The Los Angeles Times ran an article titled “Women’s
Rights Legislation—A Vintage Year,” in which it discussed the “land-
mark legislation in the field of women’s rights” the California legisla-
ture passed during the 1973–74 session.126 Jan Baran, of the California
Commission on the Status of Women, described it as “the most produc-
tive and exciting in terms of women’s issues in the history of the
state.”127 As discussed above, the law has expanded since that time.
Still, it is perhaps troubling that groups with the same goals as the Un-
ruh Act are now being targeted by men for lawsuits charging discrimi-
nation.
As of September 2019, no sex discrimination case against these
women’s empowerment agencies has been decided by a California court.
Some recent California cases have settled rather than face expensive
litigation, suggesting possibly that the organizations did not feel that
their cases were strong enough to prevail under California law. Yet, it
is unclear exactly how the courts would apply the law to these cases. As
discussed above, the Unruh Act seems pretty clear in its prohibitions
against discrimination, and courts apply it liberally. In many respects,
women’s empowerment agencies appear different from previous in-
stances of discrimination through “Ladies’ Night” promotions that were
motivated purely by business interests. Organizations that seek to pro-
vide space for women to address sexual harassment or particular diffi-
culties women face in the workplace seem very different from those pro-
motions. It seems incongruous that courts would find that organizations
focused on gender equality have violated antidiscrimination statutes.
Indeed, this section argues that the purpose of the Unruh Act weighs
against finding violations in these cases.
In Rotary Club of Duarte,128 the appellate court discussed that the
Unruh Act “must be construed in the light of the legislative purpose and
design.”129 The court there maintained that “[i]n enforcing the command
125 Murphy, supra note 13.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (1976).
129 Id. at 1046, citing Winchell v. English, 62 Cal. App.3d 125, 128 (1976).
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of a statute both the policy expressed in its terms, and the object im-
plicit in its history and background, should be recognized.”130 Califor-
nia’s Unruh Act was drafted to address inequalities in society and the
harms of discrimination.131 The California legislature has discussed
how the Unruh Act’s protections go beyond the listed categories, as “the
California Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Unruh Act
in an expansive way.”132 Rather than limit its application to the catego-
ries explicitly in the text, the Legislature recognized that the courts
have interpreted it as “cover[ing] all arbitrary and intentional discrim-
ination by business establishments.”133 That said, the legislature has
added protected categories through amendments several times
throughout the Unruh Act’s history.
The California Supreme Court has stated that the Unruh Act is
“clear and unambiguous.”134 In Koire, the California Supreme Court
said that “[t]he express language of the Unruh Act provides a clear and
objective standard by which to determine the legality of the practices at
issue.”135 In that case, the sex-based price differentials clearly violated
the “plain language of the Unruh Act.”136 However, that court left open
that “a compelling social policy” might persuade the court to look be-
yond the statute’s text.137
As seen above, the plain language of the Unruh Act provides ex-
tremely broad protections. On its face, the majority of the sex-segre-
gated events and programs mentioned above that have recently been
charged with violating the Unruh Act seem to do so. The example of the
girls’ empowerment camp might be distinct as it could be compared to
sex-segregated schools or the Boy Scouts, which California courts have
held not to violate the Unruh Act. Similarly, events like the Women’s
Beer Forum that market themselves to women but do not actually ex-
clude anyone also do not violate the text of the Unruh Act. Attempting
to create spaces for women, without excluding anyone based on pro-
tected characteristics, should not be made to be in conflict with the
state’s antidiscrimination statute.
130 Id.
131 Hearing on SB 600 Before the S. Assemb. Comm. On Judiciary (Ca. 2015) (bill analysis of
Mark Stone, Chair) (enacted).
132 Id. at 6.
133 Id.
134 Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 28 (1985).
135 Id. at 39.
136 Id. at 38.
137 Id.
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Beyond the text, the California Supreme Court consistently dis-
cusses the purpose of the Unruh Act in its decisions, taking into consid-
eration the legislative intent in drafting the statute.138 This interpreta-
tion has been used in cases to attempt to define “business
establishment” in line with legislative intent. In determining that the
Mother’s Day giveaway did not violate the Act, one California appellate
court looked to the policy behind the Unruh Act in determining that the
giveaway did not “emphasize an irrelevant difference, nor perpetuate
an irrational stereotype.”139 A willingness to consider the purpose be-
hind the statute might help women’s empowerment organizations con-
vince courts that disallowing men is not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or
invidious discrimination.”140 Organizations aimed at women’s empow-
erment or helping women get ahead in the work force have the goal of
creating equality between men and women, in keeping with the spirit
of the Unruh Act. Lawsuits bringing these organizations into conflict
with the Unruh Act thus seem in tension with its purpose.
One recent amendment to the Unruh Act, passed in 2005, added
“sexual orientation” and “marital status” to the list of protected catego-
ries.141 The legislature started the amendment with the recognition
that, “[e]ven prior to the passage of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Califor-
nia law afforded broad protection against arbitrary discrimination by
business establishments.”142 The purpose of the Unruh Act was thus “to
provide broader, more effective protection against arbitrary discrimina-
tion.”143 Legislators discussed how the addition of these protected char-
acteristics did not “break new ground in expanding the scope of protec-
tion provided by the Act.”144 This is because the California Supreme
Court “has rejected the argument that the Unruh Act’s ban on discrim-
ination reaches only the classifications specified in the Act’s text.”145
138 Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 1046 (“The Unruh Act is to be
liberally construed with a view for effectuating the purposes for which it was enacted and to pro-
mote justice); Cohn v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(“Cohn’s allegations . . . are not supported by the interpretation of, or policy behind, the Act.”);
Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 28 (“The Act is to be given a liberal construction with a view to effectuating its
purposes.”).
139 Cohn, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 405.
140 Id.
141 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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The purpose in including these explicitly was to avoid litigation and
“encourage better compliance with the law.”146
It is unclear how a California court would view an argument that
excluding men from women’s empowerment events is not arbitrary dis-
crimination. In the case Easebe Enterprises v. Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Appeals Board,147 the defendant tried to argue that excluding men
from a show featuring male dancers was not arbitrary discrimination
as prohibited by the Unruh Act.148 The defendant nightclub argued that:
[C]hanging social perspectives recognize that in some situations
a policy founded on gender-based discrimination is consistent
with everyday realities and in fact inures to the benefit of those
who have been the victims of past societal and legal discrimina-
tion.149
The California Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control’s decision to revoke the club’s license for its
discriminatory practice.150 It said that the argument that the practice
of excluding men was “benignly inspired” was not enough to create an
exception to the Unruh Act as a matter of law in this case.151 It stated
that it was not “within the purview of an intermediate appellate court,
at this late date, to substitute its perspective for that of the Depart-
ment.”152 That said, the court noted that “were we the triers of fact, or
were we writing on an entirely clear slate, we might find such theory
persuasive.”153 However, the court felt restricted by the judgment pre-
viously made by the Department. This suggests that, given a clean
slate, a court may be willing to accept a women’s empowerment organ-
ization’s claim that its policy of excluding men should be exempt from
the Unruh Act on these grounds. Or, as discussed below, this logic might
be more cleanly adopted through a legislative exemption to the Unruh
Act.
146 Id.






153 Easebe, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 987.
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IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION AND
PERPETUATINGGENDER STEREOTYPES
As discussed above, California courts state one purpose of sex-dis-
crimination bans is a concern that they perpetuate irrational stereo-
types. This is taken from Supreme Court Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection understanding of sex discrimination, which has traditionally
focused on eradicating stereotypes. Although these events are held by
private actors, the Supreme Court’s discussion of sex discrimination by
state actors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment can provide some insight into how courts should
consider these issues. California courts should follow the Supreme
Court in deciding whether discrimination is arbitrary (in violation of
the Unruh Act) based on whether the organizations’ policies are
founded on gender stereotypes.
In United States v. Virginia,154 the Supreme Court held that Vir-
giniaMilitary Institution’s (VMI) categorical exclusion of women denied
them equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.155
The Supreme Court discussed that, in order to defend gender-based
state action, the state would have to show “at least that the [challenged]
classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.”156 The Court said that sex classifica-
tions by government actors would be allowed in some cases in order to,
for example, “compensate women for particular economic disabilities
[they have] suffered . . . promote equal employment opportunity . . . ad-
vance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s peo-
ple.”157 They would not be allowed, however, “to create or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”158 In both this case
and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,159 the Court high-
lighted that single-sex policies may not be based on stereotypes.160 That
is, classifications must avoid “fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females.”161 The Supreme Court highlighted that
this distinction is important in order to avoid “perpetuat[ing] historical
patterns of discrimination.”162
154 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 533.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 34.
159 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 725.
162 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542.
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As discussed in the debate between the California and the Wash-
ington Supreme Courts, California courts similarly forbid single-sex
policies that are based on irrational stereotypes. Unlike older “Ladies’
Night” promotions that California courts have seen as focusing on arbi-
trary distinctions between men and women and thus advancing irra-
tional stereotypes of women, women’s empowerment organizations do
not seem to evoke the same ideas. Instead, organizations that coach
women to ask for higher salaries or offer space to discuss experiences
with sexual harassment would work to combat stereotypes women face
in their workplaces. Under this understanding, the situations in the
new cases mentioned above would not violate the Unruh Act.
This can be a complicated argument because, as one California Ap-
peals Court discussed, “few cases have held discriminatory treatment
to be nonarbitrary based solely on the special nature of the business
establishment.”163 The examples the court gave were limited: (1) a gam-
bling club’s exclusion of one individual woman who was found to be a
compulsive gambler;164 and (2) a cemetery’s exclusion of “punk rockers”
from a private funeral at the request of the deceased’s family.165 The
court discussed that the exceptions are generally only allowed “when
there is a strong public policy in favor of such treatment.”166 There, the
court cited examples of excluding minors from bars and ensuring afford-
able housing for the elderly.167
The court left open that there “may also be instances where public
policy warrants differential treatment for men and women,” discussing
sex-segregated facilities like restrooms justified by a right to personal
privacy.168 The court suggested that even some sex-based price differ-
entials may be warranted by a “compelling social policy.”169 Further, it
stated that public policy can occasionally be gleaned from viewing other
statutory enactments.170 A women’s networking organization may be
able to point to statutes like the Equal Pay Act to suggest that public
policy supports efforts to close the gender pay gap. Insofar as these or-
ganizations seek to equal the playing field between men and women,
they do not seem to advance irrational stereotypes against women. The
California legislature, spurred by the #MeToo Movement, further
passed several laws that took effect January 1, 2019, to combat sexual
163 Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 30 (1985).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 31.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 33.
168 Id. at 38.
169 Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 38.
170 Id. at 31.
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harassment.171 Jennifer Barrera, executive vice president with the Cal-
ifornia Chamber of Commerce, recognized this explicitly, stating, “#Me-
Too was a dominating topic at the Capitol this year.”172 These statutory
enactments give more weight to women’s empowerment organizations’
claims that their goals are supported by a “compelling social policy.”
This distinction would also combat the possibility of historically privi-
leged groups attempting to discriminate against historically marginal-
ized groups, as there will not be the same compelling social policy.
V. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES: EXCEPTIONS FORHISTORICALLY
MARGINALIZEDGROUPS
As it stands, women-only organizations have a difficult time of
avoiding the Unruh Act in California. Courts can read the law narrowly
to avoid applying the Unruh Act to events that are designed for or mar-
keted towards women, but that do not exclude men. Beyond that, it is
not obvious that a solution like the one the Supreme Court in Washing-
ton gave in MacClean, of requiring the plaintiff to prove damages,
would be better. The flexibility of the Unruh Act allowed it to expand to
cover protected characteristics (like gender identity or sexual orienta-
tion) that were not considered by the legislators drafting it. Allowing
that discrimination is per se injurious under California law and having
statutory damages encouraged the filing of civil rights lawsuits in order
to benefit the society as a whole. Rather than changing that jurispru-
dence, which could limit the Unruh Act’s application in other situations,
the legislature could act to carve out an exception for these organiza-
tions.
If legislatures want to leave space for these types of events, they
could carve out exceptions in their Civil Rights Laws. One potential way
to distinguish between whether groups are in line with the laws or not
could be to analyze the power dynamics. As an example, under the Ca-
nadian Human Rights Code:
It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry
out a special program designed to prevent disadvantages that
are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disad-
vantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when
those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohib-
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ited groups of discrimination by improving opportunities re-
specting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or employ-
ment in relation to that group.173
As an example of a “special program” thus protected, the Canadian Hu-
man Rights Commission points out that the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides for tem-
porary “special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality
between men and women.”174 Language like this would still prohibit ar-
bitrary discrimination while allowing historically marginalized groups
to attempt to reduce disparities. An exception like this would likely pro-
tect networking and empowerment groups. It would also prevent his-
torically privileged groups from using the Unruh Act to attack women’s
organizations.
VI. CONCLUSION
One California appellate court expressed an aversion to finding vi-
olations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act in cases of what it was concerned
were men “involved in numerous of what have been characterized as
‘shake down’ lawsuits.”175 This is especially concerning given that the
settlements mentioned above threaten to shut down the organizations
completely. To the extent these laws are used as a tool to harass women
or attempt to get money through the threat of a lawsuit, their applica-
tion to these types of organizations seems inherently in conflict with the
laws. Especially given recent statutory enactments by the California
legislature focused on helping women gain power in the workplace and
eliminating sexual harassment, these organizations have a strong ar-
gument that they do not arbitrarily discriminate in violation of the Un-
ruh Act. In keeping with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, the examples given above do not perpetuate
stereotypes by excluding men.
It is not clear the extent to which courts might accept an argument
that organizations seeking to ameliorate gender inequality should be
treated differently under the law than organizations that perpetuate
inequality. This space could be filled by legislative efforts to provide ex-
emptions for these organizations, focusing on power dynamics and his-
torically marginalized groups. Given that the majority of these organi-
zations have chosen to settle their cases rather than face potentially
devastating legal fees, a legislative carveout might be needed.
173 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6, Section 16(1).
174 Policy on Special Programs, CANADIANHUMAN RIGHTSCOMM’N, https://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.c
a/sites/default/files/policyspecialprograms_eng_0.pdf.
175 Cohn v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
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As one California court of appeals reasoned, “[t]his important piece
of legislation provides a safeguard against the many real harms that so
often accompany discrimination. For this reason, it is imperative we not
denigrate its power and efficacy by applying it to manufactured inju-
ries. . . .”176 Limiting its application to cases of arbitrary discrimination
that perpetuate stereotypes would serve to better meet the goals of the
Unruh Act itself.
176 Id. at 403.
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Revenge Porn and the First Amendment: Should
Nonconsensual Distribution of Sexually Explicit
Images Receive Constitutional Protection?
Evan Ribot†
I. INTRODUCTION
Like many issues related to relationships and sexuality, “revenge
porn” has become more complicated—and its consequences more sinis-
ter—thanks to twenty-first century technology. Revenge porn, often re-
ferred to as nonconsensual pornography, involves the publication or dis-
tribution of sexually explicit images without the subject’s consent.1 This
may include images obtained without consent, as well as images ini-
tially obtained with consent—often within the context of an intimate
relationship—but later shared broadly or used as blackmail.2 The issue
received increased public attention after a 2014 incident in which a
hacker accessed and leaked sexually explicit photos of several celebri-
ties.3 But celebrities are far from the only victims: a 2016 study found
that roughly one in twenty-five Americans have been threatened with
or been the victim of nonconsensual image sharing.4
The impact of revenge porn is deep for its victims because, even if
they can bring their attackers to justice, the stain of the images or vid-
eos shared—especially if they circulate online—is hard to erase. Victims
of revenge porn often face workplace discrimination or cyberstalking,
† B.A. 2014, Harvard College; J.D. Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School. I
would like to thank Professor David Strauss for his advice and feedback. I would also like to thank
the current and former staff and board of The University of Chicago Legal Forum.
1 Danielle Keats Citron, Revenge Porn Should be a Crime in the U.S., CNN (Jan. 16, 2014),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/index.html [https://perma.cc/65P5-5
RDQ].
2 Danielle Keats Citron &Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKEFOREST
L. REV. 345, 346 (2014).
3 Nicole Darrah, Jennifer Lawrence, Kate Upton’s Nude Photo Hacker Sentenced to Prison,
FOX NEWS (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/jennifer-lawrence-kate-upton
s-nude-photo-hacker-sentenced-to-prison [https://perma.cc/4PL9-SLMY].
4 Lori Janjigian,Nearly 10 Million Americans are Victims of Revenge Porn, Study Finds, BUS.
INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/revenge-porn-study-nearly-10-million-
americans-are-victims-2016-12 [https://perma.cc/5RVL-FLPE].
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and many victims lose their jobs or struggle to gain employment be-
cause their sexually explicit images are readily available online.5 As un-
derstanding of the negative impacts of revenge porn has deepened,
states have rushed to pass laws criminalizing the practice. To date,
forty-six states as well as Washington, D.C., have enacted statutes ban-
ning the disclosure or distribution of sexually explicit images without
the subject’s consent.6 Activists and scholars alike see the growth of
state laws criminalizing revenge porn as healthy progress in addressing
a phenomenon that existing laws lack the teeth to curb.7
As revenge porn statutes spread, however, they face increasing re-
sistance from critics who claim the new laws run afoul of the First
Amendment. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”8 Accordingly, the govern-
ment’s ability to restrict speech is limited, and if the government wants
to impose a “content-based” restriction on speech, such a restriction
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.9 Yet,
First Amendment doctrine does not provide blanket protections for all
speech, and some types of speech “can be regulated due to their propen-
sity to bring about serious harms and only slight contributions to First
Amendment values.”10 Thus, proponents of strong criminal statutes
against revenge porn seek to argue that nonconsensual pornography
falls into one of the categorical exemptions of speech that does not gar-
ner the full protection of the First Amendment. Alternatively, drafters
of statutes addressing nonconsensual pornography aim to demonstrate
that these statutes can be carefully constructed to survive strict scru-
tiny.
But two recent court decisions evaluating different state revenge
porn statutes reveal the potential flaws in those approaches. In April
2018, the Texas Court of Appeals struck down the state’s law prohibit-
ing “Unlawful Disclosure or Promotion of Intimate Visual Material” as
overbroad under the First Amendment.11 The court reasoned that the
law, which did not consider the intent of the person posting or sharing
5 Citron, supra note 1.
6 See 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIV. RTS.
INITIATIVE (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/R
63K-ZBK3].
7 See Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 349.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 374.
10 Id. at 375.
11 Andrea Zelinski, Texas “Revenge Porn” Law Struck Down by State Appeals Court, HOUS.
CHRON. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/Texas-revenge-porn-la
-struck-down-by-12848920.php [perma.cc/2TS6-7E44].
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the sexually explicit images, was not the least restrictive means of pre-
venting the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography.12 But in Au-
gust 2018, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the state’s statute
banning “Disclosure of Sexually Explicit Images Without Consent” was
constitutional.13 Although the Vermont Supreme Court declined to
place revenge porn into a category of speech exempted from full First
Amendment protection, it ruled that the state’s law did survive review
under strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to advance a com-
pelling state interest.14
This Comment will argue that revenge porn should be categorically
exempt from the full protection of the First Amendment so that statutes
restricting it need not withstand strict judicial scrutiny. As states con-
tinue to draft and litigate these statutes, it would be prudent for propo-
nents of criminalizing revenge porn to argue for an exemption from
First Amendment protection for the distribution of nonconsensual por-
nography. Such arguments are in line with the historical expansion of
Supreme Court jurisprudence in understanding “low-value speech.” In
fact, the call to exempt revenge porn from garnering constitutional pro-
tection mirrors the Supreme Court’s embrace of a First Amendment cat-
egorical exemption for child pornography inNew York v. Ferber.15More-
over, a categorical exemption for revenge porn from First Amendment
protection will prevent proponents from having to define revenge porn
under the “obscenity” exemption, which would limit the potency of re-
venge porn statutes. Finally, a categorical exemption for nonconsensual
pornography will prevent these statutes from having to withstand strict
scrutiny, a requirement which threatens to derail state efforts at curb-
ing revenge porn.
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF REVENGE PORN
A. Defining Revenge Porn and its Harms
Revenge porn refers to the sharing and distribution of sexually ex-
plicit images or videos without the subject’s consent.16 This definition
may include images obtained without consent, as well as images ini-
tially obtained with consent but with the expectation that they would
remain private.17 It is often referred to as nonconsensual pornography
12 Ex Parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *7 (Tex. App. May 16, 2018).
13 State v. VanBuren, No. 16-253, 2018 WL 4177776, at *12 (Vt. Aug. 31, 2018).
14 Id.
15 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
16 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 346.
17 Id.
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and is sometimes described as “involuntary porn” or “cyber rape.”18 That
distinction in terminology, of course, “is one of motive, not effect: re-
venge porn is often intended to harass the victim, while any image that
is circulated without the agreement of the subject is nonconsensual
porn.”19 That is, an image or video need not be shared or posted by a
former partner to constitute nonconsensual pornography, and the cir-
culation of images posted by hackers or individuals seeking to profit
from them lack the “revenge” element that comes to mind in discussions
of this issue.
Regardless of whether the images are posted by a scorned ex, a
hacker, or someone looking to blackmail the subject, the impact of re-
venge porn on the victim is deep. Due to the permanence and vastness
of the internet, victims often struggle to escape the impact of their sex-
ually explicit images being circulated. Once an image is posted, it can
reach hundreds of websites with ease, and even if a victim has “an im-
age scrubbed from one site, there’s no way to guarantee it hasn’t been
copied, screenshotted, or stored on a cache somewhere.”20 This means
that, at any given moment, a victim’s photos may be “only one email,
Facebook post, or Google search away.”21 Further, rather than being a
rare phenomenon, modern technology has allowed revenge porn to be-
come startlingly common: a 2016 study found that 4 percent of U.S. in-
ternet users—roughly 10.4 million people—have either had someone
post an intimate image of them without their consent or threaten to do
so.22 For women under thirty, that number rose to nearly 10 percent.23
These images may be posted to websites devoted to revenge porn, but
they often hit victims closer to home by being posted on social media
and shared with friends and family. In January of 2017 alone, Facebook
received more than 51,000 reports of revenge porn and disabled 14,000
accounts in response.24
Unsurprisingly, because revenge porn is fueled by technology, its
impact is most deeply felt by younger people. A 2016 study showed that
16 percent of American adults had sent a sexually explicit photo, and
more than 20 percent had received one.25 More than 23 percent of those
who had received nude photos reported sharing the images, and men
18 I will use “revenge porn” and “nonconsensual pornography” interchangeably throughout
this Comment.
19 Charlotte Alter, ‘It’s Like Having an Incurable Disease’: Inside the Fight Against Revenge
Porn, TIME (Jun. 13, 2017), http://time.com/4811561/revenge-porn/ [https://perma.cc/CE5H-4C9P].
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Janjigian, supra note 4.
23 Alter, supra note 19.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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were twice as likely as women to do so.26 Young people—the generation
most adept at using smartphones and modern technology—are increas-
ingly likely to send and receive sexually explicit texts, photos, or videos
by cell phone, practices known as “sexting.”27 A 2015 survey found that
nearly 40 percent of teenagers had posted or sent sexually suggestive
messages, and that 24 percent of people between the ages of fourteen
and seventeen and 33 percent of people between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-four engaged in nude sexting.28 Accordingly, revenge porn
is a uniquely twenty-first century phenomenon that poses twenty-first
century challenges to lawmakers looking to curb it. Stories in recent
years of school officials and law enforcement discovering and trying to
stomp out “sexting rings”—in publicized incidents in Virginia,29 New
York,30 Colorado,31 and Connecticut32—are emblematic of the challenge
nonconsensual pornography poses to a generation empowered to upload
and share anything from their phone instantaneously.
Older Americans may find the practice of sharing sexual photos
within a relationship alarming, and critics sometimes dismiss victims
of revenge porn for having created the content in the first place. But
MIT professor Sherry Turkle explains that sexting is “embedded in
modern relationships” in a way that does not trouble a generation of
people who “grew up with a phone in [their] hand.”33 Although parents
are often startled by the idea that their teenagers may be exchanging
explicit images and videos, such practices are understood to be common
within relationships in the digital age.34 Moreover, Carrie Goldberg, a
New York lawyer profiled in The New Yorker as “the attorney fighting
26 Id.
27 Karen Thalacker, New “Revenge Porn” Law Could Snag Sexting Teens, DES MOINES REG.
(July 10, 2017), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2017/07/1
0/new-revenge-porn-law-could-snag-sexting-teens/465718001/ [https://perma.cc/5B2H-C3HJ].
28 Id.
29 Sexting Exposes Louisa Teens, THECENT. VIRGINIAN (April 2, 2014), http://www.thecentralv
irginian.com/sexting-exposes-louisa-teens/ [https://perma.cc/PX3J-HKTV].
30 Kristine Thorne, Massive Sexting Scandal at Kings Park High School Leads to Dozens of
Suspensions, Some Arrests, ABC7 (Nov. 9, 2015), https://abc7ny.com/news/massive-sexting-scan-
dal-at-long-island-high-school-leads-to-dozens-of-suspensions/1075927/ [https://perma.cc/DX53-A
M4Z].
31 The Associated Press, Colorado: No Charges for Students in Sexting Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/colorado-no-charges-for-students-in-sexting-cas
e.html [https://perma.cc/CAU2-8W4P].
32 Lorenzo Ferrigno,Newtown High School Students Charged in ‘Sexting’ Ring, CNN (Jan. 27,
2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/27/us/connecticut-high-school-sexting-ring/index.html [https:
//perma.cc/XT5Q-RVT6].
33 Alter, supra note 19.
34 See Thalacker, supra note 27.
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revenge porn,” suggests that sharing intimate material is “time-hon-
ored behavior” that is “often part of intimate communication.”35 The
digital exchange of intimate images and videos, Goldberg suggests, re-
sembles the practice of soldiers deploying to war decades ago carrying
pinup photographs of their wives and girlfriends.36 Goldberg also cites
other invasive practices—such as voyeuristic upskirt videos, peephole
videos, and other nonconsensual means of obtaining explicit images—
as a reminder that many victims of revenge porn did not consent to the
creation of such images in the first place.37 Even when the creation of
the image is consensual—as it often is within modern intimate relation-
ships—the nonconsensual distribution of the material harms its vic-
tims.
It is also unsurprising that the victims of revenge porn are over-
whelmingly female. While women sometimes circulate images of men,
studies show that the vast majority of nonconsensual pornography in-
volves images of women posted and shared by men.38 Some men admit
to sharing these images out of anger or jealousy toward a former part-
ner, but for others, “[t]he dissemination of images can be as much about
impressing other men as it is about humiliating the victim.”39 Addition-
ally, studies suggest that minorities and members of the LGBTQ com-
munity are more likely to be threatened with or victimized by revenge
porn than the general population.40 Because of its disparate impact on
women and members of other marginalized communities, activists and
legal scholars alike have called for a more serious recognition of the is-
sue within the #MeToo Movement.41 Undoubtedly, the growth of the
#MeToo Movement and heightened scrutiny surrounding sexual mis-
conduct has intensified the spotlight on revenge porn and accelerated
legal and political discussions about how to approach the challenge.
Now, activists seek to change how people discuss the phenomenon, say-
ing that revenge porn “should be called out for what it is: image-based





38 See Alter, supra note 19.
39 Id.
40 See Janjigian, supra note 4.
41 See Leah Juliett, Why Revenge Porn Needs its Own #MeToo Movement, GLAMOUR (June 4,
2018), https://www.glamour.com/story/why-revenge-porn-needs-its-own-metoo-movement [https://
perma.cc/EU67-547L].
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sexual abuse.”42Within abusive relationships, the explicit images them-
selves can be “a form of domestic violence.”43 Abusers often use the
threat of disclosing the material to pressure their victims into staying
in a relationship and follow through on the threats when the victims
leave.44
Revenge porn’s connection to the #MeToo Movement is bolstered by
the fact that its impact haunts victims in a way that is similar to sexual
assault and other forms of sexual misconduct. Victims of revenge porn
suffer professional consequences: once an explicit picture is posted
online, a search of the victim’s name will display the image, meaning
that many victims either lose their jobs or struggle to find employ-
ment.45 Especially in an age when employers screen job candidates’
online profiles throughout the hiring process, victims of nonconsensual
pornography are deeply disadvantaged—and often permanently.46 As
victims struggle to remove all traces of their explicit images from the
internet, they have limited success in seeking employment because
“employers do not want to hire individuals whose search results might
reflect poorly on the employer.”47 Furthermore, revenge porn raises the
risk that its victims will face offline stalking and physical attack, mean-
ing that victims often do not feel safe leaving their homes.48 Many vic-
tims report withdrawing from social settings, particularly from online
engagement, where they shutter their social media profiles and back
away from online networking, an essential tool of the internet age.49
Revenge porn also leaves its victims with lasting trauma, as many vic-
tims suffer from panic attacks, depression, and other symptoms associ-
ated with post-traumatic stress disorder.50 Research from the End Re-
venge Porn campaign showed that 51 percent of revenge porn victims
have had suicidal thoughts.51 These studies of victims and their stories
paint a picture of revenge porn’s lasting—and often unavoidable—im-
pact.
42 Claire McGlynn, Call “Revenge Porn” What it is: Sexual Abuse, VOX (July 10, 2017), https://
www.vox.com/first-person/2017/7/8/15934434/rob-kardashian-blac-chyna-revenge-porn-abuse [htt
ps://perma.cc/5NXV-W8E5].
43 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 351.
44 Id.
45 See Citron, supra note 1.
46 Id.
47 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 352.
48 See Citron, supra note 1.
49 Id.
50 See Melanie Ehrenkranz, We Need to Study the Effects of Revenge Porn on Mental Health,
GIZMODO (June 22, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/we-need-to-study-the-effects-of-revenge-porn-on-m
ental-1823086576 [https://perma.cc/K5TS-HUNA].
51 Id.
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B. The Growth of State Law
As recent studies and news reports began to illuminate the scope
of nonconsensual pornography and its harms, activists and legal schol-
ars began to call for states to criminalize the practice. Although coun-
tries around the globe—including Australia, Canada, Germany, and Is-
rael—had all passed laws criminalizing revenge porn by 2014,
American jurisdictions were slower to approach the issue.52 One of the
earliest and most significant calls to address the problem came from
Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks in the Wake Forest Law
Review in 2014.53 Their article details the revenge porn phenomenon,
explains the shortcomings of civil law and the need to invoke criminal
law to address it, and offers some guidance for states looking to square
their approach in combating revenge porn with the limits of the First
Amendment.54 This article is highly informative, and it reflects how per-
vasive the issue of nonconsensual pornography has become. When Cit-
ron and Franks first published their article, only six states had laws on
the books criminalizing revenge porn.55 Today—just five years later—
forty-six states as well as Washington, D.C. have passed laws criminal-
izing the nonconsensual distribution of sexually explicit images.56
Citron, Franks, and others who have written on the subject have
offered guidelines for states to follow in drafting revenge porn laws that
will effectively counter the practice without clashing with the First
Amendment. Citron and Franks argue that a “narrowly crafted revenge
porn criminal statute that protects the privacy of sexually explicit im-
ages can be reconciled with the First Amendment.”57 Accordingly, they
recommend several careful drafting techniques for state legislators.
First, they say revenge porn laws should explicitly clarify the perpetra-
tor’s mental state, possibly to require the defendant’s knowledge that
the victim did not consent to the disclosure.58 However, Citron and
Franks fear that revenge porn statutes that require intent to do harm
or inflict emotional distress go too far and are not required by the First
Amendment.59 Second, they suggest that statutes will better withstand
52 See Yifa Yaakov, Israeli Law Makes Revenge Porn a Sex Crime, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Jan.
6, 2014), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-law-labels-revenge-porn-a-sex-crime/ [https://perm
ma.cc/Q2GS-B5EF].
53 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 345.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 371.
56 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6.
57 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 376.
58 Id. at 387.
59 See id. (“Whether the person making the disclosure is motivated by a desire to harm a par-
ticular person, as opposed to a desire to entertain or generate profit, should be irrelevant”).
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First Amendment challenges if they require proof that the victims suf-
fered harm and contain clear exemptions to protect disclosures regard-
ing matters of public interest.60 These suggestions address concerns
that the First Amendment limits restrictions on speech that contribute
to a matter of public importance without inflicting private harm. Fi-
nally, Citron, Franks, and others also note the importance of clearly
defining the terms of the crime in state statutes to establish a clear un-
derstanding of what exactly a “sexually explicit” image is and what “dis-
closure” entails.61 Other authors addressing the subject recommend
taking definitions of “intimate material” from existing federal law.62
A survey of state revenge porn laws enacted within the last few
years reveals the practical implications of recommendations from schol-
ars like Citron, Franks, and others.63 The enacted state laws reflect a
messy legal landscape of nonconsensual pornography laws across the
country and demonstrate the extraordinary challenge of defining and
addressing the issue. While Citron and Franks argue against an intent
requirement, the majority of state revenge porn laws include some “in-
tent to harass”64 or “intent to harm”65 requirement. Of the forty-seven
enacted statutes, only twelve lack any sort of intent requirement.
Twenty-seven of the statutes require that the victim have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy”66 or that the parties “agree or understand”67 that
the image was to remain private. This requirement is not necessarily
the same as having knowledge that the victim has not consented, the
mental state that Citron and Franks recommend; twenty-three of the
statutes include a requirement that the defendant “knows or should
have known”68 that the victim did not consent to the distribution of the
image. Eight states adopted the recommendation to require that the
victim actually suffer harm, while four others require that the action
would “cause a reasonable person to suffer harm.”69 This haphazard na-
tional landscape reflects the difficulty legislators face in assessing the
60 Id. at 388.
61 Id.
62 See Adrienne N. Kitchen, The Need to Criminalize Revenge Porn: How A Law Protecting
Victims Can Avoid Running Afoul of the First Amendment, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 247, 284 (2015).
63 While this Comment is in no way intended to review or evaluate each state law on the books
to date, it will discuss some significant laws to show relevant trends and point to potential
strengths and shortcomings evident in different statutes.
64 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.472(1)(a) (2017).
65 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 2606(b)(1) (2015).
66 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101(a)(8) (2016).
67 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (2019).
68 See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/11-23.5(b)(3) (2015).
69 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 2606(b)(1) (2015).
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pernicious—but still relatively new—challenges associated with re-
venge porn. The gaps in state laws create a few notable challenges.
First, two state laws err in requiring some type of romantic rela-
tionship for the law to apply. Arkansas law mandates that the victim
be “a family or household member of the actor or another person with
whom the actor is in a current or former dating relationship.”70 Penn-
sylvania law requires an “intent to harass, annoy or alarm a current or
former sexual or intimate partner.”71 The shortcomings of these two
statutes should be evident: a victim need not have been in a sexual re-
lationship with the perpetrator in order to suffer from the lasting im-
pact of nonconsensual pornography. The Pennsylvania law seems to
suggest that a victim’s angry ex could provide intimate images to a
friend with instructions to share them with intent to cause harm, and
the friend—who had never been an “intimate partner” of the victim—
could do so without punishment. These laws too narrowly portray the
scope of nonconsensual pornography.
Second, perhaps the most significant gray area between different
state laws lies between requirements that the victim had an expectation
that the image would remain private and that the defendant dissemi-
nated the image knowing that the victim did not consent. Citron and
Franks focus only on the latter in their recommendations, suggesting
that the perpetrator’s knowledge that the victim did not consent is the
most effective way for state laws to establish the defendant’s mental
state.72 There is ostensibly some overlap between knowledge that the
victim did not consent to the distribution of sexually explicit images and
the reasonable expectation that those images would remain private. Yet
several state statutes include both requirements. Observing how those
clauses work together as more cases of nonconsensual pornography
come to the fore should illuminate the differences between these two
requirements.
Statutes that have neither an intent requirement nor a require-
ment that the defendant know that the victim has not consented might
present First Amendment challenges. Georgia’s bizarre statute re-
quires that the dissemination of the image “is harassment or causes fi-
nancial loss to the depicted person and serves no legitimate purpose to
the depicted person”73 but also says that a violation only occurs if the
defendant, “knowing the content of a transmission or post, knowingly
70 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-314(a)(2) (2015).
71 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3131(a) (2014).
72 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 387.
73 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90(b) (2015).
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and without the consent of the depicted person”74 disseminates the im-
age. The defendant need not know that the victim has not consented
but rather merely must knowingly post the image and know its con-
tent.75 First passed in 2015, Texas’s law required only that the defend-
ant disclose material “without the effective consent”76 of the victim. Ac-
cordingly, anyone who distributed nonconsensual pornography—even
without any understanding of the circumstances in which it was created
or any intent to do harm to the subject—became liable under the Texas
statute. Laws like this are likely too broad to survive First Amendment
challenges because they can be more narrowly tailored and because
they treat defendants with intent to do harm and knowledge of a vic-
tim’s lack of consent no differently than they do defendants who
thoughtlessly share an image. It should be no surprise, then, that the
Texas revenge porn statute was successfully challenged in court.
C. Jones, VanBuren, and Lingering First Amendment Questions
Texas’s law criminalizing revenge porn was passed in 2015, but the
state’s Twelfth Court of Appeals struck it down in April 2018 in Ex
Parte Jones.77 The Texas law made a defendant liable for disclosing in-
timate visual material “without the effective consent of the depicted
person” when that material was obtained or created “under circum-
stances in which the depicted person had a reasonable expectation that
the visual material would remain private” and the disclosure both
caused harm to and revealed the identity of the victim.78 Notably, the
statute included no requirement of intent to harm or knowledge that
the victim did not consent to disclosure of the material. After being
charged with unlawful disclosure of intimate visual material in viola-
tion of the statute, defendant Jordan Jones offered a pretrial applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the statute was unconsti-
tutional.79 Although the trial court denied his application, the Twelfth
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Texas revenge porn statute
was an unconstitutional regulation of free speech that did not survive
strict scrutiny review.80
74 Id.
75 Georgia’s statute is one of three that alludes to financial hardships of victims, along with
Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1110.9(b) (2018)) and North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-190.5A(b) (2017)).
76 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16(b)(1) (2017).
77 No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888 (Tex. App. May 16, 2018).
78 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16(b) (2017).
79 Ex Parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *1 (Tex. App. May 16, 2018).
80 Id. at *8.
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The court rebuffed efforts from the Texas Attorney General’s office
to reconsider its ruling.81 In an interview following the Twelfth Court of
Appeals’ decision, Mary Anne Franks said that, even though the Texas
statute was “not perfect,” the court “‘delivered a very poorly reasoned
opinion that will hopefully be quickly reversed.’”82 Jones’s attorney,
Houston First Amendment lawyer Mark Bennett, disagreed, arguing
that “‘[i]f a statute restricts a real and substantial amount of protected
speech, then it’s void.’”83 But lawyers defending the law for Texas’s Of-
fice of the State Prosecuting Attorney countered by emphasizing the
limited contribution that revenge porn makes to the marketplace of
ideas. As Texas attorney John Messinger explained, “[t]here is no ‘core
political speech’ at risk here . . . the conduct prohibited by the statute—
violations of privacy of the most intimate kind—is not necessary or even
helpful to a vibrant democracy.”84
The Texas Twelfth Court of Appeals’ opinion squares with the no-
tion that a statute must be narrowly tailored in order to survive strict
scrutiny analysis. The court described the statute’s broad reach in its
strict scrutiny review with a hypothetical in which a man shares an
explicit photo of an ex taken with the understanding it would remain
private; after the vengeful ex shares the photo, it is shared again by
others who do not recognize the victim and do not know that it was dis-
seminated without her consent.85 In this scenario, the court laments, all
parties who share the photo can be charged under the Texas law, “de-
spite . . . having no knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
photograph’s creation or the depicted person’s privacy expectation.”86
Thus, the court concluded that the statute created a prohibition of
“alarming breadth” and did not survive strict scrutiny.87 However, just
as Franks suggested that the Texas statute “could have been drafted
more carefully,” the court here offered suggestions for improving the
law.88 “At the very least,” the court reasoned, the law “could be nar-
rowed by requiring that the disclosing person have knowledge of the
81 Emma Platoff, Is “Revenge Porn” Protected Free Speech? Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
to Weigh In, THE TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/12/12/revenge-por
n-free-speech-texas-court-criminal-appeals/ [https://perma.cc/7Z4L-X4XE].
82 Melanie Ehrenkranz, Texas Court Strikes Down Revenge Porn Law for Being ‘Overbroad’,
GIZMODO (Apr. 20, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/texas-court-strikes-down-revenge-porn-law-for-be-
ing-ove-1825429020 [https://perma.cc/8LJ4-GGG9].
83 Platoff, supra note 81.
84 Id.
85 Ex Parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *6 (Tex. App. May 16, 2018).
86 Id at *7.
87 Id.
88 Ehrenkranz, supra note 82.
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circumstances giving rise to the depicted person’s privacy expecta-
tion.”89
Following this legal defeat, the Texas House and Senate each voted
unanimously to heed the court’s advice and revise the state’s revenge
porn statute. The revised law, signed by Governor Greg Abbott on June
15, 2019, includes a provision requiring the defendant to have intent to
harm the victim and that that he or she “knows or has reason to believe
that” the victim had a reasonable expectation the material would re-
main private.90 When unveiling the bill, State Rep. Mary Gonzalez said
that the revisions were made “in order to make sure that unintended
consequences, that people who might’ve accidentally received [an ex-
plicit image] and then continued to send it aren’t negatively im-
pacted.”91
On the other hand, Vermont’s 2015 revenge porn law was upheld
in August 2018 by the Vermont Supreme Court in State v. VanBuren.92
The Vermont lawmakes it a crime to “knowingly disclose a visual image
of an identifiable person who is nude or who is engaged in sexual con-
duct, without his or her consent, with the intent to harm, harass, intim-
idate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted, and the disclosure would
cause a reasonable person to suffer harm.”93 Defendant Rebekah
VanBuren was alleged to have accessed the Facebook account of a man
she was romantically involved with and discovered messages of nude
photos from complainant, an ex-girlfriend.94 The defendant told the
complainant she was “going to ruin [her] and get revenge,” and posted
the pictures on Facebook.95 The trial court granted the defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss on the grounds that the Vermont statute was an uncon-
stitutional prohibition on free speech that did not withstand strict scru-
tiny, but the state’s supreme court reversed and upheld the statute.96
Following the case, Defender General Matt Valerio said in an interview
that the decision was “bizarre” and that his office is contemplating an
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.97
89 Ex Parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *7.
90 Civil and Criminal Liability for the Unlawful Disclosure of Intimate Visual Material, 2019
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 1354 (H.B. 98).
91 Stephen Young, Texas Fixes Its Revenge Porn Law, THEDALLASOBSERVER (May 20, 2019),
https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/texas-passes-revenge-porn-fix-11668838 [https://perma.cc/3
4BP-EUYK].
92 No. 16-253, 2018 WL 4177776 (Vt. Aug. 31, 2018).
93 VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 2606(b)(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
94 VanBuren, 2018 WL 4177776, at *2.
95 Id.
96 Id. at *4.
97 Mark Davis, Vermont Supreme Court Upholds Revenge Porn Law, SEVEN DAYS VT. (Aug.
31, 2018), https://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/archives/2018/08/31/vermont-supreme-court-
upholds-revenge-porn-law [https://perma.cc/YT7M-FGZD].
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Unlike the much broader law in Texas, the Vermont revenge porn
statute withstood strict scrutiny analysis, as the court concluded that
the law was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The
Vermont court said that the state interest underlying the statute is
compelling based on “the relatively low constitutional significance of
speech relating to purely private matters, evidence of potentially severe
harm to individuals arising from nonconsensual publication of intimate
depictions of them, and a litany of analogous restrictions on speech that
are generally viewed as uncontroversial and fully consistent with the
[First Amendment].”98 While not denying that the restriction was “con-
tent-based,” the court compared the statute to others that prevent dis-
closure of private information surrounding health or finances and rea-
soned that the state’s interest in preventing nonconsensual disclosure
of sexually explicit images is “at least as strong as its interest” in other
disclosures, restrictions upon which are “uncontroversial and widely ac-
cepted as consistent with the First Amendment.”99 Said the court:
In the constellation of privacy interests, it is difficult to imagine
something more private than images depicting an individual en-
gaging in sexual conduct, or of a person’s genitals, anus, or pubic
area, that the person has not consented to sharing publicly. The
personal consequences of such profound personal violation and
humiliation generally include, at a minimum, extreme emo-
tional distress.100
Further, the court construed the statute’s requirement that the dis-
closure be made “knowingly” to require knowledge both of the act of
disclosing and the absence of consent from the subject.101 By relying on
this narrow construction, the court affirmed the statute’s intent while
avoiding an interpretation of the law that would force a constitutional
clash.
Although the courts in Texas and Vermont performed a strict scru-
tiny analysis of their state’s respective revenge porn laws, the question
of whether strict scrutiny review is unnecessary remains. The Texas
court in Ex Parte Jones noted that content-based restrictions on speech
survive only when confined to some traditional categories of unpro-
tected speech such as obscenity, defamation, fraud, and true threats.102
Yet the state in Jones oddly conceded at oral argument that Texas’s
statute was subject to strict scrutiny instead of arguing that it may
98 VanBuren, 2018 WL 4177776, at *12.
99 Id. at *15.
100 Id.
101 Id. at *17.
102 Ex Parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *4 (Tex. App. May 16, 2018).
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cover speech consistently categorized as unprotected.103 Then, on re-
hearing and in subsequent briefs, the State disregarded that concession
and argued that the statute should be subject only to “intermediate
scrutiny,” which would afford revenge porn less protection than “speech
on pressing political questions.”104 Nonetheless, the court quickly
brushed aside the idea that the speech targeted by the Texas law was
obscene, saying that the statute “does not include language that would
permit a trier of fact to determine that the visual material disclosed is
obscene” and, even if it did, the statute would be “wholly redundant in
light of Texas’s obscenity statutes.”105 Thus, the court spent little time
on anything other than its strict scrutiny analysis, which it used to in-
validate the law.
However, the Vermont court considered in much greater depth the
possibility that revenge porn may not get full First Amendment protec-
tion, potentially creating an opening for new legal arguments on the
issue. In VanBuren, the state argued its revenge porn statute could es-
cape strict scrutiny because it “categorically regulates obscenity.”106 The
court was not persuaded because “a state’s interest in regulating ob-
scenity relates to protecting the sensibilities of those exposed to obscene
works, as opposed to, for example, protecting the privacy or integrity of
the models or actors depicted in obscene images.”107 In other words, ob-
scenity receives less robust First Amendment protection than other
speech because of its ability to offend unwilling recipients of obscene
speech, whereas revenge porn laws aim to protect the privacy and safety
of unwilling subjects. In dismissing the attempt to label revenge porn
as obscenity, the court offered a potentially useful hint: “Vermont’s stat-
ute is more analogous to the restrictions on child pornography that the
Supreme Court has likewise categorically excluded from full First
Amendment protection.”108
Similarly, the court dismissed Vermont’s argument to carve out a
new category of unprotected speech for revenge porn as an extreme in-
vasion of privacy. The court detailed favorably the argument that “non-
consensual pornography seems to be a strong candidate for categorical
exclusion from full First Amendment protections” based on precedent
103 Id.
104 Platoff, supra note 81.
105 Ex Parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *4.
106 VanBuren, 2018 WL 4177776, at *6.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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supporting the government’s ability to regulate speech about purely pri-
vate matters.109 Nonetheless, the court declined to offer such a categor-
ical rule about nonconsensual pornography based on the Supreme
Court’s “emphatic rejection of attempts to name previously unrecog-
nized categories, and the oft-repeated reluctance of the Supreme Court
to adopt broad rules dealing with state regulations protecting individ-
ual privacy as they relate to free speech.”110Ultimately, the court wrote,
“we leave it to the Supreme Court in the first instance to designate non-
consensual pornography as a new category of speech that falls outside
the First Amendment’s full protections.”111
III. CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION FOR
REVENGE PORN
Although they reached different conclusions in assessing their re-
spective states’ revenge porn laws, the courts in Texas and Vermont
each declined to categorically exempt revenge porn from the protection
of the First Amendment. The court in Texas was brief in its assessment
of the issue, as the state mostly conceded the point: “[n]ew categories of
unprotected speech may not be added to the list based on a conclusion
that certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”112 The Vermont Su-
preme Court gave more credence to the idea but nonetheless “decline[d]
to predict” that the Supreme Court would create a new categorical First
Amendment exemption for revenge porn.113 The court based this deci-
sion primarily on United States v. Stevens,114 where the Supreme Court
decided not to recognize a new category outside the First Amendment’s
full protection for depictions of animal cruelty. This decision was based
largely on the lack of historical regulation of such a category of speech
rather than on policy arguments for the proposed category.115
While both courts may have been rightly reluctant to step ahead of
the Supreme Court—and while the Vermont Supreme Court explicitly
suggested the Supreme Court may take a different approach—revenge
porn can and should properly be characterized as low-value speech de-
manding a categorical First Amendment exemption. If given the oppor-
tunity to consider the issue, the Supreme Court should create a cate-
gorical exemption for statutes criminalizing revenge pornography. To
do so would not depart from the Court’s historical approach to First
109 Id. at *11.
110 Id. at *12.
111 Id.
112 Ex Parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *4 (Tex. App. May 16, 2018).
113 VanBuren, 2018 WL 4177776, at *12.
114 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
115 VanBuren, 2018 WL 4177776, at *7.
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Amendment exemptions—despite its holding in Stevens—and would
properly categorize revenge porn as low value. Indeed, a First Amend-
ment exemption for nonconsensual pornography could operate like the
exemption the Supreme Court created for child pornography in Ferber.
Without such an exemption, revenge porn statutes will face an uphill
battle either to be categorized as obscenity or to survive strict scrutiny
when challenged.
A. The History of Categorical Exemptions for Low-Value Speech
While the courts in Jones and VanBuren treated First Amendment
categorical exemptions as stagnant and rooted only in history, a thor-
ough historical analysis reveals this is not the case. In a 2015 article,
Genevieve Lakier challenged the prevailing assumption that the exist-
ence of the “low-value” categories of speech—such as obscenity, libel,
and true threats—have been fixed throughout American history.116 In
fact, Lakier noted, from the country’s founding through the nineteenth
century, courts extended significant First Amendment protection to
many categories of speech that would later be recognized as low
value.117 It was not until the 1930s and 1940s that the Supreme Court
began to broadly categorize high-value and low-value speech, and even
when the court did make such distinctions, it “relied very little on his-
torical precedent to actually define the low-value categories.”118 Nor did
the Supreme Court decide whether to identify new categories of low-
value speech solely based on historical considerations; its decisions on
which categories of speech demand full First Amendment protections
have long been “functional, rather than historical.”119
This history makes the Supreme Court’s assertion in Stevens, that
new categories of low-value speech cannot be created absent a “long-
settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation,” dubious at
best.120 The Vermont Supreme Court quoted Stevens in “rejecting the
notion that the court has ‘freewheeling authority to declare new catego-
ries of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.’”121 In Jones,
Texas’s Twelfth Court of Appeals cited the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association122 to support the idea
116 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 (2015).
117 Id. at 2182.
118 Id. at 2207.
119 Id. at 2210.
120 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
121 State v. VanBuren, No. 16-253, 2018 WL 4177776, at *12 (Vt. Aug. 31, 2018) (citation omit-
ted).
122 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
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that new categories of unprotected speech cannot simply be created be-
cause the legislature concludes they are harmful, an idea that Brown
attributed to Stevens.123 Thus, it is clear that the reasoning behind Ste-
vens has contributed to courts’ reluctance to offer a First Amendment
exemption to revenge porn. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Stevens
leaves open the possibility of creating new categories of low-value
speech “that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been
specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.”124
Within that framework, Stevens is better understood not as fore-
closing the possibility of new First Amendment categorical exemptions
but instead as suggesting that depictions of animal cruelty do not war-
rant the creation of one. In Stevens, the government sought to defend a
statute prohibiting visual and auditory depictions of “conduct in which
a living animal is intentionally harmed.”125 It argued that, because “de-
pictions of illegal acts of animal cruelty . . . necessarily lack expressive
value,” such speech should be added to the list of categorical exemptions
to First Amendment protection.126 The Court rejected the government’s
proposition that categorical exclusions be considered “under a simple
balancing test” of whether the value of the speech outweighs its societal
costs:
As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that [bal-
ancing test] is startling and dangerous. The First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs
and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by
the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the
Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any
attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some
speech is not worth it.127
This passage suggests that balancing tests alone are insufficient
grounds for creating First Amendment categorical exemptions because
they “allow[ ] judges to impose their own values onto the Constitu-
tion.”128 While the Court acknowledged that the notion of a balance of
harms has “descriptive” value in identifying types of exempt expression,
123 Ex Parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *4 (Tex. App. May 16, 2018).
124 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
125 Id. at 1584.
126 Id. at 1585 (internal quotations omitted).
127 Id.
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such a balancing test is insufficient on its own to determine such cate-
gorical exemptions.129 Instead, the Court noted that its exemptions have
arisen from “special case[s]” in which the speech was “intrinsically re-
lated” to an underlying harm.130 Although the Court stressed the lack
of historical regulation of speech depicting animal cruelty to reject the
government’s proposed balancing test, assessments of categorical ex-
emptions must focus on whether the speech in question is integral to a
harm the state seeks to eliminate. In Stevens, the Court did not find the
link between depictions of animal cruelty and the harms of animal cru-
elty itself sufficient to warrant a First Amendment categorical exemp-
tion.131 However, it noted that it “need not foreclose the future recogni-
tion of such additional categories to reject the Government’s highly
manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.”132
Thus, although courts in Vermont and Texas relied on Stevens to
support the contention that the Supreme Court will not create new First
Amendment exemptions without historical precedent, the Court’s rea-
soning in Stevens should be limited to the issue it confronted there. The
depiction of animal cruelty is simply not a strong analogue for noncon-
sensual pornography. The government’s proposition in Stevens that de-
pictions of animal cruelty “necessarily lack expressive value” is similar
to the claim made by Texas lawyers insisting that revenge porn is not
“entitled to the highest level of protection afforded by the First Amend-
ment” because it “is not essential for the marketplace of ideas to func-
tion properly.”133 A clear understanding of Stevens suggests that this
argument is misplaced. Instead of focusing on “expressive value,” the
strongest argument to establish a categorical exemption for revenge
porn is the intrinsic link between its distribution and the infliction of
permanent and repeated harm upon its victims. Because a categorical
exemption for revenge porn would look quite different from the one the
Supreme Court considered in Stevens, the invocation of Stevens in Jones
and VanBuren may be misguided. Nonetheless, it is understandable
that lower courts would hesitate to create a new First Amendment cat-
egorical exemption without Supreme Court guidance, so it is not unrea-
sonable that the Vermont Supreme Court elected to “leave it to the Su-
preme Court.”134
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B. First Amendment Parallels Between Revenge Porn and Child Por-
nography
The need to create a First Amendment categorical exemption for
revenge porn is similar to the recognized exemption for child pornogra-
phy. Despite the potential roadblock presented in Stevens, the Supreme
Court has latitude to identify categories of speech that are newly ex-
empt from First Amendment protection based on the connection be-
tween the speech and its underlying harms. Thus, the Supreme Court
could carve out an exemption for nonconsensual pornography much like
it did for child pornography in New York v. Ferber.135 In Ferber, the pro-
prietor of a bookstore specializing in sexual materials claimed that a
statute banning the dissemination of child pornography violated the
First Amendment.136 The Court wrote that “[r]ecognizing and classify-
ing child pornography as a category of material outside the protection
of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier deci-
sions.”137 Just as Lakier’s article suggests, the Court’s approach in up-
holding a law criminalizing child pornography was rooted in practical
considerations, not entrenched history.138 The Court supported this cat-
egorical exemption—and could do so again—by noting that “the evil to
be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if
any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is re-
quired.”139 Child pornography does not earn full First Amendment pro-
tection because it “bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of
children engaged in its production,” so “the balance of competing inter-
ests is clearly struck.”140
But Ferber’s creation of a categorical exemption for child pornogra-
phy is rooted not merely in the danger of the speech itself but rather in
the relationship between the dissemination of child pornography and
its ongoing harms. As the Court explained:
The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual ac-
tivity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of
children in at least two ways. First, the materials produced are
a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm
to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second, the dis-
tribution network for child pornography must be closed if the
135 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
136 Id. at 751.
137 Id. at 763.
138 Lakier, supra note 116, at 2218.
139 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64.
140 Id. at 764.
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production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of
children is to be effectively controlled.141
Thus, laws prohibiting the distribution of child pornography ad-
dress two distinct harms of that speech: the harm from creating the
video, during which a child is forced to engage in sexual activity, and
the harm from the dissemination and the “permanent record” of the ma-
terial. In that sense, the distribution of images or videos is a part of the
abuse itself, which means banning that distribution is essential to curb-
ing child sexual abuse. Notably, the depictions of animal abuse consid-
ered in Stevens do not present this brand of harm, as the dissemination
of images and videos of animal abuse does not “intrinsically” compound
that abuse.142 In other words, while animal abuse is illegal, the spread
of materials documenting that abuse does not impose harm on the ani-
mals themselves, whereas the spread of child pornography exacerbates
the harm felt by its victims.
However, when the distribution of speech or material is not inte-
gral to an underlying harm, that speech is unlikely to garner a categor-
ical exemption from First Amendment protection. This notion is made
clear in contrasting Ferber and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.143 In
Ashcroft, the government sought to defend provisions of the Child Por-
nography Prevention Act of 1996 from a First Amendment challenge.144
Although Ferber created a categorical exemption for the dissemination
of child pornography, the provisions at issue in Ashcroft banned “child
pornography that does not depict an actual child,” whether as “virtual
child pornography” or as depictions that “appear to be” of minors engag-
ing in sexual conduct.145 The Court noted that such depictions “do not
involve, let alone harm, any children in the production process” and
scoffed that the statute’s literal terms could criminalize “a Renaissance
painting depicting a scene from classical mythology.”146 Ultimately,
criminalizing speech that merely appears to be child pornography is
distinct from Ferber because it “records no crime and creates no victims
by its production,” thus eliminating the “intrinsic[]” relationship be-
tween the distribution of child pornography and its harms.147 Because
141 Id. at 759.
142 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.
143 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
144 Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1396.
145 Id. at 1397.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1402.
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the production of child pornography that is not actually child pornogra-
phy does not in itself harm children, the law challenged in Ashcroft was
not within the purview of Ferber.
This nuanced distinction between the categorical exemption devel-
oped in Ferber and cases like Stevens and Ashcroft creates a framework
to develop a First Amendment exemption for nonconsensual pornogra-
phy. Laws prohibiting the dissemination of child pornography in Ferber
addressed the harms arising both from the creation and distribution of
the material. In Stevens, the distribution of depictions of animal cruelty
did not cause the animals to suffer any additional harm. In Ashcroft,
there were no real victims harmed by the creation of virtual images who
could be further harmed by their distribution. Conversely, the harms of
nonconsensual pornography are rooted in its dissemination, and stat-
utes prohibiting that dissemination attempt to address the idea that
such distribution creates victims. Undoubtedly, the creation of child
pornography is far more sinister than the creation of sexually explicit
images between adults, especially when such images are created con-
sensually within the confines of a romantic relationship. However,
when images or videos are obtained without consent—in the form of
voyeuristic upskirt videos, peephole videos, or depictions of sexual as-
saults—the creation of such material is itself a crime, and its dissemi-
nation exacerbates the harm to the victim.148 These cases create the
closest analogue to Ferber and highlight a clear need for categorically
exempting the dissemination of such material from First Amendment
protection.
But even when the sexually explicit material is initially created
with the victim’s consent, the harm resulting from its nonconsensual
distribution closely parallels that described in Ferber. The Court in Fer-
ber emphasized that the “materials produced are a permanent record of
the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by
their circulation.”149 Additionally, because of that harm, the value of the
distribution of the material “is irrelevant to the child who has been
abused.”150 In Ferber, the Court deferred to legislative judgment that
“the use of children as subjects in pornographic materials is harmful to
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child,” and that
each step in the reproduction and dissemination of the material com-
pounds the trauma of the victim.151 Modern stories and studies about
the impacts of revenge porn paint a similar picture: victims cannot es-
cape the presence of their explicit images, struggle to remove them from
148 See Talbot, supra note 36.
149 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 759.
150 Id. at 761.
151 Id. at 758.
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web searches and social media, and find it nearly impossible to outrun
their impact in professional and personal settings.152 Victims whose im-
ages are posted on sites catering to revenge porn are often harassed,
stalked, and physically threatened.153 If anything, the intrinsic distri-
bution harms described in Ferber—decided nearly four decades ago—
are worsened exponentially by the use of modern technology to fuel re-
venge porn. Even when there is no harm in the consensual creation of
a sexually explicit image, its nonconsensual dissemination online cre-
ates permanent repercussions for victims that can be at least as harm-
ful as those associated with child pornography.
Thus, the Supreme Court could craft a categorical First Amend-
ment exemption to revenge porn that mirrors the approach it took to-
ward child pornography in Ferber. As the #MeToo Movement grows and
stories of revenge porn’s harms come to the fore, evidence that the non-
consensual distribution of sexually explicit material bears “heavily and
pervasively” on victims’ welfare is exceedingly strong. Victims of re-
venge porn are overwhelmingly young, female, LGBTQ, or members of
another minority group, and their lives are forever changed by the dis-
semination of a single sexually explicit image.154 They suffer physical,
financial, and emotional hardship as a result of the distribution of their
images—that is, revenge porn attacks the welfare of its victims and of-
ten permanently impacts their lives. Moreover, the fear of dissemina-
tion of an explicit image is often an intrinsic part of an abusive relation-
ship insofar as the abuser will force the victim to stay in a relationship
by threatening to share the material if the victim leaves.155 By the Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in Ferber—and an understanding, rooted in
Lakier’s arguments, that the Court can and should create First Amend-
ment exemptions by weighing “the expressive value of speech against
its social costs”156—there are strong reasons for the Supreme Court to
create a new categorical exemption from First Amendment protection
for revenge porn when the Court reviews the constitutionality of the
revenge porn statutes.
Finally, the Vermont Supreme Court in VanBuren details the com-
pelling argument that extreme invasions of privacy like revenge porn
are “historically unprotected, but . . . not yet . . . specifically identified,”
per Stevens.157 This means that, in addition to the bevy of practical and
152 See Citron, supra note 1.
153 Id.
154 See Janjigian, supra note 4.
155 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 351.
156 Lakier, supra note 116, at 2212.
157 State v. VanBuren, No. 16-253, 2018 WL 4177776, at *7 (Vt. Aug. 31, 2018) (citation omit-
ted).
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policy implications that support stamping out revenge porn and curbing
its impact on victims, the longstanding legal tradition of safeguarding
privacy supports a categorical exemption for revenge porn as well. The
Vermont court notes that the “Supreme Court has never struck down a
restriction of speech on purely private matters that protected an indi-
vidual who is not a public figure from an invasion of privacy or similar
harms.”158 Instead, the Supreme Court has considered the private and
public interests at stake on a case-by-case basis.159 Even in cases where
the Court upheld the free speech right, it was careful to not diminish
privacy interests. For example, the Vermont court in VanBuren noted
that the Supreme Court had never held “that truthful publication is
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of per-
sonal privacy within which the State may protect the individual from
intrusion.”160 The lengthy legal history that supports a right to privacy
even against First Amendment considerations thus provides an addi-
tional reason for the Supreme Court to draw a categorical exemption
from First Amendment protection for nonconsensual pornography. Cou-
pled with the weight of the intrinsic “evil to be restricted” as described
in Ferber, these clear historical standards create a strong case for the
categorical exemption of revenge porn, even under the ostensibly re-
strictive framework laid out in Stevens.
C. Revenge Porn and Modern Conceptions of Consent
Those hesitant to criminalize revenge porn present First Amend-
ment and practical concerns, but a categorical exemption for revenge
porn would comport with modern understandings of consent in the #Me-
Too era. John Humbach’s 2014 article notes that revenge porn does not
fall into the Supreme Court’s delineated categorical exceptions to the
First Amendment and far more closely resembles “emotionally distress-
ing speech” that nonetheless receives full constitutional protection.161
Further, Humbach argues that revenge porn laws prevent dissemina-
tion of true, albeit harmful, information.162 Thus, although revenge
porn may lead to “definite individualized harm” for victims such as the
loss of employment opportunities, the fact that it “conveys information
that matters, at least to some people” should afford revenge porn First
Amendment protection even if that information is harmful.163 Essen-
158 Id. at *8.
159 Id.
160 Id. at *9 (citation omitted).
161 John A. Humbach, The Constitution and Revenge Porn, 35 PACE L. REV. 215, 237 (2014).
162 Id. at 226.
163 Id. at 228.
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tially, Humbach suggests that an employer evaluating a potential can-
didate—or anyone evaluating someone in a social setting—may want to
know about conduct that reflects the character of that person, and the
decision to take and send a nude photo may be useful information even
if it harms the victim.
But Humbach’s approach understates the harmful impact of re-
venge porn on its victims and conflates a personal decision to intimately
share an explicit image with the experience of seeing one’s explicit im-
age disseminated without consent. Perhaps this argument would be
stronger if the impacts of revenge porn were solely professional, but vic-
tims of revenge porn face stalking, harassment, and physical threats
and abuse in addition to lasting economic and professional hardship.
Those professional hardships should not be minimized, as women today
struggle within the workplace to escape the cultural reach of sex dis-
crimination. Moreover, Humbach’s idea that criminalizing revenge
porn restricts “the free flow of information concerning the activities that
it reveals” narrows the importance of consent by suggesting that a vic-
tim’s proclivity to share photos within an intimate relationship “re-
veals” something worth knowing.164 To the extent that it does, there re-
mains a vital difference between knowing that someone shares explicit
photos with an intimate partner and seeing the photos themselves. Cit-
ron and Franks aptly state that “[c]onsent to share information in one
context does not serve as consent to share this information in another
context. . . . Consent is contextual; it is not an on/off switch.”165 The ar-
gument for the Supreme Court to classify revenge porn as speech cate-
gorically exempt from full First Amendment protection is supported by
the Court’s precedent and history. That support is not at all eroded by
misguided suggestions that laws criminalizing revenge porn halt the
free flow of truthful information.
Finally, Humbach’s assertion wrongly minimizes the impact of ma-
terial that was not obtained consensually at all. In addition to conflat-
ing consensual creation with consensual distribution, this line of criti-
cism—much like state laws requiring a romantic relationship between
the defendant and the victim—presents too narrow a conception of non-
consensual pornography. While “revenge porn” conjures up headlines
about jilted exes, “[s]ometimes people surreptitiously film consensual
sex acts, or even rapes, and make the footage public for reasons other
than revenge.”166 Accordingly, the suggestion that revenge porn be cat-
egorically exempt from the First Amendment encompasses nonconsen-
164 Id. at 230.
165 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 355.
166 Talbot, supra note 36.
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sual pornography of all stripes, including voyeuristic recordings, depic-
tions of nonconsensual sexual acts, and sexually explicit material
shared coercively within the confines of an abusive relationship. The
latter example is particularly confounding to Humbach’s conception of
consent, since the exchange of sexually explicit materials is “often part
of a pattern of coercive domestic abuse.”167 In that context, a victim’s
choice to create an image may not be much of a choice at all, notwith-
standing the fact that such creation does not support dissemination. All
told, nonconsensual pornography can have numerous origins and mech-
anisms of distribution, and material need not be created consensually
to fall within the purview of an appropriate First Amendment categor-
ical exemption.
D. The Ill-Fitting Obscenity Exemption
Rather than placing nonconsensual pornography in a new categor-
ical exemption from First Amendment protection, some scholars argue
that revenge porn could fit within the obscenity exemption. Citron and
Franks gesture toward the idea that “nonconsensual pornography can
be seen as part of obscenity’s long tradition of proscription.”168 Other
authors argue that, because the “Supreme Court respects each state’s
‘long-recognized legitimate interest in regulating the use of obscene ma-
terial,’” lawyers defending state revenge porn statutes should try to
classify them as obscene to garner an existing categorical exemption.169
This argument notes that “prurience and patent offensiveness are ap-
parently permissible grounds on which to discriminate,” so revenge
porn statutes that criminalize sexually explicit material can be con-
strued as criminalizing obscenity and thus avoid the hurdle of strict
scrutiny review.170
The problem with this argument is that the revenge porn statutes
in question do not aim to restrain sexually explicit material itself but
rather the conduct associated with its dissemination. Nonconsensual
pornography is harmful not necessarily because the images exist in the
first place, but because those images are disseminated. While an image
obtained or created without consent is harmful on its own, many mod-
ern couples value the ability to consensually exchange intimate pho-
tos.171 Trying to place revenge porn laws under the categorical cover of
the obscenity exemption misstates the aim of these statutes, which are
167 McGlynn, supra note 42.
168 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 384.
169 Kitchen, supra note 62 at 278 (citation omitted).
170 Id. (citation omitted).
171 See Alter, supra note 19.
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not geared toward criminalizing images but rather toward prohibiting
the conduct associated with their nonconsensual distribution. Thus,
this argument conflates the consensual and nonconsensual sharing of
explicit images just as Humbach’s does and, if carried forward, may
threaten the potency of revenge porn laws in addressing the actual
harm of dissemination. The Vermont Supreme Court recognized the Su-
preme Court’s unwillingness to “shoehorn speech about violence into
obscenity” in rejecting the suggestion in Brown that violent video games
fit within that categorical exemption.172 The VanBuren Court’s obser-
vation that the “purposes underlying government regulation of obscen-
ity and of nonconsensual pornography are distinct [and] the defining
characteristics of the regulated speech are accordingly quite different”
wisely demonstrates that obscenity and revenge porn do not fit together
under one First Amendment exemption.173
E. Overcoming the Strict Scrutiny Hurdle
Creating a categorical exemption for revenge porn will provide clar-
ity to the messy picture of emerging statutes and protect them from
strict scrutiny review. For now, absent word from the Supreme Court
or a state court willing to create its own categorical exemption for non-
consensual pornography, statutes criminalizing revenge porn have to
withstand strict scrutiny analysis if challenged in court. Some observ-
ers may argue that this status quo is not problematic. After all, state
court decisions in Vermont and Texas—although reaching different con-
clusions—appear to offer relatively clear guidelines for how a statute
can survive a legal challenge. The Texas statute was initially too broad
because it did not require knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent or
intent to do harm, thereby including in its sweep actors who may have
shared images without clear criminal elements. The Vermont statute
was upheld because it, as construed by the Vermont Supreme Court,
required knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent as well as intent to
do harm in disseminating an image.174 Thus, a revenge porn statute
that simply looks like Vermont’s law and avoids the pitfalls of Texas’s
original law should stand up in court.
But not all legal challenges are so simple, and the forty-seven re-
venge porn laws enacted to date leave us with more questions than
courts in Texas and Vermont may have answered. Although activists
have made their case for states to adopt stringent laws prohibiting non-
consensual pornography, a survey of the enacted statutes shows a
172 State v. VanBuren, No. 16-253, 2018 WL 4177776, at *7 (Vt. Aug. 31, 2018).
173 Id. at *6.
174 Id. at *17.
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sweepingly incoherent legal landscape. Citron and Franks offered nu-
merous clear and cogent suggestions in their 2014 article. Five years
later, dozens of states have developed statutes that jumble intent to
harm, knowledge of the lack of consent, actual harm, and the victim’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. It remains unclear how these various
legal thresholds will work together, and no one state law perfectly mir-
rors any other. Thus, notwithstanding persuasive policy recommenda-
tions from Citron, Franks, and other scholars who have tackled the is-
sue, state legislatures have made progress in implementing revenge
porn laws but have done little to mitigate confusion surrounding them.
Similarly, despite the ostensibly logical results in Jones and
VanBuren, neither case seems to have resolved the law in its respective
state. Instead, these decisions left scholars puzzled and the losing side
contemplating appeals, meaning these battles may be far from over.175
Further, the lack of uniformity of state laws likely means more lawsuits
are coming, which will provide additional insight—and doubtless create
additional questions—over criminal elements like intent to harm, ac-
tual harm, and the violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Ul-
timately, these questions seem destined to be resolved by the Supreme
Court, but the wide array of state laws means that the high court’s take
on revenge porn may depend significantly on the statute it confronts.
Given this litany of lingering questions, legal activists should not rest
on their laurels and merely hope that the ruling in VanBuren offers a
blueprint for drafting a constitutional revenge porn law. Instead, they
should push for a categorical exemption to full First Amendment pro-
tection for these laws in order to increase their impact and limit the
legal hurdles to rooting out nonconsensual pornography.
IV. CONCLUSION
Revenge porn is a uniquely twenty-first century phenomenon, ex-
acerbated by the sinister capabilities of modern technology and ampli-
fied by the #MeToo Movement’s engagement in new dialogues about re-
lationships, consent, and sexual abuse. To curb its harms, states have
laudably begun implementing new laws criminalizing the nonconsen-
sual distribution of sexually explicit images. Yet, the most significant
legal triumph over revenge porn would be classifying it as categorically
exempt from the full protection of the First Amendment. Doing so would
match the Supreme Court’s historical approach in evaluating low-value
speech based on its harmful nature. In fact, the rationale underlying
the Supreme Court’s decision to exempt the distribution of child por-
175 See Ehrenkranz, supra note 82; Davis, supra note 97.
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nography from First Amendment protection is echoed in modern discus-
sions of revenge porn. Activists leading the charge against revenge porn
should emphasize this connection. The need for a contemporary cate-
gorical exemption for revenge porn is bolstered by the pervasive threat
to victims from online dissemination as well as modern understandings
of consent in the #MeToo era.
Conversely, trying to place nonconsensual pornography within the
existing categorical exemption for obscenity or attempting to clarify a
messy landscape of state statutes in hopes that they can survive strict
scrutiny are unlikely to be successful approaches. The creation of a First
Amendment categorical exemption for revenge porn will empower leg-








E heard, “[we are] not a hospital and [we are not] doctors” as she
lay for eight days bleeding out and crying as she miscarried, losing her
son during the fourth month of her pregnancy.1 Emma heard, “No, don’t
tell me anything. You all say the same thing,” as she tried to explain
that she was a pregnant as a result of rape.2 Teresa heard no response
as she complained on several different occasions that she was in pain,
that she was bleeding profusely despite being four months pregnant,
and that she needed to go to a hospital.3
What do E, Emma, and Teresa have in common? They were all
pregnant immigrant detainees confined to United States detention cen-
ters who were shackled around their hands, legs, and stomach.
In December 2017, the Trump administration instituted a Depart-
ment of Homeland Security policy allowing for the detention of preg-
nant women in their first and second trimesters.4 The new Immigration
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and Customs Enforcement (ICE) directive, which failed to be announced
until March despite its earlier implementation, ended the Obama ad-
ministration’s August 2016 policy to refrain from detaining pregnant
women whose immigration cases are pending except in extreme circum-
stances.5 The 2016 policy change was prompted by ICE’s acknowledge-
ment of the larger consensus among humanitarian and medical organ-
izations that shackling and other forms of mistreatment are harmful to
the health of expectant women and that its detention centers are not
prepared to meet their unique medical needs.6 Due to President
Trump’s executive orders on immigration,7 though, this reasonable ra-
tionale has been swept aside in favor of incarcerating pregnant women
who have yet to reach their third trimester.8 The ICE directive has also
eliminated reporting procedures that previously allowed outside agen-
cies to monitor ICE’s detention facilities and the treatment of women.9
Furthermore, despite the new policy’s directions not to hold women
in their third trimester and to provide appropriate medical care, preg-
nant detainees’ testimonies prove that this portion of the directive is
being ignored.10 In fact, pregnant detainees often are not given proper
medical care, are physically and psychologically mistreated, and are
shackled around the stomach.11 The treatment within detention centers
is often re-traumatizing for these women, especially since many of these
women’s pregnancies are a result of sexual assaults.12
Part I of this Comment describes in more detail the physical and
mental suffering inflicted on pregnant detainees during their time in
detention centers. It further discusses the ICE detention standards and
the 2017 ICE directive’s contravention of them. Part II goes on to review
42 U.S.C. § 198313 claims brought forth by past prisoners, alleging vio-
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Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
8 O’Connor, supra note 1.
9 López, supra note 4.
10 O’Connor, supra note 1.
11 See e.g., id.
12 At least three of the ten women who filed complaints testified to becoming pregnant as a
result of sexual assaults, whether in their home country or on their journey into the United States.
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 6–9.
13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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lations of their Eighth Amendment rights under the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard. The Comment goes on to recognize that pretrial detain-
ees, though they are non-convicted, have been tried by courts under this
same subjective standard. It points out, though, that a recent United
States Supreme Court decision, Kingsley v. Hendrickson,14 applied an
objective standard to a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claims. In
turn, it has led to a circuit split in which the Ninth, Second, and Seventh
Circuits interpret this objective standard to extend to all Fourteenth
Amendment claims while the Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits do
not. Part III then evaluates how international law, through its conven-
tions and cases, has weighed in on the treatment of detainees and, thus,
might affect courts’ decision making.
Due to the broad wording of Kingsley and the similar injuries, both
physical and constitutional, of excessive force and other Fourteenth
Amendment claims, this Comment argues in Part IV that courts should
interpret Kingsley to apply the objective standard to all Fourteenth
Amendment, § 1983 claims of pretrial detainees. This reading not only
is backed up by the Court’s decision in Kingsley, but also will provide a
more favorable standard for pretrial detainees. Part V further asserts
that international law, especially relevant given that pregnant detain-
ees are foreign nationals, supports this assertion and should be used by
courts as persuasive authority. Finally, Part VI of this Comment re-
sponds to counterarguments by contending that current and pending
domestic laws do not apply to or adequately protect pregnant pretrial
detainees.
Given the increasing number of pregnant detainees within U.S. de-
tention centers,15 this inhumane treatment needs to be legally ad-
dressed as soon as possible. In fact, the #MeToo Movement demands
that this treatment of pregnant women be stopped and that their rights
and dignity be acknowledged. This Comment concludes, then, that the
best course of action courts can take is to extend the Kingsley decision
to Fourteenth Amendment claims other than excessive force. Especially
in light of the support provided by international law, such an interpre-
tation not only is legally correct but also would provide justice for preg-
nant immigrant detainees, who should have never been mistreated or
shackled in the first place.
14 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
15 By April 2018, 506 pregnant women had already been detained since December’s policy
reversal. Compare this to 292 pregnant women detained between January andMay of 2017. Jones,
supra note 4.
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I. ANOVERVIEW OF ICE DETENTION CONDITIONS, STANDARDS, AND
DIRECTIVES
A. Physical and Mental Harms to Pregnant Detainees
Pregnant detainees, who are often asylum seekers fleeing violence
in their own countries, have shared similar accounts of inadequate med-
ical attention andmistreatment. They report detention officers ignoring
their requests for or delaying medical care, even when they are in se-
vere pain, bleeding out, or miscarrying.16 Detention staff also failed to
refer women with high-risk pregnancies to specialists.17 When women
are given medical attention, their physicians often fail to inquire about
their physical or mental state and to provide them with prenatal vita-
mins.18 Due to this inadequate health care, pregnant detainees report
having headaches, abdominal pain, weakness, nausea, and vomiting.19
Additionally, women attest that the detention centers are over-
crowded, the food makes them nauseous, the mattresses, if any, are
thin, and viruses, such those causing the flu and diarrhea, are ram-
pant.20 Emma, mentioned in the introduction, said that she could not
sleep at the facility due to the crying of the detained children.21
In addition, shackling of pregnant detainees persists despite being
a dangerous practice that poses unacceptable health risks to expectant
mothers and children.22 Restraints can leave deep gashes on expectant
mothers’ ankles, bruise their abdomens, and decrease their stability,
which increases their likelihood of falling, harming themselves or their
child, and miscarrying.23 During labor, shackling prevents physicians
16 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 5. For example, Teresa, mentioned
in the Introduction, eventually miscarried due to lack of medical attention and was later denied
any pain relief medication, causing her to have headaches and dramatically lose weight. Id. at 9.
17 Id.
18 One doctor even failed to give a twenty-four-year-old Honduran her vaccinations; instead,
he gave them to her five-year-old daughter who had already received them. Id. at 7, 12.
19 See, e.g., López, supra note 4. See also Jones, supra note 4 (recounting Jacinta Morales’
similar detention conditions that eventually led to her miscarriage). It should be noted that, aside
from nausea and vomiting, these are not common pregnancy symptoms. Furthermore, these
women reported being nauseous and vomiting after being detained. See What Are Some Common
Signs of Pregnancy?, NICHD: EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILDHEALTH
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2018), https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/pregnancy/condition-
info/signs [https://perma.cc/ZGY6-FQYS].
20 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 6, 7, 11.
21 Id. at 8.
22 See O’Connor, supra note 1; Hilary Hammell, The International Human Right to Safe and
Humane Treatment During Pregnancy and a Theory for Its Application in U.S. Courts, 33WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 244, 250 n.49 (2012) (citing a Human Rights Watch report that found pregnant women
in immigration detention are routinely shackled.).
23 See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, Health Care for Pregnant and
Postpartum Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females, THEAMERICANCOLLEGE OFOBSTETRIC-
IANS ANDGYNECOLOGISTS (Nov. 2011), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Commit
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from safely assisting pregnant women, limits women’s critical need to
move during labor, and causes complications such as hemorrhaging and
decreased fetal heart rate.24 It may also delay a woman’s caesarian sec-
tion, which could cause permanent brain damage to the child.25 Post-
partum shackling may prevent women from healing properly and
breast-feeding.26
Pregnant women’s mental health is endangered in detention as
well. The lack of access to health care, the physical harms suffered, the
separation from their families, and the uncertainty of immigration pro-
ceedings leave pregnant detainees severely stressed. Indeed, most
women have attested to feeling isolated, depressed, and anxious.27
Many pregnant detainees are also survivors of abuse and are either
fleeing their abuser or are pregnant due to sexual assault.28 They often
find the mistreatment in the detention facilities and the preparation for
a credible fear interview29 with an asylum officer to be re-traumatiz-
ing.30 All interviewed pregnant detainees worried that this mental pres-
sure adversely affected their pregnancies; this fear of stress thus causes
pregnant detainees to be more stressed.31 Acute stress during preg-
nancy, especially in the final trimester, could then lead to preterm
births,32 which often lead to higher rates of child death or disability.33
tee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co511.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20181030T0057284577 [https
://perma.cc/A4SK-XHYM]; The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison
Project, ACLU Briefing Paper: The Shackling of Pregnant Women & Girls in U.S. Prisons, Jails &
Youth Detention Centers, ACLU: AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNION, 3 (2018), https://www.aclu.org
/files/assets/anti-shackling_briefing_paper_stand_alone.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GDZ-G265].
24 See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, supra note 23; United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Women and Imprisonment 20 (2nd ed. 2014). See also
The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 23, at 4.
25 See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, supra note 23; United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Women and Imprisonment 20 (2nd ed. 2014); see also
The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 23, at 4.
26 See Dana L. Sichel, Giving Birth in Shackles: A Constitutional and Human Rights Viola-
tion, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y&L. 223, 225 (2007); The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Pro-
ject and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 23, at 3 (citing Dr. Patricia Garcia’s statement
to the Chicago Legal Aid to Incarcerated Mothers in December 1998).
27 See American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 5–12.
28 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 2, 6–9.
29 This is an interview with an asylum officer to establish a credible fear of persecution. Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 2.
30 For example, a twenty-eight-year-old from Honduras attested to the traumatic preparation
for her credible fear interview in which she was forced to disclose her history of domestic and
sexual violence in detail. American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 6.
31 Id. at 5.
32 This is the testimony of Sera Bonds, founder and CEO of Circle of Health International,
who has cared pregnant women after they have been released from detention centers. Madhuri
Sathish, Pregnant Immigrants Are Being Shackled at the Border & Lawmakers Want to End That
Practice, BUSTLE (July 26, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/pregnant-immigrants-are-being-shack
led-at-the-border-lawmakers-want-to-end-that-practice-9892600 [https://perma.cc/L6RB-HRDY].
33 Disabilities include “breathing problems, feeding difficulties, cerebral palsy, developmental
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B. ICE Standards and Directives
To deter such harms, medical organizations34 have drafted preg-
nancy-related care standards to guide prisons and jails. In addition to
condemning the shackling of pregnant women, they recommend thor-
oughly documenting all pregnancies and the care provided, screening
and counseling women, referring high-risk pregnancies to the appropri-
ate physicians, and providing essential prenatal care.35
ICE adopted the medical organizations’ standards in the 2011 ICE
Performance Based National Detention Standard (PBNDS) on Medical
Care for Women. ICE acknowledges that pregnancy constitutes a spe-
cial vulnerability and may put detainees at a higher risk for victimiza-
tion or assault.36 Detention centers must provide prenatal care and
counseling “inclusive of, but not limited to: nutrition, exercise, compli-
cations of pregnancy, prenatal vitamins, labor and delivery, postpartum
care, lactation, family planning, abortion services, and parental skills
education.”37 Detention centers must also offer pregnant detainees
“temperature-appropriate” clothing and blankets, beds in their holding
cells, and more food during meals.38 The PBNDS also bars the shackling
of women who are pregnant or recovering post-partum, “‘absent truly
extraordinary circumstances.’”39
Following the PBNDS and recognizing the harms of detaining preg-
nant women, the Obama administration released a policy in August
2016 barring the detention of pregnant women unless the mandatory
detention statute applied or “extraordinary circumstances” existed.40 If
delay, vision problems, and hearing problems.” Preterm Birth, CENTERS FORDISEASECONTROL AN-
DPREVENTION (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pret
ermbirth.htm [https://perma.cc/5VW9-H6A7].
34 These include the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC), American
Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), and American Public Health Association
(APHA).
35 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 4 (citing Committee Opinion: Health
Care for Pregnant and Postpartum Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females, THE AMERICAN




36 ICE Performance Based Detention Standards, 2.2 Custody Classification System, U.S.
IMMIGRATION ANDCUSTOMSENFORCEMENT (rev. Dec. 2016) 62, 70, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dete
ntion-standards/2011/2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9K-W9Y7].
37 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 4. See also ICE Performance Based
Detention Standards, 4.4 Medical Care (Women), U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(rev. Dec. 2016) 324–25, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/4-4.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/SYC8-KM6J].
38 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 4.
39 Id. (citation omitted).
40 ICE Policy 11032.2: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainee, supra note 5. See
also American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 3.
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a pregnant woman was detained, ICE needed to evaluate each week
whether her continued confinement was necessary.41 In spite of this di-
rective, attorneys and other advocates reported in November 2016 that
detention centers and officers continued to detain and shackle pregnant
immigrant women.42
A little over a year later, in December 2017, the Trump administra-
tion repealed this directive and gave ICE the power to detain pregnant
women in their first and second trimesters.43 Its policy also removes the
mandated reporting mechanisms through which outside organizations
monitored ICE’s detention centers and treatment of pregnant detain-
ees.44 Given this extension of ICE’s abilities and lack of supervision,
hundreds—and counting—of pregnant immigrant women have contin-
ued to be detained, shackled, and subjected to inhumane conditions.45
II. DOMESTIC LAW: THEDELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD VS.
THEOBJECTIVE STANDARD
When subjected to repeated abuses and mistreatment, pregnant
immigrant detainees are afforded avenues to bring forth cases against
detention officials, medical staff, detention centers, and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security. Historically, pregnant detainees, like con-
victed prisoners, have brought suits under 42 U.S.C. § 198346 against
state actors, claiming violations of their Eighth Amendment47 rights,
which are extended to pretrial detainees through the Fourteenth
Amendment.48 But a recent Supreme Court decision, Kingsley v. Hen-
drickson,49 suggests that pregnant detainees are entitled to more pro-
tection than convicted prisoners and that they should be tried under a
different standard, which has led to a circuit split.
41 ICE Policy 11032.2: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainee, supra note 5.
42 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 3.
43 ICE Directive 11032.3: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainees, supra note 4.
See also López, supra note 4.
44 Id.
45 López, supra note 4.
46 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2012) (providing the cause of action for a claim that “[a] person . . . under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” violated a federally
protected constitutional or statutory right).
47 U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
48 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”).
49 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
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A. Eighth Amendment Protections Afforded Convicted Pregnant
Prisoners (and Extended to Pregnant Detainees)
Given that courts have historically viewed pregnant detainees’
cases under the same standard as those of pregnant prisoners, it is
worthwhile to explore the history and merits of those cases. This history
begins with Estelle v. Gamble.50
In Estelle, the Supreme Court acknowledged prisoners’ right to re-
ceive adequate medical treatment. The Court held that prison officials’
deliberate indifference to incarcerated persons’ serious medical needs
constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and thus
violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.51 Indeed, denying prisoners medical care could cause them
pain and suffering that does not serve a legitimate penological pur-
pose.52 Furthermore, the Court found that prison guards’ intentional
denial or delay of prisoners’ access to medical care constitutes deliber-
ate indifference.53 Thus, the Court in Estelle created the deliberate in-
difference standard, a subjective standard requiring plaintiffs to show
that the defendant intended harm and actually believed harm would
likely occur.54
By 1994, the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan55 established
that two elements must be satisfied to establish that defendants vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs must show that defendants: (1)
exposed them to a substantial risk of serious harm56 and (2) were delib-
erately indifferent to their constitutional rights.57 The Court acknowl-
edged that deliberate indifference was a vague phrase and attempted
to clarify it as a standard of reckless disregard, though it acknowledged
that this explanation was equally vague.58 By this time, the Court had
50 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
51 Id. at 104–05 (citing to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
52 Id. at 103.
53 Id. at 104.
54 See, e.g., Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cty. of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2014).
55 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
56 Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
57 Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–03). See also Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating the two necessary elements).
58 Id. at 836–37 (concluding that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference).
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also extended the deliberate indifference standard to other types of
claims such as failure-to-protect59 and conditions of confinement.60
Pretrial detainees, though, have different standing than prisoners.
Detainees, unlike sentenced inmates, have yet to be tried for their
crimes.61 Given this lack of adjudication of guilt, courts must scrutinize
pretrial detainees’ claims under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.62 Whereas the Eighth
Amendment allows for the punishment of sentenced prisoners so long
as it is not cruel and unusual, the Due Process Clause mandates that
pretrial detainees not be punished.63
Despite this acknowledged difference, courts have usually exam-
ined the claims of pretrial detainees under the Eighth Amendment’s
standards. This is due to the Supreme Court’s vague explanation of
what deprivations the state can subject pretrial detainees to short of
punishment. Indeed, the Court in Bell v. Wolfish64 stated that, while a
detainee does not have a fundamental liberty interest under the Four-
teenth Amendment to be free from discomfort, a condition or restriction
of pretrial detention must be “reasonably related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective.”65 Given this ambiguous and broad definition,
courts have relied on the Court’s repeated assertion that pretrial de-
tainees’ due process rights “are at least as great as the Eighth Amend-
ment protections available to a convicted prisoner”66 to extend Eighth
Amendment scrutiny to pretrial detainees’ claims.
Under these Eighth Amendment standards, both pregnant prison-
ers and pregnant detainees have brought § 1983 claims alleging delib-
erate indifference to their serious medical needs. Circuits, though, have
interpreted the deliberate indifference standard differently.
59 Id. at 837.
60 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303.
61 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979).
62 Id. at 535, 535 n.16.
63 Id. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment scru-
tiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees tradition-
ally associated with criminal prosecutions.”); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317–18 (1946)
(“[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned
until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.
Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent consti-
tutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
64 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) and
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
65 Id. at 539.
66 City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). See also Bell, 441 U.S. at 545.
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1. The Second, Eighth, and Sixth Circuits have found inade-
quate medical care and shackling to meet the deliberate indif-
ference standard
The Second Circuit heard the case of a pregnant prisoner who
claimed that county jail officials intentionally delayed her medical care
when she suffered severe pain and subsequently miscarried.67 Despite
disagreements on the plaintiff’s health status and timing of emergency
medical care, the Second Circuit stated that “[t]hese assertions, how-
ever disputed, do raise material factual issues.68 After all, if the defend-
ants did decide to delay emergency medical aid—even for ‘only’ five
hours—in order to make Archer suffer, surely a claim would be stated
under Estelle.”69
The Eighth Circuit has also found ignoring pregnant prisoners’
bleeding constitutes deliberate indifference and violates their right to
medical care. In Boswell v. Sherburne,70 a pregnant pretrial detainee
told the county jail upon her admittance to the county that she was
pregnant and experiencing troubling symptoms.71Despite being alerted
to her medical condition, jailers ignored her constant bleeding, her pas-
sage of blood clots, her cramping, and her requests for a physician.72
When she was finally transferred to a hospital, she gave birth in the
ambulance and lost her newborn son thirty-four minutes later.73 The
Eighth Circuit found that officials’ denial of her requests violated her
right to medical care.74
The Eighth Circuit, along with the Sixth Circuit, also found that
shackling pregnant women during labor violated their Eighth Amend-
ment rights. In 2009, the Eighth Circuit heard Nelson v. Correctional
Medical Services,75 which involved a former pregnant inmate who was
shackled during labor.76 As a result of the restraints, Ms. Nelson suffers
67 Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
68 Id. at 16.
69 Id.
70 849 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1988).
71 Id. at 1120.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1123; see also Pool v. Sebastian Cty., 418 F.3d 934, 944 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that
it would have been obvious to even a layperson that a pregnant prisoner complaining of bleeding
and extreme pain from cramping, which inhibited her ability to eat and shower, indicated that she
needed medical attention); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the nurse
on duty’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s history of premature deliveries and failure to examine the
plaintiff when she voiced her concerns showed the nurse’s deliberate indifference towards and
actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s “serious medical need”).
75 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009).
76 Id. at 526.
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chronic pain in her now-deformed hips, which, according to her ortho-
pedist, refuse to go “back into the place where they need to be.”77 She
can no longer play with her children, do anything athletic, sleep or lean
on her left side, sit or stand for more than a short period of time, or have
children.78 She was a non-violent offender, imprisoned for writing bad
checks.79 The Eighth Circuit ultimately denied summary judgment for
the defendant-officer, stating that shackling a pregnant inmate during
childbirth has clearly been established as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.80 The Sixth Circuit in Villegas v. Metropolitan Govern-
ment of Davidson County81 also found that shackling pregnant detain-
ees in labor substantially endangers the expectant mother’s health and
“offends contemporary standards of human decency such that the prac-
tice violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the ‘unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain.’’’82
2. D.C. and Ninth Circuits’ have found that inadequate medical
care and shackling do not meet the deliberate indifference
standard
Unlike the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, the D.C. and Ninth
Circuits have concluded that inadequate medical care and shackling do
not meet the deliberate indifference standard and, thus, do not violate
detainees’ Eighth Amendment rights. In Women Prisoners of D.C. v.
District of Columbia,83 female prisoners sued the District of Columbia
for violating their Eighth Amendment rights by providing them with
inadequate medical care, shackling them, and sexually abusing them.84
The trial court had ruled in favor of the female inmates, but the D.C.
Circuit reversed it. It rejected the provision in the district court’s order
requiring that prisons have written protocols regarding prenatal care,
reasoning that the district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction.85 It




80 Id. at 533. See also Brawley v. State of Wash., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1221 (W.D. Wash.
2010) (denying summary judgment because shackling a prisoner in labor has clearly been estab-
lished as an Eighth Amendment violation).
81 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013).
82 Id. at 574. See also Villegas v. Davidson Cty., 789 F. Supp. 2d 895, 919 (M.D. Tenn. 2011)
(holding that shackling a pregnant detainee in the final stages of labor shortly before birth and
during the post-partum recovery and denying breast-pump post-partum infringes the Eighth
Amendment).
83 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
84 Id. at 913.
85 Id. at 932, 944.
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to create a pre-natal clinic, and to provide for obstetrical examinations
inside the detention facilities.86 The D.C. Circuit also refused to declare
the use of restraints on pregnant detainees unconstitutional and re-
jected the district court’s standard.87 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that
courts have no experience running prisons, and, thus, they should defer
to prison officials’ judgments.88
As recently as 2016, the Ninth Circuit has held that lack of prena-
tal necessities and shackling does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment rights.89 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in Mendiola-Mar-
tinez v. Arpaio90 held that the following did not violate the Eighth
Amendment: the county’s use of restraints on the prisoner during labor
and postpartum recovery after a caesarian section, its failure to provide
her with a breast pump, and its nutrition policy for pregnant inmates,
even though the prisoner reports of being repeatedly hungry and having
to drink water from the sink by her toilet.91
B. Kingsley v. Hendrickson: A Different Standard for Pretrial Detain-
ees?
Despite courts commonly including the Eighth Amendment’s delib-
erate indifference requirement in cases involving pretrial detainees, the
Court recently expressed disagreement with this extension of the
amendment. In particular, it rejected the idea that there is one deliber-
ate indifference standard that should be applied to all § 1983 claims
regardless of whether they are brought by convicted prisoners or pre-
trial detainees.
In Kingsley v. Hendrickson,92 a pretrial detainee brought an exces-
sive force claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He alleged that officers, who had repeatedly asked him to
remove the paper covering the light in his cell, used excessive force by
handcuffing him, placing a knee in his back, slamming his head on con-
crete, and using a Taser on him.93
The Court found that confinement conditions of a non-convicted de-
tainee violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments if they (1) impose
some harm to [her] that either significantly exceed or are independent
of the inherent discomforts of confinement and (2) are not reasonably
86 Id. at 923.
87 Id. at 931–32.
88 Id.
89 See generally Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016).
90 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016).
91 Id. at 1239, 1243.
92 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
93 Id. at 2470.
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related to a legitimate government objective or are excessive in relation
to the legitimate governmental objective.94 Courts then must objectively
assess if there is a reasonable relationship between the government’s
conduct and a legitimate purpose.95 Thus, the Court held that the de-
tainee only needed to prove that the defendant’s conduct, used pur-
posely or knowingly against her, was objectively unreasonable, not that
the defendant subjectively knew that the amount of force used was un-
reasonable or excessive.96
The Court concluded the objective standard was the appropriate
standard given its precedent. The Court has held that “pretrial detain-
ees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less
‘maliciously and sadistically.’”97 It also has held that “the Due Process
Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that
amounts to punishment,”98 which can include actions “taken with an
‘expressed intent to punish.’”99 However, Bell further explained that if
pretrial detainees cannot show an express intent to punish, they can
still win their case by demonstrating that the defendants’ acts or omis-
sions are not “rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive govern-
mental purpose” or that the actions “appear excessive in relation to that
purpose.”100
Kingsley, though, did not address whether its objective standard
applies to only excessive-force claims or to all Fourteenth-Amendment
claims made by pretrial detainees. Courts have since debated this ques-
tion. Thus far, the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits have expressly
found that the objective standard set forth in Kingsley applies to pre-
trial detainees’ other Fourteenth Amendment claims while the Eighth,
Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits have declined to make such an extension.
1. The Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits’ extension of the
Kingsley objective standard
The Ninth Circuit was the first court of appeals to review Kingsley.
In Castro v. County of Los Angeles,101 a pretrial detainee banged on his
cell’s window to alert jail officials that the inmate placed in the same
94 Id. at 2473–74.
95 Id. at 2469.
96 Id. at 2472–73.
97 Id. at 2475 (internal citations omitted).
98 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).
99 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
100 Id. at 561.
101 Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 831
(2017).
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cell was combative and would likely harm him.102 Officials ignored him,
though, and his cellmate ultimately beat and severely injured him.103
He brought a § 1983 action, alleging violations of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to be protected from the harm inflicted by other in-
mates.104
The Ninth Circuit held that the objective standard of Kingsley was
not limited to excessive-force claims, extending it to pretrial detainees’
Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claims.105 It reasoned that
the federal right and injuries suffered are the same for excessive force
and failure-to-protect claims.106 It also recognized that both claims arise
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, es-
pecially given pretrial detainees’ different status than convicted prison-
ers.107 In addition, it observed that the Court in Kingsley did not confine
its holding to “force” but rather stated that a pretrial detainee need only
provide objective evidence that “the challenged governmental action” is
unreasonably related to a legitimate government goal or is excessive in
relation to its objective.108 Using an objective inquiry to evaluate liabil-
ity under § 1983, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in favor of
the detainee.109 It found sufficient evidence that the officers and the
County knew their actions and policies posed a substantial risk of seri-
ous harm to the detainee but were deliberately indifferent to that
risk.110
After the Castro decision, the Second Circuit also extended Kings-
ley, applying its holding to pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement
complaints under the Fourteenth Amendment.111 In so doing, the Sec-
ond Circuit overruled its past decision in Caiozzo v. Koreman,112 which
used a subjective test when evaluating a medical-care claim, given that
the Court in Wilson113 found medical care to be a condition of confine-
ment.114 By the next year, the Second Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit,
102 Id. at 1064.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1060.
105 Id. at 1070–71.
106 Id. at 1069–70.
107 Id. (citing to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015)).
108 Id. at 1070 (citing to Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473–74).
109 Id. at 1060. The Ninth Circuit has since applied the Kingsley holding to a detainee’s medi-
cal-need claim. Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1122–25 (9th Cir. 2018).
110 Id.
111 Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 34–35 (2nd Cir. 2017).
112 581 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 2009).
113 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991).
114 Caiozzo, 581 F.3d at 66, 68, 70–72.
551] PATROLLING PREGNANT IMMIGRANTDETAINEES’ BODIES 565
used the Kingsley objective standard in a case involving a claim of de-
liberate indifference to a serious medical need.115 The Second Circuit
specifically asked “whether a ‘reasonable person’ would appreciate the
risk to which the detainee was subjected.”116
The Seventh Circuit most recently heard Miranda v. County of
Lake,117 concerning the death of a pretrial detainee, an Indian national,
due to severe dehydration at a county jail and her Estate’s claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for inadequate med-
ical care.118 The Seventh Circuit held that only the objective unreason-
ableness standard of Kingsley applied to pretrial detainees’ medical-
care claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.119 The Seventh
Circuit first reasoned that the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed
courts to recognize pretrial detainees’ different status as compared to
convicted prisoners’ status.120 Second, it noted that the Court has found
that the analysis under the Eighth Amendment is “not coextensive”
with that of the Due Process Clause given the different language and
nature of the claims.121 To the Seventh Circuit, the Court’s reasoning in
Kingsley did not indicate that its holding applied only to excessive-force
claims but rather that it included other claims arising under the Four-
teenth Amendment.122 Thus, the district court improperly instructed
the jury on intent; a jury, based on the evidence that the jail doctors
knew Gomes was not eating or drinking, could have found that the de-
fendants purposefully, knowingly, or with reckless disregard chose to
observe Gomes in jail rather than take her to a hospital.123
2. The Fifth, Eleventh and Eighth Circuits’ refusal to extend the
Kingsley objective standard
The Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits, on the other hand, have
held that Kingsley applies only to pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth
Amendment claims alleging excessive-force. Thus, they have limited
the case to its facts.
115 Bruno v. City of Schenectady, 727 F. App’x 717, 720 (2d Cir. 2018).
116 Id.
117 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018).
118 Id. at 335, 346.
119 Id. at 352.
120 Id. at 350, 352–53 (citing to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015)).
121 Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352 (citing Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2475 and Currie v. Chhabra, 728
F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[D]ifferent constitutional provisions, and thus different standards,
govern depending on the relationship between the state and the person in the state’s custody.”)).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 354.
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In Alderson v. Concordia Parish Correctional Facility,124 a pretrial
detainee was stabbed and stomped by two inmates.125 It took several
complaints by the detainee and his family about his safety and medical
condition for an officer to acknowledge his attack and take him to the
hospital, where he was diagnosed with multiple broken ribs and numer-
ous puncture wounds to his head, face, and body.126 The plaintiff
brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that the correctional facility provided
him with “inadequate security and impermissibly delayed [his] medical
care.”127 The Fifth Circuit found that court precedent applied the sub-
jective standard in cases decided after Kingsley; thus, the circuit’s rule
of orderliness mandated that they continue to do so.128 The Fifth Circuit
next asserted that, at the time, only the Ninth Circuit had extended the
objective standard of Kingsley.129 Finally, it concluded that, even if
Kingsleymandated the adoption of the objective standard for failure-to-
protect claims, the plaintiff did not make such a claim.130 Thus, under
the subjective standard, the Fifth Circuit found that the detainee did
not sufficiently demonstrate that officials acted with deliberate indif-
ference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee when they
incorrectly housed him with department of correction inmates, though
there was some evidence that the officer acted with deliberate indiffer-
ence to his serious medical needs.131
In Nam Dang, by & through Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole
County,132 the Eleventh Circuit heard a case in which a pretrial de-
tainee developed meningitis in jail, which resulted in him having
strokes that permanently injured him.133 The plaintiff alleged that he
received constitutionally deficient medical care due to deliberate indif-
ference.134 He further argued that he need not show deliberate differ-
ence due to Kingsley.135 The Eleventh Circuit, though, held there was
no need to decide whether the objective standard applied.136 Kingsley
124 848 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2017).
125 Id. at 418.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 415.
128 Id. at 419 n.4 (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996)). See also Estate
of Henson v. Wichita Cty., 795 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2015).
129 Alderson, 848 F.3d at 419 n.4.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 420–21.
132 871 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2017).
133 Id. at 1276–78.
134 Id. at 1276.
135 Id. at 1279 n.2.
136 Id.
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only involved an excessive force claim.137 Moreover, the decision would
not help the detainee even if it could be applied because the Court noted
that “liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
threshold of constitutional due process.”138 And, to the Fifth Circuit, the
jail nurse’s failure to treat Dang’s symptoms and her misdiagnosis was,
at most, negligence.139
The Eighth Circuit in Whitney v. City of St. Louis140 stated that
Kingsley did not apply because the detainee brought a deliberate indif-
ference case rather than excessive force case.141 Under the subjective
standard, then, the Eighth Circuit found that the father of a pretrial
detainee who hanged himself in a jail cell did not sufficiently allege that
the officer knew of the detainee’s suicidal thoughts or that the munici-
pal policy was deliberately indifferent.142
Therefore, while the Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits refuse to
read Kingsley as applying to claims other than excessive-force, the
Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits apply Kingsley’s objective stand-
ard to other Fourteenth Amendment claims. Given the Fourteenth-
Amendment claims likely to be brought by pregnant detainees in light
of the mistreatment and inadequate medical attention in detention cen-
ters, courts will have to decide which of the circuits to follow.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RIGHTS TODIGNITY AND TO BE FREE
FROM CRUEL, INHUMANE PUNISHMENT
International law has also addressed the treatment of prisoners.
Most notably, international law bars cruel and inhumane punishment
through various treaties and U.N. General Assembly Resolutions. Spe-
cifically, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),143 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the
American Convention on Human Rights (“American Convention”), and
the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) all state that “[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”144
The CAT defines torture as:
137 Id.
138 Id. (citing to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015)) (emphasis in original).
139 Dang, 871 F.3d at 1276–78, 1279 n.2.
140 887 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2018).
141 Id. at 860 n.4.
142 Id. at 857.
143 The U.S. is a signatory to the UDHR.
144 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Or-
ganization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
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[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or ac-
quiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.145
The CAT also bars “other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I,
when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.”146 The CAT, ratified by the United States in 1994,
mandates that all State Parties “shall take effective legislative, admin-
istrative, judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any
territory under its jurisdiction.”147
The ICCPR, which the United States signed in 1977 and ratified in
1992, further requires that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall
be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person.”148 The American Convention, signed by the United
States, similarly mandates that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human per-
son.”149
The United Nations has also developed rules prohibiting shackling
specifically.150 For example, Rule 24 of the United Nations Rules for the
Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for
Women Offenders, otherwise known as the Bangkok Rules, expressly
states that “instruments of restraint shall never be used on women dur-
ing labour, during birth and immediately after birth.”151 The United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, oth-
erwise known as the Mandela Rules, bars the use of restraints as pun-
ishment, though it does acknowledge their use for clear, narrow excep-
tions.152
145 U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
146 Id. at art. 16(1).
147 Id. at art. 2(1).
148 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 144, at art. 10.
149 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 144, at art. 5(2).
150 These rules are included in United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. They are not
signed and ratified by each individual Member State but rather are adopted by the General As-
sembly, which consists of one representative from each Member State. For more information, see
General Assembly of the United Nations, UNITEDNATIONS (2018), http://www.un.org/en/ga/ [https:/
/perma.cc/57DC-NRL8].
151 G.A. Res. 65/229, ¶ 24 (Dec. 21, 2010) (emphasis added).
152 G.A. Res. 70/175, U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Dec. 17,
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Since the inception of these treaties, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee has clarified their meaning. For example, it found
the goal of Article 7 of the ICCPR, expressing freedom from torture or
inhumane treatment, was to “protect both the dignity and the physical
and mental integrity of the individual.”153
The United Nations Human Rights Committee further examined
Article 7 in Mellet v. Ireland.154 The Committee found that Ireland, by
prohibiting and criminalizing abortion and preventing Mellet from ac-
cessing medical care, subjected a highly vulnerable pregnant woman to
severe physical and mental suffering.155 The committee pointed out that
her anguish could have been avoided if the state had given her proper
health care.156 As a result, the state violated, among other rights, her
right to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under Ar-
ticle 7 of the ICCPR.157 The Committee noted that the fact that an act
is legal under domestic law does not stop it from violating Article 7; the
article is absolute and without exception, thus leaving no room for any
excuses.158
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, along with the
United Nations Committee Against Torture and United Nations Special
Rapporteurs on Torture and on Violence against Women, have also ad-
vocated for all States to stop using restraints on women during their
pregnancy and while they are recovering thereafter.159 For example, the
Committee against Torture expressed concern about the United States’
treatment of female detainees, especially its shackling women detain-
ees during labor and use of “gender-based humiliation,” and requested
2015).
153 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20, Article 7, Compilation of General Com-
ments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
HRI/Gen/1/Rev.1 (1994), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom20.htm [https://perma.c
c/362H-PUFT].
154 Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 2324/2013, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/
2013 (2016).
155 Id. ¶ 7.4.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 7.6.
158 Id. at 7.4, 7.6.
159 Amnesty International, Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct and the Shackling
of Pregnant Women at 2 (2001); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Promotion and Pro-
tection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the
Right to Development, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3 (Jan. 15, 2008); Comm. on Human Rights,Report
of the Mission to the United States of America on the Issue of Violence against Women in State and
Federal Prisons, ¶¶ 53–54, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.2 (Jan. 4, 1999); U.N. Human Rights
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes, and Conse-
quences: Ms. RashidaManjoo: Mission to the United States of America, ¶ C(h), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17
/26/Add.5 (Jun. 6, 2011).
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that the State adopt the necessary policies to bring it back into “con-
formity with international standards.”160
IV. COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW THENINTH, SECOND, AND SEVENTH
CIRCUITS’ INTERPRETATION OF KINGSLEY
In light of the mistreatment of pregnant immigrant detainees,
which has been exacerbated due to the new ICE directive allowing for
the detainment of pregnant women in their first and second trimesters,
pregnant immigrant detainees will most likely bring more § 1983
claims, alleging inadequate conditions of confinement and delayed med-
ical care due to deliberate indifference. When faced with these claims,
courts should mirror the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits by apply-
ing the objective standard set forth in Kingsley to all Fourteenth
Amendment claims brought by pretrial detainees, such as failure-to-
protect and serious medical needs claims.
First, such a standard acknowledges the different protections that
pretrial detainees are afforded. Indeed, the Court has held time and
again that pretrial detainees have not been charged with anything and
thus cannot be punished.161 Immigrant detainees, such as pregnant
women held in detention centers, might be held to an even higher stand-
ard than pretrial criminal detainees.162 Thus, courts around the country
should use a standard that does not make it harder for pretrial detain-
ees to receive the protections that the Court has already held they are
due. Rather, it should be enough that a reasonable person could find
that the conditions or lack of adequate medical care non-convicted per-
son was unreasonable.163
In addition, the objective standard might better adhere to constitu-
tional standards given that it does not engage in the subjective deliber-
ate indifference standard of an Eighth Amendment analysis. Indeed,
160 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against
Torture: United States of America, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (2006).
161 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–39 (1979).
162 SeeWong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). Although they have not come to
an official consensus, courts have repeatedly held that immigration detainees are afforded at least
the same due process protections as pretrial criminal detainees. See Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d
772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000); Dahlan v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 215 F. App’x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2007).
But see Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2004). For more information, see Tom
Jawetz, Litigating Immigration Detention Conditions, ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT (2008),
https://law.ucdavis.edu/alumni/alumni-events/files/mcle-files/jawetz_detention_conditions.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/VTY4-TWB2].
163 See Kyla Magun, A Changing Landscape for Pretrial Detainees? The Potential Impact of
Kingsley v. Hendrickson on Jail-Suicide Litigation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2059, 2085 n.169 (2016)
(quoting Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 571 (2008) (“A showing of objective deliberate indifference, combined
with some showing of more than de minimis injury, shocks the conscience and thus should sustain
a substantive due process claim.”)).
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the Court has repeatedly stated that the Eighth Amendment analysis
is not the same as the Due Process Clause analysis; they differ in lan-
guage and in the nature of their claims.164 Thus, the objective standard
could veer courts away from intertwining the analyses of the Eighth
Amendment and Due Process Clause, which in some courts has proved
detrimental to detainees’ cases.165
The Kingsley decision is also broadly worded. As the Ninth Circuit
pointed out, Kingsley’s holding is not limited to “force.”166 Instead, the
Court asserted that pretrial detainees need only provide objective evi-
dence that “the challenged governmental action” is unreasonably re-
lated to a legitimate government goal or is excessive in relation to its
objective.167 Thus, this wording indicates that the Court meant for its
holding to apply to all Fourteenth Amendment claims brought by de-
tainees. This especially makes sense in light of the fact that the injuries,
both physical and constitutional, suffered in excessive force claims and
other Fourteenth Amendment claims are the same.168
Furthermore, evidence exists that another circuit might join the
Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuit interpretation of Kingsley—the
Sixth Circuit. Despite both parties’ failure to raise arguments concern-
ing Kingsley, the Sixth Circuit in Richmond v. Huq169 acknowledged the
change in Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference jurispru-
dence that “calls into serious doubt” whether detainees such as the
plaintiff are required to demonstrate defendants’ subjective awareness,
and wanton disregard, of detainees’ serious medical conditions.170 This
reading of Kingsley mirrors the objective, reasonable person standard
set forth in the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits and, thus, shows
that the Sixth Circuit is inclined to follow their lead.
The Fifth Circuit might also include proponents of the Kingsley ob-
jective standard. Although Judge Graves in Alderson concurred in part,
he encouraged the Fifth Circuit to reevaluate applying the subjective
standard to pretrial detainees’ other Fourteenth Amendment claims
given the Kingsley holding.171
164 Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352 (citing to Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2475 and to Currie v. Chhabra,
728 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[D]ifferent constitutional provisions, and thus different stand-
ards, govern depending on the relationship between the state and the person in the state’s cus-
tody.”)).
165 SeeWomen Prisoners of D.C. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d at 931–32; Mendiola-Martinez
v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 2016).
166 Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
831 (2017).
167 Id. (citing to Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473–74).
168 Id.
169 885 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2018).
170 Id. at 938 n.3.
171 Alderson v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 424–25 (5th Cir. 2017) (Graves,
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A. Counter-Arguments to Emulating the Ninth, Second, and Seventh
Circuits
Critics might argue that Fourth Circuit offers support to the
Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits’ interpretation of Kingsley. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Circuit in Duff v. Potter172 still examined a detainee’s
inadequate medical treatment claim under the deliberate indifference
standard while analyzing his excessive-force claim under the objective
reasonableness standard. But the Fourth Circuit, unlike the Sixth Cir-
cuit, did not expressly contemplate the application of Kingsley to other
Fourteenth Amendment claims of pretrial detainees. Moreover, after
Kingsley, the Seventh Circuit still applied the deliberate indifference
standard under the Eighth Amendment to inadequate medical care
claims before joining the Ninth and Second Circuits with its holding in
Miranda v. County of Lake, which leaves it open for the Fourth Circuit
to follow the same path.173 Therefore, it is hard to say that the Fourth
Circuit supports the Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits’ holdings.
In addition, supporters of the Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits
might contend that the application of Kingsley to claims other than
those of excessive force is in conflict with the Court’s decision inDaniels
v. Williams.174 In that case, the Court overruled Parratt v. Taylor175 in
part and concluded that negligent conduct does not offend the Due Pro-
cess Clause.176 Opponents of the objective-reasonableness standard
might be concerned that Kingsley’s objective-reasonableness standard
will allow negligence to be sufficient for liability and, thus, will conflict
with Daniels by constitutionalizing medical malpractice claims.
Kingsley, though, does not hold that negligence suffices for liability.
Rather it stated that courts must consider two separate state-of-mind
questions. First, they must inquire into the defendant’s state of mind
concerning his physical actions—“i.e., his state of mind with respect to
the bringing about of certain physical consequences in the world.”177
Then they must determine the defendant’s state of mind “with respect
to whether this use of force was ‘excessive,’” using an objective standard
and thus ensuring the defendant’s state of mind is not a matter that a
plaintiff has to prove.178 Unlike the second objective inquiry, then, the
J., specially concurring in part).
172 665 F. App’x 242, 244–45 (4th Cir. 2016).
173 See, e.g., Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 554 n.31 (7th Cir. 2016).
174 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
175 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
176 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330–31. See Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016)
(en banc), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 831 (2017).
177 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015).
178 Id.
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first question asks courts to decipher whether defendants have acted
purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly when they thought about the con-
sequences of their actions concerning the pretrial detainee.179 The
Ninth Circuit and other courts of appeals, upon hearing detainees’
claims, have acknowledged that Kingsley requires a detainee to “prove
more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin
to reckless disregard.”180
B. The Effect of the Objective Standard on Pregnant Immigrant De-
tainees
In addition to adopting Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuit prece-
dent, courts should also interpret Kingsley to apply the objective stand-
ard to all Fourteenth Amendment, § 1983 claims of pretrial detainees
because it will likely allow pregnant immigrant detainees to be more
successful in their serious medical need, failure-to-protect, and condi-
tions of confinement claims. Rather than show actual knowledge, preg-
nant immigrant detainees would only have to show that, under the cir-
cumstances, detention officials and staff should have known they
needed medical attention. It seems that this standard would prove
fruitful in pregnant immigrant detainees’ cases given that most, if not
all, claim that at least one official was alerted to their condition, their
discomfort, or their bleeding and did nothing to alleviate it.181
In fact, under the Kingsley holding, courts could find that the inhu-
mane treatment of pregnant detainees violates their Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. First, these practices of endangering women’s
health exceeds and is independent of the inherent discomforts of con-
finement.182 It does not serve a legitimate penological purpose to allow
a pregnant woman to miscarry in a jail cell or to provide such poor con-
ditions that she develops depression.183 In addition, precautionary
measures such as shackling might be related to an often-upheld govern-
mental interest in ensuring safety but ultimately are excessive, espe-
cially given that a guard accompanies a detainee everywhere outside
her cell, including the delivery room.184
179 SeeMiranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).
180 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. See also Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1122–25
(9th Cir. 2018); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 36, 36 n.16.
181 See generally American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2.
182 Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473–74.
183 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
184 The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note
23, at 5.
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It will also likely be easier for a detainee to hold officials accounta-
ble under the objective deliberate indifference standard given the deci-
sions of the circuit split. Whereas every circuit that heard cases using
the objective standard rendered judgment in favor of detainees, the
other circuit courts, i.e. the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth, did not despite
officials knowing about detainees’ injuries or illnesses and failing or de-
laying to give them the treatment they are afforded under the Four-
teenth Amendment.185
Immigrant detainees in particular have already had some success
in gaining judgments in their favor. For example, the Ninth Circuit,
using the objective deliberate indifference standard, upheld a district
court’s order to provide clean bedding, personal hygiene accommoda-
tions, and medical screenings as well as monitor compliance and ensure
implementation.186
The objective standard would not only provide a more favorable
standard for pretrial detainees, but it could also change current policies
concerning pregnant detainees. As will be discussed in Section VI be-
low, Congress has left some loopholes in its current and pending legis-
lation that allows for detention officials and medical staff to exercise
their discretion when making decisions regarding pregnant detainees’
medical treatment or shackling.187 This discretionary standard has ren-
dered its laws null and void because staff and officials often abuse the
standard and have continued to mistreat and shackle pregnant in-
mates.188 If courts use the objective standard when evaluating pretrial
detainees’ claims, they could not only discontinue the deference given
to detention officials189 but also signal to Congress and state legisla-
tures that making allowances for officials’ discretion is no longer viable.
Detention staff also might refrain from mistreatment or act with more
diligence, knowing that the court will look at their actions from the per-
spective of a reasonable person rather than simply looking at their ver-
sion of events.
185 See Alderson v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2017); Dang v.
Sheriff, Seminole Cty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1276—78 (11th Cir. 2017); Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887
F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2018).
186 Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 710, 721–25 (9th Cir. 2017).
187 See the discussion of the First Step Act and the Stop Shackling Act in Section VI below.
188 See generally American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2.
189 SeeWomen Prisoners of D.C. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 931–32 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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V. COURTS SHOULDUSE INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PERSUASIVE
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT THEIR ADOPTION OF THEOBJECTIVE
STANDARD
Given the current circuit split, courts should refer to international
law as persuasive authority.190 Upon reviewing international law, they
will find that ICE policies and practices violate pregnant detainees’
rights to freedom from cruel, inhuman treatment, to dignity, and to be
treated with humanity. Given this clear contravention of the ICCPR,
the CAT, the American Convention, the UDHR, the Bangkok Rules, and
the Mandela Rules, courts might be more persuaded to follow the ex-
amples of the Seventh, Ninth, and Second Circuits and extend the
Kingsley decision given that they are more consistent with the interna-
tional law approach.
As aforementioned, the ICCPR, the CAT, the American Conven-
tion, and the UDHR prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.191 The treatment, especially officials’ inadequate attention
to pregnant detainees’ miscarriages, clearly violates this prohibition.
Indeed, likeMellet, detention officials have prevented or delayed highly
vulnerable pregnant women from receiving medical care and contrib-
uted to their mental and physical pain, which could have been avoided
if they had chosen to pay attention to detainees’ needs.192 Thus, similar
to Ireland, the United States has violated detainees’ right to freedom
from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Furthermore, the pain and suffering that pregnant detainees have
reported193 falls within, at the very least, the CAT definition of “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.”194 Specifically, pregnant detainees
have suffered both physically, receiving gashes from shackles and en-
during miscarriages due to lack of medical attention, and mentally, suf-
fering from stress, anxiety, and depression brought on by detention cen-
ters’ conditions and re-traumatization.195 The anguish has also been
inflicted and acquiesced by officials given their refusal to acknowledge
190 See Sichel, supra note 26, at 237–239 (describing in detail how international human rights
law is persuasive authority and citing to federal cases that have used international law as persua-
sive authority).
191 See e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 144; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 7, supra note 144; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), supra note 144.
192 See Human Rights Committee, supra note 154.
193 See generally O’Connor, supra note 1; American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2.
194 U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, supra note 145, at art. 16(1).
195 This also contravenes Article 7 of the ICCPR in that it does not “protect both the dignity
and the physical and mental integrity of the individual.” U.N. Human Rights Committee, supra
note 153.
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or their dismissal of women’s cries for help, profuse bleeding, and obvi-
ous need for medical treatment.
The continued shackling of pregnant detainees also violates the in-
ternational prohibitions against torture and inhuman treatment, Rule
24 of the Bangkok Rules,196 and the Mandela Rules.197 Indeed, the U.S.
has not complied with treaties’ requirements that it implement domes-
tic mechanisms to prevent such mistreatment.198 The UN Human
Rights Committee, the UN Committee against Torture, and the UN
Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Violence Against Women199
have repeatedly denounced this inaction, asserting that the United
States has failed to uphold modern standards of decency.200
It is also apparent that detention centers have been violating preg-
nant detainees’ rights to dignity and to be treated with humanity under
the ICCPR and the American Convention.201 As the Eighth Circuit in-
sinuated, it is quite obvious that a woman bleeding out in her cell is
indication that she needs medical attention.202 Yet detention officers
and medical staff continue to ignore women’s needs, such as when they
left E lying in a pool of her blood for eight days or when they fail to
inquire about detainees’ mental health, especially when their pregnan-
cies are a result of rape.203 Anyone can observe that such mistreatment
of pregnant detainees does not afford them dignity and treats them as
less than human.
196 G.A. Res. 65/229, ¶ 24 (Dec. 21, 2010).
197 G.A. Res. 70/175, U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Jan. 8,
2016).
198 U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, supra note 145, at art. 2(1).
199 See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 159.
200 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
201 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 144, at art. 10; Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights, supra note 144, at art. 5(2).
202 See Pool v. Sebastian Cty., 418 F.3d 934, 935 (8th Cir. 2005).
203 See O’Connor, supra note 1.
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Some critics might be skeptical about the role of international
law204 in courts’ interpretation of the United States Constitution.205
However, the Court has acknowledged the importance of the interna-
tional consensus on basic human rights and the value of foreign laws
when deciding the constitutionality of certain acts.206 For example, the
Court determined that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning
from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society.”207 This interpretation of standards came from reviewing
the laws and universal belief of “civilized people” and the “civilized na-
tions of the world.”208 Estelle further elaborated on “contemporary
standards” of decency by asserting that the infliction of unnecessary
suffering was inconsistent with them.209
Reviewing international law, then, should sway courts to extend
the objective standard to claims beyond excessive-force. Indeed, inter-
national law does not review the official actor’s intent but rather has
204 Given the universal acceptance that international law exists and the extensive research set
forth in other academic articles on international law, this Comment will not spend time arguing
that international law exists. Rather it will remind its readers that the United States Supreme
Court has acknowledge international law since the 1800s. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815)
(citing to the “law of nations”); The Paquete Habana; The Lola, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“[I]nter-
national law is part of our law.”). For more on international law, especially in the context of female
prisoners and detainees, see generally Sichel, supra note 26; Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and
Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating International Human Rights Protections under Do-
mestic Civil Rights Law—A Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 71 (2000); Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Open-
ing Up the Conversation on Proportionality, Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 638
(1999); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225,
1235 (1999).
205 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court’s use of international sources when interpreting Constitutional provisions such as the
Eighth Amendment.); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(“Where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the view of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon
Americans . . . .”). See also Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General
Assembly on Customary International Law, 73 PROCEEDINGS OF THEANNUALMEETING (AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 301, 301 (1979) (stipulating that U.N. General Assembly Reso-
lutions are not binding); Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolu-
tions in Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876,
877 (1983) (arguing that General Assembly Resolutions are not “independent, authoritative
sources of international law”).
206 See e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (using comparative and interna-
tional law to determine that capital punishment for the mentally ill is unconstitutional); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 577 (2003) (relying on a European Court of Human Rights decision,
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, as guidance to find that a person’s choice to engage in consensual
homosexual activity is a protected liberty interest).
207 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
208 Id. at 101–04.
209 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578
(2005) (finding other countries’ practices and opinions to be “respected and significant confirmation
of [their] own conclusions” and to show the “centrality of those same rights within [the United
States’] own heritage of freedom”).
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made blanket prohibitions on mistreatment, inadequate medical care,
and shackling of detainees and prisoners. Thus, courts should be per-
suaded that extending the objective standard would uphold interna-
tional law and modern global standards of decency.
VI. CURRENT AND PENDINGU.S. LEGISLATIONDOESNOT APPLY TO OR
PROPERLY PROTECT PREGNANTDETAINEES
Critics could argue that the First Step Act,210 signed into law on
December 21, 2018 by President Trump, bars shackling of pregnant
women in addition to other significant criminal justice reforms.211 Thus,
the Comment’s aforementioned arguments are unnecessary.
But this prohibition on the use of restraints applies to prisoners
who are pregnant or are recovering postpartum.212 For the purposes of
the new law, “prisoners” only include people “sentenced to a term of
imprisonment pursuant to a conviction for a Federal criminal offense,
or a person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), including a
person in a Bureau of Prisons Contracted Facility.”213 In theory, this
could extend to pregnant detainees given that ICE used five federal
prisons to house approximately 1,600 immigrant detainees through
temporary interagency agreements with the Bureau of Prisons.214 In-
deed, such June 2018 agreements, needed to accommodate the overflow
of detainees in detention centers, are valid until June 2019.215 In prac-
tice, however, no immigrant detainees have been put in federal prisons
since November 2018.216 Using federal prisons to house detainees was
unprecedented and highly controversial given that most detainees were
asylum seekers yet were treated like criminals.217 Some attorneys have
expressed doubt that federal prisons will be employed again given that
using federal prisons to detain immigrants and asylum seekers violated
210 First Step Act, S. 3649, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
211 Id.; see also Lauren Kuhlik, Congress Just Took a Big Step Toward Ending the Shackling
of Pregnant Prisoners, ACLU (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/women-
prison/congress-just-took-big-step-toward-ending-shackling-pregnant [https://perma.cc/LV38-K8P
8].
212 S. 3649, supra note 210.
213 Id.
214 James Doubek, ICE to Send 1,600 Detainees to Federal Prisons, NPR (June 8, 2018), https://
www.npr.org/2018/06/08/618182740/ice-to-send-1-600-detainees-to-federal-prisonsn [https://perm
a.cc/Q8GP-6KMQ].
215 Conrad Wilson, ICE Appears to End Use of Federal Prisons for Immigrant Detainees, NPR
(Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/20/658988420/ice-appears-to-end-use-of-federal-pris-
ons-for-immigrant-detainees [https://perma.cc/76X9-HFJ9].
216 Conrad Wilson, Final ICE Detainees Leave Federal Prison in Oregon, OPB: OREGONPUBLIC
Broadcasting (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.opb.org/news/article/ice-detainees-prison-oregon-releas
e-final/ [https://perma.cc/22XF-QQYB].
217 Conrad Wilson, ICE Appears to End Use of Federal Prisons, supra note 215.
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their constitutional rights and that more facilities are now being built
on the southern border.218
Critics could also contend that recent legislation specifically bars
the mistreatment and shackling of detainees. The first is the twenty-
ninth amendment of the Homeland Security Appropriations Bill for Fis-
cal Year 2019, which limits the use of restraints on detainees who are
pregnant or in post-partum recuperation.219 The second piece of legisla-
tion is Senator Patty Murray’s Senate Bill 3225, or the Stop Shackling
and Detaining Pregnant Women Act, introduced on July 17, 2018.220
The Act purports to “ensure the humane treatment of pregnant women
by reinstating the presumption of release and prohibiting shackling, re-
straining, and other inhumane treatment of pregnant detainees.”221 The
bill, as of January 4, 2019, has made no movement within the Senate
since its introduction.222
Despite the well-intentioned provisions of the amendment, the
First Step Act, and the Stop Shackling Act, the legislation, if passed,
will not protect pregnant women due to some very large loopholes: they
allow for the detainment and shackling of women in “extraordinary cir-
cumstances.”223 An appropriate official may individually determine that
a pregnant detainee is a “serious flight risk” or “poses an immediate
and serious threat to herself or others” and “cannot be prevented by
other means.”224 A medical or healthcare professional also has the au-
thority to request that pregnant women be restrained in the interest of
women’s medical safety.225 These officials are to use the least restrictive
restraints possible and may not use shackles during labor.226
While it may seem that this serves a compelling governmental in-
terest, i.e. protecting others and the detainee from herself, it ends up
harming pregnant detainees in practice. Indeed, despite past and cur-
rent legislation, the discretion allotted to detention officers has allowed
for the continuation of mistreatment and shackling of pregnant detain-
ees, including during labor.227 The “least restrictive means” constraint
218 Id.
219 House Appropriations Committee, Amendments Adopted to the Homeland Security Appro-
priations Bill for FY 2019, HOUSECOMMITTEE ONAPPROPRIATIONS, 36–7 (2018), https://docs.house
.gov/meetings/AP/AP00/20180725/108623/HMKP-115-AP00-20180725-SD022.pdf [https://perma.c
c/DM72-ZQNG].
220 Stop Shackling and Detaining Pregnant Women Act, S. 3225, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See e.g., S. 3225, supra note 220.
224 Id.; S. 3649, supra note 210; House Appropriations Committee, supra note 219, at 36.
225 S. 3225, supra note 220; S. 3649, supra note 210; House Appropriations Committee, supra
note 219, at 37.
226 Id.
227 See e.g., Kuhlik, supra note 211; American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 3.
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is ineffective given how easily officers circumvent, and thus abuse, the
requirement; they can simply cite to their determination that the shack-
ling was necessary.228 Detention staff also often lack proper education
about the law and, thus, believe their mistreatment is not illegal.229 De-
tention officers and medical professionals’ broad discretion and lack of
education are compounded by the lack of oversight. The Trump admin-
istration’s ICE directive disabled the reporting mechanisms that al-
lowed outside organizations to supervise ICE’s detention officers, thus
ensuring that officials are not held accountable for unreasonable deter-
minations.230 Therefore, the exceptions essentially nullify the prohibi-
tion.
Furthermore, the use of the extraordinary circumstances provision
is unjustified given that, thus far, lack of restraints on pregnant women
has not jeopardized anyone’s safety. Pregnant detainees in civil deten-
tion have not been convicted of any crimes, or most notably, any violent
crimes.231 Rather they are usually seeking asylum due to violence in
their home countries.232 None of the states where shackling pregnant
inmates is barred have reported that women in labor have escaped or
This behavior mirrors the continued shackling and mistreatment in state prisons despite state
legislation banning the use of restraints and mistreatment. For example, Illinois, one of the earli-
est states to adopt anti-shackling laws, discovered rampant non-compliance years after legislation
passed. See generally Zaborowski v. Dart, No. 08 C 6946, 2011 WL 6660999 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20,
2011).
228 See e.g., Chris DiNardo, Pregnancy in Confinement, Anti-Shackling Laws and the Extraor-
dinary Circumstances Loophole, 25 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 271, 282–83 (2018).
229 See id.; Nina Liss-Schultz, 6 Years Ago, New York Banned the Shackling of Pregnant In-
mates. So Why Are These Women Still Being Restrained?, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 13, 2015), http://ww
w.motherjones.com/politics/2015/10/new-york-shackling-pregnant-inmates/# [https://perma.cc/DK
6S-Y7FE].
230 ICE Directive 11032.3: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainees, supra note 4;
see also López, supra note 4.
231 In comparison, the majority of imprisoned women have committed non-violent offenses.
Fact Sheet on Justice Involved Women in 2016, NATIONALRESOURCECENTERON JUSTICE INVOLVE-
DWOMEN, 2 (2016), https://cjinvolvedwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Fact-Sheet.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/NJY9-GWEJ].
232 For example, all but one of the women included in the complaint filed by the ACLU et al
were from the Northern Triangle (namely, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) and cited vio-
lence in their home countries as the reason for fleeing to the United States. American Civil Liber-
ties Union et al., supra note 2, at 5–12. Indeed, studies show that the current influx of unauthor-
ized immigrants is mainly from the Northern Triangle, with 1.85 million arriving in 2016 alone
due to the rampant homicide and extortion in their home countries. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera
Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips to Lowest Level in a Decade, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Nov. 27, 2018), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2018/11/27/u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-tot
al-dips-to-lowest-level-in-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/VF9H-92AU]. The Northern Triangle coun-
tries are some of the most violent countries in the world; El Salvador, for example, is ranked as
the world’s most violent country not at war due to gang-related activities. Rocio Cara Labrador &
Danielle Renwick, Cen. Am.’s Violent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June
26, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle#chapter-
title-0-3 [https://perma.cc/52Q5-X4TF].
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harmed themselves, the public, medical staff, or correctional officers.233
Armed officers also usually guard shackled women, staying in or around
their delivery room, which many argue is adequate to protect all—doc-
tors, nurses, the mother, and the newborn—involved.234 Finally, women
giving birth are in no condition to flee or strike out in violence.
Given the ongoing abuses, detention, and lack of education and ove-
rsight, many organizations and individuals who work with and advo-
cate for pregnant detainees doubt that the legislation will actually
change officials’ behavior, finding the acts to be unsustainable.235 To
create long-term change, lawmakers must work on mechanisms to edu-
cate detention officers, enforce these measures, and allow for third-
party supervision. Without such measures, legislation like the amend-
ment, the First Step Act, and the Stop Shackling Act will continue to be
ignored and, thus, rendered meaningless.
CONCLUSION
In light of the harsh policy the Trump administration had adopted,
it will ultimately be up to the courts to ensure that pregnant immigrant
detainees are treated humanely and with dignity. They can take a step
towards ensuring this by following the example of the Ninth, Second,
and Seventh Circuits and interpreting Kingsley to extend to Fourteenth
Amendment claims other than excessive force. This determination is
supported by precedent that bars the punishment of pretrial detainees
and calls for scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth
Amendment. Furthermore, using international law as persuasive au-
thority should convince courts to favor the Ninth, Second, and Seventh
Circuits’ interpretation of Kingsley given that the mistreatment of preg-
nant detainees is outlawed by several binding treaties, such as the
ICCPR and the CAT, which view these human rights violations objec-
tively, not subjectively.
If courts follow this interpretation of Kingsley, it will likely have a
positive impact on pregnant detainees, making them more likely to
have successful outcomes when bringing § 1983 claims and holding de-
tention officials more accountable for their disregard for pregnant de-
tainees’ rights. Moreover, it could alter current policies and legislation
by signaling to Congress that it must close the gaps that allow for def-
erence to detention centers and its officers who abuse their discretion.
233 See e.g., Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
2, 2006) http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/national/02shackles.html [https://perma.cc/H7SL-EP
BG].
234 The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note
23, at 5.
235 Id.; Sathish, supra note 32.
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With these actions, the United States will be closer to ensuring that
another pregnant immigrant detainee does not say #MeToo.
583
Opening Closed Doors: How the Current Law
Surrounding Nondisclosure Agreements Serves
the Interests of Victims of Sexual Harassment,
and the Best Avenues for Its Reform.
By D. Andrew Rondeau†
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the plethora of pervasive and long-obscured women’s issues
suddenly exposed by the #MeToo Movement, nondisclosure agreements
(“NDAs”) have taken center stage. Indeed, it was the public revelation
of Harvey Weinstein’s unchecked behavior and NDA protections that
thrust the #MeToo Movement into the national limelight.1 Both the
Weinstein2 and Stormy Daniels3 stories perfectly illustrate the reasons
behind such intense public concern. Wealthy, sophisticated parties can
bind financially vulnerable victims to private avenues of relief that are
unlikely to remedy the harm caused and likely to perpetuate patterns
of sexual harassment and abuse.4 To anyone unfamiliar with American
law, the idea that courts enforce these agreements smacks of blatant
injustice. Even many familiar with American law strongly believe that
something ought to change.
† B.A. 2017, Williams College; J.D. Candidate, The University of Chicago Law School. I would
like to thank Professor Omri Ben-Shahar and the 2018–2019 Board of the Legal Forum for their
generous advice and feedback throughout the Comment process.
1 See Samantha Schmidt, #MeToo: Harvey Weinstein Case Moves Thousands to Tell Their
Own Stories of Abuse, Break Silence, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/10/16/me-too-alyssa-milano-urged-assault-victims-to-tweet-in-solida
rity-the-response-was-massive/?utm_term=.49c4af27ba54 [https://perma.cc/8M5F-HN44] (detail-
ing the mass proliferation of #MeToo tweets after the Weinstein story broke).
2 See Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements [https://perma
.cc/XTV5-CX6C].
3 See Nina Burleigh, Stormy Daniels Defies Trump to Join Chorus of Women Violating Non-
disclosure Agreements about Sex, Abuse and Harassment, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.
newsweek.com/stormy-trump-2016-election-sex-hush-money-835646 [https://perma.cc/2HUB-HK
B8].
4 For a quick overview of the argument, see Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76, 79–83 (2018).
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The #MeToo Movement has made demand for reform more preva-
lent than ever. Empowered by their newfound public solidarity, some
women have begun to breach the terms of their NDAs for the sake of
the Movement and their own reparation.5 Legislators have scrambled
to introduce new laws that either protect sexual harassment victims
seeking to disclose information or prevent employers from hiding these
stories from the public eye. As of February 2019, seven states have
adopted bills that impose significant restrictions upon NDAs in the con-
text of sexual harassment.6 In February 2018, the state attorneys gen-
eral unanimously submitted a letter to Congress seeking a ban on arbi-
tration agreements as pertained to workplace sexual harassment
claims because of the “veil of secrecy” created by private arbitration and
their related NDAs.7
As for the judiciary, Judge William Young of the District of Massa-
chusetts cited #MeToo while radically rejecting a corporation’s “C”
plea—a guilty plea where the prosecutor and the accused agree on pun-
ishment and avoid a jury—in favor of a public trial.8 He wrote:
Face it, if used in strong cases the “C” plea delegitimizes the cen-
tral role of the trial judge. Any injustice rankles Americans, sys-
temic injustice rankles them profoundly. Those of us who occupy
the constitutional offices of the United States—in whatever
branch we serve—must humbly acknowledge that there exists
in America today a deep and pervasive sense of injustice.9
By 2017, #MeToo was already showing influence upon Judge
Young’s decision-making in a case involving the systemic advantages
granted to corporate defendants.10 It seems likely that other judges
share his sentiment.11
5 See Burleigh, supra note 3.
6 Antone Melton-Meaux, Sex Harassment Settlements: A New Scarlet Letter for Employers?,
75 BENCH & B. MINN. 18, 19 (2018); see also NAVEX Global, The Sexual Harassment Legislation
Watch List (State by State), JD SUPRA (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-
sexual-harassment-legislation-watch-24212/ [https://perma.cc/3FSQ-8CLP].
7 SeeMelton-Meaux, supra note 6, at 19.
8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
9 United States v. Aegerion Pharm., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 217, 228 (D. Mass. 2017) (citing




11 Cf. Linda L. Berger, Bridget J. Crawford & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Using Feminist Theory to
Advance Equal Justice under Law, 17NEV. L.J. 539, 539–40 (2017) (noting that judges were among
the audience of the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project: Writing the Law conference, where experts
discussed how “judges applying feminist perspectives could bring about change in the development
of the law . . . .”).
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It is surprising, then, that discussion on this topic has been mostly
confined to popular media sources like the New Yorker12 and the Atlan-
tic.13 Of course, legal scholars have denounced sexual harassment
NDAs and proposed some legislative restrictions.14However, none have
investigated the substantive law that currently applies to NDAs in the
context of sexual harassment, nor have they considered what the law
implies for future legislation and whether it is likely to change. Part II
of this Comment briefly reviews why the current legal regime fails to
adequately protect future victims of workplace sexual harassment.
Parts III and IV examine the judiciary’s present treatment of NDAs and
the underlying rationale behind that treatment, respectively. Part V
weighs the challenges to reform imposed by current case law against
the advantages of new legislation. Ultimately, this Comment argues
that the intersection between nondisclosure and workplace sexual har-
assment presents thorny legal issues that are better resolved by legis-
lation than by judicial reform.
II. THENEED FOR REFORM
The purpose of this Comment is not to determine what specific
NDA regulations will serve the best interests of workplace sexual har-
assment victims. Other scholars have already taken that question to
task, and there is increasing agreement that moderate—but not se-
vere—restrictions should be imposed.15 On the one hand, NDAs are in-
tuitively favorable for employers, since reputational damage and legal
costs could easily outweigh the costs of settlement with the victim.16 On
the other, NDAs may also provide many advantages for victims them-
selves, such as a greater likelihood of compensation from their em-
ployer, a quicker end to the painful ordeal, and greater privacy given
lingering stigmas surrounding workplace victims.17 Therefore, laws
12 See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 2.
13 See, e.g., Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of Sexual Assault,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/legal-agreements
-sexual-assault-ndas/543252/ [https://perma.cc/7UU7-U5EB].
14 See generally, Ayres, supra note 4; Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment
from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 46 (2018).
15 See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 3; Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking
the Culture of Silence around Abuse through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret
Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2515–16 (2018) (collecting articles).
16 Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and Sex-
ual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 314 (2018).
17 See Annie Hill, Nondisclosure Agreements: Sexual Harassment and the Contract of Silence,
GENDERPOL’YREP. (Nov. 14, 2017), http://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/nondisclosure-agreements-
sexual-harassment-and-the-contract-of-silence/ [https://perma.cc/ 7VVW-LXWV]; Elizabeth Grac-
e, Confidentiality of Settlements in Sexual Abuse Cases—Necessary Evil or Positive?, LERNERS
PERS. INJ. GROUP (Jan. 31, 2013), https://lernerspersonalinjury.ca/articles/confidentiality-of-settle
ments-in-sexual-abuse-cases-necessary-evil-or-positive/ [https://perma.cc/AN7Y-VZU3].
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that ban sexual harassment NDAs outright would deny victims a sig-
nificant opportunity for confidential reparation. The debate continues,
however, as to what these regulations should encompass and how far
they should go to prevent such cases.18
Regardless, a majority of scholars have reached a powerful consen-
sus: reform is necessary in order to prevent employers from crafting
NDAs that do not amply compensate the victim or that enable perpe-
trators to continue patterns of sexual harassment and assault.19 While
some settlement agreements boast six to seven-figure payoffs,20 others
offer far less for similar harm;21 and even for victims who receive large
payments, money cannot fix their trauma.22 Meanwhile, the stringent
confidentiality of unfettered NDAs has enabled powerful individuals to
avoid detection, both by other employees and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (the EEOC), thus opening the possibility for
decades of abuse across multiple victims.23 Scholarly consensus and the
plethora of victims’ jarring stories collectively illustrate the need for
change.
III. RELEVANT CASE LAW
Before delving into the law that governs sexual harassment NDAs,
it is important to note that provisions that obligate nondisclosure go by
a few other names, such as “non-assistance” or “confidentiality” provi-
sions. For the purposes of this Comment, an “NDA” refers to any agree-
ment that prevents one party from disclosing some type of information
to a third party. Moreover, NDAs are difficult to examine in a vacuum.
This is to say: they rarely come about on their own. As the case law will
show, the vast majority of NDAs (or at least the ones that generate lit-
igation) occur as components of three sources: settlements, employment
contracts, and arbitration agreements that arise from those contracts.
18 See id.
19 In addition to the many contributions in this volume, see Schultz, supra note 14 (writing on
behalf of Rachel Arnow-Richman, Ian Ayres, Susan Bisom-Rapp, Tristin Green, Rebecca Lee, Ann
McGinley, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Nicole Porter, and Brian Soucek); see also, Ayres, supra note
4; Prasad, supra note 14; Margaret Ryznar, #MeToo & Tax, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 53,
53–57 (2018); Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law after #MeToo: Looking to California as a
Model, 128 YALE L. J. FORUM 121, 140–41 (2018); Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible
Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 976–77 (2006).
20 See Farrow, supra note 2.
21 This Comment will directly address one such settlement in Part III. See Bandera v. City of
Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2003) (refusing to invalidate a settlement agreement in which
the employer offered to recommend the victim for a substitute teaching position in exchange for
dropping her case).
22 See Farrow, supra note 2 (detailing the many psychological harms that the settlement pro-
cess itself caused upon one of Weinstein’s victims, Ambra Battilana Gutierrez).
23 See Ryznar, supra note 19, at 54–57.
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Legal rules that take aim at these sources will necessarily have an im-
pact on their nondisclosure provisions, and vice versa. This poses a chal-
lenge to this Comment’s analysis because there are some aspects of the
three sources beyond standalone NDAs that are thematically similar to
NDAs but outside of the scope of this Comment’s inquiry, e.g., arbitra-
tion procedures or for-cause termination. For the sake of simplicity,
therefore, this Comment will discuss NDAs that emerge from different
sources interchangeably. In the rare case where judge-made rules or
legislation could have different effects on different forms of NDAs, this
Comment will address those differences expressly.
A. Unconscionability and Public Policy Doctrines
Judicial solutions to the threats posed by sexual harassment NDAs
rely on two key components of contract law: the “unconscionability” and
“public policy” doctrines. The former dictates that a judge may refuse to
enforce a contract’s terms if she finds them to be “unconscionable” or
otherwise modify them in order to prevent such a finding.24 While what
constitutes “unconscionable” varies somewhat from state to state, the
D.C. Circuit has advanced the most popular definition: the “absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with con-
tract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”25
Some jurisdictions hold that the “procedural” and “substantive” factors
of this definition—absence of choice and one-sided terms respectively—
must both be present for a court to render a term unconscionable.26
Within this group, some courts apply a “sliding scale:” the more proce-
durally unconscionable a term is, the less substantive unconscionability
is required for a court to rescind that term, and vice versa.27 Other ju-
risdictions, in contrast, may render a contract term unconscionable
even if the plaintiff only alleges procedural or substantive unconscion-
ability.28
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (“If a contract or term thereof is unconscion-
able at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of
any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”); see also Hume v. United States,
132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889).
25 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18:9 (4th ed.
1993 & Update 2018) (collecting cases).
26 See Bynum v. Maplebear Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Summers v. Crestview
Apartments, 236 P.3d 586, 590 (Mont. 2010).
27 SeeGrayiel v. Appalachian Energy Partners 2001-D, LLP, 736 S.E.2d 91, 102 (W. Va. 2012);
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002).
28 See Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enter., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Wash. 2013) (rendering con-
tract terms void because they were substantively unconscionable, without a consideration of pro-
cedural unconscionability); In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 360 (Tex. 2008).
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In order to determine whether a contract or term is procedurally
unconscionable, a court considers factors such as disparate bargaining
power between the parties, differences in business sophistication, rep-
resentation by counsel, ambiguous or misleading contract language,
and economic, social, or practical duress that may have compelled a
party to execute the contract against her best interests.29 Contracts of
adhesion—the often labyrinthine standard-form contracts typically pro-
vided by larger companies—may be procedurally unconscionable per se
(though many courts must still find substantive unconscionability in
the terms themselves).30 A term is substantively unconscionable where
it is so “one-sided or overly harsh” or “exceedingly calloused” so as to be
“shocking to the conscience.”31 Terms are not substantively unconscion-
able simply because they are much more favorable to one side; their
one-sidedness ought to suggest that “the weaker party had no meaning-
ful, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to
the unfair terms.”32 In summary, the unconscionability doctrine is jus-
tified by and applied according to the fundamental public policy princi-
ple that there could be no real freedom of contract if courts had to en-
force contracts that boasted neither mutual interest nor mutual assent.
The public policy doctrine—inmany ways the sibling of unconscion-
ability—states that a term of an agreement is unenforceable if either
(1) “legislation provides that it is unenforceable” or (2) “the interest in
its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public
policy against the enforcement of such terms.”33 Courts consider a vari-
ety of factors when weighing enforcement interests, such as the parties’
justified expectations and the negative consequences of non-enforce-
ment.34 As for weighing public policy interests, courts consider factors
such as legislative precedent, the relation of the contract to the policy
interest, and the seriousness of enforcement’s consequences as they per-
tain to public policy.35 Accordingly, there is a large variety of terms that
a court may render void as against public policy. The most paradigmatic
cases involve agreements to commit illegal acts,36 but the implicated
action does not need to be explicitly illegal for a court to render it void.37
29 See Tedesco v. Home Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 407 P.3d 289, 298 (Mont. 2017).
30 See Day v. CTA, Inc., 324 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Mont. 2014); see also Grayiel, 736 S.E.2d at 104.
31 Gandee, 293 P.3d at 1999.
32 Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 737 S.E.2d 640, 657 (W. Va. 2012).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178; see also Williston, supra note 25 at §§ 12:1–
3 (collecting cases).
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2).
35 Id. at § 178(3). This Comment will examine these factors more fully below.
36 See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77 (1982) (rendering unenforceable
terms of a collective bargaining agreement that violated federal antitrust and labor laws).
37 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 192 (promises to commit torts are also
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Exceptions and inconsistencies abound within and between juris-
dictions, such that an attempt to map the public policy doctrine could
quickly overwhelm the main focus of this Comment. Therefore, it must
suffice to say that sexual harassment NDAsmay be void as against pub-
lic policy, but only in the specific circumstances that this Comment is
about to address. Perhaps unconscionability plays a role in some of the
forthcoming cases, but assuming most legal departments are savvy
enough to avoid the “shocking”38 behavior necessary to render a contract
unconscionable, it remains a secondary consideration for the purposes
of this Comment’s investigation and analysis. The main problem that
this Comment seeks to address emerges when the employer’s careful
and sophisticated lawyers intervene in order to contain the damage that
the perpetrator has already caused.39
B. Voiding NDAs to Report Criminal Conduct
Given the obvious confidentiality of most sexual harassment NDAs
and the often-steep penalties imposed for violating them, case law on
the topic is quite limited.40 However, courts have provided enough for
one to determine the extreme ends of whether these NDAs are unen-
forceable contracts as a matter of public policy. For one, it is clear that
courts will not enforce NDAs that bar an individual “from providing rel-
evant evidence regarding past allegations of sexual abuse in a domestic
violence proceeding” or from “reporting future criminal behavior to a
court.”41 Indeed, any NDA that “purport[s] to suppress information con-
cerning the commission of felonies” is “illegal per se.”42 This also in-
cludes agreements that create a failure of one’s duty to disclose to a
third party, involve a breach of contract with another party, or other-
wise cause wrongful non-performance.43 However, “[t]he mere possibil-
ity that an employer could use a [nondisclosure] clause to hide illegal
unenforceable).
38 See Gandee, 293 P.3d at 1999.
39 Granted, some lawyers themselves can be coarse and intimidating, but professional coun-
sels would stay clear of inducing the level of duress necessary for unconscionability.
40 This was even more true in 1998, when Terry Dworkin and Elletta Callahan first tackled
confidentiality more generally. See Terry Dworkin & Elletta Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS.
L.J. 151, 153 (Fall, 1998). Dworkin and Callahan’s work represents the most extensive discussion
on the topic to date. New case law since their date of publication and our particular focus on the
sexual harassment context distinguishes this Comment from their earlier work.
41 Lana C. v. Cameron P., 108 P.3d 896, 902 (Alaska 2005).
42 Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). Accord Perricone
v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 689 (Conn. 2009); Unami v. Roshan, 659 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Ct. App. Ga.
2008) (citing 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:14 (4th ed.)).
43 See Unami, 659 S.E.2d at 727 (citing Lachman v. Sperry–Sun Well Surveying, 457 F.2d
850, 852–54 (10th Cir. 1972); S. R. & P. Imp. Co. v. Am. Union Bank, 204 N.Y.S. 755, 755–56 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1924); Eggleston v. Pantages, 175 P. 34, 36–37 (Wash. 1918)).
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activity is . . . insufficient to void the clause on grounds of public pol-
icy.”44 Instead, courts “subject” NDA agreements to “implied exceptions
for public policy purposes,” so that the agreements are enforceable un-
less they are used to prevent the disclosure of illegal activity to a court.45
As for the prevention of disclosure to non-governmental sources—even
if there is potentially unlawful activity involved—such agreements are
typically legitimate.46 This includes attempts to provide testimony in a
third party’s civil claim against one’s employer, even though that dis-
closure would take place before a judge.47
In other words, if a victim has enough evidence that a felony has
been committed by her harasser or abuser, she may report the felony,
even when an NDA purports to bar her from such a report. However, as
the #MeToo Movement has revealed, this is a big “if.” First, as damag-
ing as sexual harassment can be, harassment alone rarely, if ever, qual-
ifies as a felony under state law.48 Second, there are many disincentives
for a victim to remedy her situation by means of a criminal case. For
example, she may fear retaliation from other superiors at her corpora-
tion or affiliates of the accused, and criminal law does not necessarily
supply her with any monetary remedy.49 Third, criminal law’s high
standard of guilt—beyond a reasonable doubt—makes it incredibly dif-
ficult for a private individual to mount evidence sufficient to prevail at
trial. This is especially true for sexual harassment and abuse, where
perpetrators can often cover their tracks, and witnesses have personal
incentives (including their own settlements) to keep quiet.50 Finally,
criminal prosecution takes control of the case away from the claimant
and places it in the hands of a prosecutor, whose central duty is to pun-
44 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 457 (5th Cir. 2005).
45 Katz v. South Burlington Sch. Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1229 (Vt. 2009) (citing Camp v.
Eichelkraut, 539 S.E.2d 588, 598 (2000)).
46 See id.; see also Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (D. Nev. 2006).
47 See Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 922; Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, No. 95-1130, 1996
WL 520789, at *10 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996).
48 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (2013) (limiting unwelcomed sexual contact with
a non-minor, even if the perpetrator is in a position of power over the victim, to a class A misde-
meanor); DEL. CODEANN. Tit. 11, §§ 763–773 (2018) (limiting sexual contact with non-minors to a
misdemeanor offense); D.C. CODEANN. § 22-3005 (2019) (requiring that a sexual contact felony be
brought about by reasonable threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/11-1.60 (2019) (imposing a requirement for sexual abuse felonies that the perpetrator used
or threatened to use a dangerous weapon or caused bodily harm, among others); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.345 (2019) (requiring a finding that the perpetrator used force or the threat of force in order
to charge him with felony).
49 See Schultz, supra note 14, at 38–39; Nicole Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with
Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 50 (2018).
50 See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling Harassers in an At-Will
World, 128 YALE L. J. F. 85, 93–94 (June 18, 2018).
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ish the perpetrator rather than ensure maximum recovery for the vic-
tim.51 In sum, reporting even expressly illegal activity is a difficult hur-
dle to overcome for an inherently nebulous transgression.
The EEOC works to ameliorate these barriers by institutionalizing
some investigations;52 whistleblowers who violate their NDAs at the be-
hest of the EEOC are protected.53 And yet, the EEOC cannot be every-
where at once, nor is every employee willing to take on a whistleblowing
role, especially when employers compel internal disclosure first.54More-
over, as mentioned above, the EEOC has little justification to launch a
full investigation if it has not received any reports because the victims
of a serial harasser are unanimously restrained by NDAs.55 Therefore,
we must consider the options available outside of criminal law to indi-
viduals who seek to bypass their NDAs for the sake of obtaining a rem-
edy from a civil suit or retribution by public disclosure.56
C. NDAs and Self-Enforcement
EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc.57 provides the leading case for unen-
forceability when criminal activity has yet to be established.58 In Astra,
the EEOC brought a preliminary injunction against Astra USA, Inc., in
51 See Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky,Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 301, 312 (Spring, 2017) (“It is well accepted . . . that the prosecutor is a fiduciary
who represents the sovereign and must make decisions in the public interest, for society at large—
not any individual client.”) (citing Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26
FORDHAMURB. L. J. 607, 633–34 (1999)).
52 The EEOC has endorsed the estimate that one in four women have experienced sexual har-
assment in the workplace, but that many women do not report it. See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, WOMEN IN THEAMERICANWORKFORCE (2015). Even when they do, in any given year, the
EEOC resolves roughly 50 percent of their charges under the category of “No Reasonable Cause,”
and 20.9 percent under “Administrative Closure” (another form of charge failure). EQUAL EMP’
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGES ALLEGING SEX-BASED HARASSMENT (CHARGES FILED WITH
EEOC) FY 2010–FY 2018 (2018). Only 22.8 percent of charges resolve with positive outcomes for
the victim (as defined by the EEOC, not the victim), so there is no way of knowing whether the
victim has truly received adequate reparation. See id. The EEOC does not provide data for the
number of NDAs it has challenged in court. However, given the meager case law, that number is
likely very low compared to the roughly 8,000 charges it resolves each year. See id. Indeed, about
9 percent of EEOC charges are resolved via settlement, so filings with the EEOC may be creating
more sexual harassment NDAs. Id.
53 See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Shores v. Senior
Manor Nursing Center, Inc., 518 N.E.2d 471 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700
S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984); Harless v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
54 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 40, at 190.
55 See Ryznar, supra note 19, at 54–57.
56 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 50, at 90–92 (discussing the inadequacy of antidiscrimina-
tion law to cover all forms of sexually motivated harm); Tristin K. Green,Was Sexual Harassment
Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128 YALE L.J. F. 152 (June 18, 2018).
57 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996).
58 See generally id.
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order to prevent Astra from entering into or enforcing settlement agree-
ments that prohibited employees from filing sexual harassment claims
with the EEOC and assisting the EEOC in its investigation.59 Multiple
Astra employees had communicated to the EEOC that they could not
divulge any information because of such agreements.60 Indeed, only
twenty-six out of ninety contacted employees even replied to the
EEOC’s requests.61 In order to determine whether Astra’s NDAs were
unenforceable as against public policy, the First Circuit applied a “bed-
rock” balancing test: “[A] promise is unenforceable if the interest in its
enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
harmed by enforcement of the agreement.”62 Specifically, the court
weighed the impact of the NDAs on the EEOC’s enforcement of Title
VII against the impact that outlawing those NDAs would have on pri-
vate dispute resolution.63
According to this test, Astra quickly became an open-and-closed
case. The EEOC is a public body empowered by Congress, and “it is
crucial that the Commission’s ability to investigate charges of systemic
discrimination not be impaired.”64 Furthermore, as the court found sig-
nificant, the EEOC does not only benefit private parties; its investiga-
tions are designed to advance the public interest first and foremost.65
Even a “sprinkling” of prohibitions that “materially interfere[ ]” with
communications between an employee and the Commission harms pub-
lic interest.66 The court did recognize that public policy “strongly favors
encouraging voluntary settlement,” but it ultimately found that unen-
forceability would not (1) create a “substantial disincentive” to settle-
ment, (2) promote further litigation, or (3) disturb the finality of al-
ready-negotiated settlements.67 Read plainly, the First Circuit’s finding
here is puzzling: confidentiality is a major incentive for corporations to
privately resolve employee disputes. While arbitration has other ad-
vantages as well, public disclosure was clearly one of Astra, Inc.’s great-
est concerns when it wrote the NDAs at issue.68 Therefore, it is unclear
59 Id. at 740–41.
60 Id. at 741.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 744 (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
63 Id. at 744.
64 Id. (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984)).
65 Id.
66 Id. (citing EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L’Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (1987)). It is
important to note for later how the court reserves this interference only for communications with
the EEOC, not any other party. It does not even suggest that nondisclosure in the sexual harass-
ment setting could be harmful to public interest per se.
67 See id. (citing Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981)).
68 See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1638 (2005).
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why the Astra court thought that nullifying a central provision of those
agreements would not disincentivize settlement between Astra and its
employees; if the nondisclosure provisions were unimportant, why
would Astra fight for them in court?
If one were to read Astra as saying that any nondisclosure compo-
nent of an arbitration agreement was non-substantial in terms of incen-
tives for private settlement, one could expect public policy challenges
against NDAs to be somewhat successful. However, the case law prob-
ably leans in the opposite direction, at least as it applies to private
plaintiffs. For example, in Saini v. International Game Technology,69
the Nevada District Court applied Astra’s balancing test and deter-
mined that an employee’s confidentiality agreement was valid even
though it would prevent employees from providing testimony that In-
ternational Game Technology (IGT) had purposefully sold refurbished
and defective gambling machines as new products.70 The court distin-
guished its case from Astra on multiple grounds. For one, the protection
of trade secrets, which was the supposed purpose of IGT’s agreement,
was more significant than the concealment of sexual harassment com-
plaints.71 Second, the court found that “public policy [in uncovering the
sale of defective products] is not as high a priority as enforcement of
sexual harassment law by the EEOC, at least when, as here, the defect
at issue is not a threat to the safety or economic well-being of the public
at large.”72 Third, IGT’s terms were part of a “standard agreement;”
they were not “specifically designed to stifle evidence of wrongdoing.”73
Finally, the court found it significant that the employee—instead of a
regulatory agency—had moved to void the NDA and thereby “act as de-
cisionmaker about what information IGT does and does not have a le-
gitimate confidentiality interest in.”74 An employee’s belief that an NDA
is concealing illegal activity is not enough.75
At first glance, Saini appears promising for individual victims at-
tempting to void their employer’s NDAs. Indeed, the court asserted that
the concealment of workplace sexual harassment in Astra was at least
more significant than the dangers of concealing product defects. How-
ever, a closer reading of the opinion reveals that the court significantly
limited its consideration of sexual harassment to the context of EEOC
69 434 F. Supp. 2d 913 (D. Nev. 2006).
70 See id. at 923.
71 See id. at 923.
72 Id. at 921.
73 Id. This finding is somewhat questionable if ITG was in fact intentionally short-changing
its customers.
74 Id. at 922.
75 Id.
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investigations. Namely, it specified its consideration of public policy
concerns in Astra as the “enforcement of sexual harassment law by the
EEOC.”76 It did not weigh a public interest in encouraging enforcement
by private individuals—nor, as pertains more closely to #MeToo, the
attempts of private individuals to seek better remedies in court or bet-
ter retribution in the public eye. The court’s reservation is only made
clearer by its final distinction that the plaintiff was a private individual
and not a regulatory agency.77
The Saini court’s limitation of Astra’s findings to public agency en-
forcement is consistent with the language and underlying rationale of
Astra itself. As noted above, the First Circuit considered the NDAs in
question to be harmful to the EEOC’s own actions, not unjust to the
actual victims involved. Moreover, it felt compelled to expressly recog-
nize the otherwise intuitive notion that the EEOC’s actions benefit the
public as a whole, not just “private” victims. That court did not, on the
other hand, discuss whether private challenges to unfair NDAs can also
similarly benefit the public, especially when harassment is too subtle
for the EEOC to root out. Perhaps this explains why the First Circuit
found that a preliminary injunction would not undermine prior settle-
ments or discourage future ones: its holding really only applied to As-
tra’s relationship with the EEOC. Astra and Saini indicate there is a
significant public interest in preventing workplace sexual harassment,
but on the whole, that interest only overcomes the public’s interest in
freedom of contract when it is the government who seeks to advance it.
1. EEOC investigations
Surrounding case law supports the interpretation that government
investigation / private dispute is the most significant predictor for de-
termining whether a sexual harassment NDA is void as against public
policy. As regards invalidated agreements, there are plenty of cases in
which courts have refused to enforce agreements that are likely “to chill
employees’ participation in legitimate investigations.”78 Given this
Comment’s discussion so far, “legitimate” may very well be a stand-in
for “government-led.” In EEOC v. International Profit Associates,79 the
Northern District of Illinois invalidated a severance agreement that
prohibited an employee from “disclosing anything relating to his em-
ployment . . . except as may be necessary in response to lawful process
76 Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 922.
78 See, e.g., EEOC v. Int’l. Profit Assocs., No. 01 C 4427, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761, at *3–4
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2003); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984).
79 No. 01 C 4427, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2003).
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of any judicial or adjudicative authority or otherwise allowed by law.”80
Here, as in Astra, the court narrowly confined its ruling on the contract
as “inapplicable to communications with the EEOC.”81 Such a limitation
strongly invokes the “implied” public policy “exceptions” that allow re-
porting of criminal activity when the reporting party is bound by an
NDA.82
In EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,83 the Southern District of New
York invalidated a non-assistance agreement that required employees
to notify their direct supervisor and the “Law” or “Compliance” depart-
ments before communicating with the EEOC.84 Even though the con-
tract’s language only threatened the possibility of demotion or termina-
tion if an employee failed to notify the appropriate officers, the court
found that this language was sufficient to frustrate the EEOC’s inves-
tigation.85 As in Astra, the agreement sported at least a “sprinkling” of
prohibitions that “materially interfered” with the EEOC’s efforts.86 It
seems reasonable that Morgan Stanley would want its Law and Com-
pliance departments to stay well-informed about the EEOC’s interac-
tions with its employees, so perhaps the court erred in denouncing the
company’s prudence. Regardless, this court’s decision illustrates the ju-
diciary’s eagerness to protect and advance the government’s own at-
tempts to curb workplace sexual harassment and discrimination.
Courts have therefore provided the EEOC with a great boon in enabling
it to bypass corporate NDAs for the sake of its investigations. However,
and again, the Commission does not have the resources to investigate
behind every closed door.
2. Private attempts to invalidate NDAs
The #MeToo Movement has made it clear: private individuals must
also come forward with their own stories in order to effect meaningful
social change.87 And yet, despite the judiciary’s eagerness to assist the
EEOC, it has been less charitable with private actors who attempt to
invalidate NDAs themselves. As the court proclaimed in Saini, it is not
80 Id. at *2.
81 Id. at *6.
82 Katz v. South Burlington Sch. Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1229 (Vt. 2009).
83 01 Civ. 8421 (RMB) (RLE), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17484 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2002).
84 See id. at *5–6.
85 See id.
86 EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996).
87 See, e.g., Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced
Sexual Harassment, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, INC. (Feb. 21 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-women-have-experienced-sexua
l-harassment [https://perma.cc/7DY5-7934].
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within the individual’s “prerogative” to determine for herself what type
of information is “legitimately” confidential.88
For example, in Perricone v. Perricone,89 the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut enforced a divorce settlement NDA that prevented a celebrity-
doctor’s ex-wife from divulging his purportedly condemnable behavior
to popular public media sources.90 That court went a little further, in-
terpreting Astra as a case purely concerned with communications to
public enforcement agencies and thereby writing sexual harassment
out of the script.91 It also limited voidable nondisclosure provisions to
five main categories: terms that (1) restrict “the right to speak on mat-
ters of public concern” (referring to voting in public elections), (2) re-
strict communication with a public agency regarding civil rights law
enforcement (Astra), (3) “require[ ] the suppression of criminal behav-
ior,” (4) suppress information important to public health and safety, or
(5) impose confidentiality for the benefit of a “public entity or official.”92
Taken literally, some of these categories should have helped those seek-
ing to invalidate their NDAs. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court
also urged that the public policy doctrine “should be applied with cau-
tion and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine
rests . . . .”93 Therefore, a term may be enforced even if it could poten-
tially fall into one or more of these categories.94
Bandera v. City of Quincy95 provides an example of the judiciary’s
hesitancy to apply the public policy doctrine in private disputes even
when multiple Perricone categories may be implicated.96 In Bandera,
the former director of Quincy’s Community Policing Commission at-
tempted to invalidate a settlement agreement after she was allegedly
coerced into it by her previous attorney.97 According to her trial testi-
mony, for which the jury awarded her $135,000 dollars, Bandera had
88 Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (D. Nev. 2006). See also Dworking &
Callahan, supra note 40, at 166–68 (discussing other cases supporting the proposition that “the
courts seem reluctant to excuse an employee from a confidentiality agreement where breach is
motivated by personal gain, even in situations where disclosing information might advance public
safety”).
89 972 A.2d 666 (Conn. 2009).
90 See id. at 689.
91 See id. at 688.
92 See id. at 688 (citing Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 891 (5th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Astra
U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996); Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 664
(Ohio 1988); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787–88 (3rd Cir. 1994)).
93 Id. at 687 (citation omitted).
94 See also Katz v. South Burlington School Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1228 (Vt. 2009).
95 344 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2003).
96 See id. at 50.
97 See id. at 49.
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been excluded from meetings, ridiculed on the basis of her sex, and sub-
jected to graphic stories of the sexual exploits of male officers.98 She was
fired by the mayor of Quincy soon after bringing her complaint.99Mean-
while, even the plain language of the settlement appeared suspicious.
It demanded a general release of all claims and the imposition of non-
admission and non-disclosure agreements concerning her claim in ex-
change for her then-attorney’s full compensation and a promise that the
mayor would recommend Bandera for a permanent substitute teaching
position at the city’s public school.100
The issues of unconscionability in this case are beyond the scope of
this Comment.101 Nonetheless, the facts of Bandera raise various con-
cerns along the lines provided by Perricone. The settlement and its NDA
were unduly favorable to the city and its public officials, the potential
criminal activities of the city and its officers were probably a matter of
public concern, and the settlement was possibly designed around con-
cealing those potentially criminal activities.102 Despite these potential
red flags, the First Circuit found that the settlement’s provisions were
not void as a matter of public policy, citing Astra but refraining from
entering into a public policy balancing test.103
Whatever the import of the First Circuit’s refrain, Bandera compel-
lingly illustrates the extra-legal difficulties facing private individuals
who pursue litigation. Even if they are not barred by a boilerplate arbi-
tration agreement, their employers typically have ample resources to
compel settlement against the victim’s best interests and return the
transgressions at issue to a state of nondisclosure. Any litigation is ex-
hausting, resource-intensive, and full of uncertainty, especially for non-
lawyers.104 This is doubly so in the case of a sexual harassment claim,
which requires that the victim relive her harm at every court proceed-
ing. The same does not apply to the well-informed and well-equipped




101 Even if the harassing employee exerted undue influence on the victim, the NDA is most
often between the victim and the employer. Employers, as opposed to individual harassers, often
have significant incentives and sufficient legal knowledge to prevent the extra risks that would
emerge from soliciting an NDA via undue influence. Therefore, while the unconscionability doc-
trine is thematically relevant to sexual harassment, courts rarely apply it when the other party of
an NDA is an employer (assuming the employer is not the individual harasser).
102 The public officers involved had likely violated Massachusetts law. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 151B § 1.18 (2014).
103 Bandera, 344 F.3d at 55.
104 See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 50, at 95–96; Schultz, supra note 14, at 46.
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order for the district court to determine whether the settlement agree-
ment had been properly formed.105 However, the case did not make it
that far: Bandera, who then proceeded pro se, capitulated to the earlier
settlement agreement, even though the jury’s award would have easily
covered her legal fees and far exceeded her prospective income as a sub-
stitute teacher.106 Only Bandera’s psychological fatigue and lack of
trustworthy legal resources could satisfactorily explain why she sub-
mitted to such a bad deal.
D. Summary of Findings
This Comment has so far attempted to carve out a body of case law
applicable to NDAs that purport to prevent victims of sexual harass-
ment from divulging their stories to the public. Not every case that this
Comment has examined is expressly linked by precedent. Nor does each
case tackle the problem of sexual harassment NDAs head-on. Nonethe-
less, they all speak as one in providing the lay of the land: Courts are
extremely hesitant to render an NDA unenforceable unless (1) the al-
leged harasser is under investigation by the EEOC or (2) the victim has
strong evidence that the agreement was intended to prevent her from
reporting a crime, of which there is also substantial proof.107 With this
review of relevant case law complete, this Comment could conclude.
However, in order to understand why courts have decided upon these
doctrines and how they may change after #MeToo, one ought to take a
closer look at the “bedrock” upon which Astra and its sister cases relied.
IV. THE JUDICIARY’SUNDERLYING RATIONALE
The analysis above raises a crucial question: Why do courts draw
the line for NDA invalidation between public and private enforcement,
when such a line clearly leaves some harassment victims vulnerable to
further harm? True, the foremost duty of the courts is to apply the law,
not to make ad hoc moral judgments. However, in the case of the com-
mon law public policy doctrine, courts have and will continue to actively
shape the legal regime that applies to sexual harassment NDAs. Their
105 Bandera, 344 F.3d at 55.
106 The agreement did not even guarantee a position at the school. Mayor Sheets merely prom-
ised to recommend Bandera for a substitute position if she could not secure a full time position
herself. See id. at 49. Quincy Public Schools currently pays its substitute teachers $85 per day, or
roughly $15,000 per year if the substitute works every day of the year. Quincy Pub. Sch. Dist.
#172: Internal Postings: Substitute Tchr., APPTRACK.COM (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.applitrack.c
om/qps/onlineapp/jobpostings/view.asp?internaltransferform.Url=&internal=internal&district=&
category=Substitute+Certified [https://perma.cc/834N-TN4S].
107 As laid out in section B, such cases exist in the context of other crimes, but there has been
no case in which a private plaintiff has succeeded in invalidating an NDA by a showing of clear
evidence that she was sexually harassed by the other side of the agreement.
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development of that regime can thus be evaluated for the purposes of
determining its efficacy and the room it leaves for reform.
Therefore, the following sections of this Comment take a closer look
at the underlying principles of the public policy doctrine and the specific
factors that courts consider in weighing public policy in the sexual har-
assment context. Such an examination is an essential foundation for
weighing the viability of judicial reform. Ultimately, this part of the
Comment will find that even though the current judicial regime does
not optimally advance the interests of sexual harassment victims, its
approach is motivated by valid concerns for efficiency and accuracy in
distributing justice.
A. The Public Policy Doctrine’s Underlying Rationale
The line between public and private enforcement can be explained
by the judiciary’s emphasis on the wrongdoer rather than the victim in
public policy cases. Voiding a contract despite the universal public in-
terest in freedom of contract is a significant deployment of a court’s au-
thority. Were a court to do so in order to benefit an individual, it would
raise major concerns about abusing its discretion, especially if that pri-
vate benefit imposed a detriment upon the public overall (such as di-
minishing the binding power of private agreements). Therefore, as
Dworkin and Callahan’s article, Buying Silence, elaborates, courts limit
their application of the public policy doctrine to cases in which a bad
actor’s behavior should not be enforced:
In general, “freedom of contract” is manifested by the courts’ dis-
inclination to evaluate the substance of agreements between pri-
vate parties. There are cases, however, in which this principle is
superseded by societal interests, and a court may decline to en-
force a contract term on public policy grounds. The introductory
note to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “reluc-
tance to aid the promisee rather than solicitude for the promisor”
provides the basis for such a determination. Refusals of enforce-
ment on these grounds are designed to deter misconduct and to
avoid using the courts as instrumentalities of questionable ac-
tivity. 108
Voiding a term mainly to benefit a sympathetic individual risks in-
juring the public by undermining freedom of contract. However, pun-
ishing a bad actor by refusing to enforce his term advances public inter-
est overall (whether because the actor was trying to get away with a
108 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 40, at 162 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
introductory note (1981)).
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crime or because he was clearly abusing contract law, among other rea-
sons). Still, it may be difficult in practice for a court to draw the line
between the two—that is, between an employer-favorable contract pol-
icy and a behavior so harmful to public policy that it must be rendered
void. As suggested Part II, that inquiry becomes easier when other
agencies have already addressed it themselves.
As Buying Silence points out, Astra provides a great example of the
courts’ emphasis on refraining from assisting the promisee. If a govern-
ment agency complains that a company is likely concealing unlawful
action by means of NDAs, the court has good reason to take that agency
at its word and void such agreements. It is not just that the agreements
are wrongly concealing unflattering information; they represent a com-
pany’s unwillingness to submit itself to rule of law. Thus, even though
the EEOC brought a civil injunction, the First Circuit’s refusal to en-
force the NDAs was just a simple extension of the legal rationale that
there is no “freedom of contract” interest when contracts are used to
break the law.109
Nonetheless, Buying Silence does not address a crucial feature of
both the Restatement and Astra’s decision: both expressly refuse to con-
sider the “solicitude of the promisor” in determining whether an agree-
ment is unenforceable for the sake of public policy. As already ex-
plained, Astra emphasized the EEOC’s function as “vindicat[ing] the
public interest” rather than only serving private parties.110 The matter
at hand was not a battle between remedying an employee’s sexual har-
assment and protecting a company’s right to enforce its agreements; it
was a battle between a company’s (unnecessarily strict) private deal-
ings and an agency’s enforcement responsibilities as laid down by Con-
gress itself.111 What is more, the factors that the First Circuit weighed
in its balancing test were even larger than the most basic stakes in the
case. Namely, while the court considered individual impact on Astra for
the sake of the injunction, as for its balancing test, it did not weigh the
impact that voiding the NDAs would have on Astra’s relationships with
its employees. Instead, it weighed “the impact [of its decision] on pri-
vate dispute resolution” overall.112 In other words, the court did not
weigh the impact of enforcement on the EEOC’s specific investigation
against Astra; it weighed the impact that these types of agreements
would have on all EEOC efforts if the court decided to enforce them.113
109 See, e.g., Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). See
also, Katz v. S. Burlington Sch. Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1228 (Vt. 2009).
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Nowhere in the opinion is there a speculation on how a ruling for one
side or the other might affect the actual victims in the case.
B. The Courts’ Current Approach Is at Odds with #MeToo’s Princi-
ples
The main thrusts of #MeToo and its sister movements114 urge us to
focus on the exact same factors that courts leave out in public policy
considerations, such as the harm to the victim, the power dynamics be-
tween victim and harasser that exacerbated the harm, and the remedy
necessary not only to deter the harasser but more importantly to make
the victim whole again.115 With these #MeToo factors in mind, the
courts that this Comment examined could have inquired as to whether
invalidating the NDA was necessary to ensure that the victim finds ad-
equate relief. Under such a regime, companies could still have faith in
the legitimacy of their employment contracts, so long as they provided
their employees with generous arbitration terms and a thorough system
for deterrence and accountability. However, the regime must be dealt
with as it stands, not as how it should be.
This is not to say that there was no room in the doctrine for Astra
to have considered the position of sexual harassment victims. The Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts provides four factors for a court to con-
sider in determining whether a contract should be void as against public
policy:
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or ju-
dicial decisions;
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further
that policy;
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to
which it was deliberate; and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and
the term.116
The First Circuit’s opinion explicitly involved considerations of fac-
tors (a) and (b), but factors (c) and (d) had no explicit role to play. If they
114 For example, #TimesUp has also gained significant traction in the past two years since
Weinstein’s behavior was revealed. See About Time’s Up, TIME’SUP, https://www.timesupnow.com/
about_times_up [https://perma.cc/QW5P-E9KX] (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
115 See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 50, at 101–02; Green, supra note 56, at 166–68.
116 § 178(3)(a)–(d) (1981). Of course, this language was available to the First Circuit by 1996.
Dworking and Callahan discuss this in Buying Silence but only as pertains to whistleblowers. See
Dworking & Callahan, supra note 40, at 179–90.
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did, as regards to (c), one might expect the court to have delved into
EEOC’s investigation to see the degree of potential harassment at As-
tra. Alternatively, the court could have expressly assumed that (c) was
satisfied because the possible activity raised to the level of gravity as to
attract EEOC’s investigation in the first place. Either way, the stories
of individual victims at Astra could have played a role in determining
the degree of misconduct. As for (d), plenty in the contract suggested an
intention to cover up misconduct. The court even noted (but again did
not explicitly weigh) the concerning silence with which the EEOC’s in-
vestigation was met by numerous Astra employees.
There is evidence that other courts have externally considered fac-
tors (c) and (d). For example, in Saini, the District of Nevada court noted
that IGT’s contracts were standard and not designed to cover up con-
sumer fraud.117 Such a particular observation about the case at hand
has little connection to the nationwide scope of Astra’s test, which Saini
expressly followed. Furthermore, courts may focus on (c) and (d) in re-
fusing to enforce NDAs that conceal illegal activity. However, this is
likely because (a) and (b) are already easily satisfied: (a) Enabling crime
is certainly against legal precedent and (b) allowing reports of that
crime would surely help prevent it.118 This Comment will address
whether the weighing of #MeToo factors is actually workable. For now,
suffice it to show that the court in Astra and other courts have decided
to orient their opinions towards broader questions of public interests
rather than fact-intensive issues of individual harm.
From this—in addition to the language from other opinions that
suggests likewise—one may gather that courts are more than comfort-
able recognizing the silent plight of workplace sexual harassment vic-
tims, but they have clearly delegated to the EEOC the question of how
and when to protect those victims. In other words, the judiciary’s cur-
rent approach refrains from determining how to empower those victims
to protect themselves.119 One can only speculate as to why each court
unanimously adhered to this particular construction of the public policy
doctrine. On the one hand, they have a general obligation to follow prec-
edent, but on the other, there was clearly room to branch out without
totally diverging from the Restatement. Regardless, armed with the
findings from Part III of this Comment, some speculation should prove
productive.
117 Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (D. Nev. 2006).
118 See, e.g., Katz v. S. Burlington Sch. Dist., 970 A.2d 1226, 1228 (2009).
119 See Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
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C. The Judiciary’s Current Approach Is Justified
As this Comment has argued, the best predictor for determining
the validity of an NDA is whether the party that is seeking to invalidate
the agreement is a government agency or a private individual. Drawing
this line keeps the court’s determination simple, because, as in Astra, it
makes satisfying the Restatement’s first two factors easy: (a) Congress
clearly supports the EEOC’s Title VII investigations as a matter of pub-
lic policy over a general desire to encourage freedom of contract, and (b)
allowing companies to enforce their NDAs despite an EEOC investiga-
tion would severely frustrate the EEOC’s efforts and therefore Con-
gress’s wishes. Again, such a ruling is merely an extension of the fun-
damental rationale that the public’s interest in law enforcement is
prime.120 And if a court is concerned with factors (c) and (d)—even if
they play no explicit part in the balancing test—the EEOC has done
much of that consideration for them. From the court’s perspective: (c)
the misconduct is serious because the EEOC is investigating it, and (d)
there is likely a direct connection between the agreements and the mis-
conduct, because the EEOC is asking the court to invalidate them.
Private attempts at invalidating NDAs would require a far more
difficult deliberation before a court could justify a decision not to enforce
the agreement. There is no universal piece of legislation proving that
Congress or state legislatures desire private individuals to violate their
NDAs in spite of the freedom of contract interest.121 Even if courts could
comfortably determine that legislative bodies would want the victim to
come forward in its case, it would then have to decide whether that com-
ing-forward would actually advance, say, the public’s interest in having
harassment-free workplaces. By the preliminary injunction stage, the
court would have to not only estimate whether the victim’s case would
be successful, but also whether its success would serve to deter future
incidences of sexual harassment. It is far from clear that corporate lia-
bility for officer misconduct actually deters those officers from future
misconduct.122
Meanwhile, if courts entertained invalidating an NDA at the sole
behest of a private plaintiff, they could no longer rely on other agencies’
expert judgment—namely, the EEOC or an attorney general—as to
whether alleged misconduct was serious and whether the agreements
are connected to that misconduct. A court could compare the victim’s
120 Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). Accord Perricone
v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 689 (Conn. 2009); Unami v. Roshan, 659 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Ct. App. Ga.
2008) (citing 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:14 (4th ed.)).
121 As we will see, this may change in the future.
122 Harvey Weinstein is too easy an example. See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 50, at 95–
96.
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testimony and evidence with that of the company’s own (the dreaded
“he-said / she-said” problem). However, as evinced by Bandera, courts
are rightfully hesitant to conduct a mini-trial on such issues in order to
determine whether or not the case can even proceed.123 Instead, it is
simpler to adhere to basic contract principles in these cases rather than
commit every NDA breach to intensive litigation before liability can
even be established.124 Again, the hope is that the EEOC will protect
these victims for whom arbitration or criminal law is insufficient.
V. STATUTORY REFORM AND ITS ADVANTAGES
A. Existing Case Law Does Not Provide for Effective Reform
A consideration of the many disadvantages posed by reforming the
judiciary’s approach makes evident that legislative measures are the
best option for improving the state of the law surrounding NDAs in the
context of sexual harassment. As this Comment has already examined,
the current case law fails to address many of the important interests
and intricacies that the #MeToo Movement has brought to light. This is
indubitably a major concern. First, however, there are the standard
criticisms of case law as a platform for social change, both practical,
such as its long time-horizon, and political, such as the needed cooper-
ation from other branches of government.125 Second, there are problems
facing judicial reform unique to the context of NDAs and sexual harass-
ment. Sexual harassment is an extremely divisive issue, and not all
123 Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (“But by the same token the
district court cannot summarily deny enforcement simply because material facts are in dispute:
the task is to resolve the dispute. And, in this instance, it is unlikely—though perhaps not impos-
sible—that the matter could be resolved without an evidentiary hearing.”).
124 Efficiency is an important consideration when courts resolve issues of first impression or
demands for reform. For example, the Supreme Court has many times invoked the federal judici-
ary’s limited case capacity in defining the limitation of “Federal Question Jurisdiction”—the ability
of federal courts to hear cases involving federal issues. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prod. v.
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318–19 (2005) (“For if the federal labeling standard without a
federal cause of action could get a state claim into federal court, so could any other federal standard
without a federal cause of action. And that would [mean] a tremendous number of cases.”); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). Letting too many cases into federal court would not only create an imbal-
ance between the state and federal systems, it would pose a serious threat to the efficiency of
federal courts. See alsoMerrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 811–12 (1986) (noting
the “increased [complexity and] volume of federal litigation” as “considerations that should inform”
efficiency decisions in the interpretation of Federal Question). Promptness and accuracy are both
essential components in delivering justice, so an inefficient system threatens to become an unjust
one. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The purpose of this
revision, adding the words ‘and administered’ to the second sentence, is to recognize the affirma-
tive duty of the court to exercise the authority conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation
is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or delay. As officers of the court, attorneys
share this responsibility with the judge to whom the case is assigned.”).
125 See generally, GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2nd ed. 2008).
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courts are likely to share Judge Young’s pro-victim sentiments.126More-
over, a balancing test that considers the victim’s harm in every attempt
to invalidate an NDA is not a reasonably workable judicial regime.
As mentioned above, courts are hesitant to resolve complex dis-
putes of fact before it is clear that a plaintiff actually has a valid
claim.127 Determining whether an NDA is invalid because it is being
used to cover up sexual harassment would require a court to figure out
whether or not the victim was actually sexually harassed. Such a deter-
mination could take years, and a regime that requires it would enable
complainants to unduly burden their employers and the courts. Moreo-
ver, even if the courts had the resources to reasonably allow for these
private investigations in every case—and corporations had the re-
sources to tolerate them without seriously affecting employment condi-
tions—it is asking them to make some very difficult determinations in
every instance.
Under this alternative regime, courts would have to consider:
(1) Was there sexual harassment for which the other party is
responsible?
(2) Is an NDA preventing the disclosure of that harassment?
(3) What is the degree of harm?
(4) Are the standard remedies currently available to the plaintiff
outside of this court sufficient to remedy that harm?
(5) If not, would invalidating the NDA make a better remedy
available—in other words, is the NDA the reason for the victim’s
lack of recourse?
(6) If invalidation would aid the victim, and recognizing that
there is a default public interest in freedom of contract, would
invalidation in this case create a precedent that would advance
public interest overall?
Alternatively, courts could abandon the general public policy con-
siderations of the current doctrine, but reinventing the wheel is danger-
ous when no better framework is apparent.
It is difficult to imagine how requiring these questions would pro-
liferate an efficient legal system. It is even harder to imagine that
126 SeeUnited States v. Aegerion Pharm., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 217, 228 (D. Mass. 2017); Megan
Keller, Poll: Over 40 Percent Believe #MeToo Movement Has Gone Too Far, HILL (Oct. 31, 2018)
https://thehill.com/homenews/news/414076-poll-over-40-percent-believe-metoo-movement-has-go
ne-too-far [https://perma.cc/J7Q2-TRNR].
127 Bandera, 344 F.3d at 52.
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judges, legal generalists by necessity, are equipped to answer these
questions correctly in every case. For these reasons, the status quo is
more justified than was first apparent. Namely, it is sound public policy
in itself for a court to require that at least some of the questions sur-
rounding a sexual harassment NDA are answered first by agency inves-
tigation and criminal prosecution. The tradeoff with this governmental
approach, of course, is that it provides limited remedies to victims, even
though it is most likely to focus on the most serious incidences of har-
assment and assault. And as some scholars convincingly argue, the cur-
rent regulatory scheme may not do enough to affirmatively incentivize
victims and witnesses to come forward.128 Nonetheless, because case
law does not provide room for a compelling judicial alternative, we must
look towards other avenues for reform.
B. Advantages of Legislation
Legislation is the best avenue: it will better serve sexual harass-
ment victims by preventing harmful NDAs from the outset rather than
trying to strike them down retroactively in court. Some scholars have
already put thought into what this legislation should look like. For ex-
ample, in Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs,129 Ian Ayres suggests a
“middle ground” that would allow for NDAs that could still protect vic-
tims who seek confidentiality but would prevent their validity when
used to protect “serial offenders.”130 In contrast, this Comment does not
seek to propose the “right” legislation. Instead, as with its consideration
of case law, the Comment seeks to address legislation as it stands in
order to determine whether legislatures can ameliorate the #MeToo
concerns that have been raised throughout this inquiry.
1. Examples of ongoing statutory reform
California and New York provide instructive case studies, not only
because they are influential and commercially powerful states, but also
because they are currently leading the way in passing new and ambi-
tious #MeToo laws. Effective as of January 1, 2018, California’s newly
amended civil procedure code states:
(a) Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settle-
ment agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual infor-
mation related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the
128 See Schultz, supra note 14, at 39 (citing Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by
Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAND L. REV. ONLINE 49 (2018)); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in
an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 136–39 (2014)).
129 Ayres, supra note 4, at 79–83.
130 See id. at 78–79.
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factual foundation for which establishes a cause of action for civil
damages for any of the following:
(1) An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense. . . .
(4) An act of sexual assault, as defined in paragraphs (1) to (9),
inclusive, of subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, against an elder or dependent adult, as
defined in Sections 15610.23 and 15610.27 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in
paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall
not enter, by stipulation or otherwise, an order that restricts the
disclosure of information in a manner that conflicts with subdi-
vision (a). 131
Were Saini a case about sexual misconduct, this code’s language
may have produced the opposite result. Specifically, the language pro-
hibits the enforcement of any contract that purports to prevent a victim
or crucial witness from coming forward in a civil claim. True, the code
does not reach so far as sexual harassment, which is not a felony in
California, but it would take some clever drafting to somehow specify
that an NDA applies to disclosures about sexual harassment but not
sexual assault. Bare minimum, such language would put employees
and the court on notice that the corporation providing such agreements
has sinister intent to conceal its misdeeds.
As discussed above, the connection between the NDA and the harm
at bar is at least a tacit consideration during a public policy challenge
to a contract provision.132 A court would be more comfortable voiding a
contract as against public policy when its plain language suggests that
the company aims to evade due accountability.133 Finally, and most im-
portantly, this law remedies an essential problem with the judiciary’s
current reliance on the EEOC and prosecutors to root out sexual as-
sault: it ensures that victims can personally recover damages by means
of a civil claim once the sexual misconduct has been established in a
criminal proceeding.
New York has taken even greater steps, with an improved atten-
tion to the position of employee-victims. Its new legislation (Section
5003-b) says:
131 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(a)–(b) (2019).
132 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(3)(a)–(d) (1981); Saini v. Int’l Game
Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (D. Nev. 2006).
133 See id.
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Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, for any claim or
cause of action, whether arising under common law, equity, or
any provision of law, the factual foundation for which involves
sexual harassment, in resolving, by agreed judgment, stipula-
tion, decree, agreement to settle, assurance of discontinuance or
otherwise, no employer, its officer or employee shall have the au-
thority to include or agree to include in such resolution any term
or condition that would prevent the disclosure of the underlying
facts and circumstances to the claim or action unless the condi-
tion of confidentiality is the plaintiff’s preference. Any such term
or condition must be provided to all parties, and the plaintiff
shall have twenty-one days to consider such term or condition.
If after twenty-one days such term or condition is the plaintiff’s
preference, such preference shall be memorialized in an agree-
ment signed by all parties. For a period of at least seven days
following the execution of such agreement, the plaintiff may re-
voke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effec-
tive or be enforceable until such revocation period has expired.134
Like California’s law, Section 5003–b prevents employers from in-
dependently establishing NDAs that would prevent their employees
from disclosing information about sexual harassment in a civil suit. In-
ventively, under this statute, an employee can still agree for such a pro-
vision to be enforceable, but only after the required deliberation period
and in her sole discretion. This certainly ameliorates general concerns
about employee bargaining power in the face of corporate giants, while
preserving an option for employees who desire confidentiality them-
selves.135 The language is somewhat unclear, but “underlying facts and
circumstances to the claim” leaves open the possibility that the law pre-
vents a company from restraining a victim from disclosing her story
outside of court.
2. Forecasting the impacts of reform
These statutes may be too recent to produce case law examples of
their impact on victims’ attempts to invalidate NDAs.136 On the other
134 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003–b (McKinney 2018).
135 See generally Arnow-Richman, supra note 50; Ayres, supra note 4.
136 As of September 13, 2019, no case has cited New York’s statute. As for California’s statute,
no cases have emerged, though it is cited by a series of complaints against USA Gymnastics and
Michigan State University for their alleged cover up of Dr. Lawrence Nassar’s sexual violations.
See, e.g., Complaint at 202, Davis v. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00029, 2018 WL 4329266 (W.D.
Mich. Sep. 10, 2018). As one can tell from the complaint’s jurisdiction, the California statute is not
central to the plaintiff’s claim.
583] OPENING CLOSEDDOORS 609
hand, more than a year has passed since they both became effective.137
Silence itself could speak to their efficacy: a lack of new cases involving
sexual harassment NDAs suggests a decrease in frequency for contrac-
tual cover-ups that provide insufficient solicitude and reparation for the
victim. That is a victory for legislation in itself, even if #MeToo’s cul-
tural shift has so far led the charge.138
Regardless, the future impact of these laws may be projected by
imposing them on the cases examined above. For one, a statute in the
style of California’s could have deterred the strongly one-sided settle-
ment arrangement that featured prominently in Bandera.139 First, Cal-
ifornia only requires an act that “may” be prosecuted as a felony sex
offense for its code to apply.140 Even if Bandera did not suffer from such
an act—in California, the unwanted touching of an intimate area for
the purpose of sexual gratification—the threat of such an allegation and
the prolonged litigation required to validate it would have left the City
of Quincy far more desperate to resolve the case.141 Second, Bandera’s
claims would have served as an even stronger warning to the City of
Quincy: if any of the City’s employee-perpetrators went further in their
actions, the City would have to face a claimant whom they could not
silence through settlement. California’s new law not only preserves dis-
closures to a court in a criminal case; by proactively preventing certain
NDAs from being formed, it empowers a potential felony sex offense
victim to share the information of her harm as she sees fit. Thus, the
City of Quincy would have had stronger incentives to immediately elim-
inate any risks among its personnel in order to prevent public outrage
after the victim’s disclosure, no matter the case’s actual outcome.
New York’s statute, which includes sexual harassment NDAs,
would have prevented Bandera’s plight altogether.142 Because it only
allows NDAs when they are the “plaintiff’s preference,” Quincy would
likely have had to offer more money to Bandera in exchange for her
silence. And even if Bandera mistakenly moved to accept the first deal
due to bad counsel or ignorance of the law, the court could have invoked
the New York code in preventing its signing or invalidating it retroac-
tively. Indeed, the statute might have obliged the court to do so.
137 California and New York’s laws became effective on January 1, 2018, and July 11, 2018,
respectively.
138 See Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 242–67 (Eyal Zamir & Doron
Teichman eds., 2014) (concluding that law can also play an important role in changing “moral
attitudes,” especially in the sexual harassment setting).
139 Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2003).
140 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(a) (2019).
141 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4 (2019).
142 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003–b (McKinney 2018).
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Finally, whatever the concrete impacts of these laws will be, they
will likely influence how courts resolve attempts to void sexual harass-
ment on public policy grounds. Returning to the Restatement, “the
strength of that policy as manifested by legislation . . .” is one of the four
main factors that courts consider in determining whether to enforce a
challenged term.143 Therefore, a court whose state has a law that re-
stricts sexual harassment NDAs can be more confident in refusing to
enforce those agreements than a court whose state lacks them. Moreo-
ver, the more states that put such laws in place, the more likely a court
will look beyond the laws of its own state when weighing the public pol-
icy interest in refusing to enforce an agreement. Were Congress to enact
such a law, the effect would be all the more prolific.
C. Counterarguments
The most immediate rebuttal to this Comment’s argument is that
courts will have to change too—statutory reform alone will be insuffi-
cient. Indeed, it is challenging for legislatures to craft laws that provide
answers for every incident. After all, sexual harassment law has not
worked so far, and victims are likely to continue to slip through the
cracks.144 However, arguing for an emphasis on legislative reform does
not leave court reform by the wayside. In fact, legislative reform is prob-
ably the best chance at encouraging the courts to change their own doc-
trine. As this Comment just observed, the legislative scheme at hand is
a primary consideration for courts in determining whether or not a con-
tract is void as a matter of public policy.145 The more that Congress and
state legislatures restrict sexual harassment NDAs generally, the more
comfortable a court will be in stretching that law a little further to in-
validate a contract in a special case. And as many law and economics
experts have argued, the law itself has the capacity to alter cultural
attitudes, including those of judges.146 In making the legal leap smaller
for courts seeking to invalidate a sexual harassment NDA, we can ex-
pect those leaps to also become more common.
A critic might also argue that the positive influence of statutory
reform upon the courts could be nullified—and some new laws
preempted—by pre-existing legislation that favors private settlement,
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(3)(a).
144 See generally Green, supra note 56.
145 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(3)(a).
146 See Bilz & Nadler, supra note 138, at 243 (suggesting that even where judges fail to follow
the public trend, public outrage against their decisions as motivated by new laws encourages them
towards legal reform) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903–68 (1996)).
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namely, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).147 In AT&TMobility LLC v.
Concepcion,148 the Supreme Court held that state laws and judge-made
rules could be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act when they
“stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”149 Specifically, the Court invali-
dated a Californian judge-made rule that rendered a consumer arbitra-
tion contract of adhesion unconscionable where disputes involve low
damages and the weaker party alleges a scheme to defraud.150 It found
that rule to be in conflict with the FAA, which “reflect[s] . . . a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration.”151Hence, a skeptical court could in-
voke Concepcion in invalidating aggressive statutory reform by finding
that an anti-NDA law is so restrictive that it has a “disproportionate
impact” on Congress’s larger goal of encouraging (often confidential) ar-
bitration.152 Alternatively, during a public policy inquiry, it could con-
sider the FAA and Congress’s interest in encouraging arbitration as
outweighing the influence of state laws that restrict certain sexual har-
assment NDAs.
First, however, the enforcement of arbitration at issue in Concep-
cion and the enforcement of sexual harassment NDAs are not wholly
entwined issues. For one, arbitration does not always emerge from a
harmful, prolific, and intentional act that is solely the fault of the dom-
inant party. Instead, it is often an alternative approach for both parties
in a mutual dispute. Moreover, the restriction of a specific contract term
in a specific factual context is unlikely to have a material effect on the
rate of arbitration overall. While confidentiality is one major advantage
of arbitration, it is not an integral feature of it; courts can also impose
confidentiality on their proceedings “for good cause.”153 And even if sex-
ual harassment NDA restrictions were sufficient to be materially dis-
ruptive, employers still have plenty of incentives to prefer arbitration,
including forum consistency, quicker procedure, et cetera.154
Second, lower courts have significantly limited the potential effect
of Concepcion by upholding laws that have a far more significant impact
on the enforcement of arbitration agreements than restrictions devoted
solely to the sexual harassment context. For example, just after the
147 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
148 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
149 Id. at 352 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
150 Id. at 338.
151 Id. at 339 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983)).
152 Id. at 342.
153 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2, 26.
154 See Sternlight, supra note 68, at 1638.
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Concepcion decision was handed down, the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court upheld an earlier decision that ruled that “an employment
contract containing an agreement by the employee to limit or waive any
of the rights or remedies conferred by [Massachusetts law] is enforcea-
ble only if such an agreement is stated in clear and unmistakable
terms.”155 Most significantly, that court recognized an overriding public
policy in preventing gender discrimination, even in light of the FAA and
Massachusetts’ own pro-arbitration laws.156 It ultimately determined
that restrictions on arbitration agreements still kept with the “generous
spirit” of the FAA, so long as the parties were “free to agree” on arbitra-
tion.157 Such a ruling could save even New York’s strong anti-NDA stat-
ute, since that code does not prevent settlement or arbitration of har-
assment claims outright; the employer merely needs to offer more to the
victim in order for her to agree to an NDA.158
Finally, the FAA itself states that arbitration agreements are en-
forceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”159 The unconscionability doctrine was in
place by the time the Act was passed in 1925, so it could not be con-
strued to restrain the courts’ capacity to protect exploited victims.160
Given that the public policy doctrine stems from the same foundational
principles as unconscionability, the logic that applies to the FAA and
unconscionability should extend in turn.161
In summary, an invalidation of sexual harassment NDA laws via
the FAA is unlikely due to their distance from the thrust of Concepcion
and the current trend among lower courts of preserving judicial and
legislative capacity to regulate employer-employee agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment is one of the thorniest issues in modern dis-
course, and every strategy for reform will have its own set of ad-
155 Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. 910 N.E.2d 317, 326 (Mass. 2009);
accord Joule, Inc., v. Simmons, 944 N.E.2d 143, 149 (Mass. 2011); see also Harris v. Bingham
McCutchen LLP, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 843, 849 (Ct. App. Cal. 2013) (following Massachusetts’s ap-
proach in determining that the FAA did not preempt the court’s refusal to enforce a certain term).
156 See Warfield, 910 N.E.2d at 325–26.
157 Id. at 327.
158 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5003–b (McKinney 2018).
159 9 U.S.C. § 2.
160 See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (embracing the unconscionability doc-
trine).
161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 208 (stating that the two doctrines overlap). Ac-
cording to Frank P. Darr, the unconscionability doctrine is a form of public policy, since it enables
courts to dictate to society what proper contract behavior ought to be. See Frank P. Darr, Uncon-
scionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819, 1849 (1994).
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vantages, disadvantages, and uncertainties. Nonetheless, as this Com-
ment has argued, legislative reform is the most promising area of focus.
Standing on its own, current case law and judicial procedure is too in-
flexible to incorporate all of victims’ best interests without severely clog-
ging the courts—and hurting victims as employees in the long run. The
legislative approach, in contrast, can both prevent harmful NDAs from
being created in the first place and aid victims when they do seek to
invalidate them in court. Moreover, legislation not only reflects a cul-
tural change away from the acceptance of harmful sexual behavior, it
has the possibility of spreading that change to judicial attitudes as well.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion may or may not serve
as an outer limit for just how restrictive anti-NDA law can become.
However, whether Concepcion applies to such laws is still uncertain,
and the Court has let stand judicial embrace of some rules that would
likely have a greater impact on arbitration overall. Finally, even if Con-
cepcion will curtail some of the most extreme anti-NDA legislation,
lesser restrictions can makematerial contributions to the plights of har-
assment victims. As this Comment observed in New York’s new code,
tweaks to tertiary considerations such as a mandatory negotiation pe-
riod can still provide a serious boon to underpowered plaintiffs, who
typically do not have the resources to quickly understand the import of
every legal matter.
Whether the reader accepts any of the preceding arguments, this
Comment should serve as an accumulation and evaluation of key cases
and statutes that will take center stage as sexual harassment NDA law
continues to develop. This new “body” of law is in no way comprehen-
sive, since the Comment had to draw on multiple categories of contract
law in order to create a satisfactory picture of the legal landscape facing
individuals who wish to breach their NDAs. But that legal landscape
does exist, and even the most skeptical reader can appreciate the chal-
lenges it poses. The ultimate hope of this Comment is that if the reader
takes away nothing else, she can agree on the need for reform.

615
“Whistle Blowers”: To What Extent Does Federal
Law Impose Mandatory Reporting Obligations




Sexual violence perpetrated by student athletes or within univer-
sity athletic programs is a recurring theme in the media. Some statis-
tics even suggest that athletes account for a disproportionate amount
of sexual assault on college campuses.1 Recent scandals involving the
Ohio State, Baylor, Penn State, and Colorado athletic departments (to
name a few) illustrate varying fact patterns with the same central con-
cern: a coach who knew about ongoing sexual violence, yet failed to act
to stop it.2 These stories raise questions about the extent to which col-
legiate coaches are mandatory reporters under federal law, including
when they impose legal liability on their schools for failing to comply
with their obligations. In the era of #MeToo, clarifying the scope of a
coach’s duty to report is critical, both to protect collegiate campuses and
† B.S. 2017, The University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. Candidate 2020, The University of
Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Professor Anthony Casey for his advice, guidance, and
feedback. Additionally, I would like to thank the past and present staff and board of The University
of Chicago Legal Forum.
1 See Jeremy D. Heacox, Clery Act Responsibilities for Reporting Allegations of Peer-on-Peer
Sexual Assaults Committed by Student-Athletes, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 48, 50 (2012) (refer-
encing Jenni E. Spies, Winning at All Costs: An Analysis of a University’s Potential Liability for
Sexual Assaults Committed by Its Student Athletes, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 429, 430 (2006)).
2 See Michael McCann, Legal Angles of Ohio State’s Probe into Urban Meyer’s Knowledge of
Charges Against Zach Smith, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.si.com/college-foot-
ball/2018/08/01/urban-meyer-zach-smith-ohio-state-legal-contract-firing-paid-leave [https://perm
a.cdd/Z2VJ-KPW7] (discussing the potential liability Ohio State football coach Urban Meyer faced
after failing to report a domestic violence allegation). See generally Andrew Solomon, Preventing
Recurrences of the Cover-Ups at Penn State & Baylor (and Now Michigan State): Where Does It
End?, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 379 (2018) (detailing the reporting failures of coaches, athletic
directors, and university presidents at Penn State and Baylor after learning of ongoing instances
of child abuse and sexual assault, respectively).
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to ensure that the coach does not overstep a victim’s right to privacy or
an accused’s right to due process.
However, federal laws governing mandatory reporting are scarce
and occasionally conflicting, leaving reporting duties unclear. Further-
more, ex post determinations of wrongdoing by a court or federal agency
do not provide coaches with clear guidelines regarding their ex ante le-
gal reporting responsibilities. Faced with ambiguity, many universities
insert catch-all “sexual misconduct” clauses into their employment con-
tracts, fearing federal liability otherwise.3 While well-meaning, these
clauses are often overly broad and ill-defined, leaving a coach wonder-
ing whether even a third-party’s whisper of a player’s sexual activity
requires a report.4 Coaches are left in a difficult position—over-report-
ing might overstep a victim’s right to privacy and distance the coach
from his/her players (thus, deterring future reporting).5 On the other
hand, under-reporting can exacerbate the harm to current or potential
victims, deter survivors from coming forward, and lead to liability for
the university under federal or state law.6 Recent federal regulations
proposed by the Department of Education (DOE) purport to address
some of the general issues with reporting sexual misconduct, but they
do not speak specifically to coaches’ role in the process.7
This Comment focuses on the scope of mandatory reporting obliga-
tions that coaches8 incur under federal law, specifically Title IX9 and
the Clery Act.10 It examines whether and how coaches’ reporting obli-
gations change depending on: (1) the type of action brought (adminis-
trative enforcement actions v. private lawsuits); (2) the substance of the
allegation, including the definition of sexual misconduct that coaches
must report; (3) the level of authority the coach possesses; and (4) the
source of the allegation and the identity of the parties involved. The
3 See Scott Bernstein & Justin Dillon, Coach Contract Sexual Misconduct Clauses Are Con-
cerning, LAW 360 (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www-law360-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/articles/1072401/co
ach-contract-sexual-misconduct-clauses-are-concerning [https://perma.cc/5CE9-97WV].
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Jill C. Engle,Where Do We Go from Here?: Mandatory Reporting of Campus Sexual
Assault and Domestic Violence: Moving to a Victim-Centric Protocol That Comports with Federal
Law, 24 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 401 (2015) (arguing that current reporting procedures do
not respond adequately to victims’ choice on how to proceed and right to privacy).
6 Id.
7 See generally Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. 106).
8 This Comment uses “coaches” to mean full-time or part-time university employees who
serve as a head or assistant coach on one or more of the school’s sanctioned athletic teams. It will
exclude athletic directors from its consideration (because they are often considered separately un-
der Title IX). See, e.g., S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
9 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1989).
10 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2013).
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Comment concludes by reconciling the substantive and procedural in-
consistencies in these four areas and proposing a solution for clearer
reporting standards.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that the proposed Title IX DOE
regulations should mimic the Clery Act’s substantive definitions for sex-
ual misconduct, with a few exceptions regarding the scope of reporting
obligations. The Comment also contends that the DOE’s informal regu-
lation scheme is the proper procedure for implementing and enforcing
Title IX reporting requirements. This “hybrid” solution between Title
IX and the Clery Act would provide a uniform substantive standard for
reporting sexual misconduct under federal law, which would clarify
coaches’ and universities’ obligations and maximize their incentives to
comply with their duties.
II. REPORTINGOBLIGATIONS IN TITLE IX AND THE CLERY ACT
Statutory federal law on mandatory reporting is scarce; one of the
few examples is the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA).11 CAPTA sets forth the minimum definitions of child abuse
and neglect for reporting purposes, but states are left to designate who
counts as a reporter.12 Moreover, CAPTA only requires states to have
reporting laws for children up to the age of eighteen.13 Thus, it generally
does not apply to the students and university members with whom col-
legiate coaches tend to interact.
Nevertheless, two pieces of federal legislation—Title IX and the
Clery Act—impose reporting obligations on educational institutions,
and, by extension, implicate coaches. Although the two acts serve dif-
ferent purposes, they both inform universities of their reporting duties
for allegations of sexual violence.14 First, Congress enacted Title IX in
1972 in an effort to prevent sex discrimination in education and athlet-
ics.15 Enforced by both administrative agencies and private plaintiffs,
Title IX and its corresponding federal regulations provide schools with
duties to prevent, report, and investigate sexual misconduct.16
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–06 (2016).
12 Id. at § 5106(g).
13 Id. at § 5106.
14 See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge
Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205
(2011).
15 See David Lanser, Title IX and How to Rectify Sexism Entrenched in NCAA Leadership, 31
WIS. J. L. GENDER& SOC’Y 181, 184 (2016).
16 See A.J. Bolan, Deliberate Indifference: Why Universities Must Do More to Protect Students
from Sexual Assault, 86 GEO. WASH L. REV. 804, 810 (2018).
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In contrast, the Clery Act arose out of safety concerns after a college
student was murdered in her dorm room on campus.17 Her parents ar-
gued that had her university published crime statistics revealing a pat-
tern of violence on campus, she would have chosen to attend a different
school.18 As a result, the Act requires federally funded schools to “notify
[their] constituent campus communities . . .when certain crimes are
brought to their attention.”19 Among these crimes are murder, arson,
and robbery, as well as sex-based crimes, such as sexual assault, do-
mestic violence, dating violence, and stalking.20 The Act’s purpose is to
“aid in the prevention of similar occurrences” and to obligate “campus
security authorities” (CSAs) to report crime.21
Although Title IX and the Clery Act overlap, they take different
approaches to reporting, leaving several ambiguities for collegiate
coaches as to their responsibilities. These differences are examined in
the following section.
A. Title IX Reporting Obligations
Title IX itself does not impose specific reporting requirements on
any university employees, much less athletic staff. Instead, it provides
that:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.22
Formerly, the only federal regulations governing Title IX (and its
corresponding obligations for universities) were promulgated in 1975 by
the DOE’s predecessor, the Department of Health, Education, andWell-
ness. These regulations were replicated and adopted identically by the
DOE after its creation.23 The 1975 regulations do not address a univer-
sity’s reporting duties with respect to sexual misconduct because they
were created before the Supreme Court held that such harassment con-
stituted discrimination under Title IX.24
17 See Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i)–(iii).
21 Id.
22 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1986).
23 See Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993).
24 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61463–65 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. 106).
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In 1982, however, the Supreme Court concluded that an institu-
tion’s failure to address sexual harassment can constitute discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, thereby imposing reporting obligations on
schools (and, by extension, their employees) for such conduct. 25 The
George W. Bush Administration supported this assertion and provided
universities with guidelines for defining and investigating sexual mis-
conduct under Title IX (“The 2001 Guidelines”).26 The Obama Admin-
istration went further, supplementing The 2001 Guidelines with a se-
ries of Dear Colleague Letters (DCLs)27 and Title IX “Questions and
Answers”28 to clarify and expand the scope of such reporting obligations.
Because both the 2001 Guidelines and the subsequent Obama-era guid-
ance documents were not implemented via either a formal or informal
process for promulgating federal executive regulations, they were often
considered mere “suggestions” for universities.29 This also meant that
none of these documents were entitled to the “highest deference” that
courts typically allow to executive agencies under the doctrine set forth
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.30
However, in 2018 the DOE withdrew all previous executive docu-
ments31 and, in their place, issued a set of proposed regulations to gov-
ern Title IX compliance.32 These regulations did follow informal regu-
lation procedures and will take effect after the DOE reviews and
considers the public comments submitted to them regarding the new
regime.33 Until that time, reporting obligations under Title IX remain
in flux, and are examined in the next section.
25 See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (classifying teacher-on-stu-
dent sexual harassment as actionable under Title IX); Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629 (1999) (extending Franklin to cases of peer-on-peer harassment).
26 See Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students
by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 66 Fed. Reg. 5512 (Jan. 19, 2001), https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/JX5H-4XR3] [hereinafter 20-
01 Sexual Harassment Guidance].
27 See generally Office for Civil Rights, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., 1–
19 (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/7VNJ-GFRD].
28 See generallyOffice for Civil Rights,Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence,
U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., 1–53 (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-2014
04-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF9W-R7MX].
29 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61463.
30 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (holding that courts may give “considerable weight” to an admin-
istrative agency’s construction or interpretation of statutes they enforce).
31 See generally Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEPT. OFEDUC., 1–3 (Sept.
22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/6UL4-8PAL] [hereinafter 2017 Dear Colleague Letter].
32 See generally Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462.
33 See Tovia Smith, Trump Administration Gets an Earful on New Campus Sexual Assault
Rules, N.P.R. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/30/689879689/education-department-g
athers-feedback-on-new-campus-sexual-assault-rules [https://perma.cc/5HWS-F568].
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1. Public v. private enforcement actions
Viewed as a contract between the federal government and the re-
cipient school,34 Title IX permits regulatory agencies to conduct inves-
tigations and withdraw funding from institutions who are guilty of sex
discrimination.35 Accordingly, most of the guidance regarding the scope
of Title IX comes from federal regulations and guidelines. However, the
Supreme Court established in 1979 that private plaintiffs do have an
implied right-of-action under Title IX.36 In so doing, the Court explained
that Congress intended for Title IX to prevent federal agencies from
funding discriminatory practices, but also “to provide individual citi-
zens effective protection against those practices.”37 Therefore, private
enforcement through an implied right-of-action is necessary to ensure
compliance among recipients; after all, federal agencies only have lim-
ited funding for investigations.38
In spite of this holding, courts strictly limit plaintiffs’ ability to re-
cover monetary damages under Title IX. For example, in Gebser v. Lago
Visa Independent School District,39 the Supreme Court held that an in-
stitution could not be vicariously liable for the misconduct of its employ-
ees under Title IX.40 It explained that, because the statute requires ad-
ministrative agencies to advise a school of its noncompliance before
initiating sanctions, private plaintiffs could not recover damages until
they proved that a school had actual (not constructive) notice of the sex-
ual harassment.41One year later, the Court enumerated a four-part test
for Title IX liability, which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate:
(1) the school had actual knowledge of sexual harassment;
(2) the school was deliberately indifferent to such harassment;
(3) the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively of-
fensive,” that it
(4) deprived the victim of “access to the educational opportuni-
ties or benefits provided by the school.”42
34 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289 (1998).
35 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1989).
36 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
37 Id. at 704.
38 See id. at 708 n.42.
39 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
40 Id. at 285.
41 Id.
42 Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999).
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Gebser was a 5–4 decision; in dissent, Justice Stevens urged the
Court to consider the implications of imposing such a high threshold for
plaintiffs to meet in order to bring a Title IX action.43 He also pointed
out that, in Franklin (the decision where the Court initially held that
sexual harassment could constitute discrimination) the Court permit-
ted the plaintiff to recover damages, despite the fact that the DOE had
not withdrawn federal funding from the school for its failure to address
the harassment.44 Franklin suggested that courts are free to follow a
less stringent standard than federal agencies do to determine whether
a school faces Title IX liability. Nevertheless, in the years since Gebser,
courts have continued to impose a high barrier to private recovery un-
der Title IX.45 The Tenth Circuit even noted that “actual notice [under
Gebser] requires more than a simple report of inappropriate conduct,”46
suggesting that plaintiffs must satisfy additional requirements before
they may recover damages.
Administrative proceedings under Title IX, by contrast, generally
involve a review of the school’s internal policies and procedures.47 They
also require the reviewing federal agency to provide the school with no-
tice of its noncompliance and attempt to help it address any of its short-
comings before withdrawing funding.48 Previous executive guidance
made it unclear exactly when a school failed to comply with the statute,
so the DOE’s proposed regulations streamline federal investigations by
imposing the same liability standard used in Davis and Gebser.49 Thus,
under the new rules, in enforcement proceedings—as well as in private
lawsuits—universities are not liable for student-on-student sexual har-
assment unless they have actual knowledge of severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive sexual misconduct and act with deliberate indiffer-
ence towards it.50
Schools, rather than coaches, face direct liability for reporting fail-
ures under Title IX, both in private and public enforcement proceed-
ings. Nonetheless, the structure of the Act and its standard of liability
have implications for the extent to which coaches are mandatory report-
ers. If the standard of institutional liability is too low or too high,
43 SeeGebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 304 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 303.
45 See, e.g., Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018) (requiring plaintiffs’ specific
factual allegations of discrimination in a Title IX complaint).
46 Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2006).
47 See 28 C.F.R. § 42.107 (1973).
48 Id.
49 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61466–68 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. 106).
50 Id.
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schools may provide coaches with reporting obligations that are under
or overinclusive of what federal law requires.
2. Substance and definitions of reporting obligations (“what and
where?”)
Title IX does not define discrimination, so interpretations of what
needs to be reported under the statute come from administrative guid-
ance and judicial decisions. For example, in Davis v. Monroe County
Board. of Education,51 the Supreme Court recognized peer-on-peer sex-
ual harassment as actionable against an institution under Title IX.52
However, courts struggle to provide an adequate definition of ac-
tionable sexual misconduct. The Davis Court looked to Title VII53 to de-
fine harassment, holding that the sexual misconduct must be so “severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive” as to deprive a student of equal
educational benefits.54 It further explained that whether sexual miscon-
duct is actionable depends on “surrounding circumstances, expecta-
tions, and relationships . . . including, but not limited to, the ages of the
harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved.”55 Fi-
nally, Davis also acknowledged that “in theory, a single instance of suf-
ficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment” could suffice to satisfy the
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive standard, but it ultimately
concluded that it was “unlikely that Congress would have thought such
behavior sufficient to rise to this level.”56 However, this case may be
distinguishable from collegiate cases, since the Court was considering
the conduct of fifth graders, who it expected would resort to frequent
immature conduct.57
The Bush Administration’s 2001 Guidelines embraced the Davis
approach, refusing to provide a more specific definition of actionable
sexual misconduct.58 Courts interpreted the standard narrowly; the
Sixth Circuit held that a single incident of alleged non-consensual kiss-
ing is insufficient to demonstrate “severe, pervasive, and objectively of-
fensive” behavior depriving a victim of equal opportunities at school.59
It also refused to find actionable misconduct when a male student—on
51 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
52 Id. at 650.
53 Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex.
54 Id. at 651 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)).
55 Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See generally Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 26.
59 Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2018).
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three separate occasions—shoved a female student into a locker, de-
manded that she perform oral sex on him, and made obscene gestures
at her.60 In 2014, in response to mounting pressure to provide clearer
criteria and definitions, the DOE’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued
its “Title IX Questions and Answers.”61 These guidelines stressed the
need for schools to report all allegations of sexual violence, defined as
“physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a per-
son is incapable of giving consent . . . including rape, sexual assault,
sexual battery, sexual abuse, and sexual coercion.”62 However, it left
“harassment” intact under Davis, noting that schools had the responsi-
bility to provide more coherent definitions themselves.63
Due to the confusion surrounding the substance and scope of re-
porting obligations under the former guidelines, the Trump Admin-
istration’s proposed regulations provide a specific definition of actiona-
ble sexual harassment.64 This definition encompasses three different
types of conduct.65 First, it includes quid pro quo harassment: when a
recipient’s employee conditions receipt of a benefit or service upon a
student or coworker’s participation in unwelcome sexual conduct.66 Sec-
ond, it codifies the standard in Davis, and holds actionable sexual har-
assment that is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
effectively denies a person equal access to a recipient’s education pro-
gram or activity.”67 Third, the new regulations incorporate the defini-
tion of sexual assault referred to in the Clery Act regulations (“an of-
fense that meets the definition of rape, fondling, incest, or statutory
rape as used in the FBI’s UCR program”).68 However, the new rule does
not include other sex-based Clery Act crimes, because the DOE believes
that Title IX’s focus is not on “crimes per se,” but instead on behavior
that deprives university members of equal opportunities based on their
sex.69
60 See Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 360, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding
no liability because the school instituted a “supervision plan” to prevent future incidents, although
the victim argued that this plan led to more abuse off-campus).
61 See Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra
note 28, at *1.
62 See id.
63 Id. at *13.
64 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Fed-
eral Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61466–68 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. 106).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 61466.
67 Id.
68 Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. 668.46 (2015)).
69 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61467–68 proposed
Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. 106).
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Equally challenging to define are the geographical and functional
limits to coaches’ reporting obligations under Title IX. Originally, some
courts insisted that Title IX applied only to “operations of a college or
university that are educational in nature,” thus excluding operations
such as university dining services.70 However, most courts now agree
that Title IX should be read broadly in conjunction with the Civil Rights
Restoration Act amendments.71 Passed in 1987, these amendments
sought to clarify Title IX’s text—specifically, what it means for sex-
based discrimination to occur within an “education program or activ-
ity.”72 They explain that Title IX applies to any university-sponsored
program, including “traditional educational operations, faculty and stu-
dent housing, campus shuttle bus service, campus restaurants, the
bookstore, and other commercial activities.”73 However, in 2014, the
Obama Administration changed the analysis by requiring that a school
“process all complaints of sexual violence, regardless of where the con-
duct occurred.”74 For example, reportable misconduct included inci-
dents occurring in fraternities, on field trips (“including athletic team
travel”), and during off-campus events for school clubs.75
To harmonize the conflicting approaches to Title IX’s geographical
scope, the proposed regulations clarify what it means for a university
activity or program to be within the scope of Title IX.76 Schools are re-
sponsible for all misconduct occurring within their “operations,” includ-
ing activities encompassing “any academic, extracurricular, research,
[or] occupational training.”77 There are no geographical constraints on
these operations, but when determining whether an activity falls within
the school’s sphere of liability, the DOE will use factors developed by
courts in their Title IX jurisprudence.78 These factors include: whether
the conduct occurred at a location owned by the recipient; whether the
recipient exercised oversight, supervision, or discipline over the context
in which the misconduct occurred; and whether the recipient funded,
sponsored, promoted, or endorsed the event in question.79 Thus, coaches
70 Preyer v. Dartmouth, 968 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D.N.H. 1997) (emphasis added).
71 Fox v. Pittsburg St. Univ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1124–25 (D. Kan. 2017).
72 Id. at 1124.
73 Id. at 1125 (citing S. Rep. No. 100–64, at 17 (1987)).
74 Office of Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra note
28, at *29.
75 Id.
76 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Fed-
eral Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61468 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. 106).
77 Id.
78 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61468.
79 Id. (citing Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646 (1999); Samuelson v. Or.
State Univ., 725 Fed. App’x. 598, 599 (9th Cir. 2018); Farmer v. Kan. State Univ., No. 16-CV-2256-
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who know of incidents occurring at fraternities housed off-campus or
during athletic travel away from the school may still need to report such
conduct, since universities often exercise oversight over these activi-
ties.80
3. Identity and authority of the coach
Although many coaches’ contracts designate them as mandatory
reporters, Title IX jurisprudence and executive interpretations may im-
pose independent reporting obligations on them. For example, in
Gebser, the Supreme Court explained that schools have actual notice of
sexual misconduct (and thus, incur Title IX liability) when an “appro-
priate person” knows of the misconduct and fails to report it.81 An “ap-
propriate person” is “an official who, at minimum, has authority to ad-
dress the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on
the recipient’s behalf.”82 Many courts conclude that determining who
has such authority is “‘necessarily a fact-based inquiry’ because of the
varying roles of educational officials.”83 However, Gebser involved sex-
ual harassment by a school employee; in Davis, the Supreme Court
made no mention of an “appropriate person” requirement in cases of
peer-on-peer sexual harassment.84 One legal scholar thus concluded
that “when the offending party is a student, virtually any employee can
be presumed to have authority to take some corrective action.”85 In fact,
only the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have ever applied the “appropri-
ate person” test to situations where a student (rather than an employee)
committed the alleged sexual misconduct.86
Despite the language in Davis, OCR previously required that only
“responsible employees” be mandatory reporters of peer-on-peer sexual
misconduct.87 Federal regulations mandated schools to designate at
least one person as such an employee.88 Different from an appropriate
JAR-GEB, 2017 WL 980460, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 2017)).
80 Id. (citing Farmer, 2017 WL 9804060, at *8).
81 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
82 Id.
83 Kinsman v. Florida State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, No. 4:15cv235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL
11110848, at *2 (N.D. Fla., Aug. 12, 2015) (quoting Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d
1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010)).
84 See Brian Bardwell, No One Is an Inappropriate Person: The Mistaken Application of
Gebser’s Appropriate Person Test to Title IX Peer-Harassment Cases, 68 CASEW.RES. L. REV. 1343,
1349 (2018).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1349, 1354.
87 Office of Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 26, at *14.
88 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (1980).
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person, a responsible employee is “anyone who has the authority to re-
dress sexual violence; who has been given the duty of reporting inci-
dents of sexual violence or any other misconduct by students to their
Title IX coordinator or other appropriate school designee; or whom a
student could reasonably believe has this authority or duty.”89 In prac-
tice, however, this standard seemed to sweep just as broadly as the “ap-
propriate person” analysis in Davis—one study examined the reporting
policies of 150 universities and discovered that 69% of them designated
all of their employees as “responsible employees.”90
Unable to reconcile the “responsible employee” and “appropriate
person” standards, courts divide as to whether coaches incur Title IX
reporting obligations. For example, one court decided that an assistant
coach who failed to report the rape of a student equipment manager did
not possess sufficient authority to qualify as an “appropriate person.”91
However, the court determined that the school’s athletic director was
such a person, but left open whether the head coach would be as well.92
On the other hand, coaches of highly successful programs are almost
certain to incur reporting responsibilities. The Tenth Circuit, for exam-
ple, emphasized that the head coach of the University of Colorado foot-
ball team enjoyed such prestige, influence, and authority that his posi-
tion within the school “was comparable to that of police chief in a
municipal government.”93 Thus, his failure to report and address ongo-
ing sexual violence committed by recruits of the football team was evi-
dence of the entire school’s failure to comply with Title IX.94
The DOE’s proposed guidelines attempt to clarify the responsibili-
ties of university employees by retiring the “responsible person” termi-
nology.95 Instead, schools must designate a “coordinator,” who is re-
quired to inform victims of their right to file a formal sexual misconduct
complaint (which triggers the school’s grievance procedures and can be
done at any time), to handle and process such reports, and to offer sup-
portive measures (i.e., counseling or housing changes).96 In the absence
89 Office of Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 26, at *15.
90 See Merle H. Weiner, A Principled and Legal Approach to Title IX Reporting, 85 Tenn. L.
Rev. 71, 77–78 (2017) (arguing that such “wide-net” reporting policies actually deter victims from
coming forward).
91 See S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 738 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
92 Id.
93 Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007).
94 Id. at 1184–85.
95 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Fed-
eral Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61481 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. 106).
96 Id.
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of a formal complaint, however, the coordinator does not incur an inde-
pendent obligation to report sexual misconduct.97
Yet the new DOE regulations still adopt the “appropriate person”
test from Gebser for the purposes of determining whether a school had
actual knowledge of sexual misconduct.98 They also suggest that this
analysis applies regardless of whether the sexual misconduct is perpe-
trated by a school employee or by a peer.99Under this approach, coaches
who have both notice of actionable harassment, as well as the authority
to institute corrective measures on the school’s behalf, incur an obliga-
tion to report the misconduct. Additionally, although the proposed reg-
ulations agree that determining whether an employee possesses such
authority is a “fact-specific inquiry,” they also state that “the mere abil-
ity or obligation to report sexual harassment” (for example, in an em-
ployment contract) is not per se evidence of such authority.100 This lan-
guage leaves open the possibility that, even when a coach’s contract
designates him or her as a mandatory reporter, there are situations
where he or she may not trigger the school’s Title IX liability for failing
to report an incident.
4. Identity of the victim and perpetrator
The DOE’s webpage for Title IX Frequently Asked Questions states
that Title IX protects, not only students, but “all persons from discrim-
ination, including parents and guardians, students, and employees.”101
Nonetheless, the identity of the victim and the perpetrator, as well as
the source of a complaint, do seem to matter to a Title IX action. Victims
may include, for example, employees of the school,102 although courts
are divided as to whether those employees must first exhaust their rem-
edies under Title VII.103
97 Id.
98 Id. at 61466–68.
99 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61466–68.
100 Id. at 61467. (citing Plamp v. Mitchell Sch. Dist. No. 17–2, 565 F.3d 450, 459 (8th Cir. 2009),
Santiago v. P.R., 655 F.3d 61, 75 (1st Cir. 2011)) (emphasis added).
101 Sex Discrimination Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS (Sept. 25, 2018) (emphasis added), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ ocr/frontpage/faq
/sex.html#sexdisc4 [https://perma.cc/YMW9-C8CL].
102 See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
103 Compare Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that permitting em-
ployment claims under Title IX without first exhausting Title VII remedies disrupts federal em-
ployment law)withBurton v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 171 F. Supp.
3d 830, 840 (W.D. Wis. 2016), reconsideration denied, No. 14-CV-274-JDP, 2016 WL 3512287, at
*1 (W.D. Wis. June 22, 2016) (differentiating Lakoski as limited to employment discrimination,
and refusing to extend it to retaliation claims, which do not require Title VII exhaustion).
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On the other hand, courts are split as to whether Title IX liability
attaches when the victim has no affiliation with the recipient univer-
sity. For instance, in Simpson, the Tenth Circuit explained that, even
though one of the victims was not a student (and therefore, not pro-
tected by Title IX), “that circumstance [was] irrelevant to evaluation of
risk to [other University of Colorado] women.”104 But a recent First Cir-
cuit case held that a Providence University student who was assaulted
by a student at Brown University could not bring a Title IX suit against
Brown.105 The First Circuit explained that, in order to prove discrimi-
nation, the victim “must be a participant, or at least have the intent to
participate, in the defendant’s educational program or activity.”106
These decisions make it ambiguous whether a coach must report, for
example, a player who sexually assaults a student from another school.
The source of an allegation also seems to matter to a mandatory
reporting analysis under Title IX. For example, the 2001 OCR Guide-
lines required a report and investigation when a student’s parent re-
ported an incident of sexual misconduct against his or her child.107How-
ever, they explained that when employees learn about misconduct
“through other means . . . [like] a witness to an incident or an anony-
mous letter or telephone call,” their required response will vary based
on several different factors.108 Among these are: (1) “the source and na-
ture of the information;” (2) “the seriousness of the alleged incident;” (3)
“the specificity of the information;” (4) “the objectivity and credibility of
the source of the report;” and (5) whether the individuals “who were
subjected to the alleged harassment” can be identified and “want to pur-
sue the matter.”109
The proposed Title IX regulations, however, simplify matters and
do not address the source of an allegation; instead, they only require
schools to instigate grievance procedures when a formal complaint is
filed or when a university receives multiple complaints about the same
individual.110 Thus, the identity and affiliation of the alleged perpetra-
tormay also matter in a Title IX analysis to the extent that the institu-
tion has control over the assailant. In fact, the Supreme Court stated in
104 Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Kinsman
v. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Tr., No. 4:15cv235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL 11110848, at *3 (N.D. Fla., Aug.
12, 2015) (explaining that actual knowledge of an incident “does not require knowing exactly who
the victim was and the connection with the funding recipient”).
105 See generally Doe v. Brown Univ., 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018).
106 Id. at 131.
107 See Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 26, at *18.
108 Id.
109 See id.
110 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Fed-
eral Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61469 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. 106).
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Davis that “the regulatory scheme surrounding Title IX” informs
schools that “they may be liable for their failure to respond to discrimi-
natory acts of certain nonagents.”111 There are, of course, limitations to
this statement. Title IX liability for damages is limited to “circum-
stances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both
the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.”112
Thus, social-media harassment by third parties against a victim who
accused the quarterback on her university’s football team of sexual as-
sault is not actionable, “but can bear on the severity and offensiveness”
that the victim suffers.113
B. Clery Act Reporting Obligations
Unlike Title IX, the Clery Act explicitly imposes reporting obliga-
tions on the universities to which it applies.114 Specifically, it requires
schools to disclose their campus security policy and statistics of certain
crimes occurring in a defined geographical area.115 Additionally, “alt-
hough the Clery Act generally does not require particular policies or
procedures, a more detailed policy statement is necessary with regard
to campus sexual assaults.”116 Thus, schools (and by extension, coaches)
may face stricter Clery Act obligations for sex-based crimes than for
other crimes covered by the act, such as robbery.
1. Private v. public enforcement actions
No private right-of-action is available under the Clery Act.117 The
text of the statute provides that it cannot “be construed to . . . [either]
create a cause of action” against a university or its employees or to “es-
tablish any standard of care.”118 Courts have honored this provision,
barring plaintiffs from asserting any sort of liability for a school’s fail-
ure to honor its Clery Act duties.119 However, the DOE permits parties
to trigger a noncompliance investigation by filing a complaint with its
111 Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999).
112 Id. at 645.
113 Kinsman v. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Tr., No. 4:15cv235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL 11110848, at *5
(N.D. Fla., Aug. 12, 2015).
114 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2013).
115 Id. at § 1092(f).
116 Heacox, supra note 1, at 53.
117 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(14)(A).
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Moore v. Murray St. Univ., No. 5:12-CV-00178, 2013 WL 960320, at *3 (W.D. Ky.
2013). See also Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2007).
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office.120 The DOE may also initiate investigations in the following cir-
cumstances: (1) after a school conducts an independent audit for com-
pliance, (2) via a review selection process, and (3) “if media attention
raises concerns.”121
DOE Clery Act investigations are extensive and may include: re-
views of university publications, policies, and procedures; sampling of
crime reports filed and logged on campus; interviews; and attendance
at university meetings.122 A university who fails to meet its obligations
faces fines of up to $27,500 per violation.123 For example, after Jerry
Sandusky (an assistant football coach at Penn State) was arrested for
ongoing sexual abuse of young boys attending football camps, the De-
partment imposed a fine of over $2 million on the university for Clery
Act violations.124 It noted the failure of the athletic staff, particularly
the head coach Joe Paterno, to report allegations of sexual violence to
the campus police.125 Its findings relied heavily on the investigative pro-
cedures, which revealed numerous violations under 34 C.F.R. § 668 (the
regulations setting forth the specific requirements and procedures
schools must implement to report crime, i.e., keeping records for at least
three years).126
The Penn State case indicates some of the troubling procedural
characteristics of the Clery Act’s mandatory reporting policies. In par-
ticular, the Act shields the coaches from personal liability for its viola-
tions, as plaintiffs do not have a private right-of-action and the DOE ‘s
only remedy is to fine an institution for its failures.127Moreover, the Act
does not permit private plaintiffs to seek monetary damages—as dis-
cussed later in the Comment, this feature tends to lead the DOE to focus
its attention on large-scale violations. Still, the Clery Act “fine” letters
issued by the DOE after an investigation do provide coaches and uni-
versities with an exact discussion about where reporting failures oc-
curred and how to prevent such mishaps in the future.128
120 Heacox, supra note 1, at *55.
121 Id.
122 See, e.g., Penn State Fine Letter, FEDERAL STUDENT AID: ADMINISTRATIVE AND APPEALS
SERVICEGROUP, *3–5 (Nov. 3, 2016), https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacen-
ter/cleryact/pennstate/PennStateFineLetter.pdf. [https://perma.cc/6UM2-T7LS].
123 34 C.F.R. § 668.84 (2015).
124 See Penn State Fine Letter, supra note 122, at *1.
125 See Penn State Campus Crime Final Program Review Determination, FEDERAL STUDENT
AID: ADMINISTRATIVE AND APPEALS SERVICEGROUP, *24 (Nov. 3, 2016), https://studentaid.ed.gov/
/sa/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/cleryact/pennstate/PSCFPRD10327991.pdf [https://perma.
.cc/L766-P6E7].
126 See generally Penn State Fine Letter, supra note 122.
127 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(14)(A) (2013); 34 C.F.R. § 668.84.
128 See generally Penn State Campus Crime Final Program Review Determination, supra note
125.
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2. Substance and definitions of reporting obligations (“what and
where?”)
In comparison to Title IX, the Clery Act provides much more spe-
cific definitions for the crimes that it requires coaches to report, often
cross-referencing other federal law. For example, it explains that sexual
assault is a “forcible or nonforcible sex offense,” as classified by the
FBI’s uniform crime reporting system.129 This includes “penetration, no
matter how slight of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or
oral penetration . . . without the consent of the victim,” as well as at-
tempted penetration.130 The Clery Act also requires reports for domestic
violence, dating violence, and stalking, which are defined in section
12291(a) of Title 34.131 This section, known as the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA),132 defines domestic violence as “felony or misde-
meanor crimes of violence committed by [among other things] a current
or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim.”133 Similarly, dating
violence is “violence committed by a person who is or has been in a social
relationship of romantic or intimate nature with the victim.”134 Finally,
stalking means “engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety
or suffer substantial emotional distress.”135
Furthermore, unlike Title IX, the Clery Act has specific geograph-
ical constraints on reporting. Initially, the Act required universities to
report violent crimes occurring: (1) on campus; (2) off-campus in build-
ings “owned or controlled” by the institution; and (3) on public property
within the area “reasonably contiguous to the institution and adjacent
to a facility owned or controlled by the institution.”136 However, Con-
gress expanded the law to include crimes committed on “non-campus”
property “adjacent to a facility owned and controlled by the institution,”
so long as such property is used by the institution in some way to fur-
ther its academic goals.137
129 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(6)(A)(v).
130 Federal Bureau of Investigation, UCR Offense Definitions, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Jan. 26,
2017), https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm [https://perma.cc/XB59-BKN5].
131 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(6)(A)(i).
132 34 U.S.C. § 12291 (2006).
133 Id. at § 12291(a)(8).
134 Id. at § 12291(a)(10).
135 Id. at § 12291(a)(30).
136 Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1092(f)(6)(A)(i)-(iii)).
137 Id. at 31 (citing Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105–244, 112 Stat.
1581, 1744 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(6)(A)).
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Helpfully, the DOE provides a Handbook with examples to help
schools understand the practical meaning of these definitions and
boundaries.138 For example, it explains that hospitals and medical as-
sociations count as institution property for the purposes of the act, as
do off-campus buildings that students “consider to be, and treat as” part
of the campus, such as art studios.139 It also provides detailed scenarios
to illustrate the scope of reportable sexual violence, including dating
violence, domestic violence, and stalking.140 For example, a heated ar-
gument between a husband and wife on campus is not considered do-
mestic violence if neither party reports physical harm or intimida-
tion.141
3. Identity and authority of the coach
The Clery Act requires university actors to report sexual violence
when they are acting as “campus security authorities” (CSAs).142 The
DOE’s Handbook on reporting explains that a CSA is “an official who
has significant responsibility for student and campus activities.”143 It
includes in its examples of CSAs “director[s] of athletics, [and] all ath-
letic coaches (including part-time employees and graduate assis-
tants).”144 However, reporting is only mandatory when the coach re-
ceives the allegation in his or her “capacity as a CSA.”145 This means
that coaches do not have the obligation to report incidents that they
overhear or learn about indirectly.
During the Penn State Sandusky investigation (discussed in Sec-
tion II(B)(1)), the DOE used these definitions to determine whether
CSAs at the school failed to report the violence.146 The investigation em-
phasized the failure of both Penn State’s head football coach (Joe Pat-
erno) and a graduate assistant (Mike McQueary) to report McQueary’s
eyewitness account of Sandusky sexual assaulting a child in the locker
room to anyone beyond the athletic director.147 According to the DOE,
138 See generally Dept. of Educ. Office of Postsecondary Educ., The Handbook for Campus Safe-
ty and Security Reporting 2016 Edition, DEPT. OFEDUC. (June 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/
lead/safety/handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4XM-3F8G] [hereinafter The Handbook for Campus
Safety].
139 Id. at ch. 2, 3–4.
140 Id. at ch. 3.
141 Id. at ch. 3, 37–38.
142 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(iii).
143 The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 137, at ch. 4, 2–3.
144 Id. at ch. 3.
145 Id. at ch. 4, 5.
146 See Penn State Campus Crime Final Program Review Determination, supra note 125, at
*24.
147 Id.
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both McQueary and Paterno were mandatory reporters under the Clery
Act, and thus they should have reported the incident to Penn State Uni-
versity Police Department to include in its annual crime statistics.148
This was true even though Penn State itself did not designate
McQueary as a Clery Act reporter and only conceded that Paterno was
a reporter after conducting an internal investigation.149
4. Identity of the victim and perpetrator
The text of the Clery Act itself does not specify whether it applies
only to victims and perpetrators who are associated with the university.
However, the Campus Crime Reporting Handbook issued by the DOE
states that, for reporting purposes, it does not matter “whether or not
the individuals involved in the crime, or reporting the crime, are asso-
ciated with the institution.”150 Thus, a coach does not need to know
much about the victim or perpetrator’s identity—only that the coach
learned of the crime while in his or her official capacity as a CSA.151
The official capacity requirement is the greatest limitation on the
Clery Act in this sense. Coaches do not need to report, for example, as-
saults and violence that students mention in settings like “Take Back
the Night”152 events.153 They also do not need to report overheard con-
versations or other indirect ways of learning about an incident.154 How-
ever, if the coach has no reason to believe that a direct allegation was
not made in good-faith, he or she must report it, even if it came from a
third party.155 For example, a coach must report a sexual assault that
he or she learns about through a local mental health counselor who calls
to inform the coach that a student on campus sought treatment for the
assault.156
The Clery Act Handbook makes it much more straightforward for
collegiate coaches to understand their reporting obligations. However,
because it is merely a handbook, it is not “law.” Furthermore, the Clery
Act’s purpose is to require institutions to keep accurate statistical crime
148 Id.
149 Id. at *23.
150 The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 137, at ch. 4, 1.
151 See id. at ch. 4, 5.
152 “Take Back the Night” is a non-profit, international organization whose mission is to end
sexual violence by creating “safe communities and respectful relationships through awareness
events and initiatives.” See Take Back the Night Foundation, https://takebackthenight.org/about-
us/ [https://perma.cc/QR6U-LYFZ].
153 Id. at ch. 4, 6.
154 Id. at ch. 4, 5.
155 Id.
156 The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 137, at ch. 4, 6.
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data; therefore, it only requires university employees to report allega-
tions “to the official or office designated by the institution to collect
crime report information.”157 These reports do not need to include the
names or information of the alleged victim or perpetrator and do not
require further action on the part of the coach.158
III. PROPOSAL TO CLARIFY ANDHARMONIZE COACHES’ REPORTING
OBLIGATIONS
Although sexual misconduct in collegiate athletics is by no means
a new problem, the #MeToo Movement highlights the prevalence of sex-
ual violence on college campuses.159 Unfortunately, ambiguities in fed-
eral reporting laws and executive regulations result in a body of incon-
sistent jurisprudence. Unable to untangle these inconsistencies,
universities often attempt to solve the problem and avoid liability by
inserting all-encompassing reporting clauses into their employment
contracts, requiring coaches to report all instances of “sexual miscon-
duct.”160 Coaches are left to their own devices to understand their re-
porting obligations under such broad and vague terms. This leads to
both under-reporting (and increased sexual violence on campus)161 and
over-reporting (and inadequate protection for both victims and alleged
assailants).162 Clarifying the scope of coaches’ reporting obligations un-
der federal law is thus critical and overdue in order to ensure the ap-
propriate balance of safety and confidentiality for victims, as well as
due process for the accused.
As the law currently stands, both Title IX and the Clery Act fall
short of achieving a consistent standard. Title IX itself is broad, neces-
sitating executive guidance and regulations, as well as adjudication, to
guide its interpretation. The Clery Act, on the other hand, contains
more specific and extensive reporting regulations within its statute and
regulatory scheme. However, its failure to provide for a private right-
of-action directs DOE resources towards large-scale violations (like the
Penn State scandal), leaving inadequate remedies for individual plain-
tiffs. Therefore, to maximize the efficacy of federal reporting law, the
proper solution is to enact Title IX regulations that mimic the substance
157 Id. at ch. 4, 5.
158 Id.
159 See Lena Felton, How Colleges Foretold the #MeToo Movement, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/01/how-colleges-foretold-the-metoo-m
ovement/550613/ [https://perma.cc/6M68-PW7M].
160 See Bernstein & Dillon, supra note 3.
161 See Heacox, supra note 1, at 50–51 (discussing how inadequate reporting and grievance
procedures deter victims from coming forward).
162 See Bernstein & Dillon, supra note 3.
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of the Clery Act and its Handbook. Such a solution would preserve the
procedure and structure of Title IX proceedings (including the private
right-of-action) and also minimize inconsistency in judicial enforcement
of Title IX, since courts would likely defer to DOE interpretations under
Chevron.163
A. Proposed Substance of Reporting Obligations
To harmonize the requirements of these two statutes governing
federal reporting obligations, the regulations and jurisprudence guiding
Title IX enforcement should mirror the substance of the Clery Act (with
a few exceptions). Specifically, Title IX interpretations should include
Clery Act sex-based crimes (such as sexual assault, dating violence, and
stalking) in their definition of actionable discrimination. They should
also clarify the boundaries of the Davis sexual harassment standard
and the “appropriate person” test by mimicking the Clery Act Hand-
book. However, Title IX should continue to take its own approach to
defining (1) the geographical scope of reporting obligations and (2)
which allegations require a report. This approach respects the differing
goals of the two statutes while also availing Title IX of the Clery Act’s
specificity and clarity.
1. Title IX interpretations should mimic the Clery Act’s substan-
tive definitions of sex-based crimes.
The Trump Administration’s proposed regulations define sexual
harassment as (1) conduct that satisfies the Davis standard (“severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive” behavior), or (2) conduct that sat-
isfies the standard for quid pro quo sexual harassment and assault, as
defined by the Clery Act.164 However, this definition fails to include
other sex-based Clery Act crimes—such as dating violence and stalk-
ing—and also does nothing to clarify the Davis standard. These defi-
ciencies result in an incomplete understanding of sex-based discrimina-
tion, and require coaches to disentangle two different definitions of
sexual misconduct in order to determine whether the Clery Act or Title
IX requires a report.
To remedy the problem, the Title IX regulations should adopt a def-
inition of actionable sexual misconduct that incorporates not just sexual
163 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (holding
that courts may give “considerable weight” to an administrative agency’s construction or interpre-
tation of statutes they enforce).
164 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61466 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. 106).
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assault, but also the other VAWA crimes listed in the Clery Act (domes-
tic violence, dating violence, and stalking). The DOE explains the omis-
sion of these crimes in its proposed regulations by pointing out that Ti-
tle IX is a contract that requires federally funded universities to comply
with anti-discrimination law on the basis of sex—not to prevent all
crimes related to sex.165 However, this interpretation misunderstands
Title IX’s text and purpose. Title IX prevents federal funding recipients
from discriminating “on the basis of sex” in order to promote equal ed-
ucational opportunities for university members.166 Consistent with this
language, it follows that if sexual harassment and sexual assault can
constitute actionable discrimination, other sex-based crimes (like da-
ting violence) can have a similarly discriminatory effect, discussed in
detail later in this section. Thus, the proposed Title IX regulations
should expand their definition of actionable sexual misconduct to in-
clude domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking as defined by the
Clery Act. Doing so would harmonize federal laws for reporting sex-
based crimes, minimizing confusion and promoting compliance. Until
such amendments are made, however, courts should interpret theDavis
“severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” standard of sexual harass-
ment to presumptively include conduct that meets the Clery Act defini-
tion of dating violence, domestic violence, or stalking.
The Davis standard also requires some clarification, given its in-
consistent application by courts. Although it is likely impossible for the
DOE to articulate exactly what behavior is “severe, pervasive, and ob-
jectively offensive” without being over or under inclusive,167 the sug-
gested Title IX regulations could benefit from including a few examples
of the boundaries of the definition. The best way to do so would be to
model the Clery Handbook, providing examples of behavior that must
and must not be reported within the federal regulations. For instance,
the regulations could clarify whether “severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive” behavior can ever include a single incident of harassment168
and whether the conduct present in Pahssen (three separate incidents
of harassment, including pushing a student against a locker, demand-
ing oral sex, and making obscene gestures) would ever be actionable.169
Setting such limits would not only clarify the scope of coaches’ reporting
obligations, but also help universities draft future sexual misconduct
165 Id. at 61467–68.
166 See Lanser, supra note 15, at 184.
167 Although, helpfully, the Davis court suggests a number of factors that will weigh on this
consideration, including the ages of the harasser and the victim, as well as the number of individ-
uals involved (see Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999) (citing Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)).
168 A question raised in Davis; see Davis, 526 U.S. at 653.
169 See Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 360, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2012).
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clauses in employment contracts. Because schools would be more aware
of the limits to their own Title IX obligations, they would have a better
sense of how to define any additional reporting obligations that they
wish to impose on their staff. Thus, coaches would face fewer all-inclu-
sive “sexual misconduct” clauses, and have a clearer idea of what be-
havior they need to report.
A potential objection to this expanded Title IX definition might be
that it is overly broad, given that domestic violence, dating violence,
and stalking do not necessarily have to be motivated by the victim’s sex
(and thus are not per se discriminatory). This certainly seems to be one
of the DOE’s concerns in excluding such crimes.170 However, this argu-
ment overlooks both the statistics behind these crimes, as well as the
potential solutions to limit concerns about Title IX capturing crimes
that are not “on the basis of sex.”
First, like sexual assault—which is included in the DOE’s defini-
tion of actionable misconduct—dating violence, domestic violence, and
stalking are empirically sex-based.171 Second, the proposed regulations
(or judicial interpretations of them) could remedy the problem by creat-
ing a “rebuttable presumption” that these crimes are sex-based. Thus,
schools would be allowed to demonstrate that a certain instance of do-
mestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, or stalking was not in
fact based on the victim’s sex.
There may also be concerns that this approach will constrain the
flexibility of the Davis standard, rendering it unable to respond to var-
ying fact patterns and new forms of sexual harassment (i.e., cyberbul-
lying). Again, this fear is groundless. Providing general limitations as
to whether behavior is “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive”
does not preclude courts from exercising discretion and evaluating
where specific conduct should fall along the spectrum. Rather, bounda-
ries can serve to harmonize federal law as to broad questions (like
whether a single instance of misbehavior can meet the Davis standard),
while leaving the majority of cases somewhere in the middle. Indeed,
courts will still be able to conduct their own case-by-case analysis for
170 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61467–68 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codi-
fied at 34 C.F.R. 106).
171 See Jennifer James,We Are Not Done: A Federally Codified Evidentiary Standard Is Neces-
sary for College Sexual Assault, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1321, 1331 (2016) (discussing the history of
VAWA and explaining that it includes “domestic violence . . . dating violence, sexual assault, and
stalking” because they involve higher rates of targeting victims due to their sex than other crimes);
Shannon Cleary, Using Title IX and the Model of Public Housing to Prevent Housing Discrimina-
tion Against Survivors of Sexual Assaults on College Campuses, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 364,
366 (2016) (explaining that sexual assault, particularly on college campuses, disproportionately
affects women and that 19.3% of women have been raped during their lifetime, compared with
1.7% of men).
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actionable harassment using the factors that Davis suggests they con-
sider—the age of the harasser, the age of the victim, the number of in-
dividuals involved—as well as any other unique circumstances they
find relevant to the situation at hand.172 This approach is optimal for
coaches and universities; they will understand what conduct definitely
is and is not actionable, and be allowed to tailor their contractual poli-
cies accordingly.
2. Title IX’s “appropriate person” test requires clarification that
parallels the “CSA” examples in the Clery Act Handbook.
Perhaps the most ambiguous element of Title IX guidance and ju-
risprudence is the “appropriate person” test and its application to uni-
versity employees, like collegiate coaches. The proposed DOE regula-
tions recognize that categorically designating school employees (like
coaches) as “reporters” or “non-reporters” is not optimal, given the var-
ying roles these individuals might play depending on the school.173Nev-
ertheless, the regulations still lack any meaningful criteria or limita-
tions to guide universities, coaches, and courts in interpreting who has
the responsibility to report sexual misconduct. Accordingly, Title IX
guidance should provide concrete examples of the “appropriate person”
test’s boundaries by following the Clery Act Handbook’s format for de-
termining the scope of CSA authority. Additionally, courts applying the
“appropriate person” test should enumerate a series of factors to guide
their analysis from case to case.
The Clery Act Handbook employs a bright-line rule that says
coaches always have the duty to report sexual violence when acting in
their official capacity as a CSA.174 While this approach is straightfor-
ward, holding coaches to be per se appropriate persons under Title IX
is inconsistent with Gebser, which rejected automatic vicarious liability
for schools.175 On the other hand, the Clery Act Handbook provides ex-
amples of the limitations to a coach’s “official capacity” status. The pro-
posed Title IX regulations could implement a similar series of examples
that explain, for instance, whether a graduate-student coach can ever
be an appropriate person with respect to employeemisconduct (presum-
ably, student coaches do not have the authority to institute corrective
measures against their superiors and thus cannot be appropriate per-
sons under Gebser). Doing so would provide clearer boundaries for
courts to assist their “case-by-case” analyses. Additionally, the judicial
172 Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82
(1998)).
173 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61467–68.
174 See The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 138, at ch. 4, 3.
175 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 288 (1998).
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branch itself should enumerate a series of factors that weigh on the Ti-
tle IX appropriate person analysis for coaches. These factors could in-
clude the coach’s level of authority, employment status at the university
(full-time or part-time), and the coach’s relationship with the victim
and/or alleged assailant.176
One might argue that the approaches discussed above do not pro-
vide coaches or universities with adequate notice ex ante about which
employees constitute appropriate persons. This might appear particu-
larly concerning because courts sometimes refuse to defer to a school’s
designation of whether the employee is such a person.177 This fear is
overstated, however, when considered in conjunction with the DOE’s
other proposed regulations. Specifically, the regulations now require a
coach (or other appropriate person) to report misconduct when (1) the
victim files a formal report directly or (2) the alleged offender is a repeat
perpetrator.178 If courts interpret these provisions to also apply to pri-
vate lawsuits, a coach will only be a Title IX mandatory reporter in
those two circumstances. Accordingly, universities will understand
when crafting their employment contracts which employees (and
coaches) are most often in these situations, and thus more likely to be
appropriate persons in a judicial analysis.
3. Title IX should maintain its distinct approach to the scope
and source of reporting obligations.
Although the Trump Administration’s proposed Title IX guidelines
would generally benefit from harmonization with the substance of the
Clery Act, they should continue to maintain a distinct approach to (1)
the geographical scope of educational liability and (2) the source and
origin of complaints requiring reports. In particular, Title IX should
continue to employ a broader conception of geographical liability than
the Clery Act, but require reports from a narrower set of circumstances.
Doing so would promote the separate purposes of the two statutes by
differentiating them in a way that is easy for coaches and universities
to understand and apply.
The Clery Act only requires coaches (in their role as CSAs) to report
sexual misconduct on or near campus, but179 also mandates that they
176 Universities may already consider some of these factors when writing their reporting poli-
cies. For example, the University of Oregon designates “all coaches of any team on which the ac-
cused student is a member” as mandatory reporters, “but only the head coaches of any team on
which the complainant is a member.” SeeWeiner, supra note 90, at 144–45 (emphasis added).
177 See, e.g., Kinsman v. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Tr., No. 4:15cv235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL
11110848, at *2 (N.D. Fla., Aug. 12, 2015) (refusing to defer to Florida State’s contention that it
considered neither its head coach nor athletic director to be appropriate persons under Title IX).
178 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61469.
179 See The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 138, at ch. 2, 3–4.
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report all good-faith allegations of such crimes.180 In contrast, the pro-
posed Title IX regulations do not have any geographical constraints
(and, in this sense, are broader than the Clery Act), but they also only
require universities to address formal complaints filed directly by vic-
tims affiliated with the school, as well as complaints that implicate a
repeat offender.181 These differences are appropriate given the distinct
purposes of the two laws, and, moreover, they are straightforward for
universities, coaches and courts to apply.
The Clery Act serves to provide transparent and accurate statisti-
cal data about crimes on college campuses in order to allow prospective
students and university members to evaluate the school’s safety.182 It is
therefore sensible for the reach of the statute to be limited in its geo-
graphical scope (the data would lose its meaning if it extended too far
away from the university’s boundaries), but broad in its reporting
sources (refusing to report a crime because it was filed by the victim’s
parent, rather than the victim him or herself, would again impede sta-
tistical accuracy). On the other hand, Title IX exists to address sex-
based discrimination in federally funded universities.183 It follows that
off-campus programs or activities controlled or funded by the university
should trigger liability, but that these reports should come from those
directly affected by the discrimination.
Nevertheless, one might contend that imposing two sets of report-
ing duties based on the source of the complaint and the location of the
incident creates undue confusion for coaches. However, the two sets of
obligations are actually straightforward for coaches to follow, as well as
for the DOE and courts to evaluate. Coaches who receive word of or are
witness to sexual misconduct only need to answer two questions to de-
termine whether the Clery Act and/or Title IX requires them to file a
report. The first is where the conduct took place and the second is who
filed the allegation (including whether the complaint was filed directly
by the victim or whether the complainant is affiliated with the school).
If the conduct took place within the boundaries specified by the Clery
Act, the coach will know to follow Clery Act procedures regardless of the
source of the complaint. On the other hand, the coach need not evaluate
whether a program is “university sponsored or affiliated” for Title IX
reporting; he or she has the obligation only to address incidents filed
directly by victims, or those which he or she knows implicates a repeat
offender. This will relieve pressure for coaches to determine whether
180 Id. at ch. 4, 1.
181 Id. at 61469.
182 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i)–(iii) (2013).
183 See Lanser, supra note 15, at 184.
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they must file a Title IX report, for example, in the case of an unsub-
stantiated incident they learned about indirectly or an incident unaffil-
iated with the university’s programs.
Another counterargument to this approach might be that Title IX
will deter reporting and lead to increased sexual violence by limiting
coaches’ responsibilities to only those instances where the victim of sex-
ual misconduct files a formal report. However, this harm is mitigated
in a few ways. Most importantly, the formal report only matters for trig-
gering grievance procedures against the accused; it does not relieve the
university of its obligation under Title IX to provide supportive
measures to the victim to allow her or him to continue to obtain equal
benefits to education.184 Thus, universities have the incentive to con-
tractually require their coaches not to report all incidents, but rather to
refer the victims to the school’s coordinator to make sure they receive
support and learn of their right to file a complaint. Moreover, the coach
must still file a report under his or her Clery Act obligations if the event
occurred on or near campus buildings.
Another potential problem with the divergent scopes of the two acts
relates instead to Clery Act reporting; coaches may be uneasy about re-
porting sexual misconduct that they learn about indirectly from a
source other than the victim him or herself. However, the Clery Act’s
Handbook permits—indeed, requires—coaches to file Clery Act reports
without giving the name of the victim or the accused.185 This allows the
coach to file a report with less worry about implicating either party’s
privacy interests and respects the decisions of victims who choose not
to file a formal complaint.
B. Proposed Procedure for Reporting Obligations
Although some of the substantive reporting suggestions discussed
above could theoretically be incorporated into either Title IX or the
Clery Act, they belong under the structure and regime of Title IX, due
to its private right-of-action.
The Clery Act’s fatal flaw to ensuring sufficient compliance with its
reporting laws is its procedural structure—it does not permit individual
plaintiffs to bring a private lawsuit. Accordingly, and understandably,
administrative enforcement agencies tend to direct resources towards
remedying the most egregious violations of the Act, like the Penn State
184 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61469 (“[S]upport-
ive measures may include, among other things, ‘counseling, extension of deadlines . . . campus
escort services . . . [and] changes in work or housing locations.’”).
185 The Handbook for Campus Safety, supra note 137, at ch. 4, 5.
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scandal.186 Unfortunately, this tendency has the possible unintended
consequence of overlooking smaller-scale violations, providing no indi-
vidual remedy when a coach fails to adhere to his or her reporting du-
ties. This becomes more problematic if the coach does not view him or
herself as a campus security authority in settings outside the Clery
Act’s scope, like during team travel, recruiting trips, or post-game cele-
brations.
On the other hand, the proposed Title IX regulations purport to
remedy the former procedural problems with Title IX enforcement,
while avoiding the pitfalls of the Clery Act. Instead of taking the form
of a guidance document or a DCL (with no legal effect), the DOE’s sug-
gested regulations follow an informal rulemaking procedure, complete
with a public notice and comment period.187 The rationale for departing
from the previous approaches taken by other administrations is to le-
gitimize the executive branch’s interpretation of Title IX—the new reg-
ulations are not meant to be mere suggestions.188 By developing and
adopting informal regulations instead of publishing guidance letters,
the hope is that schools will have a better understanding of the stand-
ard that they must adhere to in formulating reporting policies.189 In
theory, universities will be less likely to ignore rules than guidelines
and will thus follow a uniform standard in Title IX compliance, which
provides more consistency and stability for collegiate coaches.
Furthermore, while the DOE does not explicitly mention it, the new
regulations may also have the effect of promoting uniform decisions
across courts by availing themselves of judicial deference under Chev-
ron.190 Previous courts rarely deferred to or even referenced executive
guidance documents and DCLs when interpreting Title IX; they often
looked instead to Title IX’s text and purpose, as well as the original
1975 federal regulations, even in cases of sexual harassment.191 In some
186 See, e.g., Penn State Fine Letter, supra note 122, at *1. (imposing a fine of almost $2.4 mil-
lion on Penn State for the university administration’s passivity towards the ongoing sexual abuse
of young boys by one of its assistant football coaches). See also University of Montana Fine Action,
FEDERAL STUDENTAID: ADMINISTRATIVE ANDAPPEALS SERVICEGROUP at 1 (Sept. 25, 2018), avail-
able at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/UNIVERSITY_OF_MONTANA_FINE_ACT
ION_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZS9-HKWZ] (penalizing Montana’s ongoing failures to re-
port violent crimes with a fine of almost $1 million).
187 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61464–65.
188 Id. at 61465 (“[N]otice-and-comment rulemaking [is] [a] transparent, participatory [process]
. . . [that results in] procedures with greater legitimacy and buy-in from universities subject to the
resulting rules.”).
189 See id. at 61464–65.
190 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
191 See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640–45 (1999) (holding that Title
IX permits recipient liability for third-party misconduct in limited circumstances and that such an
interpretation is consistent with the contractual nature of Title IX, with the plain language of the
statute, and with the 1975 regulatory scheme).
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circumstances, they also analogized Title IX to its “model” statute, Title
VI.192 The courts’ failure to cite the previous administrations’ DCLs and
guidelines is not conclusive proof that they did not defer at all to their
formulations of Title IX. However, it does suggest that the rescinded
guidance documents were not entitled to the “highest” deference that is
generally afforded to executive interpretations of federal statutes under
Chevron.193 Several Title IX cases unrelated to sexual misconduct sup-
port this theory. For example, many courts have held that Chevron ap-
plies to the original 1975 regulations on athletic and educational dis-
crimination.194 In contrast, the Supreme Court has held (in a FLSA
case) that executive agency letters and guidelines are not entitled to
Chevron deference,195 a holding which at least one court has extended
to the former Title IX interpretations and DCLs.196
Thus, by transitioning to informal regulations (rather than guid-
ance documents) as the primary means for executive interpretations of
Title IX, the Trump Administration’s proposed rules should receive
greater deference from future courts who are evaluating a university’s
compliance with the statute. This minimizes the risk of inconsistent
judgments for Title IX cases across circuits. Accordingly, private plain-
tiffs will have more reliable expectations for liability and be able to
demonstrate a university’s noncompliance using this uniform standard.
Coaches will also benefit from the increased transparency and predict-
ability of the standard, because it minimizes the guesswork that they
must do to comply with the law. Thus, informal regulations under Title
IX will ensure a better balance of the victim’s safety with the need for
confidentiality and due process.
There is a caveat, though. Recently, Justice Breyer took the posi-
tion in a dissent that deference to federal regulations is limited when
192 Canon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (permitting a private right-of-action
under Title IX based in part on its resemblance and relationship to the Title VI regulatory scheme).
193 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
194 See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895–96 (1st Cir. 1993) (granting the 1975
regulatory scheme of Title IX “considerable deference . . . because Congress explicitly delegated to
the agency the task of prescribing standards for athletic programs”); Miami Univ. Wrestling Club
v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 1975 Title IX regulations were
entitled to deference under Chevron). See also Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d
957, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with the deference granted to the regulations by other cir-
cuits).
195 See Christensen v. Harris Cty, 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000) (“[W]e confront an opinion con-
tained in an opinion letter, not one arrived after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations con-
tained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the
force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”).
196 See Weckhorst v. Kan. State Univ., 241 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1166 (D. Kan. 2017) (explaining
that the “‘Dear Colleague Letters’ and ‘Questions and Answer’ documents issued by the OCR,
which . . . purport to interpret [Title IX] . . . do not carry the force and effect of law are not entitled
to Chevron deference”).
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an executive agency implements an unexplained or poorly explained
policy change.197 This echoes Justice Stevens’ dissent in Gebser and his
concern that unduly high standards for institutional liability (such as
requiring a school to have “actual knowledge” of harassment) would de-
prive plaintiffs of their statutory rights.198 If courts begin to accept this
argument and believe that the proposed Title IX regulations represent
a dramatic, politically motivated, or unexplained shift in policy, there
is a possibility that the regulations would receive less deference.
However, this outcome is unlikely; Justice Scalia’s majority re-
sponse to Justice Breyer largely dismisses the idea that “unexplained”
policy shifts would receive less deference than other regulations.199
Thus, coaches should expect that, should the proposed Title IX regula-
tions take effect, courts will grant them highest deference, which is the
optimal outcome. Future administrations who disagree with the pro-
posed regulations may of course amend them, but will now need to give
schools the benefit of a notice and comment period to allow them time
to adapt their policies and to voice their opinion on any changes. Thus,
even if the substantive executive guidelines for mandatory reporting
change under Title IX, the process of implementing those guidelines will
be more stable and slower to change, allowing coaches and universities
time to get up to speed. There will also be a more consistent body of law
for schools to rely upon when crafting sexual misconduct policies.
Courts interpreting the proposed DOE regulations should therefore feel
at ease adopting Justice Scalia’s position and deferring to the execu-
tive’s interpretation of Title IX.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sexual violence on college campuses and in collegiate athletics is
not a new phenomenon, but the #MeToo Movement helped reveal the
extent of the problem and the existence of reporting failures prevalent
under the current federal laws, particularly Title IX and the Clery Act.
To remedy the problem and to strike the appropriate balance of confi-
dentiality, safety, and due process, the optimal solution is to amend the
interpretation of Title IX (in both executive regulations and judicial
opinions) to closely parallel the substance of the Clery Act. Doing so
would create a consistent standard of liability for universities, allowing
197 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the “law grants those in charge of independent administrative agencies broad authority
to determine relevant policy. But it does not permit them . . . to rest them primarily upon unex-
plained policy preferences”).
198 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 300–01 (1998) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
199 See Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 514–15.
615] WHISTLE BLOWERS 645
them to understand and predict the types of sexual misconduct for
which they may face liability. Title IX’s procedural structure would also
permit recovery for wronged parties, regardless of whether the univer-
sity’s noncompliance is large enough to trigger a DOE investigation or
confined to a single lawsuit.
Accordingly, colleges will be able to write more precise reporting
policies for their coaches. The universities will benefit from this by be-
ing better able to evaluate whether a coach is failing to comply with his
or her duties (thus exposing the school to liability). Coaches, in turn,
will benefit by understanding their specific responsibilities ex ante and
not needing to guess what is expected of them. Most importantly, the
substantive changes and the potential for judicial deference will lead to
more consistent recovery across courts for survivors in private rights-
of-action. With the potential for increased financial liability for noncom-
pliance, schools will have the incentive to hold their coaches accounta-
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The Women’s Advocacy Project (WAP) was a research project de-
signed and run by law students at the University of Chicago Law School
(“the Law School” or “UChicago Law”) during the 2017–2018 academic
year—the first study of its kind to be conducted there.1 WAP collected
data in an attempt to accumulate a rich and detailed set of information
about women’s experiences at the Law School. WAP had four primary
research components: classroom observations, achievement data collec-
tion, a student survey, and professor interviews. The project represents
the efforts of over seventy law students. This article, written in the fall
and winter of 2018, is a condensed version of WAP’s initial report. Read-
ers interested in more detailed information about WAP’s methodology,
findings, and recommendations should access the report at
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/2018-05/wap_final.pdf.
WAP found significant differences between men’s and women’s ex-
periences at the Law School, many suggesting that women still face
considerable roadblocks and hurdles in legal education there. For ex-
ample, women graduate with honors proportionately less frequently,
† This article represents the views and observations of the authors but not necessarily those
of their employers. Throughout this report, the authors refer to their project as “WAP” and use the
abbreviation as shorthand in discussing both their views and the views of the research team (to
the extent those views usually aligned). The authors had extensive help in conducting the research
and revising the original version of their report, most notably from Jenn Beard, Sofie Brooks,
Jimmy Frost, Megan Lindgren, Jamie Luguri, Maria Macia, Piper Pehrson, and Andrew Sowle. A
full list of other student participants in the study (without whom it would not have been possible)
can be found in the full-length report. The graphs in this article were designed by Sean Hernandez
of PSD Graphic Arts, who designed and formatted the full-length report.
1 WAP was unaffiliated with the Law School administration. Although WAP benefitted from
the informal advice and guidance of members of the Law School faculty and administration, it was
an independent project that defined its own goals, methods, and scope at each step in the process.
WAP obtained approval from the University of Chicago’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for each
component of the study. WAP received funding from the Office of the Dean of Students, a Univer-
sity of Chicago Diversity and Inclusion Grant, and various law firms. None of the funds were con-
ditioned on the content of WAP’s report in any way.
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participate voluntarily in class less, and are less likely to be satisfied
with their law school experience than men. The data, however, also
showed that women have made significant strides at the Law School.
WAP sought primarily to document and describe, but its initial re-
port also offered recommendations responsive to the problems it identi-
fied. This article mentions some of those recommendations and suggests
areas where further research is warranted.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Scope of the Project
The study was a starting point. WAP aimed to give members of the
Law School community a wide range of information to spark conversa-
tions about gender issues and diversity more broadly and to lead the
way for further research as well as reform. Despite WAP’s efforts to
design a methodologically rigorous study, the information WAP was
able to gather was inevitably incomplete in some ways. WAP had just
one year to collect most of its data. WAP was only able to observe classes
during one academic quarter, and given the subjectivity with which stu-
dents experience classroom events, no classroom observation is likely to
be perfect. In addition, WAP’s student survey captured students’ per-
spectives at one moment in time in their Law School careers. Although
the participation rate was high, it is likely that some perspectives were
not captured, and the information gathered was, of course, limited by
the questions that WAP asked and that students were willing to an-
swer. As with any survey, the WAP’s was vulnerable to common survey
flaws, including selection bias. Professor interviews were similarly lim-
ited.
This study focuses on the University of Chicago Law School specif-
ically. WAP endeavored to contextualize some of the findings and anal-
ysis throughout the report with available data about other law schools.
Nevertheless, findings specific to UChicago Law should be useful re-
gardless of whether identical information is available for other law
schools. While many of UChicago’s peer schools struggle with similar
issues surrounding diversity, WAP believes that the UChicago Law
community should strive for gender equity not just comparatively but
in absolute terms. In the findings and discussion presented below, WAP
claims only to describe the situation at UChicago Law, unless compar-
ative information about other schools is expressly provided.
More broadly, many of the gender disparities described in this re-
port likely result at least in part from more general societal causes. Our
primary purpose was not to evaluate whether the Law School is respon-
sible for causing any particular gender disparity observed here; rather,
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the project attempted to generate information that might help to rem-
edy those effects in the future.
Despite the fact that this study was a starting point for the UChi-
cago Law community, it built upon an expansive body of research on
gender in law school education.2Specifically, the report was modeled on
similar studies conducted at Harvard in 20043 and Yale in 2002 and
2012,4 which undertook research of a similar scope and had similar
strengths and limitations. By all accounts, the Harvard and Yale stud-
ies led to positive impacts at both schools and were widely read. Many
UChicago Law professors reported reading Yale’s 2012 study and
adapting their teaching methods as a result of its findings. This study
hopes to augment the contributions made by the earlier reports by shed-
ding light on the current state of affairs at UChicago Law. Its aim was
to spark conversations about how to improve the experiences of women
at the Law School and how to promote their academic and extracurric-
ular success.5
2 Likely the most influential initial contribution was Lani Gunier’s 1997 book, which argued
that traditional legal education, including the Socratic Method, was alienating for women. See
generally LANIGUNIER, BECOMINGGENTLEMEN (Beacon Press 1997); Claire G. Schwab, A Shifting
Gender Divide: The Impact of Gender on Education at Columbia Law School in the New Millen-
nium, 36 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 299 (2003); Allison L. Bowers, Women at the University of
Texas School of Law: A Call for Action, 9 TEX. J.WOMEN&L. 117 (2000). There is also considerable
research on women’s underrepresentation in the legal profession more broadly. See generally Com-
mission onWomen in the Profession, A Current Glance at Women in the Law, AMERICANBARASSO-
CIATION, 2–7 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_gl
ance_statistics_january2017.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ2N-9W2N]. Recent research
has even identified disparities in the frequency with which male and female Supreme Court jus-
tices are interrupted by each other and by litigants. See generally Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers,
Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideology, and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Argu-
ments, 103 VA. L. REV. 1379 (2017).
3 See generally Study on Women’s Experiences at Harvard Law School, WORKING GROUP ON
STUDENTEXPERIENCES, 3–86 (Feb. 2004), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis-
trative/women/study-on-women-s-experiences-at-harvard-law-school.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXH7-
462K]. The results of the study were also published at Adam Neufeld, Costs of an Outdated Peda-
gogy? Study on Gender at Harvard Law School, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y& L. 511 (2005).
In 2013, the Harvard Crimson published a three-part series on women at Harvard Law School.
See Part I (with links to the following parts) at Dev A. Patel, Once Home to Kagan and Warren,
HLS Faculty Still Only 20 Percent Female, HARVARDCRIMSON (May 6, 2013), https://www.thecrim-
son.com/article/2013/5/6/hls-gender-part-one/ [https://perma.cc/HF25-M8ND]. The Harvard Law’s
Women’s Law Association recently released updated numbers regarding achievement disparities
between women and men at Harvard Law School. Molly Coleman, Harvard Law School’s Glass
Ceiling,HARVARDLAWRECORD (Apr. 24, 2018), http://hlrecord.org/2018/04/harvard-law-schools-gl
ass-ceilings/ [https://perma.cc/ D825-WDC7].
4 Yale Law Women, Yale Law Students and Faculty Speak up about Gender: Ten Year Later,
YALE LAW SCHOOL, 3–93 (Apr. 2012), http://yalelawwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/YLW-
Speak-Up-Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX6Y-AJBJ].
5 Note that, from the very beginning of the study, some students made clear to WAP that
they did not believe there were any gender disparities at the Law School. The data WAP gathered
suggests that this is not the majority of the student body’s view, however, or the professors’. Addi-
tionally, classroom observations and achievement data point to basic differences in the way that
women and men experience the Law School. When discussing the results from qualitative data
gathering techniques such as professor interviews and responses to the open-ended questions on
650 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019
B. Information Limitations
In addition to the predictable methodological limitations described
above, this report lacks other important categories of data that might
have helped us interpret our primary findings.
First, althoughWAP requested aggregate grade data in various for-
mats from the Law School administration, these requests were denied.
The study therefore discusses different proxies for grades that indicate
possible gender-based grade disparities at different points in students’
law school careers (such as Law Review membership, honors at gradu-
ation, etc.). None of these proxies are perfect, however.6 WAP also did
not have access to admissions data, such as undergraduate GPA or
LSAT scores; the Law School administration declined to share this in-
formation as well.
Second, WAP did not have information on the gender breakdown of
the graduating classes from 2007–2012. The Law School Dean’s Office
and Admissions Office provided WAP with the gender breakdown for
each class for the 2013–2014 through the 2017–2018 academic years
but denied requests to provide information for earlier years. As a result,
although WAP was able to calculate the baseline gender composition of
the 2014–2018 graduating classes, it was not able to do so for the earlier
classes.7
Finally, WAP requested, but was not given, baseline data about the
gender composition of each Law School course for the Autumn Quarter
of 2017. To calculate the baseline gender composition of each class ob-
served in the Classroom Observations component, WAP therefore relied
on the class observers to report the gender breakdown of each class.
Though incomplete, WAP believes the findings in this report are a
helpful starting point and is confident that they take advantage of all
available information.
1. Note on other diverse identities
This study focused narrowly on the experiences of women at UChi-
cago Law. It did not examine the experiences of students of color,
LGBTQ students, or other groups of students who are likely to be un-
derrepresented and who may face significant barriers to success at the
Law School and in the legal profession (such as first-generation college
the student survey, WAP took care to focus on views that came up repeatedly, and to indicate the
frequency with which certain comments were made, so as not to over-represent any one opinion as
a consensus view if unwarranted.
6 See Appendix K of the full-length report.
7 See Appendix L of the full-length report. For more information on how WAP calculated
baseline class composition for those years (an important step in many of the statistical significance
calculations described below), seeMethodology, Achievement Data of the full-length report.
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students and students with disabilities). WAP acknowledges that there
are often powerful intersections between different aspects of students’
identities. Many of the issues explored in this report likely impact stu-
dents differently based on their race, religion, national origin, LGBTQ
status, or other aspects of their identity, as well as the intersections of
these characteristics. Many students and professors pointed this out in
the student survey and during the professor interviews.
There were two primary reasons for WAP’s decision to focus almost
exclusively on gender and not on the impact of other identity character-
istics on student experience at the Law School. First, focusing on
women’s experiences made the project more feasible in scope. WAP
hopes that its methods enable other student groups to do similar re-
search along different demographic lines in the future. Second, because
of the small number of students of color at the Law School (and the
small size of the school generally), it would have been much more diffi-
cult to report on findings based on race in an interesting or helpful way
while preserving students’ and professors’ anonymity.
WAP is aware that most of the references to gender in this article
are, unfortunately, binary. Although the goal of this report is not to re-
entrench binary understandings of gender, almost all of our statistics
are broken down with reference to women and men exclusively, and the
report as a whole purports to evaluate the experiences of women at the
Law School as compared to the experiences of men. Additionally, many
of the methodologies employed in this study (described below) involved
making assumptions about the gender of individuals that may have var-
ied from those individuals’ self-defined identities. Focusing on the ex-
periences of women, as opposed to students who may be trans, gender
non-conforming, or who do not otherwise identify within binary under-
standings of gender was necessary for the purposes of this study be-
cause of similar concerns about scope, privacy, and anonymity to those
described above.
We sincerely hope that future research will address those short-
comings and that our work will make that research easier.
II. METHODOLOGY
This study included four primary methodological components:
classroom observations, professor interviews, a student survey, and
analysis of achievement data. First, WAP observed ninety-six Law
School class sessions during the Autumn Quarter of 2017. WAP trained
student observers to observe, in pairs, their own classes three times
each during the Autumn Quarter. The project observed twenty-four up-
per-level courses and all nine sections of doctrinal 1L courses (1L Legal
Research &Writing classes were not observed). Students identified and
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recorded cold calls, as well as various types of voluntary participation
events, professors’ responses to student participation, and the gender of
the students participating. Observers also tracked whether students
participated multiple times in a class session, allowing WAP to code the
gender of students who participated three or more times in a session
(“dominant participants”). To analyze the data from classroom observa-
tions, WAP averaged (using a simple mean) the number and type of
participation events by gender observed by all the observers for a given
class session. Statistical significance was calculated using paired sam-
ples t-tests. The tests compared the mean of the variable of interest
(e.g., the percent of total observations made by women, averaged across
classroom observations) with the mean of the class composition (the
percent of women enrolled in that class).
Second, WAP interviewed fifty-three professors during the Au-
tumn, Winter, and Spring Quarters of the 2017–2018 school year. WAP
reached out to all full-time teaching faculty, Bigelow fellows, clinic di-
rectors, and some additional clinical faculty for interviews. WAP
trained pairs of students to conduct thirty to sixty minute interviews
using a standardized interview script that included questions about
pedagogical strategies, mentoring relationships, and other areas of con-
cern for women at the Law School. Professors were also asked to fill out
data sheets including quantitative information about the numbers of
letters of recommendation and references that they provided within the
preceding calendar year as well as the numbers of research assistants
they employed. WAP collected these data sheets from thirty-seven pro-
fessors.
Interview data was analyzed using a qualitative coding software
called NVivo. WAP created a list of fourteen thematic codes, and certain
portions of the interview notes were assigned to different codes. In
drafting the report, the authors counted the number of professors who
expressed a given view by relying on the codes thematically closest to
each view. Although the interviews varied to some extent in terms of
length and content, they provide a useful window into professors’ per-
spectives on gender at the Law School, as well as student life more gen-
erally.
Third, WAP conducted a student survey in the Winter Quarter of
2018. The questions were modeled on the student surveys administered
at Harvard and Yale, revised and tailored to UChicago. The questions
were reviewed and tested multiple times by professors, law students,
and a Ph.D. student in the Sociology department. Through a combina-
tion of open-ended and multiple-choice questions, the student survey
examined students’ experiences and views with regard to their deci-
sions to enroll at the Law School, their classroom learning, their partic-
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ipation in and satisfaction with student life and extracurricular activi-
ties at the Law School, their perceptions of their own successes and fail-
ures in terms of traditional markers of academic achievement, their re-
lationships with faculty, and their career goals. Seventy one point eight
percent of all J.D. students enrolled at the Law School at the time of the
survey’s administration completed the survey, creating a unique snap-
shot of students’ interests and experiences at the Law School.
WAP conducted the survey on the Qualtrics platform. WAP then
analyzed the data using the Reports function in Qualtrics to generate
the percentages and absolute numbers of responses to most of the ques-
tions on the survey. Team members used Stata to both double check all
the percentages and calculate statistical significance for any possible
differences. In cases in which the response solicited in the survey was
numerical, WAP tested for statistical significance in any differences be-
tween men and women respondents using a two-sided t-test. For the
remaining cases in which the response type was categorical, WAP used
a Pearson chi-squared test.
Finally, WAP compiled, counted, and analyzed publicly available
data on students’ academic achievement and career outcomes, includ-
ing participation in law journals, first-year writing prizes, honors at
graduation, clerkships, and moot court participation. WAP worked with
a team of statisticians from the University of Chicago’s Statistics De-
partment’s Consulting Program to analyze the data collected and to per-
form statistical significance tests. Statistical significance was only cal-
culated for the 2014–2017 period because WAP was only given access
to the gender breakdowns at graduation for those classes.
In the following sections, we have used the terms “significant” or
“significantly” to denote statistical significance. Where a level of statis-
tical significance is not specified, we are referring to statistical signifi-
cance at the .05 level.
III. FINDINGS
This study produced broad initial findings on many aspects of
women’s experiences at UChicago Law. Overall, women have yet to
reach parity with men in many indicators of academic achievement and
satisfaction with their experiences at the Law School. But there are also
many areas in which women are doing well. The main findings are re-
produced below.
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A. Class Composition
For each of the years 2011 through 2017, UChicago Law’s student
population had a slightly larger gender disparity than any of the other
top five law schools (as ranked by US News and World Report).8
TABLE 1:
TOP SIX LAW SCHOOLS COMPARATIVEGENDER CLASS
COMPOSITIONS 2011–2017
(THE SCHOOL WITH THE LOWEST PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN EACH
YEAR IS HIGHLIGHTED IN PURPLE.)
% Women in Total Law Student Population
YearUChicago YaleHarvardStanfordColumbia NYU
2017 46.1 47.8 48.9 48.5 48.9 53.4
2016 43.9 47.7 49.3 48.9 48.2 51.4
2015 44.1 46.4 48.7 45.6 47.2 49.
2014 42.9 47.7 49.6 44.7 45.8 46.4
2013 43 46.3 47.8 44.8 46.7 43.7
2012 42.8 47.2 47.2 42.6 46.3 41. 7
2011 44.2 49.4 48.2 42.7 48 41.3
For the first time in the history of the Law School, the Class of 2020
entered with an equal proportion of men and women. However, class
composition data from the last four years demonstrates that classes
tend to gain considerably more men than women between the 1L and
2L years as transfer students, leading to more heavily male class com-
positions in the remaining two years of law school.
TABLE 2:

























2016 196 215 3 16 48 45
2017 190 216 9 17 44 43
2018 184 203 5 14 46 44
2019 185 205 5 15 46 44
8 Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings [https://perma.cc/Q794-YYL8] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
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B. Academic Achievement and Outcomes
WAP’s findings identify areas of significant progress, as well as se-
rious roadblocks, for women students at UChicago. As discussed below,
the p-values for achievement differences in this sub-section reflect the
likelihood that the difference between the rate of achievement for each
gender (on each metric discussed) and that gender’s representation in
the average class is due to chance. The p-values for survey results meas-
ure the probability that the difference in the responses between the two
genders is due to chance.
In terms of academic achievement, women are significantly less
likely to receive academic honors at graduation than men. Women are
also underrepresented at each specific level of honors, though those re-
sults are not significant except for Honors, which is marginally signifi-
cant.
TABLE 3:
HONORS AWARDED ATGRADUATION, BYGENDER
2008–2017 2014–2017
Honors Level Men Women Men Women
All Honors 65% 35% 63% 37%* (p=.037)
Highest
Honors 10 of 15 5 of 15 6 of 10 4 of 10 (p=.578)
High
Honors 76% 24% 66% 34% (p=.137)
Honors 62% 38% 62% 38%† (p=.084)
† = Statistically significant at the .10 level
* = Statistically significant at the .05 level
** = Statistically significant at the .01 level9
Women are also less likely to clerk in federal courts. Two differ-
ences are marginally statistically significant: men are less likely than
would be expected based on their representation in the class to clerk for
federal district courts, and women are less likely to clerk at federal ap-
pellate courts. The other rates of representation below show un-
derrepresentation of women in clerkships, but not at statistically sig-
nificant rates.
9 These symbols are used throughout to denote levels of statistical significance.
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TABLE 4:
CLERKSHIPSHELD BYUCHICAGO STUDENTS, BYGENDER
2008–2017 2014–2017
Court Men Women Men Women
All Courts 63% 37% 58.9% 41.4%
Supreme Court10/15 clerks5/15 clerks 4/7 clerks 3/7 clerks
Federal
Appellate 69% 31% 63%37%† (p=.099)
Federal
District Court 56% 44%56%† (p=.051) 44% (p=.968)
State Court 59% 41% 57% 43% (p=.555)
Additionally, women are significantly less likely to join the Law
Review. From 2008 to 2017, Law Review staff was composed on average
of 67% men and 33% women. These percentages were similar for the
2014 to 2017 period: the staff was composed of 65% men and 35%
women. The difference between the percentage of the women in the Law
School class from 2014 to 2017 and the percentage of women on the Law
Review’s 2L class for those years is statistically significant (p=.016). The
Legal Forum, another UChicago law journal, has historically had much
greater gender parity. Its staffers over the last ten years have been 50%
men and 50% women. Between 2014 and 2017, women’s presence sur-
passed that of men in the Legal Forum staff, with 53% of positions. The
difference between the percentage of men in the class in those years and
men’s representation on the Legal Forum staff is highly statistically
significant (p=.007). Over the last ten years, the Chicago Journal of In-
ternational Law (CJIL) staffers have been 54% men and 46% women.
Staffers from all three journals are selected through the annual
writing competition. Overall, women complete the writing competition
at a lower rate than men. Among 2L and 3L women, 50% reported par-
ticipating in the writing competition, compared to 65.1% of men, a sta-
tistically significant difference (p=.013). These numbers likely fluctuate
somewhat by year: within the 2L class, 43.3% of women reported par-
ticipating (p=.038), while in the 3L class 56.5% of women reported par-
ticipating (p=.130). 1Ls surveyed indicated that they planned to com-
plete the writing competition at rates roughly balanced by gender.
69.1% of 1L women and 70.4% of 1L men surveyed reported that they
planned to participate in the journal writing competition (p=.853), and
22.6% of women and 18.3% of men were not sure whether they planned
to participate (p=.509). These differences are not statistically signifi-
cant.
Additionally, survey results indicated that women were signifi-
cantly less likely than men to report performing academically better
647] SPEAKNOW 657
than they thought they would at the Law School. 24.1% of women and
33.0% of men reported that result (p=.043). In contrast, 29.1% of women
reported doing worse than they expected, as compared to 20.5% of men
(p=.042).
C. Classroom Dynamics
WAP’s classroom observation data indicated that men and women
participate roughly equally in UChicago classrooms. Women, however,
participate voluntarily in class significantly less often than men do.
Women’s rates of voluntary participation may be affected by the gender
of the first person to speak in a class, as well as the gender of the pro-
fessor. Men are also much more likely than women to enjoy classroom
participation. The p-values in this section represent the probability that
the differences between the rate of participation for each gender and
that gender’s representation in each class are due to chance.
1. Summary results
The raw numbers of classes, class sessions, and participation




No. of courses monitored 9 24 33
No. of class meetings 27 69 96
Percentage of women in attendance 49.5 45.1 47.0
No. of cold calls 150 350 500
No. of volunteered comments 367 1100 1467
No. of interruptions/blurts10 18 51 69
No. of total participation events 520 1452 1972
No. of students participating at least once in a
class 429 764 1193
Overall, men and women participated roughly equally in the clas-
ses that WAP observed in the Autumn Quarter of 2017. Although
women participated at a rate slightly lower than their rates of attend-
ance, those differences were not statistically significant in any category
of class (1L classes, 2L and 3L classes overall, 2L and 3L seminars, or
upper-level large classes).
10 “Blurts” were defined as instances in which a student would begin speaking without having
been called on by the professor.
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The percentages of each type of participation event by women in































































































11 Voluntary participation events included all contributions to classroom discussions that
were not initiated by a professor’s cold call. They included volunteering, asking questions, making





Men and women did participate voluntarily in class at different
rates; men participated voluntarily more frequently than women did.
These differences are statistically significant at the .05 level in all class
sessions observed overall, in upper-level courses in general, and in large
upper-level courses. The differences between men’s and women’s volun-
tary participation rates were not statistically significant in 1L classes
or in 2L and 3L seminars.
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TABLE 7:
TOTAL VERSUS VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION BYWOMEN




























Table 8 breaks down participation rates by round of observation
(“Round”). WAP conducted one Round in late October (near the begin-
ning of the quarter), one in early November, and one in late November
(near the end of the quarter). The gap in voluntary participation be-
tween women and men seems to have closed as the quarter progressed.
TABLE 8:
PARTICIPATION RATES BY ROUND

































a. Professors’ perspectives on student volunteering
Twenty-one professors noticed the small but significant difference
in the frequency with which women and men participated voluntarily,
but eleven reported that they did not notice a difference or that it did
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not occur in their classes. Three professors said that they were not sure
about whether men and women participated with different frequency,
and one observed that women speak more than men. At least five pro-
fessors who believed that there was a gendered difference in student
participation rates (or were not sure if there was) expressed the belief
that the difference is small and does not generally affect the quality of
contributions. One professor remarked, for example, that male and fe-
male students are “similarly talkative, similarly prepared, similarly
strong and informed about what they say.” Still, nine professors ob-
served that outlier students who consistently speak too much are more
likely to be men.
Twelve professors also noted that men and women’s styles of par-
ticipation differ. For example, one professor noted that male students
who volunteer are “more often trying to profess a view,” while women
are more likely to speak “to clarify a view.”
b. Students’ explanations for gender disparities in participa-
tion
Students surveyed offered various possible explanations for why
men might volunteer in class more than women. By far, the most com-
mon explanation students offered was that they believe men are less
likely to be self-conscious about the value of their contributions or sen-
sitive to norms against excessive participation. Many students also
commented that male and female students’ styles of participation differ.
For example, one student noted that when men speak “they speak more
confidently than women.” Another student stated that women “are
much more likely to use hedging language.”
3. Cold-Calling
Five hundred of the 1,972 (or 25.4%) participation events that WAP
observed were cold calls.
Overall, professors cold called men and women roughly equally.
48.5% of cold calls observed were of women. This number is slightly
higher than women’s attendance in the observed class sessions overall
(47.0%), but the difference is small and not statistically significant
(p=.500).
Classes in which there was more cold calling were not observed to
have higher rates of female participation overall. In fact, the reverse
was true. Women were observed to participate voluntarily slightly less
in class sessions in which at least 50% of participation events were cold
calls (women accounted for 39.5% of the voluntary participation events
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in these classes) than in class sessions in which fewer than 50% of par-
ticipation events were cold calls (women accounted for 46% of voluntary
participation events).12
TABLE 9:
PARTICIPATION RATES BY AMOUNT OF COLD CALLING
Classes where cold calls
were more than 50% of
participation events
Classes where cold calls









46.7% (p=.43) 46.7% (p=.28)
Cold calls by




39.5% (p=.30) 46% (p=.047)*
a. Professors’ perspectives on cold calling
Thirty-three professors reported that they cold call regularly, espe-
cially in large classes. Professors are largely positive and often enthu-
siastic about cold calling. Fourteen professors stated that they see cold
calling as a good way to help students learn. One professor reported
that “outside of clinics,” cold calling is “one of the best forms of prepa-
ration for practice we give our students.”
Twenty professors stated that they attempted to ensure that there
was gender balance in who they called on, either within a single class
session or across several class sessions.
Notwithstanding the generally favorable view professors had of
cold calling, some professors noted that it may have drawbacks. One
professor remarked that cold calling “sometimes creates a passivity in
the classroom that lessens student engagement.” Four professors
pointed out that cold calling may make some students uncomfortable in
a way that is counter-productive.
12 Note that the amount of cold calling in a class may be correlated with class size (professors
may be likely to cold call more in large classes), which may explain part of this result (given that
women participate voluntarily less in upper-level large classes than they do in seminars).
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4. First speaker gender
WAP’s findings identified differences in women’s rates of voluntary
participation based on the gender of the first speaker in a class. Those
results are provided below.13 Overall, in the forty-three observed class
sessions in which the first speaker was a man, women were responsible
for only 40% of total participation events and 39.4% of voluntary par-
ticipation events. Both those differences were statistically significant.
On the other hand, in the forty-seven class sessions in which the first
speaker was a woman, women were slightly more likely to participate
than would be expected based on the class gender composition, though
those differences were not statistically significant.
TABLE 10:
PARTICIPATION RATES BY FIRST SPEAKERGENDER




















































The strength of the relationship between a male first speaker and
subsequent female participation also seemed to decrease as Autumn
Quarter went on. Overall, the negative correlation of a male first
13 Note that whether men speak more in a class is likely a confounding variable with whether
the first speaker in that class is a man, given that in a class where men speak more frequently a
man is also more likely to be the first speaker. WAP was not able to complete additional testing to
tease apart the relationship between these two variables.
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speaker with female volunteering was not statistically significant after
the first round of observations in late October.
TABLE 11:
PARTICIPATION RATES BY FIRST SPEAKERGENDER AND ROUND
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
First Speaker
































5. The effect of the professor’s gender
Students’ course loads tend to include classes taught by fewer fe-
male professors than male professors.Overall, 2Ls and 3Ls had a mean
of 3.2 male professors and 1.5 female professors in Autumn Quarter
2017. The difference was even starker for 1Ls, who had a mean of 1.2
female professors and 3.8 male professors (including Bigelow fellows) in
Autumn Quarter 2017.
In classroom observations, women participated slightly more—but
not statistically significantly more—when in class with female profes-
sors. The percentage of total participation events by women in a class
with a male professor (across all class years) was 45.3%; in classes with
female professors it was 49.14%. Women were, however, significantly
less likely to participate voluntarily in classes with male professors
than their attendance in the classes would suggest. In those classes,
only 44.9% of voluntary participation events were accounted for by
women, a statistically significant difference (p=.03).
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TABLE 12:
PARTICIPATION RATES BY PROFESSOR’SGENDER
Male Professor FemaleProfessor
Total participation events by women 45.3% (p=.21) 49.14% (p=.98)
Unique participants who are women 45.7% (p=.53) 50.1% (p=.92)
Cold calls by women 46.9% (p=.60) 59.7% (p=.67)
Voluntary participation events by
women 44.9%* (p=.03) 47.3% (p=.50)
6. Students’ perceptions of class participation
Overall, students expressed considerable satisfaction with their ex-
periences in the classroom at UChicago Law. Forty six point six percent
of survey respondents reported that their classroom experience at the
Law School has been “somewhat positive,” and 38.2% reported that it
has been “very positive.” These numbers are similar across class years.
Despite their general satisfaction with classroom experiences at
the Law School, women and men experience class participation some-
what differently. While 42.5% of male students enjoy participating in
class, only 27.3% of female students reported the same (p=.001). Simi-
larly, 22.5% of male students dislike participating in class, and 43.2%
of female students dislike it (p<.001).
Men are more likely to report that they themselves participate in
class more often than their classmates. Although the gap in male and
female answer rates on this question is smaller than the gaps described
in the previous paragraph, it is still highly significant: 37.5% of men
and 25.0% of women report that they participate either somewhat or
far more often than their classmates (p=.006). Similarly, but less signif-
icantly, 39.0% of men and 44.1% of women report that they participate
either somewhat or much less often than their classmates (p=.291).
D. Faculty Relationships and Mentoring
Women students report outcomes similar to or better than men in
most mentorship metrics. Most students at the Law School report hav-
ing at least one mentor among the faculty, and women reported having
slightly more mentors on the faculty thanmen.Women are significantly
more likely than men to serve as research assistants. Professors also
write letters of recommendation for similar numbers of women and
men, and women and men report having similar numbers of professors
they would feel comfortable asking for letters from.
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1. Mentorship generally
Five professors reported that they believe that students who ac-
tively seek mentors have a more rewarding law school experience than
those who do not. Overall, when asked about their interactions with
professors outside of class, students across all years responded that
they were positive: 47.3% of respondents said they were “very positive,”
and 40.2% of respondents said they were “somewhat positive.” The re-
sults did not vary significantly by students’ gender. 85.9% of women
and 88.5% of men reported that their interactions were somewhat or
very positive (p=.428).
In interviews, professors were divided in their opinions about what
the appropriate or optimal role of a mentor should be. But despite these
differences, there was widespread agreement among professors that
gender does not make much difference to the mentoring relationship.
On average, most students at UChicago Law have at least one men-
tor on the faculty, and women have slightly more mentors than men.
Women at UChicago Law reported having a mean of 1.8 mentors each,
and men reported having a mean of 1.5 mentors. This difference is sig-
nificant at the .10 level (p=.086).
Mentorship seems to increase over time. 3L women and men re-
ported having more mentors on average than members of the 2L class,
and 2L students reported having more mentors than 1Ls, suggesting
that students gain mentors as they spend more time in law school. How-
ever there are differences based on gender within each class. More 1L
men feel they do not have a mentor compared to 1L women, though this
difference is not statistically significant: 54.9% of men reported not hav-
ing a mentor compared to 44.0% of women (p=.179). Of the 1L survey
respondents, the average number of mentors for women was 1.1 and the
average number of mentors for men was 0.7 (p=.023).
2L and 3L men still reported having fewer mentors than 2L and 3L
women: 27.1% of men feel like they do not have a mentor compared to




AVERAGENUMBER OFMENTORS BYGENDER, 2L AND 3L YEARS14
Average Number of Mentors15 2L and 3L Women2L and 3L Men
Total (p=.212) 2.3 2.0
Non Clinical (p=.346) 1.6 1.4
Clinical (p=.308) 0.7 0.6
The Law School’s clinical opportunities are sources of mentorship
relationships for many students. One clinical professor stated: “Mentor-
ship is at the core of what we do as clinical faculty.” Sixteen students
reported that they found mentors through their participation in a clinic.
For example, one extolled the benefits of working with clinical profes-
sors who “take time to ask about aspects of our lives outside of pure
academics and get to know us as people rather than as law students.”
2. Letters of recommendation and employer references
According to the data sheets that faculty members submitted, fac-
ulty wrote letters of recommendation for clerkships slightly more fre-
quently for men than for women, but the difference was not statistically
significant. A total of 44.1% of clerkship letters written in the last year
were for women and 55.9% were for men (p=.956).
WAP also asked student survey respondents for the number of fac-
ulty members they felt comfortable asking for letters of recommenda-
tion. Students’ reports of the number of faculty members that they felt
comfortable asking for letters of recommendation varied less by gender
than they did with regard to mentorship (see above). On average, men
and women across all classes have nearly equal numbers of professors
they would feel comfortable asking for letters of recommendation.
TABLE 14:
NUMBER OF PROFESSORS STUDENTS FEEL COMFORTABLE ASKING
FOR RECOMMENDATION LETTERS BYGENDER AND YEAR
1L (p=.700)2L (p=.089)†3L (p=.647)
Women 1.7 3.6 4.2
Men 1.8 4.2 4.4
14 These differences are not statistically significant.
15 Students who responded that they had more than four mentors were counted as having five
mentors for the purposes of this analysis.
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Twenty three point eight percent of 1L women and 22.5% of 1L men
surveyed did not have a faculty member they felt comfortable asking for
a letter of recommendation (p=.852). Of 2L women, only 4.5% did not
feel comfortable asking for a letter from any professor compared to 6.0%
of 2L men (p=.698). Of 3Ls, 10.1% of women compared to 1.6% of men
did not have any professor from whom they would feel comfortable ask-
ing for letters of recommendation (p=.042).
3. Research assistantships
In the year covered by the professor data sheets WAP collected,
57.5% of research assistants employed by the professors who submitted
such data were women and 42.5% were men, a difference that is statis-
tically significant (p=.012). Six professors reported finding their re-
search assistants either by posting the positions on Symplicity (an
online job-search database used at the Law School) or by emailing their
entire 1L class. Five professors stated that they hire research assistants
in other ways, including hiring students who approach them proactively
or recruiting students with the top grades in their classes.
4. Office hours
Professors vary in their approaches to office hours. Eleven reported
having no scheduled office hours and instead inviting students to stop
by at any time. One professor provides scheduled time slots for which
students can sign up. Other professors schedule specific office hours but
do not require students to sign up for time slots within that window.
Professors largely were unsure what approach would be best.
Generally, professors reported that there is no difference in the fre-
quencies with which women and men visit their office. But at least nine
noticed differences in the topics men and women visited to discuss. Two
professors reported that men were slightly more likely to want to dis-
cuss non-specific topics, unrelated to class, while women were more
likely to visit with specific class-related questions. Finally, six profes-
sors noted that men are more likely to stop by their offices without an
appointment.
Student survey responses roughly match what professors reported
in their interviews: there is not much difference in the frequency with
which women and men attend office hours. Of 2L and 3L survey re-
spondents, men reported attending office hours more than women, but
the difference was not statistically significant: 51.9% of men reported
attending at least once per quarter, compared with 42.7% of women
(p=.130). 1L women, on the other hand, attended office hours at a higher
rate than 1L men, and this difference was marginally significant: 87%
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of 1L women reported attending at least once per quarter, compared to
76% of 1L men (p=.080).
E. Faculty Diversity
AlthoughWAP set out to research primarily the student experience
at UChicago Law, issues of representation on the faculty, as well as the
experiences of current faculty members who are women or minorities,
came up with an inescapable frequency in both professor interviews and
student survey responses. In the spring of 2018, the Law School had
thirty-seven members of the full-time research faculty, of which only
ten were women. The clinical faculty was more diverse—of the twenty-
one total clinical faculty members, twelve were women. But 1Ls often
do not have any interaction with the clinical faculty, and because clinics
are optional, many students graduate from the Law School without hav-
ing any significant interaction with a clinical faculty member.
Students are acutely aware of this gender imbalance and expressed
their dissatisfaction with it again and again, some identifying it as a
significant failure of the Law School. Generally, students reported that
having a diverse faculty is important and that the Law School “would
benefit greatly from having more female faculty members.” Professors
are also concerned with the negative impact of the lack of diversity. One
professor suggested that a more diverse faculty would be attractive to
students. Some professors believe that mentorship responsibilities are
not distributed evenly between female and male faculty, and that the
female faculty bear the responsibilities of acting as mentors more often
than men, if only because there are fewer women than men to share the
burden. Both the faculty and the administration expressed concerns
about the burden it places on female faculty to teach 1L classes.
Some women faculty members shared examples of the challenges
they had faced at the Law School during their interviews. Those ac-
counts are explored more fully in the full-length report. Additionally,
the full-length report describes some of the difficulties the Law School
administration reports facing in hiring a diverse faculty.
F. Student Experience and Activities
Women’s experiences at UChicago differ from men’s in areas be-
yond the classroom or their faculty relationships. This section explores
trends in student satisfaction overall, students’ decisions to enroll at
UChicago, students’ reports of interactions with their classmates, their
career preferences and goals, and their participation in organized ex-
tracurricular activities. The p-values in this section denote the proba-
bility that the difference in response between men and women students
on a particular question was due to chance.
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1. Perceptions of the law school and matriculation decisions
Survey respondents were asked, “Did you have any reservations
about attending the University of Chicago Law School?” They were
asked to check all responses that applied out of a set of seven options,
which included “neighborhood safety,” “law and economics focus,” “lack
of fun,” “conservative political reputation,” “lack of diversity,” “I had no
reservations,” and “other.” If a survey respondent selected the “other”
option, he or she was given the chance to write in any additional reser-
vations that were not included in the initial set. Fifty-seven survey re-
spondents wrote in additional concerns not listed in the initial set of
seven fixed choices. Overall, women were significantly more likely to
express the reservations described below, and were significantly less
likely than men to report having no reservations about enrolling at
UChicago. Seventeen point three percent of women and 26.5% of men
reported having no reservations about their decision to enroll at UChi-
cago (p=.022). The following responses from students reflect the con-
cerns they remember having when they considered whether to attend
UChicago Law (they do not necessarily reflect students’ judgments
about whether such concerns were well-founded in reality).16
GRAPH 2:
MOST COMMON RESERVATIONS ABOUTUCHICAGO BYGENDER
16 Unfortunately, WAP’s student survey did not include a question about why students chose
to enroll. This information would likely also be interesting.
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Briefly, the largest differences between men and women students’
responses were in the following categories:
Lack of Diversity: Lack of diversity was the most commonly
reported reservation for women, with 48.6% of female sur-
vey respondents reporting it. In contrast, 27.0% of men were
concerned by a perceived lack of diversity (p<.001).
Law and Economics: Male students were significantly less
likely (p<.001) to see the Law and Economics focus of the
Law School as a cause for concern when deciding whether
to matriculate: 36.4% of female survey respondents reported
this concern, versus 16.5% of male survey respondents.
Political reputation: 48.2% of female survey respondents re-
ported that UChicago’s conservative political reputation
gave them pause when enrolling. In contrast, only 31.5% of
men checked this box. Although this was the most com-
monly reported reservation for men (and the second most
commonly reported reservation for women), the difference
between men and women’s responses was still highly signif-
icant (p<.001).
o Ten students made use of the “other” response option
to report that the Law School’s liberal political repu-
tation or lack of conservative faculty had been a
cause for concern for them in their decision to ma-
triculate.
Safety: 27.3% of female respondents and 22.5% of male re-
spondents reported being concerned about neighborhood
safety when deciding whether or not to attend UChicago.
The difference was not statistically significant (p=.0259).
Competition, rigor, and intensity: Women disproportion-
ately made use of the “other” option to write in that they had
reservations about UChicago’s reputation for competitive-
ness, although the concern was also voiced by a male stu-
dent. Three women noted concerns about “academic rigor,”
“intensity of the quarter system and curriculum,” and
“stress culture.” One professor explained such a concern,
noting: “There is an institutional commitment to free ex-
change of ideas and having hard conversations, but that can
give [prospective students] the idea that you have to be re-
ally tough to go here.”
2. Professional goals and career planning
WAP survey respondents were asked what kind of legal work they
hope to do within their first ten years after graduating from the Law
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School. Male and female respondents reported significantly different
rates of interest in every career area questioned except government
work. Women were significantly more likely than men to report an in-
terest in doing public interest work. Men were significantly more likely
to be interested in private legal practice, legal academia, clerking, and
non-legal work.
TABLE 15:
STUDENTS’ INTEREST IN LEGAL AREA OF PRACTICE INNEXT 10
YEARS BYGENDER (ALL CLASS YEARS)
Legal Area Men Women
Private Legal Practice* (p=.022) 82.5% 73.2%
Clerking* (p=.002) 66.5% 51.4%
Government Work (p=.910) 41.0% 40.5%
Public Interest Work* (p=.005) 29.5% 42.7%
Legal Academia* (p=.026) 18.0% 10.5%
Non-Legal Work* (p=.051) 13.0% 7.3%
Women are less likely than men to participate in On-Campus In-
terviewing (“OCI”). Seventy-four point three percent of 2L and 3L
women and 83.7% of 2L and 3L men reported participating in OCI
(p=.059).
Women and men who participated in OCI reported getting jobs
through the process at roughly similar rates. Eighty-three point nine
percent of 2L men and 90.4% of 3L men who participated in OCI re-
ported getting jobs through the process. Eighty-one point six percent of
2L women and 92.3% of 3L women who participated in OCI reported
getting jobs through the process.
Significantly higher percentages of women than men reported an
interest in doing public interest work at some point during the first ten
years of their legal careers (see the table above). Perhaps correspond-
ingly, women were more likely to forgo OCI in order to pursue public
interest work during the 2L summer—16.2% of 2L and 3L women re-
ported making that choice, compared to 11.6% of 2L and 3L men—
though the difference is not statistically significant (p=.286).
Female students also are historically more likely to participate in
more pro bono work during their time at the Law School, earning the
Dean’s Certificate of Recognition for completing fifty hours of pro bono
service at disproportionately high rates. Fifty-nine point six percent of




2L AND 3L PARTICIPATION INOCI BYGENDER
Participated in
OCI (p=.059)†
Did not participate be-






Men 83.7% 3.9% 11.6%
Women 74.3% 6.6% 16.2%
3. Student satisfaction and culture
The vast majority of students reported feeling positive about their
decision to enroll at UChicago Law. However, men and women did so at
significantly different rates. Eighty-four percent of male respondents
and 75.5% of women either agreed or strongly agreed with the state-
ment, “[g]iven my experience so far, I would choose to enroll at the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School again” (p=.030). Male students were more
likely than female students to report strong agreement with the state-
ment (p=.030). Women were more likely to report neither agreeing nor
disagreeing with the statement (p=.045), and more likely to report
strong negative feelings about their decision to enroll (p=.085).
GRAPH 3:
RESPONSES BYGENDER TO “GIVEN MY EXPERIENCE SO FAR, I
WOULD CHOOSE TO ENROLL AT THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW
SCHOOL AGAIN.”
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4. Improved satisfaction after 1L
Major gender disparities were not evident in survey respondents’
assessment of whether their law school experiences had improved since
the end of 1L. The majority of students overall felt that their experi-
ences at the Law School had improved at least somewhat since finishing
1L year. Sixty-two point seven percent of 2L and 3L students either
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “my law school experience
has improved since 1L.” The less positive view of 1L year compared to
later years of law school is significant because, as one professor put it:
“A huge component of the Law School culture goes into how we do 1L
curriculum. How 1L classes are run makes a big difference, and culture
is set very early.”
5. Interactions between students
Male students report having positive interactions with their fellow
students at higher rates than female students and are also more likely
than women to characterize these interactions as “very positive” rather
than “somewhat positive.”
GRAPH 4:
IMPRESSIONS OF INTERACTIONS WITH FELLOW STUDENTS
Despite the fact that the vast majority of students expressed posi-
tive impressions of their interactions with other students, in response
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to an open-ended question soliciting “other observations or suggestions
. . . about gender dynamics at the Law School,” nine female respondents
expressed negative feelings about the way that they were treated by
fellow students in the Law School community based on their gender.
One such woman remarked: “As a woman, I think the most marginal-
ized I have ever felt is at the Law School.”
6. Confidence
Many students and professors identified a confidence gap as a pos-
sible source of some of the gender-based disparities they saw at the Law
School. Three female survey respondents reported concerns about their
abilities to keep up or “compete with [ ] peers at U of C” as a reason why
they had reservations about deciding to enroll at UChicago Law. One of
these students characterized this concern as the work of “imposter syn-
drome.”
When asked about the most significant gender difference at the
Law School, one professor remarked: “In a word, confidence. There are
some students who are very accomplished, but are still not confident.
Male students tend to seem more confident than female students.” An-
other professor echoed these sentiments: “In our society, women are
raised to settle for something less than they are capable of achieving;
that’s a problem that the Law School didn’t cause, but that the Law
School can do something to correct.”
Of course, the Law School experience itself can also have an impact
on confidence. A student posited one possible explanation: “[A] diversity
of experiences and perspectives [among professors] would do a lot to
make students feel like they actually deserve to be at the school. It’s
hard to feel like . . . you’ve earned your seat in the classroom when most
of your professors look the same (i.e., not like you).”
7. Extracurricular activities
a. Moot court
Over the past five years, 71% of moot court semi-finalists, 60% of
finalists, and 67% of moot court winners have been men. Unfortunately,
WAP was not able to obtain information regarding the gender composi-
tion of participants in the first round of competition for those years.
Four survey respondents wrote about frustration with the way that the
Moot Court competition is run and women’s consistent failure to ad-
vance to later rounds in meaningful numbers.
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b. Law student organizations
1L men were members of fewer student organizations than 1L
women on average, to a statistically significant degree. 1L men be-
longed to an average of 2.3 student organizations while 1L women were
members of an average of 2.8 (p=.006). Two point three percent of 1L
men who completed the survey were members of more than four student
organizations while 9.5% of 1L female survey participants were mem-
bers of more than four student organizations (p=0.090).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Class Composition
One of the most striking gender disparities the WAP study identi-
fied is the demographic makeup of the student population. Class com-
position helps determine the kinds of voices that will be heard in class-
room conversations and in the student body at large. BecauseWAP does
not have access to admissions data, we are unable to answermany ques-
tions surrounding the historical imbalance in male and female enroll-
ment at the Law School. The study does shed light, however, on some
of the possible causes of the gender imbalance in the student popula-
tion.
1. Attracting female students
Survey results suggest that women tend to have more reservations
about deciding to enroll at UChicago Law than men do. If women are
not enrolling because of the Law School’s perceived conservative politi-
cal reputation, regardless of whether the reputation is accurate, then
the Law School could be missing out on qualified female students.
The Law School’s perceived focus on Law and Economics might be
having a similar effect on women’s enrollment. Female survey respond-
ents were much more likely than men to choose the Law and Economics
focus as a cause for concern when considering enrollment, and male
UChicago students are significantly more likely to have majored in Eco-
nomics as undergraduates than female students.17
Our study suggests that another reason for the gender imbalance
in the student population is the significant gender disparity in who
transfers into UChicago Law between the 1L and 2L years, as transfer
17 This characteristic of the Law School’s student body reflects the broader trend of more men
than women majoring in Economics as undergraduate students. See generally Elizabeth P. Jensen
& Ann L. Owen, Pedagogy, Gender, and Interest in Economics, 32 J. ECON. EDUC. 323 (2001).
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classes appear to be heavily male. The pronounced transfer phenome-
non is surprising and warrants further exploration. It is a major accom-
plishment for the Law School to have matriculated its first gender bal-
anced 1L class, the Class of 2020. However, efforts to achieve equal
representation will be incomplete if transfer classes introduce gender
imbalances for the remainder of students’ law school careers.
B. Achievement Gaps
1. Journals
As is clear from the Academic Achievement and Outcomes section
above, there is a significant gender disparity in who attains member-
ship or a board position on the Law Review.18 This is the case notwith-
standing the fact that women and men are approximately equally likely
to serve on CJIL, and women are significantly more likely than men to
serve on Legal Forum. All three journals use the same writing competi-
tion, traditionally held immediately after the 1L year, to select their
staffers.
The most obvious reason why Law Review may have the highest
ratio of men to women among the journals is that there may be a gender
disparity in grades, since traditionally, two-thirds of staffer positions
(approximately twenty-seven of forty) on the Law Review were filled by
“grading on” (a process in which the journal accepts the people with the
highest grades who completed the writing competition provided their
writing competition submissions fulfilled a minimum standard). The
Law Review’s selection processes changed in 2018, but the impact of
those changes has not yet been studied. The remaining one-third of the
positions have traditionally been based solely on an evaluation of the
candidates’ writing competition submissions. CJIL and Legal Forum,
in contrast, do not take grades into account when selecting staff mem-
bers. Although WAP did not have access to 1L grades, the marginally
significant difference in all honors awarded to women versus men from
2014 to 2017 suggests that women may on average receive slightly
lower grades than men across their law school careers.
There also appears to be a gender skew in who completes the writ-
ing competition in the first place. Significantly more 2L and 3L male
survey respondents reported completing the competition than female
18 Lynne N. Kolodinsky, The Law Review Divide: A Study of Gender Diversity on the Top
Twenty Law Reviews, CORNELL LAW LIBRARY PRIZE FOR EXEMPLARY STUDENT PAPERS, 24 (2014),
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=cllsrp [https://perm
a.cc/MDC5-36GW]. Kolodinsky’s article includes several hypotheses for why women are un-
derrepresented on many flagship law journals. Another interesting source identified a gender dis-
parity in law journals’ publication of student notes. Jennifer C. Mullins & Nancy Leong, The Per-
sistent Disparity in Student Note Publication, 23 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 385, 399 (2011).
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survey respondents did. Different rates of writing competition comple-
tion do not explain, however, the different degrees of gender disparity
among the three journals, so different rates of completion of the writing
competition cannot explain the Law Review’s gender skew entirely.
When it comes to serving on the journals’ boards as 3Ls, men and
women’s behavior is substantially similar, suggesting that any differ-
ence in women’s representation on the journals’ boards is likely due to
their different representation in the staffer classes in the first place.
2. Clerkships
Women’s rates of earning clerkships have improved somewhat over
the past ten years. Overall, however, men are still more likely than
women to clerk at the appellate level, and women are slightly more
likely than would be expected to clerk at the district court level.19
The disparity in the ratios of men and women who attained federal
appellate clerkships between 2014 and 2017 may be in part the product
of a gender skew in grades.
The disparity may also reflect differences in the rates at which
male and female students apply for clerkships. Women were signifi-
cantly less likely to report an interest in clerking in the student survey.
Women may also be particularly sensitive to discouragement given
their historical underrepresentation in the legal field, at the Law
School, on the faculty, and as clerkship and honors recipients and Law
Review members, as well as their high comparative levels of concern
about the Law School coming in. Any comparative lack of confidence on
the part of women might make them even less likely to apply than they
would be otherwise.20
The gender disparity in Law Reviewmembership may also be a fac-
tor. In explaining the gender disparities among UChicago students who
are hired as clerks, one professor noted, “the clerkship problem could be
partially a Law Review problem in that judges want students who have
had a certain type of writing experience, and they are familiar with the
experience the journals provide.”
19 Disparities in the rates at which men and women receive clerkships at the United States
Supreme Court extend beyond UChicago. For an interesting examination of the gender disparity
in Supreme Court clerkships overall, see Cynthia L. Cooper, Women Supreme Court Clerks Striving
for “Commonplace,” 17 PERSPECTIVES 1, 18 (2008). WAP was not able to compare UChicago’s clerk-
ship gender disparities with those of other schools. The 2012 Yale report included statistics indi-
cating that men were more likely than women to clerk at appellate courts. Yale LawWomen, supra
note 4, at 49. WAP was not able to directly compare the Yale numbers with the results for UChi-
cago students because the years included in each sample were quite different.
20 High achieving women often exhibit the imposter phenomenon or syndrome, lacking confi-
dence despite their successes and doubting their abilities and the legitimacy of their accomplish-
ments. See generally Anna Parkman, The Imposter Syndrome in Higher Education: Incidence and
Impact, 16 J. HIGHER EDUC. THEORY& PRAC. 51 (2016).
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3. Grading and the achievement gaps
Many of the classic markers of academic achievement at the Law
School, including Law Review membership, clerkships, other prestig-
ious jobs, and academic honors, are determined, in whole or in part, by
the same thing: grades. It is impossible for WAP to know definitively
whether 1L grades vary based on gender because of the administra-
tion’s denial of WAP’s data requests. However, the significant gender-
based disparity in honors awarded at graduation (described above) sug-
gests that women tend to receive lower grades thanmen at least to some
degree.21
All required 1L courses are blind graded, as are upper-level exam
classes. Upper-level seminar grades are frequently based on reaction
papers and research papers, which are not blind graded. Although blind
grading may help avoid the effects of certain kinds of gender or other
biases, it is not possible to know how that works in practice. There are
several hypotheses that might explain the gender disparities in aca-
demic achievement:
a. Are female students not as strong academically upon arri-
val at the Law School?
One possibility is that women who enroll are less academically
qualified than their male classmates.22 WAP’s lack of access to admis-
sions data meant that we had no way to interrogate this hypothesis. If
it is the case that female matriculants at the Law School are not as
strong academically, it is unclear why the Law School is not able to at-
tract better-qualified female candidates. It is possible, however, that
the Law School is less attractive to women than it is to equally well-
qualified men for the various reasons discussed earlier.
21 For an exploration of gender-based grade disparities at Harvard Law School, see generally
Coleman, supra note 3.
22 The most recent report in the LSAT Technical Report Series, published by the Law School
Admissions Council, found that men scored slightly higher than women on the LSAT. See Susan
P. Dalessandro, Lisa C. Anthony & Lynda M. Reese, LSAT Performance with Regional, Gender,
and Racial/Ethnic Breakdowns: 2007–2008 through 2013–2014 Testing Years, LAWSCHOOLADMI-
SSION COUNCIL (2014), https://www.lsac.org/data-research/research/lsat-performance-regional-
-gender-and-racialethnic-breakdowns-2007-2008 [https://perma.cc/B2P4-FTAH].
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b. Does the law school environment disproportionately nega-
tively impact female students’ morale or well-being in a
way that results in poorer academic performance?
It could be that male and female students come to the Law School
equally qualified and prepared to succeed, but that the Law School en-
vironment takes a heavier toll on women that detracts from their ability
to achieve. This hypothesis is supported by the findings that women
generally report positive feelings about interactions with their fellow
students and classroom experiences and their decisions to enroll at the
Law School at lower rates than men.
c. Do women have a distinctive writing style that professors
disfavor, either consciously or subconsciously?
It is also possible that men and women write differently from one
another, and that a stereotypically masculine writing style is favored
by law professors grading exams. Some professors suggested that if this
were the problem, one solution might be to vary the types of evaluations
used in the academic setting. One professor stated: “If women are per-
forming worse in exams . . . if we don’t as a school feel that that is rep-
resentative [of] their mastery of their material, the biggest thing we
could do would be to change how we evaluate people, rather than just
saying men are better at law. I don’t accept that premise.”
It is likely that several of these phenomena are working together
to cause or exacerbate gender-based achievement disparities. No mat-
ter the precise mechanism that produces achievement disparities, their
existence is disturbing.
C. Classroom Dynamics
Overall, as described above, women and men participate in class at
almost even rates (and rates that were more equal than those reported
at Yale in 2012).23 However, men participate voluntarily significantly
more frequently than women do.
1. Cold calling as an equalizer
Cold calling largely drives the almost equal rates of overall partic-
ipation between men and women, considering the fact that men were
significantly more likely to participate voluntarily than women were.
Given that UChicago Law professors tend to rely heavily on cold calling
in their teaching, it may not be surprising that participation overall is
23 Yale Law Women, supra note 4, at 3.
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more gender-balanced at UChicago than at other schools (which some
professors reported use cold calling less frequently). This indicates that
most professors are likely doing a good job of cold calling men and
women equally, and suggests that some form of cold calling is a good
idea for many or most classes.
2. Explaining the voluntary participation gap
It is impossible to know all of the root causes behind men’s higher
rates of voluntary participation in their classes. For example, men were
more likely than women to report enjoying participating in class. It is
difficult to know whether that is a cause of the voluntary participation
gap, or an effect of it, but either or both are possible. Students posited
some additional explanations, and there may also be valuable lessons
to learn from the types of classes where gender disparities appear to be
less pronounced.
First, voluntary participation rates of female students were higher
in 1L classes than in upper-level classes. There are several reasons why
that might be the case. For example, the Class of 2020, the 1L class at
the time of the project, was the first class at the Law School to be 50%
women. Women in that class might have felt more comfortable speaking
up as a result of the better-balanced gender dynamics. Or, given
women’s comparatively lower satisfaction with classroom dynamics, it
could be that women are discouraged over time. Multiple effects might
work together to help 1L women feel more comfortable speaking up in
class, both voluntarily and when answering cold calls.
Second, voluntary participation in seminars is roughly equal across
genders. Again, there are a few reasons why this might be the case,
including that seminars are less formal and potentially less intimidat-
ing, and the possibility that men are more likely to have the confidence
necessary to speak in large groups. Of course, women could also be more
interested in the topics taught in smaller, upper-level seminars.24
D. Female Faculty
WAP’s data make clear that students value having female profes-
sors teach the 1L curriculum and that many believe that having a di-
versity of professors is important to their learning experience. The lack
24 See generally Daniel E. Ho & Mark G. Kelman, Does Class Size Affect the Gender Gap: A
Natural Experiment in Law, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (2014). From 2001–2011, Stanford Law School
randomly assigned first-year students to large and small sections of their courses. From 2008–
2011 it also implemented changes in grading protocols. The changes resulted in even academic
outcomes for women and men.
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of female faculty is likely a factor behind the differences in male and
female students’ experience at the Law School.
The lack of diversity among the faculty also results in female pro-
fessors shouldering a larger burden in terms of teaching and mentor-
ship.25Because of the importance the administration places on having
a diverse set of faculty teach 1Ls, women professors may simply have
to do more (a result the administration acknowledges and states it is
trying to avoid).
The importance the Law School places on teaching evaluations may
also make it difficult to permanently hire qualified female professors. If
gender biases impact student evaluations,26 equally effective female vis-
iting professors might unfairly receive lower ratings than men.
1. Mentorship
The data collected suggests that women develop slightly more men-
toring relationships than men (this result is significant at the .10 level).
This may be a consequence of high rates of female participation in clin-
ics. It is also possible that the fact that women are more likely to serve
as research assistants accounts for their higher number of mentors, on
average, since many professors and students reported developing a
mentoring relationship that way.
It is unclear why women would have slightly higher rates of faculty
mentorship than men and work as research assistants at significantly
higher rates without correspondingly higher rates of comfort asking for
letters of recommendation, higher rates of receiving letters of recom-
mendation, or in turn, receiving as many clerkships as men.
E. Student Life and Satisfaction
1. Women’s satisfaction overall
While men and women both report high levels of satisfaction with
various aspects of their life at the Law School, it is important to note
that women consistently report satisfaction at rates lower than men do.
25 Some research suggests that female professors are consistently asked for more support and
favors from students than male professors are. See Amani El-Alayli, Ashley A. Hansen-Brown &
Michelle Ceynar, Dancing Backwards in High Heels: Female Professors Experience More Work De-
mands and Special Favor Requests, Particularly from Academically Entitled Students, 79 SEX
ROLES 136, 137–38 (2018).
26 See generally Kristina M. W. Mitchell & Jonathan Martin, Gender Bias in Student Evalua-
tion, 51 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 648 (2018) (suggesting female professors are rated by students on




There are many possible reasons for this lack of satisfaction.
Women reported negative gendered interactions with their fellow stu-
dents, the constant nagging of imposter syndrome, and the frustration
of being taught by professors with whom they do not identify. Addition-
ally, if women are less likely than men across the board to earn the
classic markers of law school academic success—good grades, Law Re-
view membership, appellate clerkships, graduation honors, and moot
court prizes—it may not be surprising that they feel less satisfied with
their experiences than men.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall, WAP’s findings show significant disparities between men’s
and women’s experiences at the Law School along various axes, despite
the real strides that women—and the Law School—have made over the
past ten years. In conclusion, WAP offers recommendations for future
research, as well as for improving student experiences at the Law
School.
WAP’s recommendations are targeted to three different audiences:
the administration, faculty, and students. WAP recommends that the
administration improve its collection, maintenance, and analysis of
data. The administration should organize and analyze pre-existing data
such as historical grade data and also gather new data by administering
27 Note that the differences in positive interactions with faculty outside of class are not statis-
tically significant.
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targeted follow-up surveys to the student body. WAP hopes that the ad-
ministration will experiment with different class organization and as-
sessment techniques in order to determine if certain class sizes or as-
sessment types augment or decrease gender disparities in grades. WAP
believes that the Law School should continue to seek to admit gender-
balanced classes and should strive for more gender-balanced transfer
classes.
WAP recommends that students think about the ways that gender
impacts their classroom participation. All students should ask them-
selves whether their participation is motivated by a genuine question,
desire to have the professor clarify something, or ability to make a pre-
viously unstated contribution to the discussion. If it is, they should par-
ticipate enthusiastically. If a student is merely repeating a point some-
one else has already made or bringing up a subject that is only
tangentially related to the material, the student might consider raising
it one-on-one with the professor after class or during office hours.
Students—especially women—should also consider speaking more
in class and continue actively seeking mentoring relationships. Both
professors and students repeatedly asserted that one possible cause of
the gender achievement disparities is a lack of confidence on the part of
female students at the Law School. Though this common observation is
apt, WAP warns that differences in confidence levels are not necessarily
innate or predetermined: the findings of the study as a whole suggest
that any gendered confidence gap should be understood to be at least in
part a symptom of other gender-based disparities and dynamics occur-
ring at the Law School.
Professors should set fixed office hours and publicize them. They
should also make clear to students that office hours are not only for
discussing class material, but that they are also happy to discuss stu-
dents’ careers and other interests. WAP recommends that all faculty
members affirmatively encourage students who make valuable contri-
butions in class, do exceptionally well on exams, or show promise as
future academics. In class, professors should make sure they often call
on women first in a given class session, and consider cold-calling more
if they can do it in a way that is gender-balanced.
WAP’s findings illustrate that while women have made strides at
UChicago Law School, they continue to experience law school differ-
ently from men in some important ways. The authors hope that this
report will continue to inspire conversations between faculty, adminis-
trators, and students about new paths forward for women at the Law
School.
